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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of the present study was to investigate word meaning and 
its development in primary school children (6-12 years) . It was 
argued that the learning and development of the meanings of words such 
as pain cannot be primarily expl ained by mealls of ostensive 
definition. Furthermore , exi sting theories of word meaning which deal 
predominantly wit h substantive words. fail to account for the learning 
of non-ostensive words. 
The pertinent psychological, linguistic and developmental 
psycholinguistic approaches to word meaning are reviewed briefly. The 
prototype approaches to word meaning are mod ified to app l y to 
non-o stensive words . The focus is on conceptual mean ing, that is, the 
way in which the senses of a word alter in different contexts. It is 
argued that the meaning of t he word is its use in a diversity of 
l inguistic contexts. The term "grammar" is applied in a unique way 
to encompass the meaning of the word (11hich stems in part from the 
words with which it co-occurs) as well as its selective use with other 
words in the language. 
Ninety -five metalinguistically-phrdsed tasks CmprlSlng short questions 
and pictu)'e-story sequenes Ivere analyzed in depth. The tasks were 
admini stered individually. A flexible interview afforded additional 
probing fo)' each question . The analysis comprised percentage scores 
of responses at different age l,'vels together with verbatim 
transcripts and qualitative descriptiollS: 
Uni formity, var iation and developmental trends were found on different 
tasks for any parti cular word. Developmental t)'ends were noted in 
children's understanding of particular words (for example, same) , 
thereby extendi ng the fi ndi ngs of previ ous researchers. There was 
evidence for a progre ssion in children's ability to take into 
consideration that a word alters its sense according to the linguistic 
context in which it oc curs (for example, same as it relates to chair 
versus dress versus pain). A comprehensive account of the word 's 
meaning could be established when a diversity of tasks was applied for 
each word. Chi ldren of different age levels employed different 
strategies in answering the questions posed. 
A model is proposed to describe the development of the meaning of 
non -ostensive words during the primary school years. It is suggested 
that psycholinguistic studies on word meaning be re-eva luated and that 
language and reading programmes inco)'porate the notion of "grammar". 
Application of this approach to the study of substantive word mean ing 
in preschool children has important impl ications for theories of word 
meaning and for therapeutic interventiun. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
"What is a sentence?" 
"A sentence is something that you 
copy from the board and that you 
have to get right" (6 year old) 
"What do you do when you have a pain?" 
"Put a plaster on" (6 year old) 
The meanings that children assign to words often remain hidden from 
adults. Somehow, beyond the preschool period, we imagine children as 
'little adults' in their language abilities because they display few 
errors in their spontaneous productions. Preschool children's 
spontaneous utterances, on the other hand, are endl ess sources of 
enchantment for receptive adults. It is only when we ask older 
children questions of the type above that we give them free rein to 
express their ideas, which are often so totally un~xpected in terms of 
our own adult view of the world. Older children differ from younger 
children both in the extent of their knQwledge of word meaning and in 
how much they are able to reveal of it. 
The first quote above reveals a 6 year old's understanding of a term 
in metalanguage, namely 'a sentence'. His explanation of this term 
differs in comparison to explanations provided by adults and older 
children. The latter offer explanations such as "A sentence i s a 
string of words put together to convey meaning". The second quote 
above highlights the restricted understanding of the word pain by 
another child as well as the emphasis on the observable, tangible 
aspects of its meaning. Her answer displays misunderstanding but is 
sensible in terms of the question posed. It is part of our 
experiential knowledge that we may put a plaster on in certain cases 
in which we experience pain. This answer is therefore possible 
(Lanham, 1985) though it is not usual. This child may also have been 
trying to attach meaning to what appeared to her as a bizarre question 
(Hughes and Grieve, 1980). However, it is of importance that older 
children, on the other hand, would argue that you "go to the doctor". 
Leech (1981) discusses the phenomenon of factual plausibility, that 
is, that we try to assign a meaning to utterances even if we have to 
set aside semantic rules and draw on the metaphoric use of language. 
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The person who utters the question has a 
then attempts to find a meaning for it. 
meaning for it. The listener 
In the present study, factual 
plausibility may influence the children's responses. For example , 
'Can you give someone a pain? ' may lead the child to conclude, "Well, 
I can kick someone and, in that sense, yes, I can give someone a 
pain". However, if there are commonalities between children of 
different ages, then ·it would suggest that children of different ages 
go about making sense of what may appear to them as bizarre questions 
in the same way as do their peers . This would then enlighten us as to 
their understanding of the word s in the tasks. The present researcher 
is interested in determining which aspects of the meanings of specific 
words are violated by children of different age levels. Particularly, 
whether he fails to take account of certain aspects of the meaning of 
the word as it relates to the other word because it is argued that the 
meaning of the word is, in large part , determined by the linguistic 
context in which it stands. 
Vocabulary tests which have been commonly applied in the fields of 
psychology and speech-language pathology (for example, the Peabody 
Picture Vocabulary Test, Dunn, 1965; the Clinical Evaluation of 
Language Functions, Wiig and Semel, 1980) take little account of 
developmental differences in children's understanding of words. I 
was led to question our use of the term 'vocabulary ', Ivhether we 
should regard it as a dynamic rather than a static term. To date it 
has been considered an an -or-none entity, either incorporated within 
the child' s repertoire or not, 
Language · therapy has been influenced by the sa'me underlying, 
premisses. We teach the word in a single context and assume that the 
child will do the rest. However, we have failed to ass ist the child 
in generalizing the word to a di versity of linguistic contexts. 
Recent work by Prutting (1979, 1983) emphasized the need to teach the 
child the semantic roles of a word (such as agent, instrument, 
location) in different language f unctions, and vice versa. According 
to Halliday (1975) and to Greenfield and Smith (1976) , language may 
perform a number of functions: instrumental (to satisfy the child's 
needs in terms of goods or serv i ce s ), in t er actional (to establ ish and 
maintain contact with those of importance to the child) , heuri stic (to 
ask about the environment), performati ve (occuring as part of a 
- 2 -
child's actions), vol itional (to obtain a desired response). 
However, researchers have not emphasized how one word influences 
another to affect meaning. Since applied research stems from 
linguistic and psycholinguistic theories, I was stimulated to question 
the assumptions on which these theories are built. 
I was inspired by the later work of Wittgenstein (1953) insofar as his 
criticisms of certain philosophical theories led me to question some 
basic assumptions of psycholinguistic theories. It must be 
emphasized, however, that this study does not attempt an 
interpretation of his work nor does it attempt to va.l idate or refute 
his position. Wittgenstein's work has been interpreted in many ways, 
but; most important, he di d not expound a theory of word mean i ng; he 
did not attempt to apply his ideas to the development of word meaning 
in children; and philosophical approaches have validity independent of 
empirical investigation. I have drawn on certain of Wittgenstein's 
terms which encompass my ideas most clearly, (for'example, "grammar") 
but I apply them differently from his original use and within a 
developmental psycholinguistic framework. 
The term "grammar" encompa sses the aHerations in sense that a word 
undergoes in different linguistic contexts as well as the meaning it 
derives, in part, from the meaning s of the words with which it 
co-occurs in everyday language. Kooij (1971, p.1l8) explain s that: 
"The verb hate will be understood differently in 
the sentences I hate~, I hate Kathy, and I hate 
lies, but we may wonder whether this entails hate 
having different senses or whether these different 
interpretations are only contextual specializations 
of one and the same sense ... The word big can mean 
'momentous', 'i mportant', and here the relation 
between the senses is much less gradual, though 
still not nonexistent " . 
In the present study, hate is 
applied in these contexts, 
meaning of the word. 
regarded as having different senses when 
all these senses contributing to the 
I found that 1 inguistic and psychol inguistic theories are generally 
built upon one of the fo l lowing as sumptions: 
i) They assume that a word has a co re meaning which can be 
establ ished outside of any context and tha t its co-occurrence with 
- 3 
other words is a function of its establ ished core meaning and its 
syntactical constraints. I propose that part of the word's meaning 
arises out of the meanings of the other words with which it commonly 
co-occurs. 
ii) These theories propose that a word is simply a 
a preformed concept (for example, Nelson, 1973). 
that the context does not add to our understandi ng 
1 abel attached to 
Thi s may suggest 
of the word: the 
concept, once learned, is in the child's repertoire and the word 
provides only a means for verbalizing the concept. It could also 
suggest that the concept is dependent on context but once learned, the 
name is simply a label used to express that concept. The present 
notion of "grammar" suggests that a word is more than simply a label 
that attaches to a previously-acquired concept but that the word adds 
to our understanding of the concept. 
iii) Many linguistic and psycholinguistic theories suggest that words 
are learned primarily by means of ostensive definition which fails to 
account for the altered senses of the' word in dHferent contexts; 
(The term 'sense' as used in th i s thes is i ncorpora tes facets of the 
meaning of the word that arise from its co-occurrence relations). They 
suggest that it is by means of ostensive definition that children 
1 earn words such as pa; n. 
manifestations of the pain 
We can point to the pain behaviour or to 
but not to the pain itself and ostensive 
definition must necessarily have only limited explanatory value (words 
such as pain are referred to as 'non-ostensive' words in this study) 
I was led to realize that these assumptions are challengeable. 
Previous researchers (for example, Katz and Fodor, 1963; Katz, 1972) 
addressed questions such as polysemia (multiple meanings). However, 
they fa il ed to exp 1 a inadequate 1 y the way in wh i ch a word alters its 
sense according to the other words with which it commonly co-occurs. 
These theorists draw on a syntactic basis together with feature 
analysis and they make no reference to any aspect of meaning stemming 
from its different senses in co-occurrence relations. Collocational 
meanings take account of the words, with which a particul ar word can 
co-occur but these focus on associative meaning rather than on 
conceptional meaning (Leech, 1974). 
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As R. Clark states in her discussion of syntactic development (1982, 
p .12) : 
In the uncharted complexity of a child's 
growing ability to communicate, certai n 
anchors have apparently been taken entirely 
for granted. Indeed, their firmness has 
hardly been questioned. 
This applies equally to the study of word meaning. 
I argue that non-ostensi ve words do not have a central, core meaning 
but rather, that the senses of a word alter in accordance with the 
words and di scourses with/i n which that word occurs. A di scourse 
"might be defined as a stretch of language which can be represented on 
the deep semantic leve l as a single network. For examp 1 e, , Brutus 
killed Caesar. This was because he loved Rome ' would be characterised 
as a discourse" (Leech, 1974, pp.284-285). 
As an extension of this argument, it is suggested that any definitio n 
of a word in isolation can only encompass a part, rather than the 
whole, of its meaning. Certain senses of words overlap in particular 
contexts, that is, words have fuzzy boundaries (for example, pain and 
ache). The area of overlap of the two words is, in this case, 
conceptual and the area of 'non-overlap' is partly styl istic and 
partly conceptual (Lanham, ibid). As an example, ache tends to be 
informal in style: we talk of 'a tummy ache' but not an 'abdominal 
ache'. We can also talk of a 'sharp pain' but not of 'a sharp ache' 
which may be due to a difference in the feature relating to duration. 
Simi larl y, 'I have an excruciating pain' is acceptable but ' I have an 
excruciating ache' is not. Here, a feature relating to degree differs 
for these two words. Phrases such as the ' pa i n of part i ng' and word 
combinations such as 'heartache' seem to be collocative, that is, 
tending to co-occur. Overlap between semantically-linked words will 
necessarily vary . In the present study, the notion of fuzzy 
boundaries was drawn from prototype approaches to the study of concept 
development but was modified to accommodate the present interest in 
the meanings of non-ostensive words. 
Finally, I recognize that existing theories of word meaning account 
predominantly for substantive or ostensive word meaning rather than 
for. the learning of non-ostensive \-Iords. The majority of studies on 
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word meaning have been 
Furthermore, metalinguistic 
carried out with preschool children. 
studies which deal with older children 
have not been primarily concerned with children's reflection on word 
meaning. In particular, they have not focused on the meanings of 
non-ostensive words and they have concentrated on syntactic and 
phonemic language components . 
A few psycholinguistic researchers, (for example, Bowerman, 1978b , 
1981) have commented on children's "late errors" in the period 2-5 
years and have attempted to account for these in the development of 
language abil ities. However, I felt that there was some aspect of 
these errors not adequately explained and it was work with language 
impaired children that suggested the direction which became the basis 
for this study. The following quotes from language impaired 
preschoolers add clarification in this regard: 
"I'll strangle your hand" (3 1/ 2 year old) 
"Look! There's a piece of blood " (on my arm) 
(4 year old) 
"You know what the Rabbi gave me for my birthday?" 
"No, what did he give you? " 
"A kiss!" 
"And could you take it home with you?" 
"Yes , I did ... on my cheek " (4 year old) 
In the first quote, the child uses a word such as strangle with a word 
such as hand with which it is not usuall y ap plied in Engl·ish. This 
particular example violates conceptual meaning: 'blocking off the air 
passage' is part of the meaning of the word strangle and, for this 
reason, hand cannot occur in thi s context. Similarly, piece and blood 
stimulate our poetic sensibilities. Such a remark ~ acceptable in 
relation to the real world bu t is unu sual in everyday discourse. "You 
know what the Rabbi gave me ... ?" suggests a present of sorts, 
essentially a concrete object, and "a kiss " violates the listener' s 
expectations in thi s regard. This could have been used figuratively. 
However, young children di splay difficulty differentiating figurative 
from 1 iteral use (for exampl e , Vosniadoll, Ortony, Reynolds and Wil son , 
1984). Furthermo r e, they did not give any indication of 'playing with 
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words', for example, laughing to indicate that they intended the 
comment as a joke. 
The quotes above suggest that we cannot assume that the chi ld can 
spontaneously use words in the different co-occurrence relations as do 
adults. Furthermore, children wi th 1 anguage impairments have great 
difficulty in general, i zing the use of a word spontaneously from one 
context to another. 
I was encouraged to question whether and in what way , older children 
(6-12 years) reveal differences in understanding of a word depending 
upon the context in whi cll that word occurs. As was ment i oned above, 
older children do not display these 'errors' spo ntaneously and 
metalinguistic tasks are the only means of delving beyond their 
superficially apparent knowledge. It is difficult to ascertain why 
these errors do not surface. Primary school children may be aware of 
the formal, contextual co-occurrence constraints· and their semanti c 
system may be sufficiently refined at thi s stage so that errors are 
not apparent, even though their semantiC' system is fIOt yet as complex 
as that of adults. The normal ch i 1 d's abi 1 ity to general i ze and 
overgeneralize words in suc h a way that errors of this type are 
minimal, i s of importance. It suggests innate abilities to apply , 
selectively, the meanings of words in a variety of contexts. 
Informal questioning about the meanings of words revealed a 
developmental lag between children's spontaneous productions and their 
metalinguistic awareness. Metalingui sti c questions of the type 'What 
is a pain? ' and 'Can you see your dreams?' highlighted these later 
difficulties and illustrated the way in which children understand the 
divers ity of use of a word in different contexts and the cons t ra i nts 
in the uses of a word wi th other words. It is the way in wh i ch these 
co-occurrence patterns throw light on the meaning of the word, and the 
development thereof, which are of major interest in this study. 
1.2 Aims of the study 
The broad aims of the present study are: 
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1.2.1 To devise a method for investigating primary school children's 
understanding of non-ostensive words at different age levels. 
1.2.2 To explore the developmental progression in the meaning that 
children of different ages assign to certain non-ostensive words when 
applied in different contexts. 
More specifically, th-e aims can be summarized in terms of answers to 
the following questions: 
1.2.1.(a) Is it appropriate to examine school chil dren' s 
understanding of non-ostensive words at different ages using 
metalinguistic questions 
requiring justifications? 
and similarities in the 
between age groups? 
together with extended 'probe' questions 
Does this method highl ight the differences 
performance of children both within and 
1.2.2(a) What qual itat i ve differences exi st between age groups in 
the use and understanding of words in particular linguistic contexts? 
Specifically, in what contexts are the words first' appl ied and what 
aspects of the word's meanings are focused upon by children of 
different ages. 
1.2.2(b) What is the eff,:ct of linguistic context on the 
use of particular words by children of different understanding and 
ages? 
1.2.2(c) What problem-solving strategies are employed by children 
as revealed in their explanations to the metalinguistic questions 
posed? These strategies will be examined according to their 
interrelationship with the child's understanding and use of words. 
1.2.2(d) To what extent can definitions provided by subjects of 
different age groups be reI i ed on to encompas s the mean i ngs of the 
words? 
1.2.2(e) Do words in combination retain the meanings which subjects 
have assigned when these same words are used in isolation? 
1.2.2(f) Does an awareness of fuzzy boundaries of semantically-
linked words follow a developmental progression? 'Awareness' is here 
inferred by the experimenter on the basis of the child's answers. 
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On the basis of the above findings, the final specific aim was to 
construct a model to explain the development of the meanings of 
non-ostensive words during the primary school period. 
1.3 Clarification of Main Terms 
If the world itself is elusive and ambiguous 
(and it seems increasingly to be so), then 
definitions should correspond; nothing wou ld 
be more misleading than to present clear and 
distinct definitions in unequivocal terms 
(Bremer, 1975, p.7l9). 
Definitions run contrary to the present researcher's approach to word 
meaning. As Lyon s (1981, pp.73-74) states 
... most everyday words are necessari 1y 
somewhat indeterminate in meaning, and, 
therefore, for theoretically interesting 
reasons, i ndefi nab 1 e. 
However, it is recognized that "a definition ts useful if it 
del ineates an area of study" (Bo1 ton, 1977). In providing the reader 
with a framework for understanding this research, these definitions do 
serve a useful purpose. 
The definition of particular terms reflects the re searcher's position 
concerning the development and structure of the processes which these 
terms serve to describe. Lyons (1977, p.XI) pOints out that: 
... frequent1y ... t he same terms are 
employed in quite different senses 
by different authors or (that) there 
are several alternatives for what is 
essentially the same phenomenon. 
In addition, many of the main terms in this study have severa l 
specific meanings which are in confl ict with their common everyday 
meanings. 
For the above reasons, definitions of major terms in the present study 
are included within an account of the view of word meaning adhered to 
by the present researcher. In relation to a part ic ular theorist and 
when reviewing the 1 iterature, terms preferred by individual theorists 
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are used. (Less important terms are omitted here but are discussed in 
Chapter 2). 
The term "grammar" (enclosed in inverted commas) is drawn from the 
work of Wittgenstein (1953) but used differently from the original 
concept ion. The present researcher app lies th i s term to word mean i ng 
to descri be the pI ace that the word hold s within the I anguage system 
over a diversity of linguistic contexts: A word is limited in its 
co-occurrence with other words in the language and the se nse of the 
word alter s as it occurs with other words and in different discourses 
(Detailed in Chapter 2, Section 2.1.1). The term "grammar" has this 
important difference from the more familiar use of 'grammar' or 
'syntax ' which comprises deep and surface structures of Chomskian 
linguistics. 
Meaning: The meaning of a word is its use ("grammar") in a diversity 
of contexts. Meaning is viewed here as conceptual; conceptual meaning 
being the most important element in communication (Leech, ibi d). It 
includes the different senses of the word (pirticularly, non-
ostensive words), the sense shifting \'iith the linguistic context in 
which the word occurs. Co-occurrence constraint s (such as 
selectional, stylistic and collocational constraints) restrict the use 
of the word to particular contexts outside of which the word's meaning 
is vi 0 1 ated. Through conceptual mean i ng, a word mayor may not be 
linked propos itionally with others. 
Language is 
identifiable 
a conventional system of communication compnslng 
elements and ru.les for comb ining them (Alston, 1964). 
Language is exemplified in the verbal behaviour of a particular 
community (Furth, 1975). It in cludes syntax, seman tics , pragmatics, 
phonology and morphology. 
Commun i cat ion incorporates verba I I anguage as we 11 as preverbal and 
nonverbal utterances, namely, voca lizations, gestures and formal sign 
language. It also takes account of context. 
Psyc holinguistics refers to t h (~ psychology of language and draws on 
the methods of experimental psychology to investigate the processes 
involved in using the l anguage system (Bates and MacWhinney, ibid). 
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Developmental Psycholinguistics refers to 
psycholinguistics which deals specifically with 
language acquisition and associated cognitive 
1978) . 
that branch of 
the nature of earl y 
skills (Macdonald, 
Cognition is used in accordance with Neisser (1967) to include those 
processes which are associated with sensory input and the organization 
of information, namely, sensation, perception, imagery, memory, 
problem-solving and thinking. 
Perception is the process by which firsthand information is obtained 
about the world. It is tied to immediate reality and does not include 
judgement (Piaget, 1969) . 
Semantics or "linguistic semantics" refers to "the study of meaning in 
language" (Lyons, 1981, p.16) . Semantics focuses on the linguistic 
system rather than on langu age use. 
Pragmat i cs refers to the pri nc i pled ways of ext ract i ng mean i ng from 
context (Lanham, 1985). 
Metalinguistic Awareness is used in its broad sense and refers to the 
ability to "reflect upon and manipulate the structural features of 
spoken 1 anguage, treat i ng 1 anguage i t se If as an object of thought ... " 
(Tunmer and Bowey, 1984, p.148). 
Context is applied to the family of all situations in which a 
particular word could have meaning. It includes both the 
intralinguistic context and the extralinguistic context. 
Non-ostensive appl ies to those words which are learned primarily by 
means other than painting or drawing the child's attention directly to 
one of the denotata (Lyons, 1977 appl ied the converse to ostensive 
definition) . 
"Language games" are the different discourse types in which a word may 
be used, for example, giving orders, tell ing jokes, thanking, cursing, 
greeting, praying, making up a story , forming and testing a hypothesis 
(inspired by Wittgenstein , 1953 , pt.23 but used differently from his 
original use). The term "language games" goes beyond that of 
'pe,rl ocutionary acts'. The latter are concerned with effects of 
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communication on the 1 i stener, "1 anguage games" is appl ied to the 
development of word meaning (Detailed in chapter 2, section 2.3.1c). 
Fuzziness is interpreted as overlap in the senses of semantically-
linked words, such as pain and ache. We can separate them out 
conceptually but in reference to the external world, they may be 
confused (Lanham, ibid) and they may be styl istically different. The 
difficulty in specifying boundaries in the meanings of these words 
results in their having fuzzy boundaries. 'Fuzziness' and 'fuzzy 
boundaries' are appl ied differently from their uses by the prototype 
theorists (for example, Rosch 1973a) who were concerned with 
perceptual differences between members of superordinate, basic and 
subordinate categories, for example, does a whale belong to the 
category , FISH'? ' Fuzzi ness' is preferred to the terms ' vagueness' 
and ' indeterminacy of sense' with which it has often been used 
interchangeably. 
Ambiquity is Llsed in accordance with Kooij (1971) in its broad sense 
and refers to that property of sentences which er.abl es them to be 
interpreted in more than one way because insufficient clues are 
available for the intended or the optimal interpretation. Most 
sentences will be "disambiguat(~d" (Palermo, 1983) by the context in 
which communication occurs. This differs from the more narrow use of 
the term ' ambi gu i ty' to refer to the way in wh i ch more than one 
lexical or grammatical structure is assigned to the same sentence 
(Gleason, 1965). In the present study , ambiguity may result from the 
"grammar" of words in conjunction with a lack of specificity of 
context. 
Sense is applied in accordance with its use in traditional linguistics 
and in dictionary listings, for example , same may be used in an 
equivalence sense comparing two objects or in an identity sense which 
focuses on the one object over ti me; and feel in ' I feel the pain' has 
a different sense from feel in 'I feel the dog.' The present use of 
'sense' distinguishes, for example, feel in feel pain from feel in 
feel awkward. (See chapter 2, section 2.1.5f). 
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Sophisticated Confusion l a term coined by the present researcher to 
refer to apparent confusion that occurs naturally as part of the 
developmental process. 
The "grammar" of words highl ights the 1 imitations that definitions 
impose and the importance of viewing these explanations only as a 
springboard from whfch to approach this study . The nuances and 
variations in the use of these terms will be elucidated through the 
course of the text. 
1.4 , Plan of the Study 
I commence Chapter Two with a discus s i on of my own approach to word 
meaning. I then review the relevant linguistic and psycholinguistic 
approaches to word meaning, concentrating on those aspects of previous 
approaches most pertinent to the present orientation. Development 
beyond the period of initial language acquisition is then discussed. 
This chapter includes a brief review of the follow~ng : The role of 
experience and particularly, learning by means of ostensive 
definition, innateness and developmental stages: Research on 
metalinguistic awareness and definitions (a type of metalinguistic 
task) is detailed and contrasted with the present use of 
metalinguistic tasks to assess \Yord meaning. This chapter is 
concluded by integrating the present orientation with the method 
adopted in this study. 
Chapter Three outl ines the experimental design and procedure adopted 
as well as problems encountered and ways in which these were overcome. 
Chapter Four comprises the experimental 
for the words same, pretend and 
semantically-linked words. 
findings on ninety-five tasks 
pain together with their 
In Chapter Five, the overall findings and theoretical impl ications are 
discussed and related to previous research on the development of word 
meaning as \;ell as to issues considered during the course of this 
study. 
1 Note Thanks to D. Franklin for suggesting this term. 
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Chapter Six concludes this study with a brief consideration of 
educat i ona 1 and 
findings followed 
clinical implications derived from 
by suggestions for future research. 
the important 
It will be noted that chapter 2 (the background chapter) is lengthy in 
comparison to the di'sc ussion (chapter 5). In chapter 2, the present 
approach, because it covers new ground, is deta i 1 ed in contrast to 
previous theories of word meaning. In the discussion, the main ideas 
have therefore, al ready been presented and only the impl ications of 
the findings are necessary to detail and to relate to previous 
research. 
1.5 Conventions 
i) Where a word is referred to, it appears in bold type, for 
example , the word pain. A concept or category is indicated by means 
of capital letters enclosed in d s ingle inverted 'comma, for example, 
the concept 'PAIN'. The latter applies mainly in the INTRODUCTION. 
ii) Where a term is referred to, it is enclosed in a single inverted 
comma, for example, the term 'lI1etalill~uistic' . 
iii) Where an error occurs in a chil d's utterance it is marked by an 
asterisk, and it is noted whether it is an error of "grammar" or of 
syntax. 
iv) The question s asked in the tasks are enclosed in a single 
inverted comma when referred to in the text. 
v) He i s used as an unmarked term to refer to an unspecified child, 
male or female. 
- 14 -
CHAPTER 2: WORD MEANING AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter comprises four major sections. In the first section 
(2.1), the present approach to word meaning, namely, that of the 
"grammar" of words, is explained and then discussed in light of the 
constituents of word· meaning. In section 2.2, the present view is 
contrasted to traditional linguistic and psycholinguistic approaches 
to word meaning, specifically, the feature theories and the prototype 
approaches. The third section (2.3) is concerned with the development 
of word meaning. The fourth and final section (2.4) in tegrates the 
present approach with the method adopted to invest igate the 
development of word meaning in primary school children. 
Wittgenstein (1953) pointed out that: 
... the question 'What i s meaning?' tends to 
attract answers which are either so general 
as to be almost vacuous or so narrow in their 
definition of ' meaning' as·to leave oub of 
account most of what ordinary users of a 
language think is relevant when one puts to 
them more specific questions about the meaning 
of this or that expression in their language 
(Lyons, 1981, p.32) 
Lyons (1977) follows the view that there are a range of mea nings for 
the word meaning: there are s.imilarities and differences between the 
different uses of the word in different contexts. He states (p.3) 
that 
... the meanings (or senses) of 'to mean'and 
'meaning' exhibit a network of similarities and 
differences such that it is impossible to say 
that one of these meanings is totally unrelated 
to the others. 
Alston (1964, p.l0) offers the following uses of mean: 
i) That is no mean accomplishment 
(insignificant) 
ii) He was so mean to me (crue l) 
iii) I mean to help him if I can (intend) 
iv) The passage of this bin will mean the end of second class 
citizenship for vast areas of our popu l ation (result in) 
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v) Once more life has meaning for me (significance) 
vi) What is the meaning of this? (explanation) 
vii) He just lost his job. That means that he will have to start 
writing letters of application allover again (implies) 
lyons ' (ibid, pp.3l-J2) cites Wittgenstein's (1953)' response to the 
question "What is meaning?" as "There is no such thing" and emphasizes 
that this response must be taken seriously: 
It clearly makes sense to enquire about the 
meaning of words, sentences and utterances, just 
as it makes sense to ask what they mean. In 
doing so, we are using the English words ' meaning' 
and 'mean' in one of their everyday metalinguistic 
functions ... 
It was part of Wittgenstein's purpose to emphasize 
the diversity of communicative functipns fulfilled 
by 1 anguage . 
lyons (ibid) adopts a "broad view of meaning" and ~ssumes that there 
is an "intrinsic connection between meaning and communication" , a view 
commonly accepted by philosophers, psychologists and linguists and 
followed in this study. 
2. 1 Approach adopted in the present study 
The present approach is discussed according to the following topics: 
"grammar" and the meaning of non-ostensive words; concepts and word 
meaning; 1 inguistic concept s and word meaning; the role of perception 
in the development of linguistic concepts; and, constituents of word 
meaning. 
2. 1.1 "Grammar" and the meaning of non -ostensive words 
Ursula (3,4 years): "r have a pain in my tummy". 
Mother, "You lie down and go to sleep and your 
pain will go away " . 
Ursul a "Where wi 11 it go? " 
(G. Matthews , 1980, p. l?) 
The humour in this exchange rests upon the sense that the words go 
away adopt when used with the word pain. Mother uses go away to 
mean 'di sappear' whereas Ursu l a appl ies it to mean 'movement away from 
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a point'. Go away assumes other senses in other linguistic contexts, 
as G. Matthews (ibid, pp.17-18) elaborates: 
However, 
and 
Grandma and Ursula's dog go away by going to 
another place. Grandma goes home, the dog goes 
outdoors . Both may come back by returning from 
the place to which they have gone . .. 
"Does a · puddle of water go away by going to another 
place? Not really ... " 
A spot on Ursula's dress, say, one made by a bit 
of marmalade at breakfast, may go away when t he 
dress is washed ... Perhaps it will di sappear al together 
... the squeak in Ursula 's tricycle. It may go away 
when the wheel is oiled. It certainly doesn't go to 
another place, yet it may come back. 
Humorous examples abound in the spontaneous expressions of preschool 
children. The examples above do not demonstrate a vio lation of 
selectional, collocative or stylistic constraints (see section 2.2.2). 
Pain can co-occu r with the words go away: the features for each word 
are compatible (selectional constraints)"; collocat i vl! meani ng plays no 
part si nce these words do not necessarily tend to be used together in 
the language; and style i s maintained. However , it is clear from the 
examples cited, that go away takes on a specific sense when it occurs 
with pain in contrast to its co-occurrence with dog, puddle, spot and 
squeak . It is these alterations in senses of a word in different 
1 inguistic contexts which comprise th e notion of "grammar" as here 
proposed. 
Chi] dren' s early errors el ucidate the "grammar ': of words but these 
errors are few compared with th e numerous unacceptable forms that 
could possibly pertain. Another example, from a l anguage-impaired 
child in a clinical situation follows: 
Mark (4 years): (experiencing pins and needles 
for the first time) "It's pain, it won't come out" 
(rubbing his legs). "If you do this" (wiggles his 
toes), "i t comes out". 
One can cite endless examples similar to those above to illustrate the 
differences in sense for any word depending on the words with which it 
co-occurs . As Wittgenstein states (1953, pt.l1): 
Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a 
hammer, pl iers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, 
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a glue-pot, glue, nai ls and screws. 
functions of words are as diverse as 
functions of these objects. (And in 
there are similarities). 
- The 
the 
both cases 
This aspect of a word 's meaning has not been adequately explained in 
tradit ional 1 inguistic approaches nor has it been in vestigated in 
psychol inguistic studies to date. It is this characteristic of word 
meaning which is ter~ed "grammar" by the present researcher and which 
is the focus of the present study, 
To exemplify further, it is part of the "grammar" of the word pain 
that it takes the kinds of forms 'I have a pain in my ·toe' rather than 
in London or in my room. A second example is feel a pain where feel 
does not take on the sense of touch as in feel the puppy. 
Syntactically equivalent questions such as 'v/here do you feel pain?' 
and ' Where do you feel hot?' necess arily give rise to different types 
of answers, for example, , I feel pain in my head' and not in the 
garden or inside. The use of the term "grammar" was inspired by the 
work of Wittgenstein (1953). However,. it must b~ emphasized once 
again that it deviates from Wittgenstein's original use and that no 
attempt is being made to interpret hi s philosophy. 
We cannot take for granted that when the child learn s a word in one 
context he can naturally use it in a variety of contexts. It is 
argued that the separate meanings of two words must be altered in 
order to use the two words in c.ombination. Learning the word same and 
1 earn i ng the word pain does not impl y that one ca n then use the two 
words together as same pain. I n the sentence, , I ha ve t he same pa in 
as you', there is a reciprocal relationship between same and pain . 
Same in this context, cannot suggest that there i s one pain which i s 
shared as would be possible with apple in the equivalently-phrased 
sentence, , I have the same apple as you'. Where t he word pain is our 
focus, other words (such as same) take on particular senses and be come 
important as part of our evaluation of the meaning of pain. 
The way in which a word can be used in the language appears to involve 
a shift in emphasis fr om the word itself into the "gramma r" (that i s, 
from with i n the word to wi thout) . On the other hand, the mean i ng of 
the word is highl ighted by other words with which it occurs and 
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involves a shift in emphasis back to the word itself, that is, from 
without to within . These are necessarily very closely connected. 
"grammar!! 
r~--------~~--------~' 
~~J/ 
meaning 
The "grammar" of a word is its use in different linguistic contexts: 
it splays outwards drawing on other words in the language, for 
example, same in the contexts of same ball, same apple and same pain. 
Meaning , on the other hand, i s the 1 ink that the word has with the 
language from the point of view of the word itself. Meaning brings 
all these diverse uses to bear on the word itself although it does not 
have a central core. Empha sis here is on the word, for example, same. 
"Grammar" and meaning are therefore, complementary parts of a single 
process. The "grammar" of the word pain tells us what pain is. If we 
plot all the uses of a word in a variety of contexts we arrive at the 
meaning of that word. 
The "grammar" of a word also relates t he word to the language as a 
whole. Each word i s con stra ined by its "grammar" and can only occur 
with certain words in the lan9u age, for example, the word pain can 
only be used with words which denote animate objects. "Grammar" 
therefore, relates the word to other words in the l anguage . 
The "grammar" of words has an analogue in chameleon behaviour and may 
be r:egarded as the 'chameleon qual ity' of words. Both alter their 
'colouring' according to their surroundings. As with a chameleon, the ' 
shift in a word's .meaning becomes camou flaged by the use of that word 
across contexts. Traditional linguistics has focused on t he ch ameleon 
as unchanging, since it blends so perfectly with its su rroundings . 
What has been ignored is the subt le colour va riation that the 
chameleon undergoes to suit its surroundings. These colour changes 
are on the surface yet together, they tell us about the chameleon as a 
whole. Similarly, "grammar" re fers to the nuan ces of co lour that a 
word undergoes in different lingui st ic surroundings. The changes are 
on the surface but together, they constitute the word 's mea ning. 
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Child phonology provides another useful analogy for explaining the 
term "grammar". A child with phonological problems may produce a 
particular sound correctly in one word but incorrectly in another 
word. Assimilation of one sound to those that precede and follow 
influences this production. It is as if the sound alters its function 
according to the other sounds with which it comes into contact. 
Similarly, this process operates for the "grammar" of words but it 
concerns words rather than sounds in the linguistic environment. 
2.1.2 Concepts and word meaning 
The importance of clarifying one's ol'ln philosophical or theoretical 
position is emphasized by Kuczaj (1982a) who states that: 
... there are di fferent theoreti cal camps in the 
study of language acquisition which may lead to 
different accounts of the same data . .. (p.xii) 
... theoretical biases not only affect- integration 
of data but may also affect the data that is 
collected since different theoretical positions 
may lend themselves to varying sorts of' 
empirical tests .. . (p .xii) 
... the right qllestions must be asked before the 
right answers can be found .. . (p.xiv) (and) 
... the types of answers a part i cul ar deve 1 opmenta 1 
psycholinguist gives to these questions, depends 
on his or her assumptions about the nature of 
language and the nature of the language acquisition 
process (p.xii) 
An entire book could be devoted to the topic of concept development as 
many theorists have done (for example, Bolton , 1977). However , it is 
within the scope of the present study only to offer a resume of the 
present orientation. A few major principles and controversies within 
this area will be dealt I'lit h briefly. Bolton (ibid, p.47) defines a 
concept as 
... a stable organisation of experience which is 
brought about through the application of a rule 
of relation and to whic h is assigned a particular name 
This definition includes tllree important components , namely: 
To say that the concept is a particular organisation 
of experience suggests t hat one point of departure 
must be a cOllsideration of the development of 
concepts from their root s in the achievements of 
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perceptual organisation; to say that it is brought 
about through an act of relation implies that we 
must look also to the achievements of sensori-motor 
intelligence as preparing the way for conceptual 
development; and to say that the concept is 
characterized by there being an agreed name for 
the experience means that language plays an 
indispensable role in concept formation (Bolton, ibid). 
The term 'concept" can be applied in many ways. The present 
researcher differentiates 'linguistic concepts' from Piagetian-type 
concepts. Piaget (1926, 1929, 1951) discusses cognitive concepts to 
explain certain behaviours that the child demonstrates at different 
stages of development. 'Concept' as used in this sense, is action 
based or nonl inguistic. On the other hand, to argue that the child 
ha s the concept of 'CHAIR' asserts that he knows what a chair is. 
Part of this knowledge lies in his ability to use the word chair in 
numerous and varied situations. In this case, there is no 
prelinguistic concept of the word chair. 
It is argued that the child will develop a perceptual (rather than 
conceptual) kno~lledge of 'CHAIR' if he sits on a lounge chair, a 
kitchen chair, a diningroom chair and a stool. All of these items of 
furniture may be called 'chair' by the child. Only when he learns the 
word stool will he differentiate a 'CHAIR ' from a 'STOOL', that is, he 
has arrived at a conceptual distinction between the two. He does not 
acquire the concept of 'STOOL' prelinguistically first and then simply 
attach a name as a ' label'. The nonverbal behaviour would not enable 
him to differentiate a ' CHAIR' from a 'STOOL'. It is only with his 
use of the word(s), 'use' implying both comprehension. and expression, 
that he learns this distinction. 
For a child to learn the word chair may require that he already has 
other prel ingui stic concepts, such as Piaget's 'object constancy', in 
his repertoire. He must understand that a chair does not disappear 
when it is out of his line of vision. His concept of 'CHAIR' would 
otherwise differ markedly from adult use since it would include the 
idea that a chair ceases to exist when it is out of sight. 
The following quote from Schlesinger (1977, p.166) highlights the 
intricate relationship between language and concepts: 
A modicum of cognitive development must precede 
any learning of language, because language remains 
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meaningless unless referring to some already 
interpreted aspect of the environment. However, 
once some structuring of the environment has 
occurred and some primitive utterances can be 
understood in accordance with the structure, 
there is room for an influence of the form of 
these utterances on the child's cognitive 
development; they may di rect him towards 
further interpreting events and states referred to. 
Non-ostensive words, such as pain, are difficult to explain as having 
been acquired nonverbally first. The child learns the concept through 
the use of the word, rather than developing a prelinguistic concept to 
which he then attaches a label. What many theorists call a 
'concept' ,is rather, the use of the word in varied contexts. 
Piaget's general conclusion that cognition precedes language in early 
development, must be viewed with caution where the term ' cognition' 
deviates from Piaget's original use. The term 'cognition' does not 
refer to linguistic concepts . Rather Piaget's' use of the term 
'cognition' refers to 'natural human responses' at particular stages 
of development in I-elation to the en'lironment(s) in "'which ' humans find 
themselves . Piaget views these stages as biological but they could 
equally be acquired and still be ' natural human responses'. To say 
that 'cognition precedes language' is acceptable if we apply it to 
natural human abilities but not Ivhen \,Ie use it to refer to linguistic 
concepts . 
Many psychol inguistic researchers have argued or have accepted as a 
basis for their studies, that children acquire the concept of an 
object to which they attach a \'/ord as label. As Macdonald (1978, 
p.241) points out: 
Piagetians are someti mes 
development of cognitive 
development of language . 
intelligence was not put 
of language development 
too keen to see early 
skills as 'causing' the 
But, sensori-motor 
forward as an explanation 
Nelson (1973) argues that object words attach to already established 
prelinguistic concepts. Later, she modified her view to allow for the 
influence of objec t words on some object concepts (Nel son, Rescorla, 
Gruendel and Benedict, 1978). Clark (1973), on the other hand, 
initially emphasized the importance of object words in the formation 
of object concepts. She later elabol'ated her v iew (1977) to include 
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mechanisms for mapping words onto pre-existing concepts. Similary, 
Vygotsky (1962) describes ordinary language concepts in which the word 
follows the learning of the concept in contrast to scientific concepts 
in which the word is learned first after which the concept emerges. 
Both Clark's and Nelson's views have been described as "inter-
actionist" allowing . for numerous possible relationships between 
1 anguage and concept format i on depend i ng upon the type of 1 anguage 
input and the types of concept involved. For certain concepts, 
language input may influence the child's cognitive structuring from 
the beg i nn i ng but other concepts may be part i ally or full y formed by 
the time the child attaches a word to these concepts. Non-ostensive 
words are particularly evasive when attempting to draw on the idea of 
a word as label in explaining their development. As Bowerman states 
(1982, p.344): 
The argument is not that the child is' incapable 
of st ructuri ng and interpret i ng the worl d without 
language; it is l'ather, that the child's nonlinguistic 
way of viewing the world cannot serve Girectly as 
the semantic basis for language. 
The present approach complies with the interactionist approaches. 
However, it is suggested that non-ustensive words are particul arly 
difficult to explain in terms of the concept preceding the word in 
development. The distinction made by Vygotsky (ibid) may be suitable 
for separating ostensive from non-ostensive word meaning. For 
non-ostensive words, it is the word which enables us to distinguish 
between semantically-related concepts such as 'PAIN' and 'ACHE' or 
'SAME' and 'SIMILAR'. 
Confusion arises because Piagetian-type concepts have not been 
distinguished from 'linguistic concepts' and because non-ostensive 
words are largely neglected in theories of word meaning 
2.2.1 and 2.2.3 on feature theories and prototype 
(see sections 
approaches). 
Further confusiun arises because 'cognitio11' and 'conception' are 
often used interchangeably (as is clear in section 2.1.4). 
I do not aim to suggest that the linguistic concepts being studied are 
based excl usi vely in 1 anguage as tllei r name might suggest. However, 
as will become clear, I regard language as playing a crucial role in 
the development of these concepts. Piaget's logically-necessary 
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concepts, by their very nature, can be easily disassociated from 
language whereas ' lingui stic concepts' can not. A summary 
distinguishing Piagetian concepts from linguistic concepts follows: 
Piagetian Concepts 
Broader ego object 
constancy 
Language is not necessary 
and does not playa crucial 
role in development of these 
concepts 
Percept i on para 11 e 1 but 
interacting through 
development. Both perception 
. and these cogniti ve concepts 
have their base in actions 
(Piase~an view, 1969) 
These concepts develop as 
part of biological maturation 
in conjunction with the 
child's interaction with 
his environment 
Necessary for the development 
of everyday concepts 
No abstract image of tile 
concept built up in the mind 
Are concerned wi th mental 
structures not with 
linguistic expression 
Stages in development 
universal across races and 
cultures though differing 
in rate 
' Linguistic Concepts' 
Narrower eg o concept of 
'CHAIR' ; concept of 'OBJECT' 
Language is not necessary but, 
in normal circumstances, it 
plays a crucial role in the 
development of these concepts . 
Perception of the object and 
it s function enables the 
child to obtain a perce ptual 
knowledge of the object . 
Use of the word adds to the 
development of the concept 
ego 'CHAIR' vs. 'STOOL' 
These concepts develop as a 
result of personal experiences 
with adults in the child's 
environment t0gether with 
innate abil ities 
Not neces sary for the 
development of Piagetian 
concepts 
No abstract image of the 
concept puilt up in the mind 
Emphasis on linguistic 
expression 
No apparent stages from 
research to date 
2.1.3 Linguistic concepts and word n~aning 
Ogden and Richards (1923, p.ll) depicted the meaning of lingui stic 
expressions in the fo rm of a triangle with t he \'iord signify ing the 
thing by means of mediating concepts. The relationship between the 
lexeme and that which it signif ies is therefore, indirect. Thi s 
relationship is depicted below: 
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sign/ 
1 exeme 
B concept 
~
A C significatum/ 
referent 
Ogden and Richards (ibid) view the relation of reference as holding 
between the concept (B) and the significatum (C) in contrast to those 
who favour a referenti al theory which emphasizes that words stand for 
things, that is, the relation of reference would hold between the sign 
(A) and the significatum (C) . 
Lyons (1977) points out that there is considerable dlsagreement about 
the details of the relationsh i ps between A, Band C. Lyons (ibid) 
also argues that there is no evidence to illustrate that such concepts 
play any part in everyday language-behaviour. We can build up an 
image of a table when we utter the word but this does not mean that we 
do so, or need to do so for all \~ords. In addition, to say that we 
must have acquired the concept of a table before we can be said to 
know the meaning of the word table, does not implY , that this concept 
is involved in the production and comprehension of most utterances 
which include this word (see Section 2.2.3). Lyons (ibid) goes on to 
argue that any theory of semantics wh i ch defines the meaning of a word 
in terms of what it signifies simplifies the issue when applied to all 
lexemes versus those which apply only to objects. This is of 
importance in relation to the present emphasis on non -ostensive words . 
The advantage of an approach such as that of Ogden and Ri chards' . 
(ibid) is that it suggests that the sign has no meaning unless it has 
a concept attached to it and a concept is much richer than a lexical 
item. The present argument is that the word should be viewed as more 
than simply a sign and that the word enriches the concept. 
Furthermore, the 
develops fi rst. 
tri angl e above does not st i pul ate whi ch component 
The different components may be made accessible only 
in metalinguistic use and not in everyday language use. 
In accordance with Bolton ' s definition (ibid , p. 47) of concepts, 
1 anguage is regarded, in th e present study, as playing an 
"indispensable role in concept formation " , Under normal 
circumstances, I anguage plays a crucial role in the development of 
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concepts such as 'PAIN' although it is not a sufficient condition for 
this development. 
It is argued that language organizes concepts in a dynamic way, that 
it allows for the cross-classifying of concepts which builds into the 
conceptual system itself, thereby altering its nature and, most 
1 ike 1 y, its complexity or the complex ity of its app 1 i cat ion, as well. 
In this way, language fills out the concept. We would assume, on this 
basis, that a person with 1 imited verbal language (for convenience, 
referred to here as 'nonverbal') will develop concepts which are at a 
different level or of a different type from those of ·a verbal person. 
The distinction between the concepts 'PAIN' and 'ACHE' may be 
idiosyncratic for the nonverbal person and we cannot ascertain the 
exact nature of this difference since verification would require the 
use of language. 
It is important that the dynamic aspect of language is not lost in our 
exp 1 anat i on of the role that word mean i ng plays in concept 
development. The 'label approach' tends to disre!)ard this dynamic 
characteristic. It is argued by the present researcher that what the 
child acquires during the preverbal period cannot be cal led 'concepts' 
to which he later attaches a name or label. These may be considered 
as the rudiments of concepts. The 'name' is much more than just a 
label - for the verbal person it establishes the scope of application 
of the concept although exact borders cannot be delimited. 
We attribute a particular concept to a nonverbal person on the basis 
of the behaviours he presents. If the behaviour resembl es that of 
verbal adults sufficiently, we grant that he 'has' that concept in his 
repertoire. We are willing to apply the concept 'PAIN' to the type of 
behaviour exhibited by the nonverbal person. The following example 
from the pilot study illustrates the difficulty we experience when 
assigning concepts 
E: (Experimenter) 
6 year old : 
E: 
child 
E: 
child: 
Can a car have a pain? 
No - ' cos it's not a real person 
Can a dog have a pain? 
Yes 
How do you know when a dog's got pain? 
Ylhen it's sore, it's lying down, it can hardly 
move. 
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E: 
ch i 1 d 
And an ant? Can an ant have a pain? 
Ants are hard! 
Our use of language is important for all 
are more language-bound than others. 
concepts but some 
As an example, 
concepts 
geometric 
concepts which depend to a large extent upon visual representation, 
may be less influenced by language than concepts such as 'PAIN'. 
Concepts are bound to the "grammar" of words, for example, pain is 
used in certain "grammatical" ways. 
2. 1.4 The role of percepti on in the development of linguistic 
concepts 
The . distinction between the role of ' linguistic concepts' and that of 
Piagetian-type concepts has, once again, not been made and adds to the 
confusion outlined below: 
Perception has not been clearly distingui shed 
in a qualitative sense from conception and (that) 
the synonymity of the hiD terms has not been cl early 
established ... The most usual solution t p the problem 
of the relation between conception and perception is 
to resort to comparatives; in relation to perception, 
conception is a more comp lex , more intellectually 
demanding, more integrative, etc. activity. 
(Pikas, 1966 , pp.136-137) 
Certain cognitive theori sts (Gibson and Gibson, 1955 ; J.J . Gibson, 
1966 ; E. Gibs.on, 1971; Ol son, 1970) have reduced all conceptions to 
percept ions and others (Bruner , 1966; Werner, 1948) have cons i dered 
perception and conception as a continuous progression in t he co ur se of 
development , conception being a more compl ex process than perception. 
Piaget falls in-between the se two extremes and he argue s (Piaget and 
Inhelder, 1969) that it i s the actions of the sensori-motor stage 
whi ch determi ne the percep t ual mechan i sms rather than the re ve r se. 
Perception and cognition are vievled as parallel and i ndepende nt but 
interacting processes. Bruner (ibid) postulates di fferent level s of 
cognition with regard to perception and conception; Piaget (ibid) 
suggests that these are differe nt types of men ta 1 act i v ity; and 01 so n 
(ibid) emphasizes the cont ext or "medium" from which new types of 
information are available. 
Despite criticisms regarding hi s three stages in conceptual 
development, Bruner's vie\v of percept ion as an inferenti al process has 
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been more widely accepted than Pi aget' s 
differentiated processes (Meltzer, 1976). 
states that : 
explanation of two sharply 
Briefly, Bruner (1966, p.2) 
Much of perception involves going beyond the 
information given through reliance on a model 
of the world of events that makes possible 
interpolation, extrapolation and prediction. 
The perceiver plays an important role in interpreting, categorizing 
and transforming the stimulus information . Bruner (ibid) proposes 
that the basic processes of categorization are essentially equivalent 
for both perception and conception but that the immediacy to 
experience of the attributes lI sed to categorize objects and events 
d iff'er. Bruner's model of percept i on requ i res an adult percei ver and 
has only limited application to very young children whose conceptual 
categories are still being formed (Wohlwill, 1962). 
For Piaget (1969), on the other hand, perception is "centered" in the 
child and does not include categorization and abstraction. The forms 
of perception, though shari ng a common sensori -motor origi n with 
conception, are "discovered in the object" (Piaget, ibid , p . 303) and 
do not follow a qual itative 
intelligence but rather 
rrogre s siun le ading to the development of 
adv ance to a higher-order perceptual 
organization. The forms of intell igence direct perceptual activities 
since one perceives better what can be constructed and reconstructed 
(Piaget, ibid). Intelligence ha s it s basi s in actions and operations 
rather than in perception. 
With regard to linguistic concept s , "it is 
important for the formation of certain 
sufficient condition for concept formation. 
argued that perception is 
concepts but is not a 
The child has to perceive 
objects in his environment in order to form concepts of thes e objects. 
J.J. Gibson's ecological approac h to perception (1966) analyses first, 
the environment, over and abo ve the senses , then the information 
itself and finally, the preceiver. Nei sser explains (1984) that we 
must understand the informati on available before we can understand how 
peopl e use it. Such aspects as movement and object pos i t i on add to 
our information. 
When applied to non-ostensiv e words, it is difficult to explain what 
would be perceptually important f or t he formation of concep t s such as 
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'PAIN' or 'ANGER'. An entire situation contributes to the child's 
learning of these concepts. 'Grammar' focuses on the co-occurrence of 
one word with other words and di scouY'ses in the 1 anguage rather than 
on the diversity of objects to which a word can be appl ied. If 
objects were focused upon, perceptual similarities would be easily 
isolated as so many researchers have done (particularly Clark, 1973) 
when expl aining the -overextension and underextension of words (see 
section 2.2.1). 
The role of perception appears to be emphasized in an ostensive 
definition approach to the learning of word meaning. 
2. 1.5 Constituents of word meaning 
Lexemes and words; sense and its relation to the "grammar' of words; 
reference, connotation, and ambiguity as they pertain to the sense of 
words, receive attention in this section. 
2.1.5(a) A lexeme is a "fully meaningful' element' (Lyons, 1970, 
p.321), • ... a unit which is manifest in one 'form' or another in 
sentences, but which is itself distinct from all its forms' (Lyons, 
ibid, p.21). Lexemes are • ... the wonjs and phrases that a dictionary 
would list under a separate entry' (Lyons, 1977, p. 23) and denotation 
of a lexeme is independent of its use on different occasions (Lyons, 
1981) . 
In the present study, it 
according to the words 
is asserted that a word alters its senses 
with which it co-occurs and that an 
investigation of word meaning must, therefore, take into account the 
linguistic context in which the word OCCU1'S. For this reason, words 
rather than lexemes are referred to throughout this study. It is not 
being denied that lexemes are useful but rather, that they restrict 
our view of word meaning. 
2.1.5(b) Sense and its relation to "grammar" 
People often think of the meaning of words as 
if each of them had an independent and separate 
existence. But ... no word can be fully understood 
independently of other words that are related to 
it and delimit its sense ... (Lyons, 1981, p.75). 
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Sense has been defined as the set of "relations that hold among 
linguistic expressions" (Lyons , ibid, p.58). Denotation relates 
expressions to classes of entities in the external world and is both 
interdependent upon, and inversely re lated , to sense . As an example : 
the denotation of 'animal' is larger than that of 
'dog' (all dogs are animals, but not all animals 
are dogs), but the sense of 'animal' is less specific 
than that of 'dog' (Lyons, ibid, p.60). 
The relationships between senses of a word or expression have been 
discussed by numerous theori sts and researchers. Component i a 1 
analysis (the analysis of the sense of a lexeme into its component 
parts) attempted to formalize the se nse relations that hold amongst 
lexemes (Lyons, 1981). It was argued that the sense of every lexeme 
could be analysed in terms of a set of more general sense-components 
or semantic features. Some or all of these semantic features would be 
common to a group of 1 exemes in the vocabul ilry (Lyons, i bi d) . 
(Criticisms of this approach are included in section 2.2.1). 
The complexity of relations holding amongst senses is revealed in the 
fo 11 owi ng quote: 
The speaker says th at he wi 11 'str i ke a match '; 
also that 'the match wa s wo n' by so and so. Has 
he in te rnali zed two different words or only one? 
We will doubtless judge that there are 2 wo rds, 
match I and match 2.' Thei 1- identity of form has no 
semantic motivation. 
He hopes that 'the weattJer will be fair'; he also 
says that hi s wife has ' fair hair', Here we might 
judge that there i s one word, fair, which ha s been 
used in 2 different senses. Or perhaps we might 
not. It depends on when we see a connection 
and when not a connection? 
(P. Matthews , 1979 , p.68). 
Kooij (1971) provides other examples, focLising on whether there are 
one or more senses rather than on whether there is one word or two 
senses . 
Added to this is the observation that " ... no vlOrd is ever limited to 
its enumerable senses", that it "always carries within it the 
qualification of 'something like' " (Bol inger, 1965, p.567). For 
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example, a sense may be extended as when a television screen was 
called a 'screen' (P. Matthews, ibid). 
It is difficult to specify the number of senses for any particular 
word as it is to clearly distinguisli one sense from another. What 
constitutes a new sense is not always clearly distinguished from that 
,which constitutes a new ~Iord. Synonymy adds another dimension, for 
example, pain and ache may be used interchangeably in certain contexts 
but not in others. Furthermore, " .. . it is poss i b 1 e to use a word 
intelligibly without using it in any of its senses" (Alston, 1964, 
p. 96), as occurs in metaphori cal 1 anguage. 
2.1.5 (c) Reference ... has to do with the relationship 
which holds between an exp ression and what that 
expression stands for on particular occasions of its 
utterance (Lyons, 1977, p.174). 
A particular word labels a particular object in the world (Lanham, 
1985). Many theorists (for example, Frege, 1892; Carnap , 1947) and 
researchers (for example, Anglin, 1978, 1983) have distinguished 
reference (extension) from rnean'ing ( 'intension) although the usefulness 
of such a distinction has al so beell queried (for example, Goodman, 
1972; Quine, 1969; WHtgenstein, 1953 ) . 
The extension of a concept (its reference) concerns the set of objects 
or events that are instances of the category or concept (Anglin, 1978, 
1983) for example, for "animal", 'dogs' and 'cats' may be included as 
instances of extension. Intension, or the meaning of a concept, 
concerns those properties tllat are true of the category, that i s, that 
define the concept or word (Angl in, ibid) for example, for "animal", 
'l ives', 'breathes', 'digests' may be included. Anglin (1983, p.262) 
cautions against i nferri ngi ntensi on from exte nsion. However , 
establishing the extension of words for any individual, enables one to 
formulate hypotheses about the inten s i on of tho se words, and those 
hypotheses can be subjected to further tests (Carnap, 1947). Many 
philosophers have al so used the term 'sense' for what others would 
describe as 'meaning' (Lyons, ibid). 
In the present study, the term 'sense' i s reserved for the different 
facets of its meaning. A distinction between 'reference' and 'sense' 
adds little to the ongoing di sc ussion because reference is limited 
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where non-ostensive vlOrd meaning is concerned (discussed further in 
section 2.3.1a). 
2.1.5(d) Connotation is also closely related to sense . As P. 
Matthews explains (1979, pp.69-70): 
Ah! But now you are talking about the emotive 
use of language. A pigsty, for example , i s a place 
where one keeps pigs. But I might say of the 
Bloggin's that 'they live in a pigsty out in 
Oxfordshire ' . This is to use pigsty in a further 
figurative sense. Or maybe it is to coin a metaphor 
for the occasion . . . 
The term 'connotation' may lead to confusion. Philosophers generally 
contrast it with 'denotation ' , although the way in which it is 
contrasted is not constant through the philosophical literature 
(Lyons, 1977) . Traditionally, connotation has been connected with 
the intentional aspect of meaning, that is, "the defining property of 
the class" (Lyons, 1981) . Denotation has been associated with the 
extensional aspect or "the class of entities that it defines" (Lyons, 
1981) . . P. Matthews (ibid) point s out that ordinary words tend not to 
have exact extens ions or intensions. 
The term 'connotation' can al so be appl i eLi more colloquially to the 
psychological associates of a term \vhich often include an affective 
component, as distinct from its extension and intension (Living ston , 
1982). 'Connotation' Inay therefore , be regarded as pa rt of the sen se 
of a word . There are standard as vlell as idiosyncrati c connotations, 
standard connotations being built into the linguistic system and 
idiosyncratic connotations stemming from the external world and 
relating to individual experiences. As an example of the latter, a 
word may have an emotional association for one person but not for 
another. 
Connotations stem from extralinguistic factors and penetrate into the 
word's meaning. Lyons (1981) points out that in particular in s tances, 
two or more descriptively synonymous expressions may differ with 
regard to the degree or nature of their expressi ve meaning . He 
pro~ides as an example the words huge, enormous, gigantic and colossal 
which are "intellectually" more exp ressi ve of their users' feel ing 
towards what they are descri bi ng t han very bi g or very 1 arge wi th 
which they are descriptively synonymou s. 
- 32 -
Shifts in sense may be marked by style. As an example, a child may 
more commonly use the word · ache and an adult the word pain when 
explaining symptoms to a doctor although the unpleasant feeling may be 
in the same place and of the same type. Similarly, adults use 
different words wilen talking to children as opposed to other adults 
and even children make this distinct ·ion when addressing adults versus 
children younger than themselves versus peers (for example, Snow and 
Ferguson, 1977). 
2.l.S(e) Ambiguity is a sense relation. For example, in the 
context sentence 'I asked him to draw the curtains' (Wiig, 1984) only 
determi nes whi ch sense of draw is intended, that is, 'draw a pi cture 
of the curtains' or, 'c lose the curtains'. Here, there are two tokens 
of one type (draw). In the following pair of sentences 
i) we are eating the same apple 
and we have the same pain, 
same in 
i i ) 
( i) i s ambiguous and may refer to either one or two apples 
(senses of either identity or equivalence); whereas same in (ii) 
necessarily refers to two separate pains and is not ambiguous. 
2.1.5(f) The term 'sense' extended 
The term 'sense' as traditionally app·lied, fails to take account of 
the diversity of uses of the word within any particular sense. As an 
example, each sense of the word same , itself takes on many functions 
as appl ied in varied contexts, 
pain and same dress. These uses 
that there are two pains/dresses. 
for example, in se ntences with same 
suggest, when two people are present , 
Within 
use of same vari es in these two contexts 
this equivalence 
of application. 
se nse, the 
Same dress 
may imply that the dresses are of the same style, colour, and so on. 
They are able to be compared and exact differences can be pointed out. 
Same pain, on the other hand, may suggest that one person's 
description of his pain parallels the other's description of his own 
pain even though · they can neve r be certain of the extent of 
similarity. This is not appl icable only because pain is an 'abstract' 
word and dress a 'concrete' word (the latter distinction is queried in 
section 2.3.1a), but would be equall y applicable to examples such as 
same thought in contrast to same pain. In both cases, we waul d be 
required to describe the exper ·ience but same alters its use in each 
case. 
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Cert<)in senses of words seem to be more easily recognized, perhaps 
because they are markedly different from each other. L i ngui st i cally 
unsophisticated adults would most 1il:e1y acknowledge that same may be 
used in an equivalence or an identity sense (if explained in lay 
terms); that think may be app 'lied conversationally as in: 'I think 
he'll come' or in mental terms (Wellman and Estes, 1984) as in "I'm 
thinking out this maths 
be differentiated in: 
conversationally, from: 
to date (for example, 
such differences. 
problem". Similarly, the use of believe may 
'I believe he's come', where it occurs 
, I bel ieve in G-d' (have faith in). Studies 
Olson and Ast -ington, 1984) have investigated 
The word feel in sentences wi th feel a pain and feel a puppy may 
appear to be used in one sense only . However, feel adopts a different 
sense in relation to pain. Feel a pain may imply that the person 
groans involuntarily, whereas feel a dog involves voluntary action, 
perhaps 1 ike a report in which one puts one's hand in a box and says: 
, I can feel a small dog - a puppy!' The word feel in a sentence with 
feel awkward introduces another sens e of feel. In t'he present study, 
the term 'sense' is also applied to the follovling uses of a word: 
namely, 'be in pain', and 'pretend t o be in pain'. Pain shifts its 
meaning in each case, and different criteria are focused upon. 
That the word feel takes on vastly different uses in these different 
contexts, suggests that it. may have to be learned in different ways. 
This appears to be counter-intuitive since the lengt h of time involved 
in learning each word in each of its numero us senses over a diversity 
of contexts would discount the possibility of 'c hi1dren ever mastering 
the language system. However , this requires assessment in children 
since it has not been investigated to date. 
There is no a priori reason to assume that once the child can use the 
word in one sense he is able to automatically use it in its other 
senses. If we are able to take this for granted then it may elucidate 
factors concerning innatenness and generalizing ability in language 
learning (see section 2.3.2). 
The "grammar" of a word involves alterat ions in senses of the word in 
different contexts. The meall"ing of a I,ord is its use in these 
di fferent contexts. Furthermore, the "grammar" of a word tell s us 
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those words in the language with which it can co-occur. These issues 
form the basis of the present investigation. 
2.1.6 Fuzzy boundaries and the "grammar" of words 
... in the world of experience all boundaries 
show some degree of vagueness, and any formal 
system which is useful for semantic 
description must allow us to record or even 
measure this property (Labov , 1973, p.352). 
Numerous theorists have discussed the notion of fuzzy boundaries in 
relation to word meaning (for example Alston, 1964; Kooij, 1971; 
Lyons, 1981; P. Matthews, 1979; vlittgenstein, 1953) and since the 
1970' s it has been argued (for example, Labov, 1973; Lehrer, 1970) 
that category-boundaries are vague. (This is discussed further in 
relation to the prototype approaches in section 2.2.3). 
The term ' fuzzy boundaries' has frequently been used interchangeably 
with terms such as 'vaguenes s' and :indeterminacy' (for example, 
Lyons, 1981; P. Matthews, ibid). However, Alston (ibid, pp.84-85) 
guards against this: 
The word 'vague' is commonly used very loosely 
(there is no inherent reason why ' vague' should 
be used loosely or even vaguely) to apply to 
any kind of "looseness, indeterminacy, or lack of 
clarity. I f we leave it in this condition, we 
shall run the risk of missi ng important distinctions. 
Alston (ibid) querie s whether every word is vag ue to some extent: the 
terms one employs to remove the vagueness will themselves be vague 
although in different respects. (Vagueness which occurs because of 
inaccurate use of a word or because of a speaker's idiosyncratic or 
inconsistent use, is undesirable in communication and therefore, not 
of interest in the present study). 
Baker and Hacker (1980, p.215) point out that Wittgenstein 
shows that all language i s vag ue , but that we 
should not deplore the fact. Vagueness is not 
neces sari ly a defect of language ... an order 
containing a vague expression is not necessaril y 
of diminished utility ... 
Baker and Hacker state (ibid, p.217) that: 
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There is ... no sense in speaking of its (language) 
having a completel y determinate sense ... But then 
it foll ows that it makes no sense to speak of 
its having a se nse which is not completely determinate . 
Natural language is "as precise as we need it to be" for the purposes 
of interpersonal communication (Wittgenstein, 1953 , pt. 71). P. 
Matthews (ibid, p.69) describe s a skysc raper as "one sort of tall 
building, but it is v~in to try and say exactly how tall". A building 
has been put up in the nearest village street, 
'Heavens!', we say, 'What do they want with that 
sort of skyscraper?' Suppose someone objected. 
'But is it a skyscraper? Look, it is only seven 
storeys high . If you put it down in Manhattan 
you would hardly notice it was there'. Well, so 
wbat? The village i s not Manhattan, and there the 
description fits. 
The word exact, as an example , varies with the context throughout all 
its uses. Wittgenstein (ibid, pts. 69,70,71) argtres that there is no 
defi ni teness of sense for the word exact. However, t h is makes the 
word no less useful. As Lyon s paints nut (1981, p.60'1: 
... the 'sense of most le xcmes, and therefore of 
most lexica ll y composite expressions, would seem 
to be somewhat fuzzy at the edges. Similarly, it 
is very often unclear whether a particular entity 
fal ls within the denotation of an express ion or 
not . . . Indeed, hoy, do \,e manage to communicate with 
one another more or less successfully, by mea ns of 
language, if the descriptive meaning of most lexemes 
- their sense and denotation - is inherently fuzzy 
or indetermina te? 
Lyons (1981, p.71) paints out th at vagueness does not impede 
communication "because we do not usually find ourselves operating in 
the fuzzy or indeterminate areas of a word's meaning " . 
Fuzzy boundaries are apparent when we ask ourselves 'How tall is 
tall?' or 'What constitutes middle aged?' The words tall and middle 
aged are fuzzy at their edges. As an example, we are uncertain 
whether to call someo ne of 40 or 60 years 'm iddle aged' (AI stan , 
ibid). However, the central part of the word's meaning is not 
affected: a 50 year old is, without doubt, middle aged and most adults 
would draw this conclusion. There is no clear definition of the words 
tall or middle aged that accurately reflects how they are used . Yet 
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we would not argue that a man is shorl: because he is not as tall as a 
tree in the vicinity. 
Where one fuzzy edge meets another fuzzy edge, we get 'fuzzy 
boundaries' between words ' such as same and similar or cross and angry, 
particularly when these words are contrasted (as in metalinguistic 
tasks: see section 2.4). Fuzziness arises because of the unclear 
boundaries separating one word from another and because of the overlap 
that occurs in their senses on different occasions. As an example, 
pain and ache can be used interchangeably in certain contexts but they 
differ stylistically in others (as in 'tummy ache' versus 'tummy 
pain') . 
Individual variation may occur between speakers when one uses a 
particular word in a situation where another speaker uses a different 
word. Fuzzy boundaries may lead to variation in decisions of 
appropriacy of a word for one speaker on diff~rent occasions or 
between two speakers. An individual may be uncertain as to which word 
to use in a particular situation becaLise of a cooceptual confusion 
such as whether to use the word moral versus good, or a perceptual 
confusion such as whether the colour is blue or violet. Neither of 
these types of confusion is of particular concern in this study . A 
word may also appear 
definition. However, 
to be fuzzy because it evades precise verbal 
the difficulty ~Ie have in defining it (see 
section 2.1.7 below for detailed discussion) arises from its 
variations in sense in different contexts. As an example, same may be 
appl ied to mean that two items have all properties in common but we 
also have a term 'exactly the same' \vhich impl ies that same need only 
approximate this first use on some occasions. 
The term 'fuzziness' is favoured over those of 'vagueness' and 
'indeterminacy' because it is neutral, not subject to the romanticism 
and the complex of connotations \'/hich the term 'vague' laboriously 
trails around. The "grammar' of a word is its all-embracing 
character, namely what can and cannot co-occur \'/ith that word due to 
its specific properties. The Fuzzy boundaries of .Iords adds to our 
difficulty in being certain what is contained in a 'list' of the 
'senses' for any particular word. 
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2.1.7 Definitions and the "grammar" of words 
As was mentioned in the Introduct ion to this study, words evade clear 
definitions and definitions fail to encompass the diversity of use s of 
any particular word. In this way, a definition is not a complete 
de scr iption of a word's meaning. Rather, a definition comprises one 
"language game" (Wittgenstein, 1953) in which the word may be used. 
Dictionary definitions and definitions by lay persons are both drawn 
on in the discussion which follows. 
The dictionary definition ... is a written record 
of explicit expressions of the meaning of words. 
The dictionary represents the cumulative attempts 
of a literate culture to systematize and explicitly 
state the mean ings of the words in the language 
(Watson and Olson, in press, p.2). 
Bolinger (1965, p.567) describes a dictionary as "a frozen pantomime": 
Our problem is on ly beginning when we consider 
the pale flowers of that 'nosegay of faded 
metaphors' that it presses between its pages. 
A semantic theory must account for the PROCESS 
of metaphorical invention. :.all the mort! 
so, a theory that stems from generative grammar 
with its emphasis on creativity. Ilow I make 
myself understood when I use previously fixed 
senses that are well known both to me and to 
my hearer, by a kind of :; equence of cance 11 at ions, 
is one thing; how [ am understood when I 
ca 11 a cha in smoker a fUlliero 1 e is someth i ng else. 
Along similar 1 ines, Vygotsky (1962, p.146) describes the dictionary 
meaning of a word as "no more tlian a stone in the edifice of sense, no 
more than a potentiality that finds diversified realization in 
speech". P. Matthews (1979, p.70) emphasizes that a dictionary defines 
one word by means of other words which results in the imprecision of 
one term (for example, skyscraper) being reflected in the imprec i sion 
of others (for example, tall, high or narrow). 
In the present study, it is argued that dictionary and lay defin ition s 
do not encompass a I-Iord's meaning as does its "grammar" but reveal 
only part thereof. Definitions con stitute only one "language game" in 
whi ch the I-Iord may be used but they fail to take ' into account its 
diversity of uses. It is also anticipated that an adult's definition 
of one word (for example same) and his definition of another word (for 
example pain) may not include the specific senses of each of these 
words when used together (that is, same pain). Dictionaries do 
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include a diversity of uses of a particular word, this very fact 
highlighting the importance of moving away from an all-or-none 
perspect i ve on word meani ng but thi s has not been accounted for in 
psycholinguistic studies to date. 
2.1. 8 Formalizing the "grammar" of words 
The "grammar" of words is difficult to stipulate formally. It would 
seem to be near impossible to formal ize the diversity of every single 
word over a variety of everyday contexts (for example, same in same 
dress, same pain, same seat) . We would have to take into account 
alterations that occur within different extral inguistic contexts (for 
example, 'I am wearing the same dress as yo u' vers us ' I am wearing the 
same dress as I wore yesterday'). Even a 1 exi con coul d not pos sib 1 y 
state each word together with the other words with which it may 
co-occur and thereby, indicate how t he features alter in each context. 
An attempt at rigour and formal ization moves away from the qualitative 
richness of the use of the term "grammar" . This notion disallows 
elegance with regard to a theory of word meaning lmt this may be due 
to the inherent complexities and the very nature of "grammar ". 
Weinreich (1966) ha s pointed out th~t the senses of a lexeme are 
infin-ite because a lexeme takes on a sl ightly different mea ning in 
each phrase in which it is u!;ed . Katz (1972, p.60) warns against 
"tak ing seriously the notion of infinite polysemy" since no rule of 
grammar could enumerate each and every difference in meaning. Katz 
(ibid) concludes that , in that case, "Ie would have to give up our 
attempt to explain semantic relations. He argues (p.60) that 
"speakers have finite brains" and that dictionaries, therefo re, store 
only finitely many bits of information. Thi s is acceptable when 
formulating a theory of word meaning but from a psycholin9uistic 
perspecti ve, we have still to establish how the child is able to make 
the necessary adjustments in using a vlord in different contexts. 
Fi llmore (1970, p.l30) touches upon the "grammar" of words in his 
discussion of change-of-state verbs: 
... the word break can be appropriately used 
only with an object that is 'rigid' in some of 
its dimen s ion s, and it expresses the appearance 
of some discontinuity tllerein. (But why one 
can break a thread but not a cloth is not easily 
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and 
covered by this stateme nt) 
... what exactly is meant by hit in the sense of 
the kind of surface contact asserted by hit in 
particular (as opposed to strike, etc.), is 
extremely difficult to pin down. 
It may be this very difficulty which renders formal ization impossible 
and perhaps, undesirable. 
P. Matthews (1979, pp.30 -31) points out that: 
There are at lea st two forms of creativity at 
work in ordinary speec h. One is the creativity 
that is governed by r ul es. If there is a noun 
wug there i s a plural wugs ... The other is governed 
by tendencies, by patterns of analogy. If we can 
talk of the 'co re ' of an apple then maybe we can 
talk of the 'core' of a carrot or a cabbage. 
(But we don't usuall y) ... 
The underlying question is why we do not usually .use core for carrot 
and the present researcher argues that the reason st ems from the 
"grammar" of each of these words. There are certain constraints in 
. , 
our use of these wo~ds whicll are essent ial in order that the words can 
be applicable at all. 
Palermo's "two-horned dilemma" (1983) may explain why formal ization is 
difficult . He argues that we have to account for both stabi lity and 
variability in explaining the develo~nent of word meaning. In its own 
way, the "grammar" of words is concerned \~ith both vari abi 1 ity, that 
is, the alteration in ' sense of a word in different contexts; and 
stability, that is, the constrai nts imposed in the l ang uag e which 
allO\~ a particular word to be used I'lith certain other words in the 
l anguage only. 
2.2 linguistic and psycholinguisti s approaches to word meaning 
In this sect ion, philo sophi ca l approaches to word meaning are referred 
to only where they add t o the present argument. linguistic and 
psycholinguistic approaches are dealt with in greater depth. 
lyons (1977) points out that it is customary to recogniz e three areas 
within the field of sem i otics, namely, syntax, semantics and 
pragmatics. In the early 1970' s the trend in psycholinguistic 
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research moved from syntax to semantics. In the late 1970's, the 
emphasis altered to that of pragmatics. 
Numerous researchers have studied semantics, that is, the content of 
the speech act (Curtiss, Prutting and Lowell, 1979), particularly at 
the one-and-two-word stages (for example, Bloom , 1970; Clark, 1973; 
Greenfield and Smith, 1976; Slobin, 1970). Fillmore's case grammar 
(1968) was regarded by many researchers (for example, Bowerman, 1973; 
Brown, 1973; Ingram, 1971) as useful for describing language 
development. An attempt was made to establish the semantic notions 
underlying two-word utterances. 
Pragmatics, the communicative intent or funct-ion of the speech act 
(Curtiss, Prutting and Lowell, ibid) has been defined as " ... the use 
of language in context" (Bates, 1976a, pp.I-2). It has been studied 
by Fillmore (1968); Antinucci and Parisi (1973); Dore (1974, 1975); 
Hall iday (1975), Bates (1976a, 1976b) and Bates -and Johnston (1977) 
amongst others, and it dravls on 1 inguistic, cognitive and social 
rules. Pragmatics includes cognition whereas seman~ics and cognition 
were regarded as separate entities and an attempt was made to relate 
the two. It has been argued that many words have more than one 
function (Karmiloff-Smith, 1979a) . However, psychol ingui sts have not 
taken into account the child's knol,ledge of the way in which the 
senses of a word alter according to the linguistic context in which it 
occurs. 
Semantic and pragmatic aspects of -language are so tightly interwoven 
in development as to seem almost inseparable (Blank , Gessner and 
Esposito, 1979; Cook-Gumperz, 1977 ; Curtiss, Prutting and Lowell, 
ibid; Leonard, 1976). However, disparate semantic and pragmatic 
skills have been isolated in children with language difficulties 
(Blank, Gessner and Esposito, ibid , ; Skarak i s and Prutting, 1977). 
The semantic approaches were concerned with the functions of words as 
action, agent, instrument. This tells us about the role that the word 
plays and consequently how t o begin understanding the child's 
intention but it does not enl -ighten us as to the word's meaning 
itself. The pragmat i c approache s WI,re concerned with i nterpersona 1 
communication and studied "how children learn to use language , to 
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exp 10 it the spec i a 1 realm between content and use" rather than how 
children acquire the meanings of words (Bates, 1976a , p.2). 
A pragmatically-oriented approach to the study of language was first 
proposed by philosophers, such as Austin (1962), Grice (1968) and 
Searle (1969). They emphasized that meaning can be viewed 
independent 1 y of the context in wh i ch it is uttered as well as in 
relation to this context (the theory of speech acts). The 
'meaning-is-use' or speech act theories assert that "the meaning of an 
expression is determined by , if not identical with, its use in the 
language" (Lyons 19B1, p.31). These theories emphasize 
speaker-listener communication. Thi s focus differs from that of the 
present study, where the effect of one word on another as part of the 
word's meaning, that is within the language is of inter~st. 
Carey's review of the field of semantic development (1982) indicates 
that a great deal of research has focused on how children acquire the 
meanings of words. Most studies to date on the development of word 
meani ng have been concerned with c'oncrete or what is termed 
"substantive" words (for example, BOI-/e rman, 1978a ; Clark, 1973, 1974; 
Greenberg and Kuczaj, 1982; Nelson, 1974, 1977). These words are 
easier to investigate becau se they refer to objects, that is, to 
something which is tangible and visible. They are acquired earl ier 
and, since most t heorists have be en concerned with study ing the 
acquisi tio n process, they have tended to eva luate these 
earlier-acquired words. 
The semantic feature t heori es of Clark (ibid) and Nelson (ibid), a!i an 
example, can say very 1 ittle about the development of abstract words 
and, in fact, t hey do not claim to be able to explain this 
development. In this se nse alone, these theories are li mited since 
they fail to explain general word meaning (Greenberg and Kuczaj, 
ibid). Most of these approaches are bui It upon a referential theory 
of word meaning (Carey, ibid) and 1'lOuld be unable to describe the 
deve 1 opment of words such as pain and thought . They also fa i 1 to 
explain the "grammar" of words arid where implied, they do not 
adequately account for it in developmellt. 
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The numerous studies conducted to evaluate non-ostensive word meaning 
are not being ignored. However, they are subject to major criticisms 
as Carey (ibid, p.351) paints out: 
In the early seventies, dozens of papers 
were published supporting the compositional 
view of semantic development ... 
Studies were carried out in the domains of 
... comparative adjectives (big. little. tall. 
short), temporal conjunctions (before. after), 
spatial prepositions (in. on, under), kinship 
terms , pronouns front. back, deictic verbs 
(come. go. bring, take), more. less , adverbs 
of time (seldom. always. never), verbs of 
possession and transfer (buy. sell. trade), 
animal names, colour terms, and time-axis 
verbs (grow, shrink, raise, lower) . 
The component-by-component view of semantic 
development depends critically upon tbe 
central tenet of the classical view of word 
meaning - namely, that complex concepts can 
be defi ned in terms of pri mit i ves . The., 
classical view has been vociferously attacked 
by philosophers, and psychologists have recently 
joined the cllorus. 
Stud i es have a I so been carri ed out on fact i ve and non -fact i ve verbs 
but have been analysed from one vanLage point only (that is, their 
factive qual ity) and have not been taken into account in theories of 
word meaning development to date. Szagun's research on moral words 
(namely, courageous and feel sorry (1983) approached that of the 
present study but drew on a I imited set of contexts in analysing each 
word and did not take account of the "g rammar" of words in the 
explanation of her findings. Others such as Keil and Carroll (1980) 
and Brugman (1984 cited by Dirven, 1985) analysed their findings in 
light of an abstract image built up in the mind which is subject to 
numerous criticisms (see section 2.2.2). 
More recently, figurative language is receiving a great deal of 
attention in psychol inguistic research (for example, Ackerman, 1984; 
Kelly and Keil, 1984; Vosniadou, 1984; Windmueller , Gardner and 
Winner, 1984). However, we are still far from having a suitable 
theory of literal word meaning development, 
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2.2.1 "Grammar" in contrast to featllr e theories 
As has been di scussed, the "grammar" of a word is its vari ety of 
senses and the unique relationships it forms with other words in 
different contexts. Thi s varied use of a word is its meaning. 
"Grammar" has no equivalent term in tl'aditional linguistics. 
The "grammar" of words di ffe rs from semantic analyses to date. Lyo ns 
(1977, p.317) pOints out that ~ 
, .. the majo r ity of structural semanticists 
subscribe nowadays to some version or other of 
component ial anal ys i s . This approach to -the 
description of the meaning of words and phrases 
rests upon the thesis that the sense of every 
lexeme can be analysed in terms of a set of 
more general sense-components (or semantic 
features), some or all of which will be common 
to several different lexemes in the vocabulary. 
In componential anal ys i s, the meaning of a word is regarded as a 
fea ture s or markers connected by logi ca l constants complex of semantic 
(Bierwi sch, 1970). The word is taken out of context for analysi s. A 
ali st of words in the 1 anguage together wi th a lexicon contains 
specification of the syntactic cate~lOry to which the word bel ongs 
(Radford, 1981). Lex ical entries include syntact -ic, phonological , 
morphological and semantic information. In the present study , only 
semantic information t hat is, the meaning of words, i s being discu ssed 
although the importance of other types of information i s not denied. 
A 1 exi con is bu i It up from a syn t ac tic base: the semant i c compon ent 
specifies " ... what those sen t ences generated by the syntax actually 
mean" (Radford, ibid, p.362). As an example, for the word it , the 
semantic component will spec ify what can and can not be an antecedent 
of it. The "grammar " of ~lOrds, on the other hand, i s not a syntact i c 
component: r at he r, the word can be used in specific ways in t he 
language because of it s "grammar" and its syntactic possibilities are 
determined by its "grammar" rather than the reverse. If the "grammar" 
of words was viewed as part of the lexical information, then the 
lexico n would be very ric h. 
There are diffe rent approaches concern ing tile semanti c information 
that should be included in the l exicon . Radford ( ibi d) menti ons the 
following: 
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i) Sememes such as kill whh:h ~lOuld take features <cause to die>. 
This has been criticized as sililply providing an "unsophisticated kind 
of paraphrase" (Radford , ibid, p.l38). 
ii) Functional structure (Bresnan, 1978) which distinguishes, for 
toaote5 
example, rely (which "5 an intransitive verb andt.,a prepositional 
phrase) from rely on (which forms a single semantic unit). Thi s 
differs from "grammar" in that same and pain are not one semantic 
unit. However, it does suggest that our consideration of word meaning 
must take account of its different uses. 
iii) Thematic relations (for example, Fillmore, 1968; Gruber, 1965; 
and . Jackendoff, 1972) concern roles such as agent, goal and so on. 
Part of the "grammar" of a word is that it can be used in part icul ar 
semantic roles only . 
iv) Se1ectiona1 restrictions (Being most pertinent to this study, 
these are discussed in depth (see section 2.2.2). 
2.2.1(a) Devel opmenta 1 studi es 
Psycho 1 i ngui st i c approaches to the study of word mean i ng are based 
upon certain "generally accepted " assumptions (Keil and Carroll, 1980, 
p . 21) namely, that word meanings can be decomposed into lists of 
features; that semantic development consists of the addition and/ or 
subtraction of such features to a set that is paired with a single 
lexical item; and that the features are psychologically real and can 
be used to predict children's errors in word use. A number of 
controversies still remain, for example, whether 
added or subtracted; whether the first features 
and whether 
features are mo stly 
to be acqui red are 
features defi ni ng mostly perceptual or functiona ·l; 
polarity are acquired first or last (Keil and Carroll, ibid). 
Work on extension in children's word meaning development has revealed 
overextensions (Barrett, 1978; Bloom, 1973; Brown, 1958; Clark, 1973, 
1979), underextensions (Anglin, 1977; Barrett, 1983; Nelson, Rescorla, 
Gruende1 and Benedict, 1978; Rei ch, 1976: White, 1982) and over l ap 
(for example, Clark and Clark, 1977) in children ' s use of words. The 
extension of a term is " ... the class of the things to which it is 
correctly applied ... we can define a class on the basis of some 
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property (or set of prop"rties) I'lhich they have in common" (Lyo ns, 
1977 , p.158). 
With overextension , the child's word in cl udes the object (Anglin, 
1983) . For example , Piaget (1951) reported that the child uses "bow 
wow" for dogs as well · as for moving objects seen from a distance. 
Underextension is apparent when the child's word is a subset of adult 
extension of the word. With overlap, both the child and the adult 
denote some of " the s~me things by the word but also denote some 
different things (Angl in, 1983). Cases of overextension seem to 
suggest that the Child's word meanings are defined " by more general 
properties than those of adults (Clark, 1973) whereas examples of 
underextension suggest 
adult s (Reich, 1976). 
but, rather, that the 
adults (Anglin, ibid). 
that tlley are more specific than those of 
Cases of overl ap suggest neither of the above 
ch "ild 's mean ings are different from those of 
There is controversy regarding the high incidence of overextension in 
early vocabularies, the ba sis for overextensions, and the character of 
overtextension as a conceptual process (Rescorla, 1980). In addition, 
consensus has not been reached as to tile t ypes of overextensions which 
ch i 1 dren demonstrate. Percep tua 1 s "i mi I arity of non referents to 
referents of the word has been shovm to y ield greater overextensions 
than referents that are not perceptually similar (Clark, 1973 ; Kay and 
Angl in, 1982; Thomson and Cha pman , 1977) . However funct i Dna I 
similarity has also been found to be important in overextension 
(Bloom, 1973; Barrett, 1978; Gruendel, 1977; Nelson et aI, 1978; 
Rescorla, 1980; Werner and Kaplan, 1963) and other less important 
factors such as associati on through contiguity also play a role. 
Furthermore, controversy exists as to whether words are le ss 
overextended in comprehen s ion (Clark, 1978b, 1979; Fremgen and Fay, 
1980; Gruende"l , 1977; Rescol'la, 1980; Thomson and Chapman, 1977) or in 
production (Anglin, 1983; Kay and Anglin, 1982). 
Bowerman concludes that: 
. . . an adequate theory of th e acquisition of 
word meaning has to be flexible enough to 
accoun t for the child's abil Hy , evell from a 
very early ae)e, to c la ssi fy experiences on the 
basis of very different kinds of similarities. 
Theories built around one basic class of 
similarities. whether perceptual or functional, 
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are too restricted to account for the rich 
diversity of ways in which children can recognize 
constancies from one situation to the next 
(1978a, pp.268-269) 
Howe and Hillman (1973) found that the acquisition of semantic 
restrictions for verbs continues into the elementary sc hool years but 
the specifi c character of these restricti ons was di ffi cult to specify. 
McNeill (1970) sugge~ted that Olle can explain word meaning by means of 
horizontal development when a word enters the child's vocabulary but 
without all its markers. As language develops, new markers are added 
to large groups of words alreadY present but inadequately marked. 
This approach vias supported by Brown, Cazden and Bellugi (1969) and 
Bloom (1970) but not clearly supported by Howe and Hillman (ibid). 
Vertical development, on the other hand, suggests that when a word is 
acquired, most semantic markers accompany it, but that such entries 
are rel atively isolated. As an example, a verb requiring an animate 
subject may be present for one verb but not for another. From the 
point of view of the "grammar" of words, horizontal development would 
have better expl anatory val ue bllt both these approac!les are 1 imi ted by 
the restrictions that a marker theory imposes. 
Rescorla (ibid) argues that normal extension and overextension are two 
aspects of the same process. If th'is is the case, then overextension 
may elucidate the process of language learning in older children. 
The se numerous stud ies on over- and underexstension have not taken 
into account the specific contexts in which the child appl ie s each 
word and the extent to which he is subco nsciously aware of how words 
alter their . senses in different contexts. The child may overextend 
and underextend because he has a restricted view of the word's meaning 
but the contexts in which overextension occurs will elucidate his 
view. 
The present researcher suggests that "grammar" errors may occur 
because chi ldren underextend 01- overextend the senses of a word to 
other words in the language. An example of underextension is the 
comment by Ursula cited in ilitroducinrJ chapter 2 when she asks about 
pain, "Where will it go?" She llses the word go ill such a way as to 
take no account of its specific sense in relation to the word pain. 
Go away can be appl ied to animate objects but not to words denoting 
non- ostensive entities. An example of overextension would be "I'll 
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strangle your hand" which was mentioned in chapter 1. 
is applied to a word with which it is not usually used. 
Here, strangl e 
The child has 
ignored the constraints which the word strangle imposes on it s use in 
the language. 
Feature theories are subject to numerous additional criticisms, a few 
of which are listed below: 
i) It is difficult to specify I'lhich features are essential in 
defining a concept (Greenberg and Kuczaj, 1982). 
ii) It is difficult to determine the number of features that would 
adequately define a concept (Greenberg and Kuczaj, ibid, p.278) 
"particularly in specifying what is meant by the notion of defining 
feature". 
iii) The theories fail to explain how children are able to sort out 
the essential from the accidental properties (Miller, 1978). 
iv) One cannot determine features that are criterial for (for 
example) dog which would "accurately distinguish dogs from non-dogs 
without, at the same time, classifying some dogs as non-dogs" 
(Greenberg and Kuczaj, · ibid, p.279). All feature theories are 
problematic since 
most concepts (meanings) cannot be adequately 
(accurately) defined by a list of features, no 
matter how exhaustive th" list . .. for most 
concepts, it is difficult (impossible) to 
provide ali st of features that would permit 
one to include only appropriate instances as 
members of tile class but at the same time 
exclude all inappropriate instances as 
nonmembers of the class ... 
(Greenberg and Kuczaj, ibid, p.285). 
v) These theories are not fully supported by experimental data in 
both children and· adults, that is, their explanatory value in relation 
to child data is limited (Barrett , 1982; Greenberg and Kuczaj, ibid). 
vi) These theories fail to ex plain the "systematic subdivision of 
semantic fields" (Barrett,ib·id), for examp le, the child may use the 
word dog .Ihen talking about all animals. \,hen he learns the word 
horse, his use of the word dog becomes mo re restricted and approaches 
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standard adult usage to a greater exten t. Thi s occurred wi th some of 
the children in Carey's ' Chromium study' (1978). 
Clark (1983) compares the acquisition and growth of a vocabulary to 
the construction of a dictionary. She argues that convent ional 
meanings which contrast with the Ineanings already available are 
continually added. Merriman (1984) ,j-iscusses the way in which a new 
word in the ch -ild's lexicon results in his correcting the meaning 
(that is , reducing the overextension) of other words already in his 
repertoire. He draws on Clark's proposal made in her original feature 
theory and emphasized in her recent lexical contrast theory (1983). 
Merriman (ibid) found that children iJetween the ages of 21 / 2 and 6 
years are disposed towards lexica l contrast. Thi s disposition emerges 
and increases during the preschool years although it is not present at 
the commencement of word learning. lie emphasizes the importance of 
taking lexical contrast into account in any theory of lexical 
development. 
vii) These tileories, because they involve features, seem to "predict 
strict, definite concept boundaries , whereas many natural concepts 
appear to have vague, Fuzzy boundaries" (Greenberg and Kuczaj, ibid, 
P.288). 
viii) These theories fail to explain or to take account of the 
"grammar" of words. 
ix) These theories accept that the child has a prelinguistic 
to which he then attaches a word as il label (Bowerman, 1978a; 
1974; Nelson, 1974). 
concept 
Cl ark ., 
x) Clark's and Nelson's theories entail some form of analytic 
process in concept development in children whic h runs counter to the 
studies on concept formation in adults: the analytic proces s is 
regarded as more comp l ex and it is argued that this follows holistic 
concept formation. Chil dren fi rst I? xper i ence objects as unana lysed 
wholes. Weaknesses of the analytic approach to semantic development 
have been detailed by Nel son (1974), Anglin (1977) and Palermo (1978a, 
1978b) amongst others and are not elabDrated upon 11ere. 
xiv) The feature theory approaches fail to account for all types of 
words. Bowerman (ibid) pOints out that words for non -o bject concepts 
- 49 -
cannot be accountea for by means of a theory of perceptual simil arity 
and Nelson, similarly, fails to explain how words for actions and 
relations are acquired. In addition, both theories cannot account for 
words which reflect the child 's own subjective experiences or 
reactions (for example, suc h words as aha). Bol inger (1965, 
pp.566-567), in a critical evaluation of the Katz-Fodor theory (1963) 
of semantic markers, proposes that: 
A complete semantic theory must not only map 
the markers of all senses but show how markers 
are added and subtracted to alter the senses of 
words. One corroboration of a marker theory 
would be its abi lity to predict semantic shifts ... 
In a marker theory, which compels us to make 
all-or-none decisions, this is a dilemma. Markers 
are atoms. They do not have ranges ... 
If the "grammar" of words has psychological real ity, then the 1 imits 
of a feature theory will be clearly exposed. 
2.2.2 Co- occurrence con s1;.rai nt,~ and . ..t.b.~_~ rammar" of words 
Conceptual mean in g "is wide ly assumed to be the 
central factor in 1 ingui s tic commun icat "io n 
and ... it can be shown to be integral to the 
essential functioning of language in a way 
that other types of meaning are not (which is 
not to say that conceptual meaning is alway s 
the most important element of an act of linguistic 
communication) . . . conceptual meaning ha s a compl ex 
and sophisticated organization ... 
(Leech, 1974 , pp.10-11) 
Conceptual meaning deals vlith differences in sense(s) of a word, and 
most closely approximates the term "grammar". Leech (ibid, pp.26 - 27) 
states that conceptual meaning or se nse ('meaning' in its narrower 
use) refers to logical , cognitive or denotative content. He uses the 
term 'communicative value' for meaning in the wider sense. Thi s 
embraces that which is communicated "by virtue of what language refers 
to" (connotati ve); what i s communicated of the social circumstances of 
language use (styl ist ic) ; of the feel ings and attitudes of the speaker 
(affective); communication through association vlith another sense of 
the same expression (reflected); or Ivit h words which tend to occur in 
the environment of another word (collocational) (Leech, ibid, p.26) 
The different types of meaning vary ill the extent of their 
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contribution to communication. Leech (ibid, p.l3) argues that "one 
can scarcely define language" without referring to conceptual meaning. 
The two principles of contrastiveness and constituent structure 
represent the way language is organized in terms of paradigmatic (or 
selectional) and syntagmatic (or combinatory) aspects of 1 inguistic 
structure. Contrastiveness can be explained in terms of features, for 
example, the meaning of the word woman could be specified as +HUMAN, 
-MALE, +ADULT, as distinct from boy, which could be 'defined' +HUMAN, 
+MALE, -ADULT. The principle of constituent structure is that by 
which larger linguistic units are built up out of smaller units, that 
is, the syntactic constituents of a sentence . 
conceptual meaning is not to be confused with language analysis 
according to truth conditions. Rather, conceptual meaning is 
concerned with factual truth. A viol ation of conceptual meaning is 
illustrated in the following sentences: 
* 'There is a tree growing in the middle of the ocean' 
* 'Dogs Ilav~ horns' 
These sentences are "perfectly interpretable, but not true of our 
world of experience " (Lanham, 1985). Another example which cannot be 
regarded as "perfectly interpretable", is 
* 'I have swallowed my pain' 
This is not possible conceptua"lly because what we swallow has to be 
concrete. This sentence may also be explained by drawing on 
selectional restrictions, for example, what we swallow has to be 
<+concrete> and pain has the feature <-concrete>. However, conceptual 
meaning and selectional restt'ictions are distinguishable one from the 
other. As an example, ship may be regarded as animate in certain 
sentences (for example, in poetry) but this would be prohibited in 
terms of our factual knowledge of the world. 
The "grammar" , of words deals specifically with conceptual meaning. In 
this study, it is aimed to invest'igate the meaning of the word by 
analyzing the way in which the word alters its senses according to the 
context in which it occurs and by determining whether children of 
different ages reveal developmental differences when required to 
reflect upon words in a variety of co-occurrence relations. The 
meaning a word introduces constraints in terms of the words with which 
it can co-occur. However, the meaning also stems, in part, from these 
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other words with wh i ch the word can co-occur. The word sh ifts in 
meaning in these different CO-OCCllrl'ence relations. As an example, 
the word same in the phrase same ball may be interpreted (by virtue of 
the external world) as suggesting that there is either one or there 
are two balls and size and/or co lour may . be focused upon in deciding 
whether the two balls are the same or no t. On the other hand, the 
word same in the phrase same pain can only be interpreted as 
suggesting that there are two pains (when two people are present). 
For same pain, the place in which the pain is located or the type of 
pain may be the factors determining whether the pains are to be 
regarded as the same or not. The word same alters it " sense in each of 
these contexts. 
The present researcher aims to investigate those aspects of the word 
which are focused upon when that word co-occurs with other words and 
the way in which children of different ages direct their attention to 
different aspects of the word in drawing their ·conclusions. It is 
suggested that aspects of conceptual r:reaning be expressed as what may 
be called 'propositional attributes', that is, statements about the 
meaning of the word. As an examp le, part of the meaning of pain is 
that it is internal and canrlot be pointed to. This is not encompa ssed 
by a feature and cannot be explained by means of co-occurrence 
relations. If the child knows what pain is, he can make a proposition 
about it. 
Co-occurrence relations discussed by Y'esearchers such as Katz (1972), 
Leech (1974) and Lehrer (1974) amongst others, differ from the 
emphasis of the present study. Lanham (ibid) proposes that it is only 
within a framework of constraints that we can estab1 ish any 
specifiable set of meaning s for words. If there are no constra ints , 
then there is no limit to the range of endless new meanings we can 
ascribe to a word. Apart from conceptual meaning, there are three 
categories of co-occu rrence constraints on the use of words (Leech, 
1974), namely: 
i) collocational restrictions 
ii) sty listic constraints 
iii) se1ectiona1 restrictions 
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i) Collocational restrictions: Collocational 
the associations a word acquires on account of 
words which tend to occur in its en"ironment" 
meaning "consists of 
the mean i ngs of the 
(Leec h, ib id , p.20). 
Leech (ibid) provides as an example, the words pretty and handsome . 
Both these words can occur with different other words but certain of 
their uses overlap. Collocational meani ng i s an "idiosyncratic 
property of individual words " (Leech, ibid, p.20). Leec h (ibid) 
argues that we need to invoke this category .of collocational meaning 
on 1 y when an exp 1 anat ion in terms of the other categori es of meani ng 
does not apply. 
Collocational meaning is a tendency to co-occurrence. Part of the 
dictionary entry of words might be an aspect of their collocational 
meaning, for example, antenuptial , by virtue of its legal use, would 
tend to occur with the word contrac t. Co 11 ocat i ona 1 meani ng is not 
categoric but indicates probabilit ies in the co-occurrence of words. 
A second example is ' prodigious effort' which i s highly probable. 
Prodigious seems to require a word which i s phys ·ical, for example, 'a 
prodigious thought process' violates the collocative constraint. It 
i s possible that phys.ical i s not part of the conceptual meaning of 
prodigious but i s an influence from t he word effort wi th which it ha s 
a high probability of co-occur ing. 
Lyons (1981 , p.91) points out that the sense of any lexeme includes 
two kinds of relations, name·ly, substitutional and combinatorial. 
Substitutional sense relations hold between "inter-substitutable 
members of the same category", for example, bachelor and spinster; 
whereas combinatorial re lat ions hold most commonly between expressions 
of different categories, for I~xample, bet~leen nouns and adjectives 
(unmarried and man) and between verbs and adverbs. The co ngruity of 
sense of the adjective with the sense of the noun makes them 
collocationally acceptable: they can occur together in the same 
constructi on. Furthe rmore, synonyliis do 
collocat ional range. (This was sugg8sted in 
not have the same 
the discussion on fuzzy 
boundaries for words such as pain and ache, section 2.1.7). As an 
exampl e, strong and powerful collocate vlith argument but they do not 
share the same set of collocations: I'le can ta ·1 k of "a powerful car" 
but not of "powerful tea" and of "strong tea" but not of "a strong 
car" (Lehrer, ibid). 
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Collocational meaning is one of severa 'i types of associative meaning 
(Leech, 1974): words take on a shade of meaning in association with 
other words but collocational meaning is not part of its sense. 
Collocation does not take into account the way in which the sense of a 
word alters when used with another word, for example, feel in feel the 
dog versus feel the pain. The words dog and pain throw light on the 
meaning of the word feel in these two instances . Collocation is 
therefore, more restricted in its application than "grammar". 
The freedom that lexemes have for combining with other lexemes varies 
markedly from one to another. For example, in Engl ish, certain verbs 
or adjectives (such as good) can collocate with numerous nouns whereas 
others, such as rancid , are more restricted in terms of their 
collocational range (Lyons, 1977). A native speaker will be able t o 
apply most lexemes in appropriate co -occurrence relations, even in 
those contexts which he has not previously encountered. Lyons (1977) 
cautions against our arguing, at one extreme, that the meanings of a 
lexeme determine its collocation s and , ,at the other extreme , that we 
can define the 
Collocations are 
meani ng of a 
independen t of 
lexelllP as its set of collocations. 
meaning: 
system and are often not l ogical (Lanham, 
they 1 ie 
ibid) . 
within the language 
ii) Stylistic constraints: Stylisti c and affective meaning " ... have 
to do with the situation in wh i ch <1 n utt erance takes place" (Leech, 
ibid, p.16). Stylistic meaning is concerned with the social 
circumstances surrounding the LI~;e of language, for example, the social 
rel ati ons between the speaker and the 1 i stener lIIay requi re either a 
formal or a colloquial use of Engl ish. Affective meaning concerns the 
way in which language reflects the personal feel ings and attitudes of 
the speaker wh i ch is" conveyed through the conceptual or connotat i ve 
content of the words used" (Leech, ibid, p.18). Leech (ibid, p.1?) 
points out that synonymy i s restriCted to conceptual meaning . 
Therefore, we have no true synonymy because words seldom have both the 
same conceptual meaning and t he s ame stylistic meaning . 
An example of a violation of styl'istic meaning is the sentence 'He 
mounted his gee gee' in wh ic h mount is formal and gee gee colloquial. 
A second example is ' tummy ache' whi ch is acceptable whereas 'tummy 
pain' is not. Tummy is s ty listicall y informa'i and ache may be used 
i nforma 11 y as we 11 . 
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iii) Selectional restrictions: The se deal with 
... the general principle that meaning seems 
to 'overflow sideways' from one part of a 
sentence to another: that certai n features 
of meaning are predictable from environment, 
and that any contradiction of such features 
will result in an unacceptable utterance 
(Leech, ibid, p.41). 
A violation of selectional restrictions is best explained by means of 
a constraint on a feature (for example, a noun is the subject of a 
verb) which also explains many metaphorical uses of language. 
Selectional restriction s refer to the set of contexts in which an 
expression can 
interpretations 
occur 
which 
(Lyons, 
can be 
1981). They reduce the 
as s igned to lexically 
expressions. Only those meanings are selected wh 'ich are 
with the context i n whi ch the l exeme occurs (Lyo ns, 1977). 
number of 
composite 
compatible 
Th i sis 
established according to the sense components of the lexemes. Words 
seldom occur in isolation and there are restrictions on the 
co-occurrence of words (Lehl"er, 1974). Lehrer (ibid,' p.175) adds that 
" . . . any adequate grammar must eventual ly handle connected discourse". 
The notion of se l ectional restriction's was used by Katz and Fodor 
(1963) and Katz and Postal (1964) to explain semantic unacceptability. 
They drew on seillant i c features but attempted to accommodate them to a 
Chomskian grammar. Together with projection ru les, selectional 
restrictions allow for certain interpretations of phrases and 
sentences as semanticall y acceptable while preventing semantically 
anomalou s interpretation s. The semantic component of language 
"interprets underlyi~g phrase ma rker s in terms of meaning" (Katz, 
1972, p.32). The semanti c component comprises a dictionary, that i s, 
"a list of the meanings of the morph emes of the language " and 
project i on rul es , that i s, " ... a set of rul es that recon struct the 
speaker 's ability to project sentence meanings from morpheme meanings" 
(Katz, ibid, p.36). Projection rules provide information on which 
constituents can co-occur in higher units (Lehrer, 1974) . 
Katz (ibid, p.33) explains that in 
"syntactically atomic constitllent 
specified: 
t he d ictionary, senses 
ill the language" are 
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of every 
formally 
... Each reading in the dictionary entry for a lexical 
item must contain a selection restriction, that is, a 
formally expressed neceisary and suffi cient condition 
for that reading to combine witli others. Thus, the 
selection restriction attached to a reading determines 
the combinations with tile readings of other lexical 
items into which that reading can enter when a 
projection rule is applied. (Katz and Postal, 1964 , 
p .15) . 
Katz and Fodor (ibid) described selectional restrictions in terms of 
which semantic features (rather than lexical items) could co-occur. 
Selectional restrictions state 
.. . the condition under which the sense 
represented by the set of semant ic markers 
can combine with other senses to form a 
sense of a syntactic complex constituent ... 
The selection restriction reconstructs the 
distinGtion between the range of sense s 
with which a given sense can unite to form 
a new sense and the range of senses wlth 
which it cannot unite. I!henever a constituent 
is formed from componen L cons t ituents aQd the 
sense of one belongs to the range of senses 
excluded from combination with the sense of 
the other, tllen the constituent is meaningless 
(conceptually absurd) urlless the component 
constituen ts have other senses that can combine 
(Katz, ibid , p.43). 
Each grammatical construction into which an item can enter is stated 
by means of a selectional re striction, for example, each verb will 
have selectional restrictions for su bject, direct object, indirect 
object, and so on (Lehrer, ibid). 
Howe and Hillman (1973, p.132) describe the selectional restrictions 
(of verbs, for example) as "contextual features restricting the 
semantic properties of nouns that can be logical subjects and objects 
of these verbs". These restraint s ma'y occur at a more abstract level, 
for example, semantic marker s (Katz and Fodor, ibid) such as <+ 
concrete> or at a more idi osyncratic level, for example , semant ic 
distinguishers (Katz and Fodor, ibid). Distinguishers are "those 
features of the semantic description of a word which are idiosyncratic 
to that \vord" whereas marker s are "those features which enter into 
semantic generalizations, features in terms of 
judgements on sentences ... can be formal i zed and 
(Fillmore, 1970, p.l31). Examples of distinguishers 
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which semantic 
made expl icit" 
are: for sitt ing 
upon, with legs, wi th a back (for the word chair) and of markers, 
<-concrete> and <-animate>. Katz and Fodor did not specify thi s 
distinction clearly and their position has been challenged by many 
theorists including Bolinger (J965) and Weinr e lc.h (1966). An example 
of a semantic distinguisher is sting which will have a semantic marker 
requiring a nOlln marked <+insect>. However, this would not preclude 
butterflies from stinging (Howe and Hillman , ibid) . 
According to Katz (ibid), semantic markers represent the conceptual 
constituents of senses, that is, the simplest and the most complex 
concepts of a sense, equivalent to phrase markers representing the 
syntactic construction of sentences. Other examples of selectional 
restrictions are kill which must take an animate object (Radford, 
ibid) and antenuptial which must occur with contract (Leech, ibid 
regards the latter as a collocational constraint) . Radford (ibid, 
p.l39) states that the isslle is over - simplified since kill can occur 
with inanimate objects \"hen used figuratively , as in ' Crowd 
disturbances are killing the sport' .. An example of selectional 
restrictions for the word handsome is provided by Katz (ibid, p.44): 
handsome [+Adj): (Physical)(Object)(Beautiful) 
(Dign i fied in appearance), «Iluman Artifact» 
(Gracious) , (Generou s) « Conduct» 
(Moderately Large) «Amount» 
Another example is the sense of hard meaning 'not easily penetrated' 
which can combine with the sense of chair if the semantic marker 
(physical) appears in the reading of chair in an underlying phrase 
marker (Katz, ibid, p.46). 
Katz (ibid , p .36) uses the term ' sense' " in i t s customary usage" , 
namely, for one of the differe nt meanings which a lexical item or 
expression may have. The term ' meaning' is applied to the set of 
senses which a lexical item or expression has: 
a dictionary entry will contain a semantic 
representation for each sense of its lexical 
item, and the semanti c repres entation of the 
meaning of a l exical item win be taken to 
be the set of semantic representations of 
its senses. 
A representation of a sen se must forma lly indicate its differences and 
similarities to other sen ses (Katz, ibid). 
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The Katz-Fodor-Postal approach has been criticized. 
(ibid) that these theori sts devote 1 i ttle attention to 
Lehrer argues 
the details of 
selectional restrictions. Furthermore , because the examples drawn on 
to explain the theory are "obv ·i ous and uncomplicated ... the difficulty 
of disco veri ng , characterizing, and devising an adequate formalism is 
obscured" (Lehrer, ibid , p.l77). As un example, if the word smell is 
marked by means of a · redundancy rule as applying to physical objects, 
this would then suggest that smell cannot be applied to stale air or 
to smoke or that the latter are physical objects. As Lehrer (ibid, 
p.lSl) states: 
It is clear that in many cases there are 
paradigmati c co ntra st s involved in words so that 
differences of selection restrictions can be predicted 
on the basis of mean ing. And one could always devise 
some features that would account for the rest of the 
cases ... 
Lehrer (ibid) concludes that most of the features 
listed as syntactic by Chomsky and others, are 
features. Chomsky (1965) ~ttempted· to deal 
that have been 
really semantic 
with selection 
restrictions in terms of the co-occurrence of syntactic c la sses (for 
example, the word admires requires an ani/nate object). Leec h (ibid, 
p.142) argues that selectional I'~ st rictions must be treated as 
semantic. He criticizes Chomsky's (ibid) ap pro ach as an attempt to 
introduce a se~antic phenomenon into the r ealm of syntax and he argues 
that this framework makes no room fo r acceptable se ntences. Chomsky's 
approach (ibid) requires that a verb I~atch positively t he features of 
subject and object rather than allowing co-occurrence unless there is 
a conflict of features. 
Fillmore (1970, p. l3l) arg ue s that for change-of-state verbs s uch as 
break, bend and fold, 
... selectional information can be as 
idiosyncrat ic as the kinds of properties that 
have been referred to a~ sema ntic di st inguis hers 
... it looks very much as if for a considerable 
portion of the vocabulary of a language, the 
conditions determining the appropriate use of a 
word involve statements about properties of real 
world object s rather thall statements about the 
semantic features of words 
- 58 -
Katz and Fodor (ibid) and Katz and Postal ("ibid) have formulated their 
approach within the framework of compositional analysis with syntax as 
primary: 
... any constituent's meaning is a compositional 
function of the meanings of its parts and thus, 
ultimately , its morphemes (Katz, ibid, p.35). 
Syntactlc organization plays a necessary role in 
determining the meaning of complex constituents 
(Katz, ibid, p.36). 
Leech (ibid, p.143) regards the Katz Fodor theory (1963) as "a more 
comprehensive account", although st ill subject to the same defect as 
Chomsky's (ibid) approach. 
Weinreich (1966) introduced a 'transfer feature' to overcome this, that 
is, a feature is transferred from one word to the accompanying word. 
Selectional restrictions are violated only where two features contrast 
within the same constituent. Howevet', meanings were still described 
by drawing on syntactic elements (such as words and sentences). Leech 
(ibid, p.143) suggests rather, that semantic units (such as predicates 
and arguments) shoul d be dravJn on. In the 1 atter case, only a 
dependency rule is reqllired which connects features in adjacent 
clusters. He explains that a spec ifi c feature wou ld be required in an 
argument if another given feature occurs in the predicate of the same 
predication. If there is a clash of contl'asting features in the same 
cluster, then it results in a violation of selectional restrictions as 
in 'The water cooked the dinner' (Leech ibid, p.141). 
The present approach, that of the "grammar" of words, i s not 
formulated within a syntactic framework although it is not intended to 
undermine the role of syntax in 1 anguage development. Different 
terms were employed by the present researcher so as to move away from 
the syntactic framework of SelE!ction.l"' restrictions used by Katz and 
Fodor, amongst others. Furthermore, Lhe term "grammar" i ncl udes not 
only the way in which the 'lOrd is used in a variety of contexts and 
any selectional constraints which operate in the use of the word in 
these contexts but also , the entire meaning of the word itself which 
stems from all its senses. The senses are not pooled to create a 
common core. Rather, the meaning is the diversity of senses of the 
word. 
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The present study does not aim to offer a theory but rather, to 
present developmental findings regardi ng primary sc hool children's 
ability to reflect upon word meaning where words are used in different 
co-occurrence relations. The elltire basis of this research differ s in 
orientation from that of Katz and Fodor (ibid) and others who have 
emphasized the notion of selectional restrictions . 
Lyons (1977) points out that both special ization and general ization 
play a part in language acquisition. Developmental studies (for 
example, Clark, 1973, 1974) have revealed that the deve lopment of word 
meaning occurs by means of spec ialization from a broader to a narrower 
sense. The present .researcher accepts these findings. However, it is 
important that these are viewed within the framework of the "grammar" 
of words. 
Errors involving selectional restrictions may be differentiated from 
errors in conceptual meaning. The sentence 'The. idea murdered his 
grandmother' demonstrate s a conceptual error or semantic anomaly. 
Lyons (1981, p.ll?) describes semant ic' anomaly as "everything that 
falls within the scope of the pre-theoretical notion of not making 
sense", that is, such expressions have no propositional content at 
all. Such 'categorical incongl'ui ty' descl-ibes expressions which are 
meaningless and cannot be interpreted by making minor adjustments 
about our world. Contrarily, when selectional restrictions are 
violated, the expression can be satisfactori ly interpreted but we have 
to make adjustments to our assumptions about the nature of the wor ld, 
for example, 'Colourless green ideas' (Lyons, 1981); 'The man is 
falling upside down' (Katz ibid), Categorical incongruity is closely 
related to syntactic unacceptability. As an example, it i s inherent 
in the meaning of exist that it cannot take an object, as in: 'My 
friend existed a I'l hole new vi llage' (Lyons, 1981 ) Another example is: 
'The hail is fall ing upside dO\~n' (Katz, ibid). In many cases, a 
clear distinction between semantic anomaly and violation of 
selectional restrictions is not possible and different theoretical 
standpoints may res ult in different interpretations of a single 
expression. 
Errors of "grammar" most cl osely ap~l'ox'imate errors of conceptual 
meaning but cannot be viewed within a feature theory framework. 
Examples of "grammar" errors are: 
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i) 'I have a pain in lilY head but I can't feel it' where an 
essential characteristic of pain, namely that one feels (experiences) 
it, is removed. This example reveals a semantic anomaly or a 
contradiction because pain must be perceived which implies the ability 
to feel. 
ii) 'He gave me a pain and now he wants it back again': part of the 
meaning of pain is that it cannot be transferred from one person to 
another. 
iii) 'The stone had a dream': part of the meaning of dream is that it 
can only be experienced by animate subjects. This example seems to 
draw on the feature <+ animate> and is equivalent to a violation of 
sel ect i anal restri ct ions. The present researcher phrases ' experi ence 
by animate subjects' not as a feature but rather, as part of the 
meaning ("grammar") of the word pain. 
From all the examples above, it is argued that "grammar" errors 
encompass a broader set of examples which include what hav e generally 
been regarded as a violation of co -occurrence restrictions (without 
drawing on a feature theory or syntactic framework as the basis). 
The three types of co -occurrence relations indicate probabilities 
\n· co-occurrences. In the present study, these co-occurrence 
relations are seen as contributing to the meaning of the word thereby 
adding to our understanding of the "grammar" of the word but they are 
not a substitute for the term "gramr,lar". As an example, the phrase 
' My pain told me' violates meaning at the level of selection 
restrictions because the word told requires an animate subject and 
pain has the feature <-animate>. From the framework of the "grammar" 
of words, this phrase would be explained, s imilarly, as a violation of 
"grammar" because pain cannot take on animate qual ities . However, in 
correct productions, selection restrictions do not have as their 
purpose to explain a word's meaning. Rather, they attempt to explain 
why words can or cannot co-occur. In so doing, they suggest that the 
meaning of the word, already e~; tablished, disallows its co-occurrence 
with certain other words. They do no t go on to argue that the meaning 
of the word stems largely from these co- occurrence relations as is the 
focus of the term "grammar" of words. 
explain a word's meaning by looking 
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The purpose of "grammar" is to 
at how other words affect or 
contribute to, its meaning. Co-occun·ence relations are important in 
the present study because they are seen as contri but i ng ina cruci a 1 
way to the word's meaning. However, it is also argued that a large 
part of the meaning stems from these co-occurrence relations. 
The focus is on the meaning of the word, for example, in the following 
contexts 
ball ~dress 
same~pain 
~leaf 
same alters its meaning: ball, dress, pain and leaf all contribute in 
different ways, to the meaning of same. Selection restrictions do not 
, 
explain these types of differences: same can occur with each of these 
nouns so no selectional constraint is violated. Furthermore , 
selectional restrictions are not concerned with the way(s) in which 
ball, dress, pain and leaf contribute to ·the meaning Df same. 
The "grammar" of a word is the meaning of the word as it is influenced 
by both the intralingu ist i c context (other words) and the 
extralinguistic context in which it occurs. Part of the meaning of 
the word is revealed by analyzing why certain words can be used 
together whereas others cannot. It is implicit in the present 
approach that any apparent 'core' meaning of the word encompasses only 
a part of the word's meaning. Foc using on a 'core' meaning takes the 
word out of. context whereas the co ··occurrence relations which are 
regarded as crucial in contributing to the word's meaning, necessarily 
pl ace the word within a context. The "grammar" of words draws on the 
three constraints mentioned by Leech (ibid) in arriving at its 
meaning. However, it is concerned mainly l'i ith conceptual meaning and 
these three constraints form part of tile process of the present 
analysis rather than comprising it s end-goal. 
Selectional restrictions assume that the meaning of the word is 
already 'there', (that is, one can isolate the features which together 
constitute its meaning) and therefon~, the word pain (as an example) 
cannot occur as the subject of the SE,ntence with the word told. The 
"grammar" of words stems f rom a very different premi ss, namely, that 
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the meaning of the word is only pal·tially isolable since it stems 
largely from the other words with whictl it co-occurs. 
Withi n the framework of the "grammar" of words, if a sentence is 
meaningless then it is "ungrammatical". In Chomsky's early model, a 
sentence could be syntactically acceptable and, at the same time, 
meani ngl ess. Sentences such as, 'Can Mary fi nd John's dog?' and 'Can 
Mary find John's pain?' reveal the striking differences in the 
"grammar" of the words dog and pain. We cannot look for John's pain 
in the same way as we look for John's dog. The "grammar" of the word 
pain disallows for the sentence 'Can Mary find John's pain?' to be 
asked in everyday language. All Eng1 ish speakers would regard this 
sentence as unacceptable, and thereby, display the same intuitions 
about language (whether due to training, to biological factors, or to 
an interaction of these factors). Contrarily, a sentence such as 'I'm 
in ache', although syntactically incorrect, is not meaningless at the 
level of "grammar". 
Despite difficulties with formal ization, Lyons (1977, pp.267-268) 
points out that: 
field theory has proved its worth as a general 
guide for research in de scriptive semantics over 
the 1 ast forty years; and it has undoubtedly 
increased our understanding of the way the lexemes 
of a language are interrelated in sense. The fact 
that it has not been, and perhaps cannot be, formalized 
would be a more damaging criticism, if there were 
available some alternative theory of the structure of 
vocabulary which had been formalized and which had 
been tested against an equal amount of empirical 
eVidence, and this is not yet the case. 
This issue of formalization has been discussed in relation to the 
"grammar" of words (section 2.1.8). 
2.2.3 Prototype approaches 
One day Morris the Moose saw a cow ... 
He said, "You're a funny -l ooking moose!" 
The cow said , " I ' m a COW. I'm no MOOSE!" 
"You have four legs and e. tail and things on 
your head. YOU'RE A MOOSE!" 
"But I say MOO!" 
Morris said, "I can say MOO too!" 
The cow said, "I give MILK to people. 
MOOS E DON'T DO THAT!!!" 
"So, YOU'RE 1\ t100SE IJHO GIVES ~IILI( TO PEOPLE!!" 
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The cow said, "My MOTHEI( is a cow!" 
"S he must be a MOOSE, because YOU'RE A 
MOOSE!" (t~orris the Moose , B. Wiseman, 1973). 
Barry: 31/2 years (language-impaired) 
"What's that?" 
"A table leg". 
" It can't be a leg 'cos it can't walk" 
The fi rst quote above ill ustrates the prototype emphas is when 
considering word meaning. Interest is in category membership, the 
difficulties we find in delimiting category boundaries even though we 
are readily able to ascertain what is prototypical of a category or 
not. The prototype approach es deal with substantive ·word meaning and 
with categorization in concept de ve lopment . Carey (1982, p.348) 
pOints out that , within the classical view, conceptualization is 
closely related to categorization. 
The second quote is included to illustrate the emphasis in the present 
study: it is not concerned with category membership as for the 
prototype approaches but rather wi tli our use of words in di fferent 
linguistic contexts. Here leg occurs in the context of table rather 
than in the context of a person or "!I imal. The example of a 'table 
leg' does not include a non-o s tensive word but the present approach is 
equally clear in relation to words which denote entities in the 
external world. 
The feature theories differ from the earlier theories of word meaning 
posited by Werner (1948) , Vygotsky (1962) and Brown (1965). Contrary 
to those theories which argue that " ... all referents are characterized 
by one or more common features" (Bowerman, 1978a), the latter ~heories 
proposed that the child does not associate a word with a single 
feature or set of feature s but shi fts from one feature to another in 
his uses of a particular word. This was termed "complexive" usage. 
In her prototype approach , Rosch (1973a, I973b, 1975a, 1975b, 1975c, 
1978; Rosch and Mervis, 1975; Rosch, t'le rvis, Gray, Johnson and 
Boyes-Braem , 1976) proposeq firstly, that a category (for example, 
'CHAIR') is not defined by a precise set of features but rather by 
attributes, none of which i s deci s ive. Examples of attributes are: 
having four legs, a back, a seat, to be sat on, and so on. An object 
whi ch possesses most of the important attri butes is a ' prototype' of 
the category. Rosch (ibid) found that the objects which are 
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prototypical can be rapidly categorized by adults. Second, she argued 
that natural categories have fuzzy borders. 
Both these factors (above) move c 1 earl y away from the feature theory 
approaches to word me aning. Rosch (ibid) argued that it i s the 
prototype which enables us to decide whether something should be 
called a chair or not and that if we imagine a chair, it will be the 
prototype that we imagine. Third, she concluded that most everyday 
concepts are arranged hierarchically ~Iith the basic level of 
categori zat ion ('CHAIR') conveyi ng the greatest amount of i nformat i on 
(in contrast to 'FURNITURE' or 'KITCHEN CHAIR'). These ba sic- level 
concepts are learned much earl ier than superordinate and subordinate 
terms (Rosch etal, 1976) 
Bates and MacWhinney (1982, p. 210) summarize the basic tenets of the 
prototype approach. These are included and elaborated upon in the 
discus s ion which follows, with emphasis upon those aspects most 
pertinent to the present study: 
i) Cent ra 1 tendency: The re is a cen t ra 1 tendency or prototyp i ca 1 
member of a category: it has most fe<ltures in cOlllmon with members of 
its own set and 1 east features in COllimun vlith members of other sets. 
A prototype is described as a "set of variation s around a central 
instance" (Bowerman, 1978a, p. 278). Whereas the feature theories 
argued for an analytic approach , that is, concepts are analyzed into 
features initi ally, the prototype approach suggests that concepts are 
holistic initially and that analysis occurs at a l ater stage. The 
latter is supported by studies in both children and adults. 
Certai n theori sts have argued for one prototype (for example, 
Bowerman, ibid; Ro sc h and Mervi s ibid); others for a set of 
prototypical exemplars (Carey , 1978; Keil and Carrol, 1980) . 
Extension of the word to novel referents is dependent upon the degree 
of similarity between the referent and the members of the exemplar 
field . Keil and Carrol l (ibid) proposed (based on Carey, ibid) that 
the meaning of a Iyord may be different for diffe re nt objects or on 
different occasions of usage. Certain elements of the meaning may be 
shared on all these occasions (for example, the I'/ord tall would never 
apply to colour properties), but witllin the domain (for example, of 
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comparative spatial adjectives), th(~ meaning of the word may vary 
considerably from object to object. 
Carey's (ibid) 'missing-feature-plus- haphazard -example-theory' argued 
that the child may first learn object - particular meanings which are 
idiosyncra\:ic and later , a more general concept that applies to all 
objects. Keil and Carroll (ibid) stud ied the word tall (a move away 
from the more common study of object nouns) and they suggested that 
this word is initially represented by a range of exemplars from which 
an "abstract concept" l ater emerges. They explain (ibid, p. 22) that 
... the child may learn what a tall man i s and 
what that particular usaye means, but may not 
have a general, abstract concept of 'tall' that 
can be used systematically and consistently with 
a wider cla ss of objects. The meaning of a modifier 
may be completel y embedded in the objects with 
which it has been learned . . . 
This view was supported by their experimental data 's ince children were 
found to use a, word correctly for some cl asses and incorrectly for 
others. Oden (1977, p.203) explain s that an appro'ach which favours 
categories that ha ve multipl (~ prototypes does not make " . . . the 
strongl y non - intuit ive prediction that modify ing a perfect table to 
make it more similar to a chair (for ex ample, by adding a back and 
padding) should make it an even better exemplar of furniture ... ". A 
single prototype approach suggests this. Nultiple prototypes, on the 
other hand , suggest that one can have separate "chair-furniture and 
table-furniture prototypes " . 
Ros ch et al argued (ibid) that the most prototypical members of 
categorie s have most attributes in commo n with other members of the 
category and least attributes in commo!! with other categories. 
ii ) Goodness of membership is determined by the degree to which 
feat ures overlap with the prototype (Bates and MacWhinney, ibid ) . 
iii) Heterogeneous membership implies t hat two items may overlap with 
the prototype but not with each other (Bates and MacWhinney, ibid). 
i v) Some features of the prototype are more heavily we i ghted than 
others. Weightings may be static acro ss co ntext s or dynamic, shifting 
from one context to another. Bate s and l~acWhinney (ibid) point out 
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that this is compatible ~Iith Rosch's position though not proposed by 
Rosch. 
v) The prototype approach (Bowerman, ibid) explains overextension as 
being 1 inked by a "fam i l y resemblance" rather than by criterial 
features. 
The notion of criterial features implies that within a particular 
category, all members possessing a simple set of criterial features or 
attributes , have a full and equal membe rship within that category. 
Rosch and Mervis (1975) extended the notion of prototypical referents 
by considering the distribution of at t ributes within a category. 
Rosch and Mervis (ibid) argued that in defining categories, 
Wittgenstein's (1953) concept of "family resemblance s" affords an 
alternati ve to the conc ept of 'criterial feature s'. As Carey points 
out (1982, p.352): 
Wittgenstein (1953) denied t he possibili ty of 
definitions for many conl~lex concepts . He 
argued that in many cases there simply 9re 
no necessary and suffici ent conditions for 
category membership. Hh spelled-o ut -example 
was game - the claim beillg that there are no 
properties in common to all games t ha t are 
necessary and suffic ient for something to be 
a game. Wittgenstein likened t he structure 
of such a concept to that of relations among 
members of a family ... 
, 
"Family resemblance" is used in a way which differs from "features". 
For example, games such as ball games, board games, competitive games, 
games in groups and games alone all bear a family resemblance to one 
another, yet they also differ from one another in many ways. I f we 
look at how we use the word game , \ve can see how diversely we have 
appl ied it. Rosch and Mervis (ibid) argued for a prototype approach 
in which certai n members of a category are more prototypica l of that 
category than are other membel's. They then applied the notion of 
"family resemblances" by arguing that within the category, the most 
prototypical members are those with mos t attributes in common with 
other members of the category. Not al l members have equal membership. 
In the present study, the term 'family resemblance' is exte nded to the 
co-occurrence of non-ostensive words with ot her words in the language, 
for example, there is a "fami"ly resp.rnb 'lance" between different uses of 
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same in an uttterance inc1 udi ng same ball versus same pain. These 
two uses of same bear a resemblance to each other rather than being 
identical in sense . "Famil y resemblances" refer to the relationships 
that hold between the senses of a word as applied in different 
contexts. The term "family resemblance " is not applied to the 
perceptua 1 resemblances wh i ch the term denotes for Rosch and Merv is 
(ibid) . 
iv. Word meaning as an image in the mind 
The ideational theory of word meaning suggests that a 1 inguistic 
expression attains a certain meaning through its being used regularly 
in communication as the ' mark' of a specific idea. The idea exists 
independently of language (Alston, 1964, p. 23) and the words express 
a complete thought. 'Idea' means sensation or mental image. 
This theory is limited in the following way: 
What are we supposed to look For by way of an 
idea of ' when'? How can we tell whether we have 
it,in mind or not? Ju st what am I supposed to try 
for when I try to ca ll it Lip out of context? The 
real difficulty is that we are unable to spot 'ideas' 
as we would have tu in order to test the ideational 
theory (Al ston, ibid, p.24). 
The ideational theory Fail s even fO l' words which could plausibly be 
connected with a mental image , for example, dog or stone. The mental 
image will not be the same on each occasion on which the word is used 
in the same sense and differences in mental i mage ry will not reflect 
in differences in what one is saying (Alston, ibid). Wittgenstein 
(1953, pt. 73) discusses the absurdity of regarding the association 
between a word and an image in ones mi nd as part of the words ' 
meaning: 
... if I am shewn vario us different lea ves 
and told " Tllis is called a 'leaf"', I get an 
idea of the shape of a leaf, a picture of 
it in my mind, - But what does the picture of 
a "leaf look like when it does not shew us any 
particular shape, but '~/hat is common to all 
shapes of leaf?' Which shade is the 'sample in 
my mind ' of the colo ur green - the sample of what is 
common to a"11 shades of oreen? ... Ask yourse1 f: 
Ivhat ~ must the sample of the colour 
green be? Should it be l'ectangu1ar? Or 
would it then be the sample of a green 
rectangle? - So sho uld it be 'irregular' 
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in shape? And what is to prevent us then 
from regarding it - that is, from using it 
only as a sample of irregularity of shape? 
Alston (ibid , pt. 25) confirms that ... we do not look for ideas in the 
minds of the speakers and listeners in order to settle questions about 
what a word means in the language ... " 
An apple may be prototypical of the category 'fruit' but this does not 
imply that, when we utter the word fruit we necessarily build up a 
picture of an apple in our minds. We may think of an apple when we 
hear the word fruit, but thi s need not occur: the image is not part 
of the meaning of the word, it is incidental to the meaning. Meaning 
is . rather, social and communal. The present approach is not 
incompatible with that of the prototype approaches. 
It is not being suggested here that the idea of a mental image does 
not exist. Certainly, we use the word's mental image , and we may say 
that something is "before my mind's eye", but it is argued that a 
mental image is not an essential par·t. of a word's meaning as some 
researchers have suggested. Certain proponents of a prototype 
approach (for example, Dirven , 1985; Keil and Carroll, ibid; Rosch, 
ibid) argue that a menta l image is built up in the mind. This may be 
true of categories such as 'FRUIT' in oll1ich an image of an apple is 
built up but this is certainly not es sential to our understanding and 
using of the word fruit. 
vii) Fuzziness and fuzzy boundaries in prototype theory. Peripheral 
members of a set are fuzzy (or ill-defined), sharing more features 
with other sets and they alter with the user's needs, whereas the 
prototype is easier to define (Sates and MacWhinney, ibid). 
The term 'fuzzy boundaries' has been appl ied to perceptual aspects 
pertaining to category membership (as in prototype approaches). 
These approaches are conce rned with the inclusion of a particular 
basic concept, such as 'WHALE' within a superordinate catego ry such as 
'FISH'. They have not been concerned with the "grammar" of words as 
is the emphasis in the present study. 
In anthropology (for example , Goodenough, 1956; Schneider, 1969) and 
in 1 inguistics (for examp·le Andersen, 1975; Labov , 1973) researchers 
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have attempted to describe categories which are by their very nature 
not discrete. 
1) Prior to this, category membel'ship was considered to be an 
all-or-none relationship (Oden, 1977) . 
2) In one study, Labov (ibid) aimed to determine the fuzzy boundaries 
of word meanings. He requested his subjects to imagine cup-like 
containers in specific contexts and to name them. He found that 
certain items ./ere considered to be r:learly prototypical with others 
on the boundary, depending on the context. Zadeh (1965, 1975) 
developed logical models for dealing with "fuzzy" information which 
provided the shift to regarding class-membership as "fuzzy". 
Other psychologists (for example, Rips, Shoben and Smith, 1973; Rosch, 
1973b, 1975a,b) attempted to devise hierarchies of prototypicality for 
inclusion of members within a particular categor~. They also found 
that the subjective degree of class membership affects other cognitive 
processes such as semantic memory (Oel ..,n, ibid). In fuzzy set theory, 
, 
many items may be neither clear members nor clear non-members and some 
exemplars may be members in certain contexts but not in others 
(Palermo, 1982). aden (ibid. p. 198) gives the example of a bathtub 
which is "sort of" furniture but adds that " ... it is certainly not as 
correct to say that a bathtub is furniture as it is to say that a 
table is furniture " . 
In the present study, the term 'fuzzy boundaries' is applied 
differently to take account of the characteristics of non-ostensive 
words. No attempt is bein9 made to devise a hierarchy of 
prototypicality for inclusion of characteristics such as duration, 
degree of discomfort, for when we use the word pain rather than ache. 
These factors are taken into account in the present tasks but it is 
not perceptual factors that differentiate these two words. 
Nevertheless, these previous studies on fuzzy sets contribute to the 
present approach. 
Andersen (ibid) proposes that the linguist ./riting a lexicon for a 
certain language , take fuzzy boundaries (which she equates with 
'vagueness') into account. Furthermore, she argues that the 
psychologist is required to explaill how children learn to make 
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distinctions between two le xica l items whkh are inherently fuzzy and 
to determine at what stage during the developmental process this 
occurs. Rosch (ibid) demonstrated thaL people are adept at rating the 
degree of membership of objects within a particular category. 
Cons i stency, both between subjects and with ina subj ect on different 
occasion s led her to conclude that peo ple experience no difficulty 
thinking in fuzzy terms. 
Oden (ibid) investigated subjects' reasoning when presented with fuzzy 
information such as, "Which is more of a bird: an eagle or a pelican?" 
and "How much more of a bird is an eagle than a pelican? " . Oden's 
finding s (ibid) supported tho se of Rosch (ibid) that humans are 
competent at proces s ing fuzzy information and that they display 
stable, consistent ratings in this regard. Degree of membership in a 
category was considered to be most important. As was mentioned , Rosch 
(i bid) suggested that for each category t here i s a prototype and that 
the extent to which the item is s imi'lar to the prototype, determines 
its degree of member.ship in the categol'Y. Tl1is view is supported by 
numerou s researchers (for example Brol'm, 1978; GI'eenberg and Kuczaj, 
1982 ; Neisser, 1984). 
As was mentioned earl'ier, Clark (1973) did not take into account the 
issue of fuzzy boundaries when expl icating her theory of semantic 
development. However , she was concerned with early 1 anguage 
acqui sition and Andersen (ibid) suggests t hat this fuzzines s may be 
learned at a relati ve l y late deve l opmental stage. Andersen (ibid) 
aimed to invest igate how children (aged 3-12 years) learned that 
boundaries are vague (or fuzzy). She used as her means the domains of 
cups and glasses, but, unlike Labov (1973) she did not place her items 
in a co ntext. 
Andersen (ibid) describes three stages in the acquisition and 
de velopme nt of these terms . Initi~lly, children have a limited 
vocabulary and li mited 'real world knowledge' and they were found to 
overextend the category 'CUP'. Children then focused on perceptual 
properties which led to overly discre te categories being formed. At 
this stage, new selllan t ically-related terms were acqllired. 
Subsequently, with an increasing awal'eness of functional properties, 
the vagueness of the boundari es betlveen cups and gl asses increa sed . 
The oldest children were the "vaguest". Andersen (ibid) conc luded , 
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contrarily to the present view (see section 2. 4.2e), that their 
definitions, as a result, more close ly approximated dictionary 
entries. As an example, 
... a cup was defined as somet hing which will 'hold 
stuff'; 'cup shaped, sometimes has a handle - sometimes 
it can be a mug'; or it is a 'curved shaped object for 
drinking out of, with a hole in the top - to hold in 
your hand'. This was opposed to a glass which is 
'taller, longer - kind of like a cup but higher ', and 
'a container for holding something to drink', 'usually 
clear, deep, and round' (Andersen, ibid, p.97) . 
This stage, comparable to adult usa~le, involved "an inter-play of form 
and culturally defined function" with increasing emphasis on the 
cultural aspects (Andersen, ibid, pp. 97-98) . Andersen argues that 
culture-specifi c characteri st i cs, 1 earned through one's experience in 
one's own culture, may be important since the functions served by an 
object may vary markedly across societ ies. These functions would then 
come to the child's attention later than would perceptual attributes. 
By the age of 12, the child starts to drav' on "cultural-functional 
criteria" in making decisions about category memDership. At this 
stage, he is not so dependent on certa in criterial features, which 
allows for "vaguer (fu zz i er) and hence more realistic boundaries" 
(Ander sen, ibid, p.99) . 
Children of all age groups were noted to learn the central members of 
a category prior to their l earn ing the peripheral members. This 
complies with the findings of Rosch (ibid) and Bates and MacWhinney 
(1982) that items closer to the central prototype are learned earlier 
than those on the periphery, closer to the vague boundaries. Andersen 
(ibid) suggested that Clark's sema ntic feature framework (1973), if 
modified to 
the child 
include the notion of vague boundaries, may explain how 
builds up an ideal and acquires the knowledge for 
identifying 'clear cases' and later, ' not-so-clear' ones. However, as 
was discussed earlier (section 2.2.2a), Clark's theory is subjec t to 
other criticisms in addition to not taking fuzzy boundari es into 
account. It is suggested that an entil'ely new framework may be 
required i n order to account for this. 
Andersen's findings are particularly 
The child's increasing awareness 
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pert i nent to the present st udy. 
of fuzziness may be equally 
applicable to the non-ostensive words being investigated. Oden (ibid, 
p. 204) concludes that: 
... the human competency for processing 
fuzzy information can be expected to 
permeate virtuall y every cognitive process 
that uses semantic information. 
It will be recalled (from section 2.1.6.) that the term 'fuzzy 
boundaries' is applied in tile present study to the overlap in the uses 
of non -ostens i ve words rather than to perceptual differences wh i ch 
account for category membership. Howe ver , a developmenta l progression 
for an awareness of fuzziness may be found equally" in the present 
approach and, "if so, it would have important impl ications for the 
development of the "grammar" of words. 
2.2.3 (a) Prototype approaches a~~.sL!Q._ chi 1 d 1 anguage 
It must be emphasized once again that prototype theory has not been 
applied to the meanings of non-ostensive words nor to primary school 
children. Rosch's theory (1973a, 1973b, 1975a, }975b) provided a 
basis for a suitable developmental theory, as shown in the work of 
Mulford (1977) and Greenberg and Kuczaj (1982) amongst others. 
In her research with chi 1 dren, Bowerman (1978a) found support for 
neither a feature theory nor a compl~xive usage approach. She found 
(p. 273) that where complexive usage did occur, it was in the form of 
associative complexes, that is, " ... successive in stances of the 
concept do not necessarily share anything with each other but all 
share at least one feature \vith a central or 'nuclear' instance ... " 
(a prototype). Contrarily, a chain complex (Vygotsky, 1962) suggests 
that the child extends a wOI'd to novel referents on the basis of 
attributes" ... shared by t.1O or more consecutive items but not by all 
the items ... there is no stable attribute nor set of recurrent 
attributes associated with the concept "(l3owerman, ibid, p.271). As 
an example, item A shares the attribute of shape with item B and item 
C shares the attribute of colour with item B but not with item A. In 
a chain complex, the original sample or the sample to which the child 
i s most commonly exposed, has no central significance. 
Bowerman (ibid) found non-complexive use for words applied to both 
objects and non-objects in the euly stages with complexive use 
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occurring more with actions than with objects. Complexive use 
occurred after the stage of one - word utterances and beyond. This 
would pertain to children in the primary school period, of interest in 
the present study. 
The prototype approach (Bowerman, ibid), in contrast to the feature 
theories, suggests that "exemplars of a concept differ in their status 
as exemplars" (Greenberg and Kuczaj, ibid) . Bowerman (ibid) proposed 
that children hear particular words modelled mo st frequently in 
connection with one referent or' with a small group of highl y similar 
referent s. Later, they produce these words in conne"ct i on with these 
prototypical referents only, that i s, they underextend. Still later, 
theY extend these words to no ve l referents that share one or more 
attributes with these protolypes. Every referent will have one or 
more attri butes in common with the prototype but they need not all 
possess t he same conjuncti ve set of attributes as the prototype 
(Bowerman, ibid, Rosch and Mervis, 1975). 
Bowerman (ibid) found support for the "find ings of ' Rosch and Mervi s 
(ibid) where applied to children. In compl exive word usage, she found 
a group of referents that has one or more attributes i n common with 
every other referent. In the child 's novel extensions, the attributes 
associated with the word" clustered maximally. Rosch and Mervis (ibid) 
reported that the ch i 1 d's categor "i es are bui lt around prototypes that 
are the first exemplars in his experience and only later do the se 
categories shift to best exemplars. Informatio n learned about 
prototypes genera l i zes wi th 1 i tt"1 e di ffi cul ty to per i phera 1 in stances 
of use though the reverse is not the case. 
Bates and MacWhinney (ibid) point out that the prototype theory allows 
for continuity in explaining child and adult categorization abilities. 
Thomson and Chapman (1977) fou nd that. " children judge certai n items to 
be better exemplars of a particular category similar to findings for 
adults . Mul ford (1977), based on Rosch, Simpson and ~1iller (1976) 
add s that the process i s simplified s ince many concepts are structured 
around correlated sets of attribute s rather than single at t ributes. 
As an example, feat her s and \,il1gs are correlated attributes for the 
concept 'BIRD', that i s, the presence of one assumes the presence of 
the other. 
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Bowerman's experimental data (ibid) and that of Barrett (1978) support 
the expl an at i on of a fami ly resembhnce approach. However Barrett 
(1982) argues that the prototype approach fails to account for the 
systematic developments that occur within semantic fields. 
Greenberg and Kuczaj (ibid) have proposed a theory of substantive word 
meaning acquisition. They favour a prototype approach based on that 
of Rosch et al (ibid). They argue that basic object concepts are 
learned holi stically by children and adults whereas superordinate 
categories are learned analytically. Both perceptual and functional 
information is more important initially. They regard prototypes as 
mental representations of instances experienced early and/or 
frequently . This differs from the present approach. 
There are other approaches to 
complex instead of a central 
variations on the approachs 
1978); as well as approaches 
limitations of· the feature 
word meaning arguing for a chain-type 
prototype (based on Vygotsky, ibid); 
detailed above (fot' example, Anglin , 
wh i cll have 'attempted to overcome the 
theol ·ie·s (for eX"ample, Barrett's 
Constrastive Hypothesis, 1982; GI-eenberg and Kuczaj's theory, ibid). 
These are not detarl ed since they do not add to the present argument 
and they fan to account for thl? "grammar" of words. None provides an 
adequate theory of non-osten s ive word lIIeani ng. 
A few researchers to date have touched upon the "grammar" of words, 
Kuczaj (1982b, p.40) discusses what he terms "semantic 
representations" which include information both about the meanings of 
individual words and about the re·lation of these meaning s to those of 
other words. He. presents as an example, the phrase hard dream which 
is "pecul i ar at best", wherea s hard book and hard rock are 
permi ss i b 1 e, although the mean i ng of hard differs in each of the 
latter two phrases, However, Kuczaj (ibid) has not attempted to 
investigate this in children nor has he taken it into account in his 
theory of language development (Greent\(' rg and I(uczaj, ibid) , 
In a recent unpubl ished doctoral study reported on by Dirven (1985), 
Brugman (1984) investigated t he ,lOrd over and isolated ninety 
different uses of this word in a variety of contexts. This accords 
with the present approach. Brugman (ibid) presented different spatial 
representations for the use of the word over and interpreted the 
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findings in spatial or visual terms. 
grammar", emphazi ng the mental image as a 
The limitations of this interpretution 
section 2.2.2 vi). 
2.3 The Development of word meaning 
She suggested a "spatial 
part of the word's meaning. 
have been discussed (see 
Development is concerned with changes that occur in behaviour with 
increasing age. Wohll'/ill (1973, p.240) states that 
... behavi oural development does not take 
place in isolated package s or a10ng neatly 
separated, independent tracks, but along · a 
variety of fronts in close interaction with 
one another. 
Feldman (1980, pp 6-7) pOints out that most developmental viewpoints 
are characterized by four basic assumptions, namely, those of 
universal achievement , 
and transition rules. 
spontaneous acquisition, in variant sequence, 
Briefly, universal achievement assumes that 
"there are ce rtain ad vallces in thought which all children will 
achieve" under varied conditions (Fe·ldman, ibid ; p.6). From a 
developmental perspecti·ve, thOSE: aspects of thought which are unique 
to us as indi vi duals hav e not been emphasized. It i s assumed that 
univer sals are acquired spont,~e2usly, t hat is; all children pass 
through all the stages of dev1,lopment witho ut specific intervention 
(Feldman, ib id). 
The i ndi vi dua 1 passes through certain 
to attaining the highest skills. 
progress i on from stage to stage 
invar iant seguences on his way 
Transition rules govern the 
in Vlhi ch earl i er steps are 
incorpo rated into 1 arger stages I n the sequence. The one stage is 
transformed into the next stage rather than being lost in the process. 
(A traditional mat urationi st approach wou ld regard each stage as 
discrete with nothing common bet\'/een the two stages). 
Devel opmenta 1 psychology has concentrated on understandi ng behavi our 
changes that occur \'/ithout spec ifl c envl ronmental I ntervent i on. 
Piaget ha s argued that intervention in the process suggests that it is 
no longer development (Miller, 1979) but rather, learning. The 
extra 1 inguistic contribution to 1 anguage learning has featured 
predomi nant 1 y i 11 deve 1 opmen tal psycho logy research over and above an 
attempt to establi sh uni versals U·1acdol1ald, 1978). Nevertheless, most 
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behaviourist psychologists accept some degree of innateness and mos t 
rationalists acknowledge that environmental factors cannot be ignored. 
In psychology, there are two opposing views of development: the 
organismic approach (for example, Bnmer, 1966; Piaget, 1950, 1967, 
1969; Werner , 1948) and the approach adopted by the social learning 
theorists (for example , Bandura and Walters, 1963). Both cognitive 
and learning theory approaches advocate the building of knowledge upon 
that which already exists within the child's repertoire (Prutting, 
1979). They draw on different processes in explaining developmental 
change . The former approach emphas i zes the concept of stages and the 
qual itative changes that occur from one stage to the next, with both 
biological and environmental factor's comi:lg into play. The latter 
approach rejects the concept of stages and emphas i zes a quant i tat i ve 
progress i on with experi ence and rei nforcement , that is , envi ronmenta I 
factors, being important in the process of development. In accordance 
with the learning theory approaches, the psychometric viewpoints of 
Gibson and Gibson (1955) and Olson (1970), both of which reject the 
notion of stages, favour a linear explanation of · che developmental 
progression. 
In the present study, development beyond the acquisition period i s of 
major interest. The early sta()es of acquisition have been discussed 
(Section 2.2.2) si nce later developme nt builds upon earlier acquired 
language abilities. The" present chapter includes a discussion of 
learning and experience, innateness, and the stage concept as it 
applie s to word meaning. The nature-n urture issue cannot be 
disregirded even at the later stages of deve l opment . 
2.3 . 1 Learning and experience 
Thi s section includes a discussion of the role of ostensive definition 
in language learning , the role of context in language learning and 
"language games " . 
2. 3. 1(a) The r ole of ostensive defjnition in language learning 
"You know, r think the Gulliver story is meant 
t o be a joke", suggested Fiona."The writer of 
the story was probably nlaking fun of the idea 
that words ta ke the place of the things they name. 
r t hink he wanted us to see that words are not 
just su bstitutes for things" (G. Matthews, 1984, p.69). 
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Denis (6,1 years): "Earl y and late aren't things. 
They're not like tables 1nd chairs and cups - things 
you can model!" (G. Matt:lews, 1980 , p.14). 
The referential theory of word meaning states that "the meaning of an 
expression is what it refers to" (Lyons, 1981, p.30). This theory is 
questioned in the present study. It relates to the importance of 
ostensive definition jn language learning, the latter view being based 
upon the assumption that a word 'stands for' an object. 
Alston (1964) points out that when ~/e say what a word means, we are 
using another expression which we "claim" has "approximately the same 
use" as the word we aim to ex pla in. Alston (ibid, p.22) therefore, 
prefers to phrase the theory in respo nse to the quest i on "What is it 
for two expressions to have the same · use? "'. This gives rise to 
answers , such as: " ... two expressions have the same use if and only if 
they refer to the same object ... " The referential theory can be shown 
to be inadequate as a tlleory of meaning simply by acknowledging that 
two expressions can have different u eani~gs but the same referent 
(Alston,ibid). Referring is only 'one of th~ functions that 
linguistic expressions perform, for example , to what do conjunctions 
refer? 
Carey (1982, p.347) states that: 
2 
Yo ung children learn most of their vocabulary 
from hearing new words in the course of norma l 
conversation and from ostensive definitions. 
Assuming a representational theory of mind, in 
both case~ tile child's menta l representation 
of th e lingui stic context i n which the new 
word is heard and his mellta1 representation 
of the nonlingui stic context are his bases 
for testing hypothe ses about the word's meaning. 
( . .. assume ... that when a person knows the meani ng 
of a wor~, he has a mental representatio n of the 
meaning) . Most psychologists, certainly all cognitive 
psychologists, would take this characterization of 
word learning as self-evident; it constitutes the 
framework within which theories of semantic development 
are set. This framework is not a theory of 
semantic development , because (inter alia) 
it lacks constraints on the kinds of hypotheses 
entertained by the ch ild. 
(The bracketed portion above is a cl'oss -reference made by Carey in 
her notes at the end of her art i cle) . 
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Added to this are problems associated with ostensive definition as 
fully explaining wor,d learning, detailed below. 
To define a word ostensively "i 5 to get someone to real ize what the 
word means by pointing to an example of that to which it refers", or 
to direct the person's attention to the object 10 which it refers 
while the word is being uttered (Al s ton, ibid, p.65). However, the 
explanatory value of ostensive definition in language learning has 
been shown to be restri cted and furthermore, it has been argued that 
learning of word denotation occurs simultaneous ly over a number of 
words. Lyons (ibid) states that children do not first learn the full 
extens i on of a word such as red "withou t knowi ng anyth i ng of the 
extension of bro~n or pink". 
dog to include all animals. 
The child may overextend a word, such as 
His full extension of the word dog will 
only occur once he has acquired the extension of words such as horse. 
A major criticism of ostensive deFinition as explaining language 
learning is that it "can never specify what it is that a sign refers 
to in the complex welter of pro pert i es that any (}bject neces sari 1 y 
displays" (Bruner, 1975, p.68). For example, if you point to a chair 
and say "chair", how does the chi ld know that yo u mean "chair" to 
refer to the object as a whol e, that is, the four-l egged, backed, 
seat-containing object. At another time , you may point in the same 
way to the same chair, and say "seat" or "brown". Wittgenstein (1953, 
pt.28) argues that " ... dn ostensive deFinition can be variously 
interpreted in every case", 
One could present the counter-argument that the child 'will 'assume' 
that the word refers to the object as a whole and, only subsequently, 
will he learn colours, parts of the object, and so on. Ninio has 
shown this to be t he case in the first two years of life (Ninio and 
Bruner, 1978; Ninio, 1980). Ostensive definitions are disambiguated 
by "the rule of the complete object", that is, a name appl ied 
ostensively to a picture is generally taken as referring to the 
depicted object as a whole rather than to parts of the object (Ninio, 
ibid, p.572). She found on a sample of forty mothers and children 
that mothers make allowance for mi sunderstandings when they want to 
name parts of objects. Either they name the part immediately after 
naming the whole object, or they refer to the whole within the 
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definition of the part, 01' both. In this regard, Ninio (ibid, p.565) 
argues that: 
... unless ostensive def'initions are used 
consistently on one level of reference, 
which is moreover known to t he listener, 
they are useless as a didactic device. 
The findings above still do not explain how ostensive definition 
enables one to differentiate colour from a part of the object. 
What does 'pointing to the shape', 'pointing 
to the colour' consist in? Point to a piece 
of paper. And now point to iLs shape - now 
to its colour ... (Wittgenstein , ibid, pt.33). 
Lyons (ibid) indicates that it is much easier to enable someone to see 
what we are pointing to if vie use other expressions that are related 
to the word we are defining . For example, 'That is a dog - not a cat' 
draws attention to specific characteristics which distinguish dogs 
from cats. Lyons (ibid) adds other major criticisms 
.. . the person for whom an expression 
is being defined ostensi vely must 
understand the meaning of the 
demonstrat i ve pronoun ' that' (or its 
equivalent ill other l anguages ) in the 
proposition "That is (an) X" , or 
alternatively of the ge s ture that 
• 
serves the same purpose. He must also 
realize what more general purpose is being 
served by the utterance or gesture in 
question ... Fina11y, he must ... either 
know in advance or infer the intention 
(defining property ) of t he class that 
is being exemplified. 
Whitehurst, Kedesdy and White (1982, p.399) argue that Bruner's 
comments against ostensive definition (1975) warrant "some rebuttal". 
They suggest that Bruner criti cizes os t ensive definition and then 
arrives at the following question: 
What must the child know before he or 
she can learn from osten sive definition 
and how does he or she come to do it? (ibid , p.400). 
Whitehurst et al (ibid) appear to have underm i ned the strength of 
Bruner's criticism of ostensi ve definition . I3runer (ibid) endeavours 
to explain language learning without recourse to ostensive definition 
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as an essential part of the learnin0 process. Bruner (ibid, p.68) 
asserts that: 
... we would do well to avoid falling into 
the classical empiricist trap of the theory 
of naming or referring ... and look instead at 
the procedures earliest used by the infant 
and adult in indicating and differentiating 
the very limited set of objects with which 
they traffi c. 
To explain language learning, Bruner (ibid) focuses on those 
behaviours that occur in mother-child interaction s that is, 
indicating, deixis and naming , and on hOl'i these behaviours explain 
early reference. Hi s use of terminology is important since he avoid s 
the term 'ostensive definition'. He emphasizes the early use of words 
for 'ritualized games' between mother and infant and argue s that these 
games offer an essential link between the word and its referent, 
thereby initiating the lexical acquisition process .. 
Whitehurst et al (ibid) conclude, correctly, that accepting that there 
are preconditions does not invalidate the proces~es which govern 
subsequent 1 earni ng. However, they have mi sco nst r ued Bruner 's 
position (ibid) and fail to . indi(: ate whe re they think Bruner's 
criticism of ostensive definition breaks down. 
Whitehurst et al's study (ibid) did illustrate, however, that 
ostensive definition and observation playa role in the development of 
naming both for object words (for exampl e, Gleitman, Gleitman and 
Shipley, 1972; Lenneberg, 1967) and for action words (for example, 
Bloom, 1973). However, Bruner's position offers an explanation which 
neither depends upon nor denies that ostensive definition plays a 
role. 
Watson and 01 son (in press) pY'opose t hat children generally acquire 
early words implicitly ratller tllan by explicit means such as ostensive 
definition. 
important. 
that are 
In t he latter caSt!, the extral ing ui stic context is most 
They argue (ibid, p.21) t hat t he "sheer volume of words 
learned by young chi ldren eliminates consideration of 
explicit introduction as a major vehicle in early language 
acquisition " . It has been assumed in much li nguistic research to date 
that the child learns a concept to which a name is subsequently 
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attached in the form of a label. This would suggest that ostensive 
definition is important in language learning. 
The learning of non-ostensive words, as their name suggests, is not 
readily explained by means of ostensive definition. However, we 
cannot rule out ostensive definition entirely, rather its role in the 
learning of non-ostensitve words is not primary. As an example, when 
considering the word pain; we can point to the pain behaviour or to a 
surface man ifestat i on of the pain but we cannot poi nt to the pa in 
itself. The extent to which ostensive definition comes into play will 
vary for each word, for examp 1 e , for the word chair, - we can po i nt to 
the chair itself although our pointing to the object and our pointing 
to the colour could be confused. In order to include the word chair 
in meaningful sentences we rely on 1 earning processes other than that 
of ostensive definition. For the word same, we can only point to 
similarities between two concrete objects. 
In the present study, the term 'non-ostensive' is appl ied to words, 
the denotation of which . <::annot be pOinted to; wol'ds that would be 
regarded, traditionally, as 'abstl'act'. Examples of such words being 
assessed are pain, same and pretend. Ostensive definition may seem to 
be more applicable to \~orcls denotin,) '<:: oncrete' objects than to words 
denoting 'abstract' entit ies. Althoug h a chi ld may learn the word 
table, in part; by means of ostensive definition, his ability to apply 
thi sword in di fferent contexts draws on pl'ocesses other than that of 
ostensive definition as does his abil ity to extend the word to other 
tables of varying . forms and sizes. On the other hand, the 
concrete-abstract distinction nlay merely mislead us into suspecting 
that a different process of word-learning may be operative. 
In our Western or-i entat ion, separat i on of the ' concrete' from the 
' abstract' imposes an arbitrary 'boundary' which helps us to organise 
our world. This distinction may then alter the way in which we 
perceive our environment. Cultural differences also playa part, for 
example, traditional Zulu people viev! what Westerners would regard as 
'abstract', such as ancestors , as tangible. There may not be a 'real' 
di fference between 'abstract' and ' concrete' terms or concepts beyond 
this surface i mposition. 
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The properties that di fferent i ate concrete From abstract ent it i es are 
difficult to isolate. Concrete objects can be manipulated but, it i s 
arguab 1 e whether pa in (an abst ract ent ity) cannot be ' man i pul ated' for 
ex amp 1 e, by a ch i ropractoY". (The sense of the word mani pul ate alters 
in each example). Concrete objects cannot be contrasted with abstract 
entities in terms of the property 'alienabl e': we can ' lend a book but 
not a pain' but within the category ' concrete', certain entities are 
inalienable and unable to be separated from the body, such as hair and 
eyes, although they are sti ll concrete. Pain , as an example, is not 
inal ienable, but it fun ct ions in the same way. 
We are compelled to look beyond ostensi ve definition for an 
explanat ion of tile development of words such as pain. The present 
approach makes no claims as to \~hether the demarcation in terms of 
, concrete' and ' abst ract' is real and, if so, whether words 
demarcating entities in these t wo categories are learned differently 
or by means of a single process. We cannot see pain, we cannot point 
to it (at best we could point to a bruise or cut on the surface of the 
skin or to the place on ones body); we cou ld poi 'nt to the person 
crying but not to the pain itself; ~If~ cannot even be certa in that the 
sensation is the same from one Dccas ion of use of the word to the 
next. However, we are led to believe that this sensat 'ion is li ke an 
object, that is, an 'object' in side ourselves . vie would then assume 
that we could point to pain, that it is tallgible, t ha t it has a shape, 
and so on, whic h is erroneous. Because pain has a physical reality we 
become confused, but what about a ~.ord like thought wh i ch ha s no 
phYSical real ity? 
2.3.1(b) The role of context in larlguage learning 
The concepts of learning and experience ' draw on the chi ld 's 
interaction with his environment. ~10ther and infant interact within a 
communication situation from about 12 weeks (Lew i s and Cherry, 1977). 
Performance factors such as memory span and 
perceptual and motor 1 imitations (Katz, 1974) , 
socio-cultural factors (Bouveresse, 1974) come 
factor s are no t detai l ed ill the present study). 
attention lapses, 
and pragmatic and 
into play. (These 
It is generally accepted that all analYSis of children's early language 
involves primarily an interpretat ion of the utterance ' s 
than of the utterance itself (Tunlner and Herrinlan, 
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context rather 
1984). The 
importance of context in rel at ion to 1 anguage behaviour and 1 anguage 
research has been emphas i zed b'y 
Bates 1976a; Kuczaj, 1982b) 
breakthrough in this regard . 
numel"ous i nves t i ga tors (for examp 1 e, 
since Bloom's (1970, 1973) first 
The present approach is framed within a psycholinguistic orientation. 
It draws on 1 anguage in context as most important in contrast to a 
formal linguistic perspective (for example, that of Chomsky, 1965), 
where language is investigated removed from context. Inspired by 
Wittgenstein (ibid), the present researcher argues that language is 
used to operate in the world: that a word or sentence must be part of 
a 1 anguage in order to atta in mean i ng, otherwi se, it woul d be merely 
noise . Chomsky (ibid) was concerned with an analysis of competence 
and in his approach, context would constitute a performance var iable . 
Kuczaj (ibid) differentiates external context from internal context. 
'External context' refers to the situat ion in which a child encounters 
a term (Greenberg and Kuczaj, 1982) that is, the nonlinguistic context 
(Bloom, ibid). The 'internal context" is a facto.r of the child's 
predispositions and past experiences which influence his 
interpretation of the external context (Kuczaj, ibid). The internal 
context emphasizes the active role .Ihid the child pla'ys in the 
interpretation process which then interacts with experience in 
determining deve"!opment. Kuczaj (ibid) emphasizes that this activity 
on the part of the chi ld must be taken into account in theories of 
cognitive development (Piaget, 1929). The separation between internal 
and external context enables us to explain wh y different people 
interpret the same event di fferently or why one person may interpret 
similar events differentl'y on different occasions. 
In the present study, the term ' context ' is used more broadly to 
encompass: 
i) Tho se "parts wh i ch precede or fol101~ a passage and fi x its 
meaning" (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1976). 
i i) Words in the sentence and in the 1 anguage as a whole to wh ich a 
parti cular word relates. 
iii) The common backgrou nd whi ch is shared and presumed by the 
speaker and the 1 i stener, that is socia l conventions which constrain 
- 84 -
the individual (Lyons, 1981), knowledge of the immediate situation and 
interactions that have occurred up to that time (Tunmer and Herriman , 
ibid) as well as the entire range of human experience. 
The term '1 i ngui st i c context' is reserved for (i) and (i i) above and 
'extralinguistic context' for (iii) ~l.ove . The term ' out of context' 
as used in this study, is applied relatively since it is argued that a 
word always occurs in a l 'inguistic context. However, language is not 
totally determined by its context since then it would carry no 
information (Lyons, 1977). 
2.3 . 1(c) "Language games" and Languag e Learning 
It was emphasized that language always occurs in context, both in a 
linguistic context and in an extralinguistic context . Researchers 
have drawn attehtion to the importance of dialogue in language 
acquisition (for example , Brunel- , 1975; Charney, 1980). Nelson (1978) 
argues that the child initially represents ·events, that is, 
interactions with others, rather t han objects. She ca lls these 
representations "social scripts". However, few researchers to date 
have drawn on Wittgenste in' s notion of "language game s". As an 
example , Snyder, l3a tes and Grethel"lon (1980) L1 sed thi s idea in 
relation to cllildren in the fir st two ye ars of li fe and talked of the 
"naming game". 
In the present study , the term "l anguage game" is used to refer to the 
different d'iscourse types in whi ch words may be used, for example, 
gi ving and following orders , tell ing jokes, greeting, cursing, and so 
on (see Wittgenstein, ibid , Jlt . 23). It is important to take account 
of 
the "language game" in which a word is used , when analysing a child 's 
language . The "language game" deli neates t he range of linguistic and 
extral'inguistic contexts in which the vlOrd is us ed and accordingly, 
the sense that it will adopt in t ha t particular context (that is, the 
"grammar" of the Ivord). The use of "language games" is particularl y 
clear when applied to non-ostensive Ivords si nce there is no exemplar 
which can be isolated as the chi ld 's initial example in learning. 
Rather , an entire situation or' "l anguage game " serves as the initial 
learning experience from which the child may generalize the use of the 
word to other "language games" either spontaneously or with additional 
teaching. 
- 85 -
Whereas speech acts deal with efft'cts on communication, that is, 
effects on the listener , the present use of the term "language games" 
app 1 i es to the development of word meani ng. Th is occurs ina 
communicative context, but the emphasis is on word meaning rather than 
on listener effects. The 'entire situation contributes to the child's 
learning of a particular word, for example, factors leading up to a 
situation and consequences of the situation are important: use of the 
word pain differs in the contexts ' be in pain' and ' pretend to be in 
pain' because the consequences of the behavioural sequences are 
different. 
"Grammar" suggests that fo r any particular \'lord, a va riety of 
"language games" i s required for learning to take place. In the 
present study, 'linguistic context' refers to same in same pain, and 
same ball and "language game" refers to same pain in 'I'm pretending 
to have the same pain as you' and 'my pain is the same as yours '. A 
word occurs in a particu'lar 1 inguistic context over a diversity of 
"language games". It is suggested that ,the meaning of the word stems 
not only from its 'i mmed i ate co -occ urrence re'l at ions in utterances but 
a 1 so from broader di sco urse . Coherence cons t rai nts in di scourse are 
not formali zed but they assist the chilc1 in learning the meanings of 
words. 
2.3 . 2 Innateness and the deve10pmen1~o f word meaning 
A " ... princip1e is innate if it does not come to be 
through learning ... " (Cat1 in , 1978 , p.,276). Universal 
in the mi nd 
aspects of 
language are "plausible candidates for the status of innateness" but 
are not necessarily innate (Cat1 in, ibid, p.277). However, if 
linguisti c universals are found in historically unrelated communities 
then it provides evidence for the innateness hypothesis (Macdonald, 
1978) . Chomsky's innateness hypothes 'is which ha s remained the same 
from his Standard Theory througll his Rev i sed Extended Standard Theory 
(Suzman , 1985) emphasizes" .. . th e child as hypothesis maker ... " with 
innate abilities wh ich erlable hi m to discover those variations 
pertaining to Ili s particular language. 
Chomsky (1972) and McNe 'ill (1970) argued for innate knowledge in 
language acquisition on the basis that input to the child is poor, 
often including comp l ex ungrammatical sentences . However, recent 
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research has shown that the inpllt provided to the child is not such a 
poor set of data. In this regard,Kuczaj (1982b, p.45) concludes 
that: 
Obviously, an account of language acquisition 
that emphasizes the child's linguistic 
experiences must assume that language 
acquisition occurs because of linguistic input 
rather than in spite of linguistic input. 
As Macdonald (ibid) points out, the language acquisition device is not 
triggered by mere exposure to a few instances of language use. 
Rather, the child displays sensitivity to language over a period of 
years (Atherton and Schlvartz, 1974) , and the functions which language 
serVes expand markedly from middle childhood through adulthood. 
2.3.2(a) "Ontological Knowled<;le" 
Katz (1966), inspired by Chomsky's work, proposed that there is an 
underlying conceptual real ity or a cognitive· preparedness for 
acquiring language and word meaning. This suggests that words enter 
into an already-present, underlying reality of language. Similarly, 
Fodor (1976) argues that thought is primary and that language attaches 
to an ~lready-present cognitive strllcture, an approach adhered to more 
recently (1979, 1983) by Keil. 
Keil (1983) attempts to specify children's earliest types of knowledge 
which he terms "ontological knowledge". This he describes as "tightly 
structured" knowledge which "forms a primitive core for lexical 
meaning ... " (ibid, p.l04). He proposes that word meaning involves two 
levels of semantic development: the ontological level and the 
defining characteristic level. Children's ontological knowledge is 
supposed to play an important part in their acquisition of word 
meaning by guiding inferences about ll ;e meJnings of unfamiliar words. 
Based on Sommers' approach (1963), Keil (ibid) emphasizes the 
importance of specifying the constraints on the hypotheses that the 
child can entertain. He arguE's that ontological categories form a 
strict hierarchy, and that predica tes in natural language span 
ontological types on diffel'ent parts of t he ontological tree . 
Arguing 
Sommers ' 
against Keil, Carey 
major hypotheses and 
(1983) provides evidence to refute 
concl ud!?s that there are no structural 
constraints on natural kind concepts: 
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... we are left with the pessimistic proposal 
that the only constraints on inductive practices 
are the theories held at the moment of induction. 
The only constraints on natural concepts come from 
the entrenchment of concepts in theories currently 
held (Carey, ibid, p.141). 
Keil's approach is subject to additional criticisms. Most pertinent 
to the ongoing discussion is that his view fails to account at all for 
the way in which a word alters its sense according to the linguistic 
context. He places a word at a particular node, thereby suggesting 
that its use in relation to other words is constant. This, in turn, 
suggests that once children learn to lise the sentence ' The pain is in 
my chest', they can spontaneously use the sentence 'I am only 
pretending to be in pain' without further training or exposure. It is 
suggested in the present study that jf the child acquires a word such 
as same and another such as pain, there is no a priori reason for his 
being able to use same and pain together as same pain. If he is able 
to make this general ization then it impl ies an 'innate capacity for 
language use. If not, it suggests that the child may need to learn 
each use of the word separately. However, the present researcher does 
not propose that there is an underl y ill'.1 ontological base. 
Rather, it is suggested that children are able to generalize their 
uses of words in specific way s , se 'lectively accounting for 
similarities and ignoring differences in their environment on 
different occasion s . Tversky and Gati (1978) emphasize that the major 
problem in concept formation and concept structure research is how 
children and adults are able to segment the environment so that 
nonidentical sti mul i can be tY'eated as equivalent. As Quine (1969, 
p.1l6) states 
.. ,there is noth i ng more basic to thought 
and language than our sense of similarity; 
our sorting of things in t o kinds. The 
usual genel'al term , .. 0\·le s it s general ity 
to some resemblance among the things 
referred to. 
Kuczaj (ibid) differentiates between innate language learning and 
innate knowledge, that is betvleen process and content. Similarly, an 
innate ability to . acquire language , tha t is , the strategies for 
language leal'ning, must be distinguished fl'om language itself as being 
innate. Putnalll (1974) and Mon ad 1980 (cited by Piatell i -Palmarini, 
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1980) make an equivalent point to explain r.1athematical knowledge. The 
present emphasis is on the process of language learning as being 
innate rather than gn the content as innate, as Keil's view suggests. 
Clark's semantic feature hypothesis (1973,1974) proposed that 
children extend words to novel referents which are "perceptually 
similar" to the referent to which they first apply the word. However, 
this does not take into account that we may group objects as 'similar' 
in one set of ci rcumstances and as ''d i fferent' in another and that we 
may disregard similarities in some situations and disregard 
differences in others. Clark (ibid) does not take account of the 
"grammar" of the words which are being extended to these novel 
contexts. 
Bowerman suggests (1981, P .17) that chi 1 dren may have "deep-seated 
cognitive predispositions towards perceiving certain kinds of 
similarities among events or relationships ... ". The child's awareness 
of similarities in his environment and his ability to shift emphasis 
in this way depending on the context may be inflate, learned, or 
determined by an interaction betw2en . the two. "Grammar" and 
environmental similal"ity may require different processes or be 
independent branches of a parallel process. From the child's use of a 
word, we assume that he regards two referents as "similar" (whether 
perceptually or functionally) but we have not taken into account the 
extent to wh i ch he is aware that the word alters its sense \~hen 
appl i ed to a dHferent context or when exactly he does become aware 
of this. Awareness is known to be a later developing function (see 
Section 2.4.2). 
Quine (ibid) argues that a standard of similarity must be innate to 
some extent since all learning depends upon it, for example, language 
learning and induction. He concludes (ibid, p.134) that: 
A man's judgements of similarity ... belongs 
in the subject matter not of our theory of 
theorizing about the world, but of our theory 
of the world i tse If ... 
Keil's studies could rather be viewed in terms of "language games", 
overlapping and intersecting in var'ious ways and perhaps subsumed 
under other "language games". Hierarchical trees are incidental to 
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his experiment itself. As an example, 'is tall' may intersect with 
'is honest' since both these "language games" apply to men. 
Keil's findings (ibid) could be interpreted as yielding information 
about the extent to which his subjects Ilave been inducted into various 
"language games". His suggestion that if the child uses a word 
appropri ately, it tell s LIS more than just that he can use the word, 
applies equally in the present study. It implies that the child has 
some understanding of the word (for example, that the word pain 
functions as a noun, in contrast to a word such as help); that he 
expects his utterance to give rise to a particular ' response on the 
part of the listener, and so on. Tile present study can be fitted into 
Keil's framework but this would merely constrain the study 
considerably. As an example, pain could be regarded as a "term" and 
is the same as yours as a "predicate". This would result in an 
investigation of one part of the predicability tree. However, this 
approach 1 imits the qual itative data which is so rich a source of 
understanding of tile child's language. 
• 
In concluding this section, 
... it seems most likely that linguistic 
universals result from the interaction of 
processing alld organiziny predispositions 
(some of which ~ay be i nnate, others of 
~Ihich may be learned) and environmental 
factors (Kuczaj, 1982b, p.Sl). 
2.3.3 The stage approach and the development of word mea ning 
Much debate about devel opmen tal theory 
has revolved around the issue of stages. 
For some developmentalists a concept of 
stage is fundamental to the very idea of 
development. For others, st age is 
considered an impediment to understanding 
the nature of development. Whether for 
or against stages, every developmentalist 
must come to grips with the place if any, 
of stages in the theoretical edifice 
(Feldman, 1980, p.ll). 
In the discussion which follows, we look first at Piaget's 
equilibration model together ,lith pertinent crit icisms of this model; 
then at attempts to formal i ze stages for the development of word 
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meaning; our use of the .lOrd vocabulary, and finally, a consideration 
of individual domains of knowledge. 
2. 3.3(a) Piaget's equilibration mod ~l 
Piaget's model (1971, 1977) describes in process terms the transition 
from one cognitive developmental stage to another. Piaget argued 
(ibid) that these stages are co nstructed by children as they interact 
with the environment and that , they are neither biologically determined 
nor presented by the environment. 
They cannot be given by t he environment 
because at times they are factually 
incorr~ct (preschoolers ofte n believe 
that the moon follows them around, that 
the wind is alive, and that dreams come 
in through the window at night). Nor 
are they innate because these 'wrong' 
ideas are later given up (Feldman, 1980, p.43). 
For Piaget, the term 'stage ' is not equatable ·to a corresponding 
chronological age but occurs within an age range. These stages emerge 
ina constant sequence althougll many vari al11 es affect the 
chronological age at which they appear (Inhelder, 1962). Piaget 
viewed development as occurring in the form of a staircase with shifts 
both within t he same level of functioning (horizontal decal age) and to 
different levels of functioning (vertical decal age). Qualitative 
rather than quanti tat i ve changes occur f r om one stage to the next 
(Flavell and Wohlwill, 1969; Pinard and Larendeau, 1969; Szeminska, 
1965), 
Piaget proposed the notion 
aspect of the developmental 
of stabilization during 
of transitional stages as an inherent 
process. These stages comprise a period 
which newly-acquired structures are 
consolidated and differences in perf ormance are accounted for by 
horizontal decal ages (Pinard and Larendeau, ibid). Flavell and 
I~ohlwill (ibid, p.81) suggest that this transition period occurs from 
the time when structures are "first-ill-competence" up to the point at 
which they are "all~ays-in-pel' fol'lnance " . During this time, the child's 
performance is influenced pal'ticularly by task and situational 
var iables. Wohlwill (1973, p.?!) point s out that Piaget (ibid) and 
Werner (ibid) were more concerned with the differences between 
behaviours at particular leve'ls of develoPment than with the 
transitions or developmental changes from one level to another. The 
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present study focuses both on the behaviours noted within any age 
range and with the developmental changes from one age 1 evel to the 
next. 
Numerous theori sts have attempted to cl ari fy the stage approach (for 
example, Flavell, 1970; Flavell and Wohlwill, 1969; Kessen, 1962; 
Pinard and Larendeau, 1969). Meltzer (1976) points out that the 
controversy has centered around whether stages do or do not exi st 
rather than concentrating on whether the stage construct has 
predictive and .explanatory value. Another question concerns the 
nature of the developmental change as either gradual or abrupt. 
Meltzer (ibid) suggests that the stage concept may be fundamental to 
Piaget's theory because the processes he measures lend themselves to 
such as explanation, contrary to the processes and issues dealt with 
by the behavi ouri sts. The stage concept may refl ect an approach to 
the study of behaviour rather than b2ing a direct reflection of the 
child's behaviour (ibid, p.41). 
In the late 1960's, the usefuln("s' of the stage concept was 
questioned: stages evade empiricalinvestigatiori; they ~Iere regarded 
as "mentalistic" and "axiomatic" and of "no heuristic va lue in guiding 
the work of developmental ists" (Feldman, ib id, p.2). It was argued, 
further, that stages as sume a homogeneous internal organization which 
has no t been found in empirical studies (for example, Turiel, 1966) 
and that the transformations to qualitatively different stages wert-
difficult to explain. Flave ll (1970, 1971a, 1971b) criticized 
Piaget's stage approach, arguing for a more gradualistic, 
'process-based approach to stag e development, namely that 
" ... behaviours reflective of g£!neral stages are present at the same 
time" and that " ... behaviou rs from new stages appear before the 
development of earl ier stages is complr,te" (Feldman, ibid, p.3). 
Brainerd (1977) argued that at any particular time, a child 
demonst rates behavi ours from several stages of development. Th is has 
been supported empirically since chi ldren Ila ve been found to take 
several years to acquire concepts wi th in a particular developmental 
stage (Feldman, ibid). Furthermore , with regard to stage development, 
Feldman (ibid, p.82) points out that: 
"There is ample specu lat ion in the literature 
about backward movement - what we have called 
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reversion - as part of the transition process ... 
we bel ieve that the individual's overall 
developmental organization does not move backward. 
More plausible from our point of view is that 
various elements in a g.enerally forward moving 
configuration are drawn back temporarily in 
order to consolidate a level or enhance elaboration 
of an emerg i ng 1 eve 1 ... " 
Numerous researchers· (for example, Brainerd, ibid) have criticized 
Piaget's notion that a stage is a structured whole, that is, that a 
developmental domain can be characterized as a set of "idealized 
stages" (Feldman, ibid). 
to gauge the behaviour 
Stages serve only as 
of actual children. 
a model against which 
Feldman (ibid, p.S) 
accepts that the concept of stage assumes a structural whole but 
argues that "structured wholes" do not exist "in children's heads". 
Fodor (1980) criticizes Piaget's interactionist view which he regards 
as a "compromise" bell-Ieen innatism and constructivism. Fodor (ibid) 
argues that there are no theories of concept learning: theories of 
learning to date explain hovi beliefs are fixed by experiences but not 
how concepts are 1 earned. Progress i on from one stage to another must 
involve moving from a conceptually impoverished to a richer system·and 
"it is never possible to learn a richer logic on the basis of a weaker 
logic" (Mehler, 1980 cited by Piatelli-Palmarini, ibid; Fodor, ibid, 
p.148). Fodor (ibid) argues that a stage progression occurs as a 
function of maturation. 
The growth of language, apart from 
obvious accretion of vocabulary, and 
the growth of knowledge, apart from 
obvious accretion of information, are 
to be seen as the unfoldihg of 
predetermined developmental stages 
involving specialization and restriction 
of competence (Piatelli - Palmarini, ibid, p.143). 
Fodor's view (ibid) has been sUPPol'ted by Popper, Kuhn, and Lakatos 
(all ci ted by Piatell i -I'almarini, J980) who argue that conceptual 
development is based on "fixation of beliefs", "nondemonstrative 
inference" and "hypothesis formation and confirmation" 
(Piatelli-Palmarini, ibid, p.161). Fodor (ibid) accepts that "more 
powerful formalisms" can be achieved by the child at certain stages 
but shows, on logical grounds, that this cannot be the outcome of a 
learning process. 
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... (it) must be a theol'y of how the 
environment selects amollg the innately 
specific concepts . It is not a theory 
of how you acquire concepts, but a theory 
of how the environment Jetermines which 
parts of the conceptual mechanism in 
principle available to you are ,in fact 
exploited (Piatelli-Palmarini , ibid, p. 151) . 
The impl ications for ' the present study of the above arguments are 
included in the section which follows. 
2.3.3(b) The stage approach applied to word meaning and our use of 
the word vocabulary 
It is apparently assumed by psycllologists and sp~ech 1 anguage 
pathologists that the child has a particular word in his repertoire 
when he uses the wOl-d appropriately. Such an approach di sregards the 
stage progress i on in the development of word meani ng. Vocabul ary 
studies of word frequency in children (for example, Burroughs , 1963; 
Carroll, Davies and Richman, 1971; Edwards and G.ibbon , 1973) follow 
thi s 1 i ne of reasoni ng. These researchers do vocabul ary counts at 
different age levels and conc'lude that a child's vo~abulary is either 
within or below his age level. SimilJrly, traditional psychology and 
speech-pathology vocabulary tests accept as axiomatic that if the 
chil d uses or understands the ~/Ord ina s i ngl e con text, he has it in 
his repertoire. Al though d'j fferent defin 'j tions lIlay be given for 
scoring, these tests fail to in clude qualitative responses for 
children of different age group !; . Examples of such te sts are the Full 
Range Picture Vocabulary Test (Ammons and Ammons, 1948), the Basic 
Concept Inventory (Engelmann, 1967), the Peabody Picture Vocabul ary 
Test (Dunn, 1965), the Clinical Eva luation of Language Functions (Wiig 
and Semel , 1980) as \'iell as vocabulary subsections in tests such as 
the Wechsler Test for the Measurement of Adult Intelligence (Wei::hsler, 
1944) . 
R. Clark (1982, [J.16) argues that there is a "lack of corre spondence 
between the conventional Ineanings of words and the meanings with which 
children invest them". Furthermore, it has been widely recognized 
that children do not "grasp the full meaning of the lvords they use" 
(R. Clark, ibid, p.16). Clark (ibid) points out that numerous 
comprehension studies (for example, E. Clark, 1973; Donaldson and 
McGarrigle, 1974) have delllOn strated childl'en's limited understanding 
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in this regard. However, the majority of tests to date have failed to 
take this into account. 
Our notion of vocabulary appears to have constrained our thinking and 
to have limited our understanding of word use. Th e presen t argument 
accords with that of Mulford (1977) who proposed that a concept is 
dynamic in its development rather than static. Even as adults, we are 
constantly acquiring new uses for concepts which we already pos sess in 
some form. 
To date, no stage progression in the development of word meaning has 
been widely accepted so we are able to take account of Fodor's 
arguments (ibid) prior to assum'ing a stage model. Recently, stages in 
semantic development have been IJrOposed (for example, Hakes, Evans and 
Tunmer, 1980; \~i i g, 1984) but they have not been accepted in any 
axiomatic form. 
Within a Piagetian framework, stages follow a set order, each stage 
being attainable only once the previuus .stage has been reached. Each 
stage is qual itatively different from the stages which precede and 
follow and stages are mutually-exclu s ive and discrete. Later stages 
are of a higher order than earl ier-developing stages and they enrich 
earlier-developing structures. liuwever, even in cognitive 
development, the notion of discrete stages is not absolute and the 
stage concept is not fully resolved (Macdonald , 1985). 
When applied to language development, additional difficulties are 
encountered. Language appears to be more of a unity than does 
cognition. This unity appears to be a characteri stic of language 
itself (Macdonald, ibid). Once sentences and discourses are learned, 
there is a gradual increase in complexity of language use but not a 
qual itative shift to stages of a different order. Individual 
variation is also greater in lan guag~ development than in cognitive 
development. Metal inguistic awareness tempts us into considering the 
child as having attained a different level of language ability because 
metalinguistic skills involve language as a control process. However, 
meta linguistic awareness is regarded as a skill appearing later in 
deve I opment rather than as a different deve 1 opmenta 1 stage. Th ere is 
still a gradual increase in the complexity of the child's language 
abil ities. 
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Hakes et al (ibid) argue that during the preoperational period, 
cogn it ion, sentence comprehens i on and word mean i ng appear to follow 
the same developmental· progression although the properties to be 
inferred are di fferent. Based upon her ~/Ork with learning disabled 
children, Wiig (ibid) proposed stages in the development of word 
meaning parallel ing Piagetian stages of cognitive development. For 
example, during the · holophrastic pilase, meanings are tied to the 
functions of words. During the preoperational period, (2-7 years), 
meanings are said to become associated with concrete actions. The 
concrete operational stage at 7-11 years parallels the child 's being 
able to perceive more complex relationships and words· take on broader 
mean i ngs , with word 
formal operational 
defi ni t ions bound to sentence contexts. At the 
child's stage (11 years onwards) , 
word-definitions are equivalent to those of adults. 
provided by Wiig (ibid) are of object-words (for 
bottle, mother) and do not include non-osten~ive 
the 
The examples 
example, bird, 
word meaning. 
Furthermore, these examples do not take account of the "grammar" of 
these words . 
In the present study, i t is ilypothesized that the child's use and 
understanding of a parUcular l"Iol-d alters l"Ii th development. Trends 
rather than specific stages are postulated. As Macdonald (1978) has 
suggested, we may not know what con st itutes a qual itative change in 
language development. At the preschool level, these changes are 
marked and, therefore, easily discerned. At the later stage s, 
development s lows down and subtler changes have to be noted. 
Hake.s et al (ibid) point out t hat both nevi Vlords are learned and new 
senses are added to knO\~n Vlords. The rudiments of this idea can be 
found in the work of researchers such as Dare (1974, 1975) and 
Halliday (1975). They argued that a va ri ety of senses is expressed 
for anyone word. However , they dealt \'lith the earl y acqu is i t i on 
stages and did not elaborate ~Iith regard to the older child. More 
recently, the work of Mulford (ibid) wllo emphasized the dynamic 
progression of word meaning approximates the idea of the "grammar" of 
words. 
It is evident that the child of 4-:' years does not have a fully 
developed linguistic system. Leech (J974, p.203) points out that: 
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Whereas we have learned the grammatical 
rules of English in all essentials by the age 
of five, we continue the process of acquiring 
vo~abulary and new uses nf vocabulary right 
the way through our lives. 
More recently, psychol inguists (for example, !lakes et al, ibid) have 
suggested that, during the period of middle childhood, children become 
capable of linguistic intuitions which enable them to manipulate 
language beyond the level of comprehension and expression (see Section 
2.4.2 for further discussion of metalinguistic awareness). The link 
between child and adult language has recently been suggested as 
resting in metalinguistic skills (for example, Hakes et al, ibid; 
Macdona 1 d, 1983). However , i nd i vi dua 1 differences have been observed 
in 'children's metalinguistic abilities during the middle childhood 
period in contrast to relative consistency between children on primary 
linguistic tasks (Tunmer and Herriman, 1984). 
Metaphoric 1 anguage seems on the surface, to be of importance in the 
present study. Metaphor involves the breaking of rules in a 
calculated way. The Illet(l.phor acquin,s its unique meaning from the 
rule that is broken. Some metaphors remain as metaphors only (in the 
language) but most of their vlOrd (ompon"nts can be used in their 
non-metaphorical ways as well. As Lanham (ibid) points out, the child 
is exposed to extensive rule-breaking of this kind both in his reading 
and in the 'imaginative language of fantasy play. Animals take on 
human qual ities, inanimate object s acquire animate properties, and so 
on. 
It is suggested (Lanham, ibid) that young childl-en may be insensitive 
to the constraints which metaphor subsequently breaks down or 
transcends. If children argue that 'you can give somebody a pain' , 
are they insensitive to the constraints imposed by the meaning of 
these words? Are. they talking metaphorically? Winner (1978) 
described metaphoric language in children at the early stage of 
symbolic play (2-3 years) but \~e are unable to determine whether this 
is 'true metaphor' invol ving conscio ll s manipulation of words on the 
part of the child. 
As Leech (ibid, p.45) points out, metaphor involves "realigning 
boundaries". It has "a liberating effect". 
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It is not surprlslng that children's 1anguage 
produces many instances of semantic ' mistakes' 
which strike the adult as poetic ... Using 11is 
generalizing ability, the child hits· on 
physical appearance as a crucial criterion, at 
the expense of the criterion of function, which 
the language regards as more important. 
The difference between the two cases, of course, 
is that while the poet is familiar with the 
institutional categories and is aware of his 
departure from them, the child is not. 
The child is, therefore, not displaying true metaphoric use of 
1 anguage. 
From a developmental perspective, the present researcher is 
inv~stigating how children progressively make the adjustments in 
learning the meaning of a word in all its diversity. What aspects of 
the word's meaning do children of different ages focus upon when 
required to reflect upon the word as it occurs in different contexts? 
As an example, what does the eh i 1 d unders tand by the word same ina 
task which includes the word same together with pain? Does he focus 
on the place of the pain at· the type of pain as being important 
factors 1 eadi ng him to concl ude whether they are the same or not? 
Does he assume that there are two pain s and not one that is shared? 
Lanham (ibid) postulates that certain errors in co-occurence relations 
may occur at diFferent age levels. As an example, young children may 
use collocation only: they have a very narrow range of word use. To 
them, one word may necessarily predict another within a limited 
vocabul ary . 01 der and younger ch i loren reveal different types of 
errors. It would "seem that children may not differentiate between 
co-occurence restrictions (such as collocative constraints and 
selectional restrictions) in their use of language. However, this 
type of information is in the child's head and is, therefore, 
inaccessible to empirical investigation. 
selectional and styl istic constraints have 
the present study. 
Furthermore, collocative, 
only indirect bearing on 
2.3 . 3(c) Stage development and non -universal achievement 
Feldman (1980) deviates from a strict Piagetian position since he 
regards stages as applying not only to general, universal cognitive 
development but also to more individual domains of knowledge and skill 
which also comprise ideal stages mastered in an invariant sequence . 
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Stemming from his work with child pl'odigies, Feldman (ibid) proposes 
that non-universally acquired domains may also be developmental: for 
example, achievements which are cultural, discipline-based or 
idiosyncratic. These would be hiearchically organized, following a 
sequence in development with trans it i ona I phases but they need not be 
spontaneously acquired. 
As an example: 
The structure of chess (or any of many other 
doma ins) could (therefore) be seen as a series 
of increasingly sophisticated programs designed 
to play the game at succeeding levels (ibid, p.8). 
The abilities tapped by the metalingu 'istic tasks in t he present study 
cannot be assumed to be universal. In a personal communication 
(1984), Feldman predicted that the children's responses in the present 
study would be non-universal or unique in character. Along si milar 
lines, G. Matthews (1980) discusses children's understanding of 
philosophical questions as unique to specific individuals rather than 
universal. The similarity between r1atthew's tasks and those in the 
present study suggest that \oJe cannot igllore either commonal ities and 
stage development or indi vidual variaL i on. 
Lieven (1980, p.37) notes that commonalities rather than individual 
differences are emphasized in child language studies, but she stresses 
the importance of taking individual differences into account in 
theories of child language. Research over the last decade has 
indicated differences between children even within the same population 
group (Bloom, Capatides and Tackeff, 1981; Nelson 1975a; 1975b). These 
researchers point out that "if the consensus fails, it may not be the 
analysis that is incorrect; the analysis could be correct, but the 
children could be different" (p.407). Kuczaj (1975) suggests that the 
acquisition sequence for the meaning of related words may vary from 
child to child ' but become con sistent in the later stages . 
Accordingly, Bowerman (1982a, p.345) argues that research is required 
to determine the extent of indi vidual differences in particular 
domains during language development and to isolate those factors which 
affect the chi ld 's "search for lingu' stic regularities " . 
Individu al differences were considered of importance to take into 
account in the present study. Furthermore, the present study included 
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children from a particular sub ,·group (namely white, Jewish) within a 
particular culture (South Africa) so that, what may be determined here 
is not universal ability but rather, cultural versus unique abi l ity. 
2.4 Rationale for the method ~nd re search design 
This section integrates the theories presented in sections 2.1,2.2 
and 2.3 with the ori entat i on of the present researcher and with the 
method adopted in this study. An overview of the present approach 
introduces the section. Thi s is followed by a discussion of the 
non-ostensive words selected for investigation, of metalinguistic 
awareness as the method adopted and of adult performance as the 
end~ state in the developmental process. 
The investigative procedures and theoretical basis of this study are 
psychol inguistic in orientation, derived in part from the prototype 
approaches. These approaches have been modifieH on the basis of 
inspiration from Wittgen stein's notion of the nature of meaning 
(1953). The prototype approaches descI'ilJe superol'dinate categories 
(for example, fruit) and basic tenus (for exailiple, apple). The 
present researcher ' extends the principles and cllaracteristics of 
prototypical referents to words, til(; mean ings of which ca nnot be 
primarily explained by ostensive definition, for example, pain and 
pretend. 
In line with specific 
accepts that categories 
as peripheral members. 
, prototype theories, the present researcher 
(words) co nsist of multip le prototypes as well 
Members of the category bear a "family 
resemblance" to each other and tllo bOllndaries of the 
many cases, fuzzy. Mod ifyi ng this approach and 
category are, in 
applying it to 
non-o stensive words such as pain and <lche, it is argued that "lords do 
not have a core mean i ng bu t rather that the mean i ng of a word alters 
as it enters into co-occurrenC8 rela!. ions with other words and with 
different discourse types. The se in turn, are related to patterns of 
human activity. The no t i on of tile alterations in a word's meaning as 
it co-occurs wi th other ,lOrds in the 1 anguage has been i nspi red by 
Wittgenstein (ibid) and is termed "grammar" in the present st udy. The 
co-occurrence of words in discourse types and their relation to 
patterns of human activity come close to Wittgenstein's use of 
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"language 
tell i ng a 
games" (ibid) and· include conducting 
joke, amongst other behaviours . 
an interview and 
In arguing against a core theory of meaning, the present researcher 
applied the term "family resemblance" (used by Rosch as inspired by 
Wittgenstein, ibid) to non-ostensive word meaning: the senses of a 
word alter in different co-occurrenCE! relations in different contexts 
and all these senses bear a "family resemblance" to one another. The 
boundari es between these senses of a word and between 
semantically-l inked words (for example, pain and ache) are fuzzy, in 
that there is at times overlap of senses of the words. -
Examples of tasks which reflect the inspiration that has been derived 
from Wittgenstein (ibid) are: 
What is a pain? 
What is a thought? 
Can you have the same pain as me? 
Can you feel my pain? 
How do you pretend to be in pain? • 
The defi n it i on and fuzzy boundary tas ks compri se different "1 anguage 
games" . 
It mList be emphas i sed tha t the prototype theori sts are not concerned 
with word meaning in the same way as the present researcher. They 
argue that an image of the category prototype is bui It up in the mi nd 
of individuals. This may be acceptable for category membership but, 
where the prototype theory is extended to non-ostensive word me aning , 
it is argued that a mental image is of no importance to our use of the 
word or to ollr understanding of the word's lIIeaning. 
Psychol inguistic research to date (for example, the feature theories 
and the numerous studies on overextension and underextension in 
children) has not concentrated on non --ostensive word meaning. It has 
al so not adequately accounted for the way in which a word (even a 
substantive word) alters its sense as it co -occurs with other words, 
expressions and discourses in the language. What is here termed 
"grammar" has been taken for granted and has not, 
questioned in numerous psycholingllistic studies. 
theori es suggest that a word attaches as a -, abel 
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therefore, 
Many of 
been 
these 
to a previously 
acqui red concept. If the present view concerning the "grammar" of 
words is supported, then it provides evidence which questions the 
'label approach' to the acquisition of word meaning; the core theory 
of meaning; and the notion that an image is built up in the mind as a 
part of the meaning of the word. 
The present approach cannot be dismissed as eclectic and atheoretical . 
In many respects, it involves expansion on the traditional approach to 
psycholinguistics, taking into account additional facets of, and 
problems related to, word meaning. For example, 
metalinguisticall y-phrased questions were formulated to examine 
children's understanding of non-ostensive words. It is of interest 
whether non-ostensive words are acquired in the same way as 
substantive ' words. The study of word meaning in older children is 
useful in examining this. Non-ostensive words are implicitly more 
complex than substantive words which suggests that they may be learned 
later in development. 
2.4.1 Sources of non-ostensive words examined in this study 
Numerous studies have investigated childl-en's understanding of words, 
the meanings of which cannot be centrally explai ned by means of 
ostensive definition. However, these words have not been studied from 
the point of view of "grammar" nor from the general orientation 
adopted in the present study. A resume follows of research findings 
to date on the words reI evant to thi s study. The coverage gi ven to 
any particular word is determined by the amount of theory and research 
in this area rather than by its reldtive importance in the present 
study. 
, 
2.4.1(a) Pain " ... gets a perhaps undue share of attention in 
philosophy" (Austin, 1979, p.254), providing a source of endless 
debate in philosophical c ircles. Howe ve r, the word pain has not been 
investigated to date from a psycholinguistic perspective. Part of its 
"grammar" is that it cannot be applied to inanimate objects; that it 
cannot be transferred from one person to another; that it is used 
within a broad situational context involving cause, possible overt 
demonstration of pain behaviour' and consequences; that the experience 
of pain is private but that we are able to communicate effectively 
about it with others; that we can point to the place of the pain but 
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not to the pain itself, and that eillot ional pain differs from physical 
pain. Furthermore, we have to feel pain in ourselves in order to have 
pain but we draw on a different set of criteria for detecting pain in 
another person. Pain and ache may both be app 1 i ed to discomfort in 
any area of the body but ache is more commonly applied to certain 
areas such as tooth, head and stomach. 
All these aspects reveal the "grammar" of the word pain and hence, its 
meaning. Pain, like other words i s learned socially as Wittgenstein 
(ibid) emphasized . It is of particular interest because it ha s given 
rise to misconceptions in philosophy: it has been thought of as a 
'mental' word which then de-emphasize5 the social aspect of language. 
Pain was grouped for investigation with ache and sore which are 
regarded as semantically-linked words. Context clearly plays a 
crucial role in the child's learning of these words and in adults' 
explanations about the words' mean ing s. 
2.4.1.{b) Anger was included because H bears num~rous similarities 
to pain while providing usefu'l contrasts. As an example, pain is 
usually i sol ated to a particul ar arl,a of t he body whereas anger is 
not . Cross was included to gain a fuller understanding of anger. 
2.4 . 1(c) 
Ti~ (6 years): Papa, how can we be sure 
that everything i s not a dream? ... Well 
I don't think everything is a dream, 
'cau se in a dream people wouldn't go 
around asking if it was a dream. 
Matthews: Couldn't one have a dream in 
which one asks whether one is dreaming? 
I see no reason why not. 
(G. Matthews, 1980, pp.23, 25). 
Children'S concepts of dreams and thlJughts have been studied by many 
researchers (for example, Larendeau and Pinard, 1962; Piaget, 1929). 
These studies traced the child's ability to categorize these phenomena 
as 'ment al' rather than invest-igating the words themse lves (Johnson, 
1982). Children commonly locate mental acts in the head and only 
later, regard them as immaterial. Ini tially, cllildren associate 
dreams with epheme ral phenomena such as cl ouds; thoughts with an inner 
voice; and mind \v ith an internal body part (Johnson, ibid). However , 
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Johnson (ibid) argues that the child is not interpreting dream to mean 
see or think to mean say. Preschoolers are able to distinguish 
appropriately between the uses of these vel'bs but are , as yet, unable 
to categorize these differences: the immaterial quality of thinking 
places it in a logically discrete category From speaking. 
I n the present 
investigated. 
is part of the 
study, the "grammar" of the words dream and thought is 
It is argued that the categori zat i on Johnson ment ions 
"grammar" of the word and that children will be able to 
apply these words appropriately in certain contexts even though their 
"grammar" is 1 imited compared to older children. Whereas some people 
may be tempted to argue that pain has a physical reality, thought does 
not ' lend itself to such a temptation. Piaget (ibid) questioned 
children about dreams and thoughts but his analysis of the data did 
not account for the role of language. The present researcher adopted 
a 1 inguistic orientation to und(~rstanding the words dream, thought and 
daydream. Findings are not entirely compati ble w'ith those of Piaget 
since they were app 1 i ed 
may still be gained. 
to different p'opuiation groups but insights 
2 . 4.1. (d) Same, similar _and diXf_er_~n,t 
Numerous studies have been cUllducted tui nvest igate the words same, 
s imil ar and different , part i cu 1 arl y duri ng the preschool peri od (for 
example, Donaldson and \vales, 1970; Kanni"loff-Slllith, 1977, 1979a; 
Palermo, 1973). A brief overview win be presented but it must be 
kept in mind that these researchers did not assess these words from 
the point of view of "gralllmar " nor did they study children beyond the 
age of 7 years. Previ ous res(~archers have di scussed the senses of 
words (parti cul arly of same) but they have not dealt wi th the way in 
which sense of a word alters according to the words with which it i s 
associated. Children's ability to reflect upon the meanings of these 
words has not been examined to date. 
Early research on children's comprehension of same and different 
(Donaldson and Wales, ibid) found that they treated both words as if 
they meant 'sallie' which was intel'preted as revealing in complete 
semantic acquisition. Three and a Inlf year olds , selected a similar 
object when asked for a different one. The authors suggested t ha t the 
young child interprets different as 'different kind', selecting a 
similar object but one which is not identical. Different suggests to 
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the child an equivalence sense of same (fol- example, 'This book is 
different from this one' in that there are two books not one). 
Glucksberg, Hay and Danks (1976) aprl ied the paradigm to adults and 
found that, in certain circumstances, adults respond identically to 
'same' and 'different' requests, for example, 'a different one' 
(screwdriver) suggested another one of the same type. 
A study by Webb, Oliveri and O'Keeffe (1974) revealed that when 
required to select 'a different object', children up to 31/2 years of 
age chose an object which was maximally similar to the other object 
with correct performance occurring beyond this age. They proposed a 
four -stage model prog)'essing from confusion of different with same; to 
the ' interpretation that different means 'another'; to correct use 
based on a dimension of silnilarity and finally, to adult use . Webb et 
al (ibid) restricted their application of same to two objects which 
, share "at least one visible dimension", Different was applied to 
objects which differ "on one or more dimensions". they noted that two 
objects can also be both similar and different. These definitions 
• necessarily impose limitations on the task when one considers the 
diversity of appl ication of each of tllcse terms both by individual 
subjects and from one context to another. 
In the present study, it is argued from the perspect i ve of "grammar" 
that one cannot define or establish a set number of criteria in 
investigating these words. Webb et al (ibid) impose co nstraints on 
these terms and therefore, on the child, vl hich biase s the task. A 
, correct' response then accords vlith the experi menter 's view rather 
than with that of the child . We ~ay be able to determine from 
observable criteria (visual differences) what the child understands by 
different if asked, for example, for 'objects that are the same' but 
justifications would better elucidate the child's reasoning when 
handl i ng such tasks. Webb et al (ibid) drew on justi Fications only in 
their second set of tasks which assessed different. 
Webb et a1 (ibid) argue that same and different cannot be explained 
with reference to lexical marking as can other antonymic pairs such as 
big and little (H. Clark' s vielv, 1970). They pro pose (ibid, p.984) 
that same and different )'eFer not to "" .any particul ar physical 
dimension but to an apparently infinite number of possible s imilarity 
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relations generated by tile speaker according to the physical or 
linguistic context". 
The findings by Webb et al (ibid) concerning the word different, 
accord with the findings of Karmiloff-Smith (1977) on same with 
French-speaking children. She investigated same and other as 
post-article determiners. She reported that children of 3-4 years 
incorrectly interpret 'the same' as 'same kind' (equivalence sense) 
rather than as 'same one' (identity sense). Three year olds regard 
same as suggesting that all attributes are identical which is not the 
case at 4 years. From 6 years, chi Idren are able to interpret same 
and other as post-article detel'miners. The use and understanding of 
the functions of determiners, therefore, develops gradually with age. 
Karmiloff-Smith (ibid) suggests that the relations between article, 
post-article and noun and their positions in the noun phrase may 
result in different interpretations, for example," 'Is it the same?' 
and 'Is it the same duck?' However, she explains this in traditional 
grammatical terms with reference to noun, noun p~rase and so on. 
"Grammar" as appl ied in the present study vlould alter the focus of 
this interpretation. Karmiloff-Smith ' (ibid) also emphasized the 
importance of taking into accoullt the type of task; the context of the 
utterance; whether presented in isolated sentences or in discourse, 
and so on . She examined whether same occurred "in subject or object 
positions and found that 'same one' \,as first applied correctly in 
object position. This is of importance since the majority of 
researchers fail to investigate such differences. 
Karmiloff-Smith (ibid) argues that children use one function for a 
term, or if two functions are used, the child is unaware that these 
two functions are covered by the sal1l" tem. By about 5 years, they 
may overmark a function or create nevi, ungrammatical forms to 
differentiate functions. She found that the childl-en understood the 
expression to mean 'same one' , and created a sepal'ate expression to 
mean 'same kind', This is similar to the suggestion that children may 
have to learn verbs with their inflecti ons for exal1lple, fit and fits 
or play and playing as two separate lexical items just as they have to 
learn break and . br6ke as two separate words (for example, Bloom, 
Lightb ovm and Hood, 1975). This has important implications for the 
"grammar' of words, emphasizing that the Cllild's ability to generalize 
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the use of a word from one funct i on to the next cannot be taken as 
axiomatic . It is also possible tha t the 'conversational state' versus 
'mental state' uses of pal'ticular verbs (for example, think and know) 
may be learned as different words (Wellmann and Estes, 1984). 
Karmiloff-Smith (ibid) question s wliether her results should be 
interpreted as an outcome of genel'a 1 cogn i t i ve development, whether 
the 3 year old is particularly concerned with resemblances and 
differences or whether there is something linguistic operating. She 
states (ibid, p.390): 
It seems clear that 'Nitll development children 
tend to endow linguistic terms such as the same 
x with different functions, irrespective of the 
particular conceptual task in which they are being 
quest i oned. It i s therefore suggested that 
language is an important experimental variable, 
a fact that has hitherto been underestimated in 
Piagetian research ... 
Language serves not only as a 'too l for intelligence' but "is actually 
for the child a problem area within its Gl'm right" (ibid, p.392). 
In summary, Karmiloff-Smith (ibid) rOUi:d that 
i) The child initially interpret ~ sam2 as same kind since it 
matches his classificatory system of modif i er and noun. 
ii) Same kind interpretat ions are more frequent si nc e same one 
meanings are often replaced by pronominalization. 
iii) The final grasp of ~~me as meaning same one may be aided by the 
child's grasp of other since then, another x may be used for same 
ki nd. 
i v) Young children seem to use language in reference to the 
extralinguistic context I'lhich may affect their preference for 'same 
ki nd' . 
Analysis of same, simil 'a r and different Iva s 
present research as a preliminary means of 
included these words in the task itself. 
al so important in the 
assessing tasks which 
As for pretend, the 
"grammar" of same I'las investigated in relation to the "grammar" of 
pain, anger, dream and so un. 
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The word same · is of particular interest: 'Sameness' underlies learning 
in general and word meaning in particular as well as the 
generalization and extension of words to novel situations (as 
discussed in 2.3.2a). In accordance witll the present orientation, 
similarity plays a part in the use of a word over a diversity of 
contexts, whether it is termed d "family resemblance" or a commonality 
of 'features'. Even metaphoric usage is subject to such similarity. 
2.4.1(e) Pretend 
Nouns are described as character·izir.g classes of objects with verbs 
expressing relations 
(ibid) found that 
between conce pt:.; (Hagendorf, 1983). 
mi ss ing feature lists provide 
Hagendorf 
inadequate 
descriptions of verb meaning. Amongst the verbs being investigated in 
the present study is the word pretend which ha s received attention 
from philosophers (Austin, 1979;, \vittgenstein, 1953) and 
psycholinguists (for example, Hidi and Hildyard , 1979 ; Olson and 
Astington, 1984). The words know, bel ieve and think have been 
previously assessed together with pretend but again, not from the 
• point of view of "g rammar". 
The complexities of pretendi ng aloe di scussed in an article by Austin 
(ibid, p.267) who points out that: 
It is quite mis leading to handle pretending 
in the way it i s so often Ilandled , as 
identical with being (01' being doing) except 
that some special feature is left out . .. 
that pretending to be in pain is just the 
same as being in pain except t hat you do not 
feel pain, or that pretellding to be ang ry is 
behaving 1 ike a really ililgry llIan only 
without feeling like one ... 
The complexities of pretend behaviour' are revealed in the following 
examples: if we pretend to be in pain, there mayor may not be a cause 
leading lip to the display of pain behaviour; if we pretend to laugh, 
there may be nothing funny to laugh at, or we may not regard a joke as 
funny and laugh to be polite; it mayor may not sound different from 
an ordinary laugh but be voluntarily not spontaneously produced. 
Pretending involves "pretence·behaviour, the actual publ ic performance 
gone through in pretending ... the reality dissemb led, about which t he 
audience is to be hoodwinked ... (and) some real-behaviour-dissembled", 
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for examp'l e, pretend i ng to be k iss i ng the carpet when you want to 
disguise your real behaviour of biting it (Austin, ibid, p.260). 
However, Austin (ibid) discusses additional comp lexities which are 
invo lved in pretence . Only a few examples are drawn on below: 
i) There is a limit which, even if 'vague, must no t be overstepped. 
For example, a man may smash the furniture or commit an assault when 
he is pretendi ng to be angry. In th i s case, he ha s overstepped the 
1 imit, is no longer pretending, "and it is useless for him to 
afterwards that he did not feel angry" (Austin, ibid, 
protest 
p.254). 
Inadequate publ ic evidence may make it difficult to determine whether 
a person is pretendi ng to be angry or whether he is really angry. 
Similarly, this is difficult to determine for being in pain in 
contrast to pretending to be in pain, because the person alone 
possesses the decisive evidence in this regard. 
ii) One can be very angry but not display this conspicuous l y. 
Someone may also be pretending to be angry I'lhere the success of the 
pretence matters seriously and he "may 'hit upon bit·ing the carpet as 
the very thing to clinch the decepti on" (Austin, ibid, pp.255-256). 
iii) In certain instances , an impa sse may arise , for example, 
" ... there seems to be nothing one can do at all like holing the putt 
which will not resu lt in the putt' s being actually holed" (ibid, 
p. 258) or pretending to walk which does not involve actually wa l king. 
Austin (ibid, p.259) illustrates that in pl-etend to do or to be doing 
an action, we are not always debarred from actually doing the act ion 
itself . 
iv) Austin (ibid) point s out that the "essence of the ,situation in 
pretending " is that the pre tender is suppre ss ing or concea li ng 
something. 
v) In Inany cases, there seems to be a clear difference between 
'pretending to A' and 'pretending to be A-ing' (ibid, p.263). Austin 
gi ves as 
typi call y 
an example the following: "children who are ignorant may 
be ' pre tend i ng to 
who are up to mi sc hi ef may 
chess'''. 
play chess'; children, ignorant 
typically be 'pretending to be 
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or not , 
playing 
vi) Austin (ibid, p.266) argues that pretence must be distinctively 
like the genuine article simulated; "you will hardly pretend to be 
angry by simulating the behaviour of an angry man in perfect control 
of himself ... " There are also cases 'in \>Ihid one can behave like an 
angry man or make others bel i eve one is angry, wh i ch are not cases of 
pretending. 
vii) Pretending to oneself borders on the activity of 'make believe', 
when we " . . . suppress our actual beliefs and simulate others" (ibid, 
p.270). 
viii) Austin mentions that 'elaborate' pretences, such as dressing up 
and , making oneself, up, lead to our talking of "impersonation", 
"imposture" or "disguise", all of which may be encompassed by the word 
pretend, if precision is not important. 
Austin concludes (ibid, p.271) that; 
... in the long term project of classifying and 
clarifying all possible \;ays and varieties of not 
exactly doing thin~~-,- wli ich has to be carried 
through H' \'Ie are p.ver It' und erstand properly what 
doing things is, the clal'ific<ltion of pretending, 
and the assignment to it of its proper place within ' 
the family of related cOllcepts, must find some place, 
if only a humble one. 
How children come to learn the "grammar" of this "lOrd is of interest 
to the present researcher. 
2.4.1. (f) Know, Believe and Think 
Pretend may also be viewed along another dimension in relation to 
know, believe and think. TheSE' 'mental verbs ' (as they are commonly 
termed), including others such as mean, forget, remember, guess and 
dream, accounted for 95% of all the me ntal terms produced by a group 
of children of 2-5 years (Wellman and Estes, 1984). For factive verbs 
such as know, "the speaker holds the complement clause to be true" and 
this is retained when the main verb is negated (Scoville and Gordon, 
1980). For Iloll-factive verbs such ]S think. bel ieve and pretend, 
different possibilities may be assigned to the truth of the complement 
(Scoville and Gordon, ibid). 
Studies on factive and non-factive verbs have been carried out by 
numerous researchers (For example, Harris, 1975; Hopmann and Maratsos, 
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1978; Johnson and Maratso s, 1977; Johnson and Wellman, 1980, 1982; 
MacNamara, Baker and Olson, 1976; Ol so n and Astington 1984; Wellman 
and Estes, ibid). Scoville and Gordon (ibid) summarized the findings 
of many of these studies and concluded that generally, the acquisition 
of factivity occurs on a verb-by-verb basis. They found that verbs do 
not fall neatly into the two categories of factive and non-facti ve and 
that the acquisition of factivity progresses gradually. However, 
there i s no consensus as to exact stages of development. Children's 
knowl edge of these verbs has been found to be "far from comp l ete" 
(Olson and Astington , ibid). They fail to comprehend "the precise 
meaning " of these verbs even though they can apply these verbs 
appropriately in natural situations. Olson and Astingto n (ibid) argue 
that "the full use" of these verbs is only mastered well into the 
school years. Wellman and Estes (ibid) report similarly, that whereas 
4 year olds are competent in dealing with mental presuppos ition s, 
factivity and fal se beliefs, their understandin.g of mental terms 
progresses until 8 or 9 years of age. 
Olson and Astington (ibid) argue that ch ildren may' have beliefs and 
intentions without knO\~ing the words believe and intend but that they 
will only be able to di st inguis h between a speec h act and its mental 
state (for example, promise and int end) vl hen they are able to use 
these terms. Their comprehension of these terms will enable them to 
understand that a per so n may hold one belief while expressing another . 
Mental states such as 'bel ieving' and' in tending' have become central 
to theories of cognition and relate directly to speech acts (Olson and 
Astington, ibid). These researcher s add that in ce rtain case s, the 
mental state does not appear t o exi st apart from the speech act and 
that, therefore, " ... if they do not know the word, they do not possess 
the concept. . . t hey can say and mean t hi ngs but they do not have t he 
concepts of saying and meaning ... " (ibid, p.22). They suggest t hat 
metacognitive processes may be dependent on the child's use and 
comprehension of {hese metacognitive verbs: 
A child l earn ing the meta l anguage comes 
to make the conceptual distinctions 
marked by these terms and he cannot make 
these distinctions if the terms are not 
kn own (i bid, p. 18) . 
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The vi ewpoi nt of the present researcher i s in di rect accordance with 
this conclusion. 
A dis tinction has been made (for example , Wellman and Estes, ibid) 
between the use of the ~'ords think, know and bel ieve as 
"conversational terms ", as in: 
'You know what?' 
'1 think it will rain' 
and as "mental terms" , as in: 
'1 know that the earth is round' 
'1 have to think ou t this problem'. 
When used as "conversational terms", these words indicate the degree 
of rel iabil ity of statemen t s, rather than suggest i ng a mental act 
(John son, 1982). Wellman and Este s (ibid) found that conversational 
use occurs first although -mental reference occurs from as young as 
about 3 years of age. At this stage, the child does not have complete 
facility with these verbs but he i s aware tllat mental and real 
entities differ. Only at 6 or 7 years i~ lIe able to ' use terms such as 
pretend and think appropriatel y (Olson and Astington, ibid) . 
Johnson (ibid) outline s a dcvclopmenLal sequence for mental terms: by 
3 years, the child is able to use these terms to talk about t hing s 
beyond those in his immediate environment; by 4-5 years, chi ldren have 
a practi cal understanding of the cognitive meanings of verbs such as 
think and know;- in the ear l y schoo l years, they develop a more 
structured semantic system and are able to contrast relations between 
terms, for example, know contrasted with guess. 
Perceptual information has bN!n rC~I~rded by some researchers .(for 
example, Clark in he r semantic feature tileory, 1973; 1974; Gentner 
1978) as the basis for children 'S ea r ly word me anings. Johnson (ibid, 
p.462) points out that this doe s not hold for verbs such as think and 
know, words for which "the child acquires a more glob al se nse of these 
relational meanings " . He add s th at this supports considerable 
evidence that there is no s ingle model l'/hich adequately predicts the 
sequence of semanti c development. 
The present researcher aims to in vestigate these words from the point 
of view of "grammar". Syntact i c kn()wl(~dge has been described as being 
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part of the mean i ng of a word with the "full mean i ng" of the verb 
being grasped only once the child has comprehended the syntactic 
structures associated with it (Olson and Astington, ibid, p.8). In 
the present study, certa i n sytltact i c factors such as fact i vi ty are 
regarded as forming part of the "grammar" of the word : a 'word is used 
in specific ways and because of its meaning, is able to combine with 
specific words only. 
Hagendorf argues (1983, p.235) that language involves "a complex 
network of interrelationships among words" for example, to answer the 
question 'Who got the book?' in the context of 'The boy gave the girl 
the book', involves manipulating the relationship between get and 
give.The child is capable of such an operation later in language 
development (Bowerman, 1978a). A similar relationship was 
investigated in the present fuzzy boundary tasks such as, 'When does a 
pain become an ache?' Other relationships being investigated differ 
from those of Hagendorf (ibid) , for example, feel the pain and feel 
the puppy which do not concern relationships from one verb to another 
• but rather, relationships between words co-occurring in the language. 
The verbs know, believe and think may be v'iewed in one respect, along 
a continuum, altering in degree of certainty . Other dimensions 
intrude, for example: Pretend differs from these other words: it is 
the inverse rather than the converse of know, that is, pretend does 
not mean 'not know' but rather, it implies that one 'knows' but that 
one chooses to act as if something else were the case. It is also not 
only cognitive as 'are these other words. 
2.4.1(g) The words do, fe~, seo and the interrogative form where 
were analysed in relation to the other I'lords selected. They were 
included to ascertain whether or not apparently simpler words are 
subject to the issue of "grammar" in the same way as more complex 
words. 
2.4.1(h) Finally, the word word was included only as a brief 
pretest. It was felt to be particularly important for the 6 year olds 
to ensure that tasks which included \~ord in the instructions could be 
understood, for example, "What does the word different mean? ' For the 
6 year olds, '\~hat is a sentence?' was also included for this reason. 
From the pi 1 at study, it was eV'i dent that SOllie, though not all, 6 year 
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olds regarded a word as a sentence or as a phoneme. For each 
individual child this was taken into account in subsequent questions 
and instructions were rephrased according to the child's frame of 
reference. As an example, certain 6 year olds described a sentence as 
'a word', others described a word as 'a letter' and still oth.ers 
described a sentence as 'a story'. If a sentence was equated with a 
story, this child was then asked to 'make up a 1 ittle story with ... ' 
when a sentence was required. It was crucial that the children 
understand the instruct ions. These alterat ions di d not affect the 
context of the tasks themselves. 
This pretest aimed to determine not whether each child has 'full 
comprehension' of the word word but only whether he has adequate 
comprehension of word for the experimental questions to be clearly 
understood. Studies on the word word (for example, 
Berthoud-Papandropoulou, 1978; Bowey and Tunmer, 1984; Downing and 
Oliver, 1973/74; Papandropoulou and Sinclair, 1974) were not of 
relevance to the present research. 
., 
2.4.2 Metal inguistic awarenes~.:._ Refl!".cting on word meaning 
2.4.2(a) 
" ... language ~on holiday ... " 
(Wittgenstein , 1953, pt . 38). 
Languages can be used to talk not only about 
the world in general, but als o about themselves 
and other languages (Lyons, 1981, p.18). 
Clarification of main terms 
Languages have the capacity to refer to or 
(Lyons, 1977) which is identified by 
to descri be themselves 
the technical term 
'metalinguistic'. Metalinguistic awarene ss ha s been defined as "the 
abi 1 i ty to make 1 anguage forms opaque and attend to them in and for 
themselves" (Cazden, 1976, p.603), that is, the language system itself 
is "treated as an object of t hought". Language is divorced from its 
context (Donaldson , 1978) which is not a necessary consequence of 
using language for communicati on. Rather t han focusing on content, 
the child focu ses on those. structures which convey content. As 
Donaldson (ibid, pp.87-88) argues , in the early stages of 1 anguage 
development: 
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The child's awareness of what he talks about ... the 
things out there to which the language refers .. . 
normally takes precedence over hi s awareness of 
what he ·talks with ... (and) language is embedded for 
him in the flow of events which accompany it ; 
Metalinguistic ability must not be confused with 'metalanguages' which 
are "highly formal ized" languages constructed by 1 inguists and 
logicians for the purpose of "describing ordinary, natural languages 
as precisely as possible" (Lyons, 1981, p.18). Examples of 
metal inguistic terms are 'lexeme', 'word', 'phrase' and 'phoneme'. 
Metal inguistic awareness refers to al'lareness of the instantiations of 
these terms, rather than to knowl edge of the terms themsel ves. As an 
example, a metalinguistically-aware child may demonstrate adequate 
manipulation of phonemes without knowing what the term 'phoneme' means 
(Tunmer and Herriman, 1984). 
The term 'metalinguistic awareness' has been. distinguished from the 
terms 'tacit knowledge', 'linguistic competence', ' linguistic 
intuitions' and 'explicit formulation' (l"1arshall 
Tunmer and Herriman, ibid). 'Tacit knowledg~' 
and Morton, 1978; 
is the speaker's 
unconscious knowledge of the rules of the language. 'Linguistic 
competence' on the other hand, refers to the speaker's knowledge of 
his language (Chomsky, 1965). 'Linguistic intuitions' are judgements 
made about the language system and they invol ve 'metalinguistic 
abilities'. However, children may be able to perform metalinguistic 
operations without having linguistic intuiti ons. The latter would 
en ab I e them to make exp I i cit judgements about language st ruct ure and 
function (Tunmer and Herriman , ibid). 'Explicit formulations' in cl ude 
judgements of se ntence acceptability, synonymy, phonological 
sequences, and structural ambiguity (lunmer and Herriman, ibid). 
Donaldson (ibid) points out that the term 'metal inguistic' has been 
overused and that, in many cases, the term 'language tasks' would be 
equally appropriate. In line with this, Karmiloff-Smith (1979a) 
distinguishes between metalinguistic data and epilinguistic data. The 
former is derived from questions such as, 'What is a word?' and ' Is 
the a word?'. The latter taps the child's awarene ss of the implicit 
syntactical rule he is using such as that · of gender concord. 
Karmiloff-Smith (ibid) argues t ha t such a disti nc tion is heuristically 
valid since it may make different cognit i ve demands. In the present 
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study, such a distinction is not of value since expl icit formulation 
of rules is not being assessed. The term 'metal inguistic awareness' 
is adhered to. 
Tunmer and Bowey (1984) describe four types of metalinguistic 
awareness, namely, phonological, word, form and pragmatic. Word 
awareness, of most rel evance to the present study, deal s with words 
and their meanings, particularly with word segmentation, word-referent 
differentiation, and appreciation of linguistic jokes. Judgments of 
semantic factors have been predominantly concerned with children's 
awareness of synonymy, acceptabi 1 ity, phonemi c segment at i on and 
violations of selection restrictions (Hakes, Evans and Tunmer, 1980: 
Macdonald, 1983) . 
A large body of research on metalinguistic awareness indicates that 
young children focus on the meanings of the words, phrases or 
utterances on which they're asked to reflect , rather than on their 
form (Hakes et al, ibid; l3erthoucl-Papandropoulou, 1978; 
Berthoud-Papandropoulou and Sinclair, 1983). In Hie present study, 
the child is speci fically required to reflect upon word meaning in 
questions such as 'What is a pain?' 
2.4.2(b) Views regarding the jevelopment of metalinguistic 
awareness in children 
As Macdonald (1984, p.6 ) points out: 
... it is very definitely the case that 
metalinguistic awareness research is not 
placed in .the mainstream of current 
developmental psycholinguistic research. 
It is pr ·imarily atheoretical ... (and) 
It is not attempting to Jemonstrate t he 
descriptive or explanatol'y adequacy of 
any particular linguistic theory ... 
The field of metalinguistic awareness 'lacks generally accepted and 
reliable methods of assessment and consensus regarding the age at 
which different metalinguistic skills emerge (Tunmer and Herriman, 
1984). Longitudinal data is sparse. Whetller metalinguistic awareness 
is a single ability or an ability comprising numerbus subprocesses and 
what underl ies these skin s is contentious (Clark, 1978a; Donaldson, 
1978: Macdonald, 1983). Clark (ibid) me ntions skills as diverse as 
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monitori ng ones ongoi ng 
utterance, and deliberately 
utterance, checking the result 
attempting to learn new words. 
of an 
• 
Despite .the need for theory-building in this area, the work on 
metalinguistic awareness is the most enlightening on language 
abilities beyond the preschool period. Higher level comprehension 
tasks such as those of C. Chomsky (1969) have been extremely valuable 
but do not offer the scope for evaluating the differences that occur 
in the performance of school-going versus preschool children. It has 
been proposed that metalinguistic judgements offer the only sound 
basis for adequately explaining language development during this 
period (Gleitman, Gleitman and Shipley , 1972; Scholl and Ryan, 1975). 
The relationship between language use and metalinguistic awareness is 
a complex one. Metalinguistic tasks are removed from everyday 
language use and thereby, create an unnatural language situation. 
However, as was mentioned earl ier, beyond the preschool period, we 
have no alternative if we are to assess the child's language abilities 
in more depth than comprehension and production tasks allow. 
There has been a tail ing off of the volume 
perhaps due to this apparent artificiality. 
ability to reflect upon language bears 
language efficiently , is questionable. 
of metalinguistic studies 
The extent to whi.ch our 
upon our ability to use 
It does not seem to be 
necessary to analyse language in ordel' to be able to use it although 
part of our understanding of a word's meaning (for example, pain) may 
stem from our abi 1 i ty to anSI-IeI' quest ions about it (such as, 'What is 
a pain?'). When viewed in this broad sense, metalinguistic awareness 
may be placed at the pinnacle of a hierarcliy encompassing both 
comprehension and production, that is 
metalinguistics 
/ ~ 
comprehension production 
In contrast, in its narrow sense, metalinguistic awareness may 
constitute one component of language at the level of comprehension and 
production, that is 
- j 17 .. 
1 anguage 
~J~ 
comprehenslon production metalinguistic awareness 
or qualitative differences in ,the understanding of word meaning may be 
of importance in the further development of language use beyond the 
preschool period, that is : 
Language 
~ ~ 
comprehension production 
~ /' 
metal inguistic .awareness 
It is possible that our ability to reflect upon language, even at a 
sub-conscious level, is a necessal-Y condition for increasing our 
mastery of language. 'Ol'dinary' comprehension may reach a certain 
level beyond which it does not advance. On the other hand, 
metalinguistic awareness may have litt"!e bearing on language use but 
be of relevance only to the child's gelleral cognitive functioning. 
If language use and metalinguist 'ic ~ll'/areness do not correlate with 
each other and are, thereforG, able to be separated, the following 
possibilities exist: 
i) An underlying phenomenon (X) may give rise to both language use 
and metal inguistic awareness, that is, 
X ~~!' 't' use meca jilYUlS lC Language al'Jareness 
i i ) Language use may precede metalinguistic awareness in 
development, that is, language use~ Illetal inguistic al'Jareness 
iii) 
but 
Language use and metalin '~uistic 
interacting abilities, that is, 
al'/areness mnay be independent 
language ~ metalinguistic 
awareness. 
Iv) Metal inguistic tasks Inay assess behaviours which are an outcome 
of our language use, a ' sidG-cFfect', oJ" by - product, having no or 
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minimal bearing upon our language skills in general development. If 
so, children at different age levels may reflect differently upon 
language as a consequence of their general stage of development in 
combination with their language skills. However, this approach would 
imply that their ability to reflect upon language is of no relevance 
to the advancement of their language itself. 
v) Metal inguistic awareness may be a strategy that children are 
able to employ at certain periods of development rather than being a 
skill (Wiig, 1985). 
There are three predominant views regarding the development of 
metalinguistic awareness in children. Easch view includes apects of 
the possible relationships presented above. 
i) It has been suggested that metal i ngui st i c awareness develops 
simultaneously with language acquisit-ion (Clark, 1978a; Marshall and 
Morton, 1978). On the basis of the spontaneous corrections children 
make to their own and to others' speec h _from 2- 3 years of age (Clark, 
ibid), it has been argued that child r en must be able to reflect upon 
their utterances even at this early st age. 
Other researchers regard self correction s as being at the "border of 
awareness" rather than being the resul t of very explicit reflection on 
language (Levelt, Sinclair and ,Jarvella, 1978). It is suggested that 
there are different levels of expl icitness of metalinguistic data. 
The ability to repair on~s utterances is not a necessary condition for 
language development s ince a child may be able t o comprehend language 
without being abl e to produce it (Tullmer and Herri man, 1984). 
Furthermore, Tunmer and Herri man (ibi d ) differentiate between 
awareness of linguis t ic structure and a~lar eness of failu r e with only 
the former being 'metalinguistic'. 
ii) The second view is that metalinguistic awareness develops as a 
distinct function in middle childhood (the age r ange from 4-8 years) 
and is related to a more general change in infOl-mation processing 
abilities that occur during thi s per i od. There is a great deal of 
research indicating that , during this period, the child develops a 
variety of linguistic sk i ll s all of ~Ihich l'equire that he reflect upon 
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and manipul ate the structural features of 1 anguage (Tunmer and 
Herriman , ibid). 
Flavell (1977, '1978, 1981) and TUnml!r and Bowey (1984) suggest that 
both metalinguistic awareness and concrete operational thought may 
reflect a more general change in underlying cognitive abilities, 
termed 'metacognition.'. Flavell (1981, p.3?) define s 'metacognition' 
as "knowledge or cognition that takes as its object or regulates any 
aspect of ~ny cognitive endeavour " . 
A relationship has been proposed betweerl cogn itive and linguistic 
development during the pre-operational period because similar patterns 
are · revealed in responses to these tasks (Hakes, Evans and Tunmer, 
1980). It has been suggested that this relationship may extend into 
the concrete operational period (Karmi loff-Smit h, 1979b). Both 
metalingui stic awareness and concrete operational thought involve the 
abil ity "to control the course of ones own thought" (Tunmer and 
Herriman, 1984, p.30) and the question of control has been regarded as 
vital to "disembedded thinking" (Dona ·ldson, 1978 , p.94). In 
accordance with this, Flavell ' s recent research (1981) has pointed to 
middle childhood as the period durin9 which the child is increa si ngl y 
able to control his own intellectual processes over a wide variety of 
tasks_ 
It is predicted that if a child is advanced on one metalinguistic task 
he should be advanCed on all and that there will be a po sit i ve 
correlation between metali ngui st ic tasks and non-metalinguistic t asks 
which require metacogniti ve operations (Tunmer and Herriman, ibid). 
Sinclair (1978, p.200) proposes that there i s a parallel between 
metalinguistic awareness and awareness in other cognitive doma in s and 
she concludes that, if so, studies on metal ingui stic awareness 
" ... offer a particularly ferti l e method of studyi ng the mechanisms of 
language acquisition". Studies to date (for example, Hake s et al, 
ibid; Tunmer and Fletcher , 1981) support these predictions but Tunmer 
and Herriman (ibid) caution that controlled cognitive process ing may 
not be the only factor contribut ing to these findings. A differen t 
approach i s put forward by Hirsch-Pasek, Gleitman and Gleitman (1978). 
They suggest that nletacognit ion may no t resemble, formally, th e 
cognitive proce ss it guides and organizes. Rather, there may be 
resembl ances amongst the higher-ol-uQr processes themsel ves. Th i s 
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would suggest that judgements are rel~ted to reasoning rather than to 
speech and comprehension. 
Numerous researchers (for example, Brown, 1980; Flavell, 1981; 
Vosniadou, Ortony, Reynolds and Wilson, 1984) point out that 
paraphrase and expl anation introduce cognitive demands over and above 
those required for tomprehension. . The highest levels of 
metalinguistic ability and logical operations may parallel and 
interact, for example, hypothesizing may incorporate both abilities. 
Flavell (1977, p.178) considers problem solving communicat ion tasks to 
be a late-developing ability involving "thinking about the message 
(metacommunication) rather than sending it (communication)". These 
typas of tasks require that the child consciously analyse and evaluate 
the verbal message. 
Cazden (1976) regards metal inguistic awareness as a special type of 
language ability which is cognitively demanding tn a particular way 
and which is less universal and acquired at a later stage than 
comprehension and expression. However,· parallels h~ve been proposed 
between metalinguistic abilities on the one hand and comprehension and 
product i on on the other. Karmi 1 off -Smith (1979b) views both 
spontaneous 
involving a 
9 years). 
utterances beyond age 5, ilnd metal inguistic awareness, as 
move from extralinguist·ic to illtralinguistic reference (at 
Sile suggests that both these abilities may reflect an 
underlying cognitive change that occurs during this period. During 
the pre-operational period, children apply inductive strategies which 
lead to systematic errors (for examp le, on conservat i on tasks) and 
which may, similar ly, be observed in language development. 
Berthoud-Papandropoulou (1982, cited by Macdona ld, 1984) classified 
responses into extral i nguistic (4-5 years), intral ingui st i c (7 years) 
and metalinguistic (II years), on tasks in which children were 
requ i red to make compl"ehen sian judgements of hypothet i ca 1 and 
counterfactual French conditional sentences. Macdonald (1983 ) 
confirmed that children progress from extralinguistic to 
intralinguistic justifications dnd then to definitiona l answers. Her 
study investigated children's llnderstanding of the actuality 
implication of certain ~odal and semi-auxilliary verbs. 
Extralinguistic justifications inc·!uded examples from the child's 01'/11 
experience or the focus all spE,cific characteristics; intralinguistic 
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justifications comprised general explanations which move away from 
specific individual experiences; and metalinguistic answers involved 
an attempt to formulate a rule. 
iii) The third view concerning metalinguistic awareness is mainly 
proposed by Donaldson (1978) although others (for example, Vygotsky 
1962) adhered to this view as well. Donaldson (ibid) argues that 
schooling and. particul arly, reading, results in increased 
metalinguistic skills such as an extensive metalinguistic vocabulary 
(Levelt, Sinclair and Jarvella, 1978). This then affords the child 
greater control over his thought processes which enables him to use 
his cognitive abil ities in a v/ider varie ty of situations. Donaldson 
(ibid) stresses the import ance of the early acquisition of reading 
s kill s. 
Numerou s researchers propose some re lationship between reading and 
metalinguistic awareness (for example, Cole and Scribner, 1981 ; Luria, 
1976) but the cause-effect relati ons hip is unclear (Tunmer and 
Herriman, ibid). Metalingui stic ability·is thought to be an important 
pre-requisite for learning to reau as \'iell as developing further, 
subsequent to the onset of reading (for example, Calfee, Lindamood and 
Lindamood, 1973; Ehri, 1979 ; Mattin~ll.Y, 1972). Tunmer and Herriman 
(ibid) argue that many children ~/ho cannot read, perfor m well on 
metalinguistic tasks and that Donaldson's view fails to explain why 
certain children with no appan,nt sensory deficits have difficulties 
in learning to read; nor how 1 iterate and nonl iterate children follow 
equivalent patterns of cog ll itive development. 
Learni ng to read does not appeal' to be a necessary condit i on for the 
development of metalingui stic awareness (Tunmer and Herriman, ibid) 
although reading instruction and the formal written language of the 
class room may increa se metalinguistic awareness (Hatson and Olson, in 
pres s). Watson ana Olson (ibid) supply cross-cultural evidence which 
supports the view that literacy and metalinguistic abilities are 
rel ated. They argue that the sense of the vlOrd word is associ ated 
with written language: it is not found in oral poetry in Yugos lavia 
nor in certain West African lang uag es. 
Tunmer and Herriman (ibid) conclude that empirical research 
predominantly supports the view that metalinguistic awareness is a 
1?2 -
distinct linguistic ability emerging during middle childhood together 
with a more general change in processing abilities during this period 
(the second viewpoint discussed above). It is this viewpoint whi ch is 
adhered to by the present researcher. 
It is clear that, beyond the preschool period, chidren are able to 
comprehend and to . express themse 1 ves competent 1 y . From the i r 
performance, they appear to be as competent as adults speakers in that 
they are able to use words in diverse ways even though they have a 
more limited vocabulary and shorter, simpler sentence constructions: 
there appear to be a few qual itat i ve differences between ch i 1 d and 
adult speakers in this regard. As Macdonald points out (1984, p.10) , 
in terms of previous research on metalinguistic awareness in children, 
"we must expect a gap between appropri ate use and the abi 1 i ty to 
explain the usage". Karmiloff-Smith (!979a) f.ound that epilinguistic 
awareness was 11/ 2 - 2 years behind spontaneous use of the same items. 
This appears to apply equally to reflecting up~n the meanings of 
words. Metalingui stic tasks allow one to penetrate beyond the surface 
to the child's deeper understanding and, at thi s Tevel , qual itative 
differences present themselves. In the pre.sent study, · metal inguistic-
type questions \-Jere used for this reasoll. 
r1etal inguistic research to date has concentrated on the developing 
metalinguistic skill s in childY'en of 5 years and older but few have 
drawn on metal ·inguistic ta sks to inve stigate the development of word 
meaning per se, certainly not from the point of view of "grammar" . In 
this study, the aim is not to investigate how children acquire the 
meanings of words. Rather , it is argued that a great deal of 
development in word meaning occurs beyond th e initial acquisition 
period (birth to 4 or 5 years). Children beyond about 4 years of age 
di sp 1 ay few errors in thei r 1 anguaye express i on and 
tasks offer the only means of penetrating to 
understanding .of words at this period of de velopment. 
In the present study, 
ability arising during 
that it builds upon 
'metalingui stic awaren es s' is 
the midd l e childhood period. 
t he child ' s comprehens ion 
metalinguistic 
thei r deeper 
regarded as an 
It is accepted 
and production 
abil ities, being bot h an exten s ion or higher lev el of these abil itie s 
(quantitative progres s ion) as well as being qualitative l y different in 
many ways. Me t alingui stic ability may comprise a different 
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developmental stage from that of comprehension. In the stage of 
metalinguistic awareness, the ability to reflect upon language 
predominates, together with the ability to comprehend at a 
progressively higher level. Abil ities such as reading which build 
upon metalinguistic skills would .be enhanced at this stage. 
In addition, metalinguistic ability is not being investigated as an 
end in itself. Rather, metalinguistically-phrased questions provide 
the means of assessing children's knowledge of the "grammar" of words. 
However, processes and strategies used by children in handl ing these 
tasks may add to previous research findings in the area of 
metalinguistic research. 
The present tasks reflect the child' s knowledge of the "grammar" of 
the word pain and of what the word pain means in questions such as: '1 
have a pain in my head but I can't feel it: does that sentence sound 
OK or not?' or 'Can you have my pain?' These questions differ from 
'true' metalinguistic questions such as: 'What is the difference in 
the meanings of feel in these two sentr~nces: -, 
'1 feel -pain' and 
, I fee l awkward'. 
Levelt, Sinclair and Jarvella (19"18, flP.l0-11) caut ion against 
confusing "the child' s capacity to explain verbally" with "his growing 
capacity to reflect on language ". Exp laining requires that the child 
express fairly complex ideas in a proper 1 ingui st ic form, a complex 
verbal activity, but this ca n be sep a.rated from a reflexive awareness 
of language. In the present study, meaning is the object of 
reflection rather than the means in communication and the child is 
also required to justify h-is responses. 
Some researchers may argue that the types of questions posed in this 
study are too di fficult for 6 year olds. It is suggested however, 
that the only way in which one can conclude whether these questions 
are d i ffi cult for them or not , is to quest i on them. Thei r answers 
will enlighten us as to the ir l anguage abil i ties. 
There has been a generill acceptance til a t cOlllprehens i on precedes 
production in development (although doubt has been thrown on this, for 
example, R. Clal"k, 1982). The impl icatio ll is that we need to know 
- 12'1 --
that the child can comprehend the word pain before we can question him 
about it. The present approach argues, contrarily, that we can only 
ascerta in what the ch il d knows about pa i ni f we quest i on him about it 
and that his ideas about pain expand (in both depth and breadth) with 
development. A frequency count as a basel ine measure of whether the 
child has the word in his vocabularly or not, does not reveal what he 
knows about pain. 
2.4.2(c) Definition tasks and metalinguistic awareness 
Word definition is related to the epistemological areas of logic, 
semant i cs, concept formation and atta i nment and is assessed by means 
of verbal definition, nonsen se \~ords, and sorting by perceptual traits 
(Litowitz, 1977). Many researcilers have regarded noun definition as a 
metal inguistic abil ity and have stud ied it in children (for example, 
Watson and Olson, in pres s; Wehren, de Lisi and Arnold, 1981). 
Definitions have · been viewed as inlportallt for the development of 
language and cognition since they make words "opaq~e, autonomous (and) 
generalizable ... " (Watson and Olson, ibid, p.36). On the other hand, 
it has been argued that narrow dictionary definitions 1 imit research 
on word meaning which includes more than "lists of feature s" and 
·category instances· (Livingston, 1982, p.429). Clark 1978a has 
argued that . word-definitions limit our study of word-awareness: 
definitions provide only an indirect means of assessing word awareness 
as children often provide common phrases or collocations. However, we 
do not have to use the word definition in order to elicit a definition 
and providing common phrases may re'leal strategies at different age 
levels. Furthermore, definitions require prerequisites in that the 
child has to know what a definition is and what constitutes a good 
definition . 
Watson and Olson ( ibid, p.l?) discllss numerous types of definitions, 
for example: 
i) 'That is an x', x being a lexical term, and the linguistic 
expression accompanying a gestural indication of the referent. On the 
basis of the discussion on ostensive definition (section 2.3.1a), this 
type of definition can be seen to be particularly limited besides 
being inapplicable to non-ostensive words. 
.. 125 -
ii) 'A circle is ' the locus of point~ equidistant from a given point' 
where the meaning is specified in the linguistic form. 
Studies on word definition of the form 'What is an x' have yielded a 
diversity of findings. Litowitz (ibid) found that the form of 
definitions of 4-7 year olds progressed from their drawing on 
individual, actual experiences to hypothetical experiences and then to 
definitional forms. Studies deal ing with the content of definitions 
have yielded contrary findings. Wolman and Barker (1965) and Swartz 
and Hall (1972) found the function of an object to predominate in the 
definitions of 4-9 year olds, in accordance with findings by Angl in 
(1977), Litowitz (ibid), Nelson (1978), Norlin (1981) and Wiig (1984). 
Cont rari 1 y, other researchers (for example, Storck and Looft, 1973; 
Wilson, 1975) found 6 year olds to be capable of providing abstract 
definitions, the latter beinjmore common than functional definitions. 
At school age, definitions become more elaborate and superordinate 
categories appear (Al-Issa, 1969). 
Wehren et al (i bi d) attempted to ['vercome what 'they regarded as 
methodological problems in the above studies. They ensured that the 
nouns being tested were present in the children's vocabularies (of 
questionable value in 1 i ne >lith the present orientation) and 
introduced. a more complex scoring system which included functional, 
relational and concrete categories as well as combinations of these. 
They found a progression from functional to combinatorial definitions 
with increasing age leading ultimately (in adulthood) to "complex 
Aristotelian forms". Concrete defillitions were infrequent for all 
subjects even when the objects to be defi ned were present. These 
authors concluded that the younger children lacked the metalinguistic 
knowledge about what constitutes a noun definition, that is, with age, 
there is an increasing awareness of what a definition is rather than 
an increased knowledge of object properties or words. In addition, 
form and cont~nt are regarded as two separate aspects in the 
development of noun definition with changes in form and content 
occurring out of phase. 
Similarly, Anglin (1978) found that 2-6 year olds and adults displayed 
marked differences in defining and categorizing four .Iords: animal, 
food, clothing and bird. He concluded (ibid, p.975) that when making 
judgements about including certain instances in a particular category, 
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adults formulate "something like a deFinition of the category" and use 
that as a guide. Howevel', children experience difficulty in 
formulating a general definition of certain verbal concepts for 
example, 
related 
'animal' , 
to their 
and their classifications are inconsistent when 
definitions. All these researchers assessed 
definitions of concrete common noun, which contrasts with the words 
used in the present study. 
Watson and Olson (ibid) point out that children's definitions are 
'incomplete' expressions of meaning, and are often not central to the 
meaning of the word, for example, a response such as: ·"it's black" for 
a definition of "dog". However, this does not reflect the child's 
ability to use the word in context 01' to categorize. Meaning is to a 
1 arge extent specifi ed by the use of the utterance on a part i cul ar 
occasion, context being an important cOllsideration in theories of 
language use. These authors state that 
2.4.3 
What a ~eaker means by the use of that word 
on a particular utterance occasion may ~ave 
varying degrees of congruence with what the word 
itself means across diverse contexts of use ,,[Watson 
and Olson, ibid, p.3). 
Adult performance 
process 
as the ~_n_d_-_st.=-at::.:e,----,-i-,,-n_t:::.h:.:::e,--.:::d=-evel opmenta 1 
Now there is a new conviction that language 
acquisition studies have significance for the 
construction of theories of adult language 
(Macdona I d, 1984, p. 5) 
The link between preschool language abilities and those of adults is 
still unclear. Researchers have argued fOI' continuity in development 
of word meaning from childhood to adulthood (for example, Bowerman, 
1978). The notion of a "language game" affords an explanatory tool in 
this regard and would suggest that all words are learned in a variety 
of "language games", whether words such as chair or pain. Although 
additional "language games" are added with development, the process is 
equivalent for the learning of all words. Assuming that 
metalinguistic awareness 
1 anguage use, the school 
is not a special ability, separate from 
child's intuitions about language may be the 
bridge from child to adult language use. Older children'S greater 
insight into language may separate them from younger children. As 
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was mentioned earlier, metalin£juistic awareness may provide the only 
real basis for an adequate explanation of language development during 
the primary school years (Gleitman, Gleitman and Shipley, 1972; Scholl 
and Ryan, 1975). 
The end-state of the developmental process may be an ideal which 
evades precise specification but it is important to take it into 
account since our viewpoint about the end-state limits what we regard 
as relevant to the developmental progression (Macdonald, 1978). In 
the present study, adult perfol'mance serves as the end-state: adults 
have maximal competence in using words in a variety of contexts. Word 
meaning still continues to develop dut'ing this period (Mulford, 1977 ) 
and · the end-state i s not, therefore, absol ute, 
Kessen (1971) argues that in the ultimate developmental theory, we 
woul d be capable of pred i ct i ng deve 1 opmenta 1 changes from our 
knowledge of cognitive structures and environmental conditions. In 
this case, the developmental endpoint Vlould not need to be specified 
because it would be predictable on the ·basis of what we know of the 
child's interaction with his environment. Macdonald (ibid) pOints out 
that there is evidence that diffen",t cul tures and cl asses do not 
achieve the same developmenta·1 endpoints, 3 consideration which is of 
importance when analysing data frolll a particular population group as 
in the present study. 
A summary of the present position, higltlighting the major issues 
considered in this chapter, follows : 
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TABLE 1 "Grammar" of words in cOlltrast to previous approaches to 
wo-rd me an i ng 
"Grammar" and the 
meaning of words 
1 
2 
Meaning is primary 
Concerned with 
conceptual meaning: 
the way in which a 
word adjusts its 
sense in different 
co-occurrence 
relations 
I Feature theories 
I 
I 
I 11 Syntax is primary 
I 
I 
I 
12 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Concerned with the 
syntactic relations 
into whicll the word 
can enter 
I Prototype . 
I approaches 
I 
2 Relation between 
words in the 
language is not 
investigated 
_________ L _______ . _____ -1--______ _ 
I 
13 
I 
3 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
be I 
Co-occurrence 
restrictions are of 
concern only as they 
contribute to our 
understanding of the 
way in which a word 
alters its senses in 
different cont exts. 
Pretend to walk, 
pretend to be in 
pain, pretend to 
angry cannot be 
explained by means 
of co-occurrence 
constraints. 
Explained by means 
of 'propositional 
attri butes' rather 
than features, for 
example, you ·can 
point to pain 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
behaviour or to a I 
surface manifestationl 
of the pain but not I 
to the pain itself I 
I 
Co-occurrellce 
restrictiolls are a 
function (If the 
meaning of w6rd s but 
these restrictions 
must be exp1~ined in 
terms of abstract 
semantic features, 
that is, 'Illich 
features can occur 
together (Lehrer, 
1974). Explained 
within a syntactic 
framework (for 
example, phrase 
structure rules, 
Katz, 1972). 
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3· Relation between 
words in the 
1 anguage is not 
investigated 
"Grammar" and the 
meaning of words 
4 
5 
In vestigates word 
meaning within a 
vari ety of 
lingui stic contexts 
Emphasi s on non-
ostensive word 
meaning. Argues 
against ostensive 
definition as 
playing a primary 
role in the learning 
of word meaning 
I Feature theories I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
14 Invest i gates word 14 
I meaning in varied I 
I linguistic contexts I 
I but fails to I 
I adequately explain I 
I the alterations of a I 
I word or the develop- I 
I mental progression inl 
I the use of words in I 
I different senses I 
I I 
I I 
15 Empha s i s ~n 15 
I substantive word I 
I meaning. Cannot I 
I account for non- I 
I ostensiv~ words. I 
I Many assume a I 
I referential theory I 
I of word meaning I 
I which implies that I 
I ostensive definitionl 
I plays a primary rolel 
I in the learning of I 
I word meall i ng I 
Prototype 
approaches 
Investigates word 
meaning out of 
linguistic and 
extralinguistic 
contexts 
Emphasis on 
substantive word 
meaning and on 
categorization. 
The role of 
ostensive 
definition fall s 
outside the 
scope of these 
approaches 
---------1--.---.----.. - --- ----.Jl------
6 Fuzzy boundaries 16 Fuzzy boundaries 6 
7 
between semantically-I between wurds 
linked words, for I ~ithin a particular 
example, pain and I lexi ca l field 
ache I 
I 
I 
"Family resemblances"17 
between the I 
different uses of a I 
particular word, fori 
example, pretend in I 
pretend to walk , I 
pretend to be in I 
pain , and · pretend I 
to be angry I 
Extension of the 
word to objects 
which bear 
perceptual or 
funct i ona·1 
similarities 
--- _ ____ -+1 _______ _ 
I 
18 
I 
8 
to I 
Applied to primary 
school children 
(6-12 years) and 
adults using 
metalinguistic 
tasks 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Applied nlainly to 
preschool children 
(2 - 5 years) using 
comprehcn ~ ion and 
product ioll tasks 
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7 
I 
18 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Fuzzy boundaries 
for category 
membership based 
on perceptual 
criteria 
"F ami 1 y 
resemblances" 
between members 
of a category. 
Members do not 
hold equal 
membership 
Applied to 
adults modi fi ed 
for application 
to preschool and 
schoo 1 eh i I dren, 
using categori-
zation tasks 
CHAPTER 3 METHOD 
In this chapter, the design of the study is presented first followed 
by details of the procedure. 
3.1. Design of the study 
Th is is presented together with assoc i ated problems and the way in 
which these problems were overcome. 
3.1,1 A cross-sectional design was selected for numerous reasons. 
Firstly, the aim of this study \~as to investigate children's 
understanding and use of words at a particular 'stage' of development. 
Th is des i gn enabled a 1 arger group of ch i 1 dren over a broader age 
range to be included at each age level than would have been 
practically feasible were a longitudinal design adopted. 
Secondly, the aim was to investigate commonalities between the 
individuals' use and under-standing of the words selected so as to be 
able to study the general proc1=ss of language development during the 
primary school period. A longitudinal design would highl ight the 
developmental progression for any particular child. Since individual 
variation between children of the same age group or 'stage ' of 
development was anticipated and confirmed in the pilot study, it was 
considered advantageous to use a 1 ar-ger sampl e of subjects withi n a 
cross-sectional design so as to reveal more generally based trends. 
3.1.2 This study can be viewed from another perspective, namely, as 
a case study as far as words are concerned rather than in terms of 
individuals. It involves in-depth study of three non-ostensive words 
together with the i r semant i ca 11 y adj acent or 1 inked words, such as 
pain, ache and sore; same, similar and different; pretend, know, think 
and believe. 
Each word was examined from different perspectives, drawing on a large 
number of tasks. It would appear that this approach enables one to 
arrive at a comprehensive pi cture of each word's meaning and of the 
children's performance at differ-ent age levels. Thls method imposes a 
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complex structure on the present inquiry which would not exist 
otherwise. In this case, the findings would be an "artefact" of the 
procedure adopted (Nesdale and Tunmer; 1984). However, if we accept 
the "grammar" of words, viewing the word from different perspectives 
is a necessary procedure for the description of word meaning. 
3 . 1. 3 Psycholinguistic researchers and language therapists may argue 
that we cannot question a child about pain unless we know that he 
has that word in his repertoire. The present argument, however, is 
that it is only by questioning the child tllatwe are able to determine 
firstly, whether he has the word in his repertoire , and secondly, the 
level at which he has an understanding of that particular word. On 
the ' basis of this argument, it was not necessary to check the child's 
level of comprehension for each of the words being tested prior to 
introducing the experimental questions, since in this experiment, 
comprehension of these words constitutes part of the task rather than 
the pretest. This argument constituted a cornerstone for the design 
and directed the formulation of the ta sks. 
3.1.4 Meta 1 i ngui st i c - t.Y£'~ __ CJ.!!..<:"~ i on ~ were asked, that is, the 
majority of the tasks demanded of the child that he reflect upon the 
meanings of the words and that he provide justifications for his 
answers. It is argued that comprehension and , product ion tasks as 
generally conceived in the literature do not reveal the full extent of 
the chi 1 d's knowl edge of part i cul ar I-lords. It is suggested that the 
child may be able to use and understand 1'lOrds in different contexts 
but that his understanding of the word at a 'deeper' level (that is, 
when questioned further), will reveal differences from adults ' 
responses to the same set of questions. 
3.1.5 The approach adopted was that of a flexible semi - structured 
interview (Seiler and Wannenmacher , 1983) . This requires that the 
tester probe and question the chil d spontaneously . This approach 
comprises dialogue techniques such as Pi agetian techniques which have 
been drawn on in assessing metalinguistic awareness 
(8erthoud-Papandropoulou, 1978). Such t echniques enable us to 
question the child further so as to arrive at his understanding. They 
minimize the influence of variables such as social desirabil ity and 
demand characteristics (Smith and Miller, 1978), verbal 
inarticulateness, memory factors and failure to understand the task. 
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Furthermore , ambiguity or lack of clarity, inherent in everyday 
language use and resolved only by the context in which communi cation 
occurs (Palermo, 1983), i s reduced by such an approach since the 
tester can question th e child about his in tended meaning. 
In a well cited study, Hughe s and Grieve (1980) illustrated that 
children attempt to make sense of bizarre questions. The present 
study aimed to examine children's convictions about the meanings of 
selected words rather than their understanding of quest ion s which 
appear to them as bizarre. The fl exible interview enabled the te ster 
to establi sh the Iyay in which the chi ldren understood the questions. 
If the que st ions are el ic"iting answers characterizing a 'stage', then 
they should not appear bizarre unless the child ha s either passed 
through that 'stage' already or has not yet reached it. If these 
questions are assessing indi vidua l differences rather t han 'stages', 
then certain children in any age group may find them bizarre. That 
children find them bizarre , would, in either of these case s, be 
enlightening as to their under standing of these words. (Thi s issue is 
elaborated upon in chapter 5). 
Explanations offered by the child allm'l us to evaluate the reasons for 
what appear to be 'incorrect' answers (Freeman, Sinha and Stedmon, 
1982; Russell, 1982): guessing may be a co ntribut i ng factor , or if 
there are commonalities between individuals wit hin a group, it may 
reflect a developmental leve l . 
Other than the use of an observational approach within a natural 
environment, test situat ion s always introduce 
artificiality. In accordance with the ecological 
some degree of 
approach to the 
study of concepts, an attempt vias made "to maintain the integrity of 
variables that matter in natural settings" wit hin a controlled test 
environment (Neisser, 1984, p.ll). Everyday concepts were studied 
using dialogue techniques which included spontaneous probe questions 
based on each subject's responses . 
3 . 1.6 A predominantly verba l ~adl to testing was adopted in this 
study as has been used in the majority of studies on metal inguistic 
awareness. Purely nonverbal method s would be inappropriate for a 
study of word meaning spec i fica lly where the words under inve st i gat ion 
lack denotata. Non-linguistic demand,; Iye r e reduced with the aid of 
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pictures and by ensuring that the tJsks were short and undemanding 
with regard to memory (a s in the question, 'Hhat is a pain? ' ). 
There are inherent problems ina 11 verbal met hods since one is us i ng 
language to assess languilge , " ... a form of theoretical circularity 
from which there is no departure" (Seiler and Hannenmacher, ibid, 
p.329). The difficulty in establishing equivalent reference with 
children during testing has been mentioned by numerous researchers 
(for example, Freeman, Sinha and Stedmon, ibid; Seiler and 
Wannenmacher, ibid). In formulilting questions, the researcher uses 
words and sentences, the meanings of which stem from her own 
conceptual framework. The subject has to interpret these utterances 
according to his (the subject's) own concepts. However , it is 
pre -s upposed that subject and investigator share some identical 
concepts and draw on this knowledge to interpret the questions asked . 
I n the present study, it was th i s very difference in understand i ng of 
concepts that was the focus of the investigation and the 1 inguistic 
environments in which these word s or concepts were assessed, comprised 
the basis for the study of the "gt"ammar" of these words. Explanations 
allowed for an examination of qualita t ive differences within and 
between age groups. 
In the use of verbal tasks, misunderstanding might arise on the part 
of the questioner or on the part of the child . In conversation, we do 
not process every word in order to understand the speaker. Rather, we 
entertain a running hyputhesi s as to what the speaker intends to 
convey. Similarly, the tester obtains a first impression as to what 
the child means during testing. However, when the data is re -examined 
more analytically, the tester might arrive at a ditferent meaning from 
her first impression. In the present study, in-depth analysis was 
favoured. Probing questions resolved any initial misunderstanding 
that the tester may have Ilad of the child 's response. Cross-checking 
of responses to different quest ion s by any individual subject assisted 
the tester further in elucidating the child's intended meaning. 
When verbal methods are used , a furth~~r compl ication i s how to phrase 
a question so that it i s understood by all subjects while at the same 
time, not altering the quest ion when simplifying it for younger 
subjects. We also have to guard against questions bei ng absurdl y 
simple for the older children. Frolll the pi lot study, il language level 
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was favoured which tended towards simplicity to ensure that the 6 year 
aIds were able to understand the questions. Certain questions were 
repeated in different forms to ensure that the formulation of the 
quest i on was not a factor contri but i ng to the responses obtained. 
Probe quest ions were adapted spontaneous 1 y to the 1 anguage 1 eve 1 of 
each individual. 
3.2 Implementation of the experimental procedure 
A pilot study ./as carried out on 18 pri mary school children (6-12 
years of age) and on 10 preschool children (4-5 years). The purpose 
of this pilot study was to determine whether the questions were 
assessing what they were designed to assess , namely, alterations in 
meaning when non-ostensive words occur in different contexts; whether 
metalinguistically phrased questions were suitable for tapping the 
developmental changes in word meaning with age; q.nd whether all the 
quest ions were understood by ch i 1 dren of a 11 the age groups. 
Furthermore, the pilot study was a IHeall·S of evaluating finer details 
of method and procedul"e such as, le ngt h of test sessions (so as to 
el iminate any fatigue factor), phrasing of ta sks and selection of 
particular non-ostensive \,ords. On the bas is of the pilot study, the 
experimental method and procedure were formulated , the details of 
which are presented below. 
3.2 . 1. Subjects 
S i xty- four ch il dren, equally repl"esented for sex , were selected as 
subjects from a middle cla'ss, pri vat e (fee paying) school, namely King 
David School, Linksfield. A private school afforded easier access 
over a long time period than did a government school . Children were 
selected from one school to afford some degree of uniformity in terms 
of socio-economic and educational background. This study aims to 
determine how children of different age s , given their particular 
educational, social and general experiences , perform on the language 
tasks with which they are presented. The sample comprises a group of 
advantaged children and this study is theref or e , not normative. 
Generalization of finding s is neces saril y res t ricted further by the 
small sample size. 
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S ;xteen children were 
(6-7years) ,standard 1 
chosen from each of the classes grade 1 
(8-9 years), standard 3 (10-11 years) and 
standard 5 (12-13 years). Subjects were randomly selected from class 
regi sters by the experimenter after whi ch the headmi stress/headmaster 
from the Jun i or and Pri mary sect i OTIS of the school excluded those 
children who had particular learning problems, those who had failed a 
class, and those who · came from a dual language background. Children 
were randomly sel ected from the full range of cl asses for each age 
group so as to guard again st a parti cular approach to teaching being 
an influencing factor. 
The adult subjects, first-year speech therapy and Engl ish students at 
the ' University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, served to represent 
the end-state for the development of ward meaning on the group of 
tasks. This was an advantaged group parallel to the sample of 
children and language had a sp,=cific intel-est for t hem although they 
had not 'yet obtained a specialist 'level in th i s' regard . A gifted 
child and a learning disabled child I~ere included to highlight issues 
, 
which may have been overlooked when as sessing the normal children . 
The following criteria were drawn on in selecting subjects: 
3.2.1(a) Socio-eco nom'ic back\Jround I'las consistent acros s the group 
of subjects in order to maintain some uniformity with rega rd to t he 
factor of s timulation. 
3 . 2.1(b) Chronological a~ 
Chi ldren within the age range extending from 6 through 12 . ye ars were 
selected for the following reasons: 
i) Studies of word mean ing on chi l dren in this age range are 
re l at i vely few when compared \'lith the study of word meaning in 
preschoo 1 ch i 1 dren . 
ii) Late r developing conce pt s can lJe in vestigated and s in ce these 
are implicitly more complex, they may help us to understand the 
relationship between early language deve 'lopment in children and adult 
word use . 
iii) Findings with older childl-en lIlay have important implication s for 
schoo ling. 
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iv) The present research was concerned with the development of word 
meaning subsequent to the acquisition period. As mentioned earl ier 
(chapter 2.4.2), metalinguistic ability is regarded by the present 
experimenter as a skill which develops during the middle chi.ldhood 
period. 
v) The present set. of metalinguistic tasks require a certain level 
of language facility in order to be attempted at all. 
3.2.1(c) Intelligence level 
Selection of subjects was completely random. The main criterion for 
selection was that there should be an equal number of males and 
females in each group and that the children's birthdays should not 
occur during the course of testing (over about 5-6 months) . 
IQ scores were available for the 12 year olds only. For each of the 
6, 8 and 10 year old groups, different reading teits or English tests 
were used by the school to establ ish reading ages. An average score 
established within a group doe!; not afford comparis,ons across groups 
because there is no uniform measure of assessment. IQ tests have been 
harshly criticized as suitable measures of intelligence (Gardner, 
1984; Sternberg, 1984), and whether reading tests are assessing 
intelligence level, language level, or another ability , is difficult 
to ascertain . 
It was assumed on the basis of random selection, that there was a 
mixed group of subjects with respect to intelligence level. 
3.2.2 Construction of test items 
Two hundred and five tasks were formulated on the basis of the pilot 
study. These comprised short questions, picture tasks and 
sequences. In all the tasks, the child was required to 
explanations for his initial response. In this way, all the 
included a metalinguistic component. 
story 
give 
tasks 
Space 1 imitations prevent discussion of all the tasks assessed. So as 
not to gloss over the major hsues by presenting a cursory view of 
each task, three words, namely, same, pretend and pain together with 
their related wOI-ds, wel-e selected for detailed analysis. Tasks for 
the other words which added either support or criticism to the present 
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argument, were also included. (See Appendices 8-F for the tasks 
analysed grouped under each word). 
It must be emphasized 
selected because they 
that these part i cul ar words and 
supported the present approach. 
tas ks were not 
Rather, these 
tasks di rectly assessed the "grammar" and meani ng of the words and 
could be analyzed as they cO-occuYTed in different contexts , for 
example, same pain, and pretend to be in pain. The tasks excluded 
were those that. were periphera 'l to the main issues, 
have a hurt. Does that sentence sound OK or not?' 
for example, 'I 
This includes a 
syntactical error which relates to "grammar" but it , does not assess 
"grammar" directly. 
Each word was assessed from a number of perspectives in tasks which 
were grouped in the following categories: 
i) Spontaneous formulation of sentences with each word: The child 
was required to formulate three sentences \vith each word prior to 
commencement of the session testing that word, to ensure that he could 
use it in appropri ate contexts. The ' other tasks for that word 
followed. Compiling a few sentences was favoured above observation in 
a natural situation since the pos sibility of obtaining a suitable 
spontaneous sample of each word from each child was remote even with a 
scene being set within a spontaneous play situation. 
ii) Definition tasks, for example, ' What is a pain?': These tasks 
examined the "grammar" of words indirc,ctly. If a word is defined in 
the same way by all subjects or by all subjects of a particular age 
group, it suggests that the vlOrd has a core meaning; if not , it 
supports the notion of "grammar". 
iii) Fuzzy boundary tasks, for exam~ l e, ' Are a pain and an ache the 
same or similar or different?': These ta sks are definition tasks which 
focus on a particular contrast in defining a word. 
iv) The "grammar" of the ,lOrd was examined directly in those tasks 
assessing the wo,rd in a diversity of linguist contexts, for example, 
the word same in the contexts of same ball, same pain, same dress, 
same apple. 
3.2.3 Instruction s 
A study of word meaning high 'l igh ts the importance of the child's 
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having an understanding of all the words in the instructions for the 
experimental tasks. The word word was included as a pretest to ensure 
that subsequent questions in which word appeared in the question 
itself, would be understood. However, no pretest was included to 
determine subjects' under~tanding of the \'1ord mean, which, together 
with numerous other words, also occurs in certain question tasks. One 
cannot assess understanding of every single word that occurs in the 
instructions. Furthermore, this becomes a never-ending process since, 
in checking the child's knowledge of one word (for example, mean) one 
includes other word s whose mean ing then ha s t o be assessed. 
The preliminary instructions were worded differently for the two 
youngest versus the oldest groups to ensure that they would be 
understood (see Appendi x A). \'Jhat i s most important is ensuring that 
both sets of instructions 'gear' the subjects in the same way. Where 
wording of the question affected the task itself rather than being 
important only for administration, all su bjects re'ceived the same set 
of instructions which afforded standar~ization. 
3.2.4 Administration of tasks 
3.2.4(a) Test Environmellt 
Each child was tested individually in a quiet room in the school. The 
child was seated diagonally acros s from the experimenter. Each task 
was written on an index card, the series being placed in front of the 
experimenter. 
Each session was tape recorded. and those children who had not been 
exposed to a tape recorder previously were encouraged to play with it 
prior to commencement of the sess ion. Recorded sess ions afforded 
accurate transcript-ions of data. This enabled. the tester to devote 
attention to the chi ld and t o minimize the formality of the test 
situation. Brief comments were noted, usually at the end of the 
session. 
A videotape would have been ideal \'1el"e role pl ay sequences preferred 
but the rela ti vely few tasks requiring role play did no t warrant video 
equipment. Furtilermore, cost and time factors excluded this as a 
practical. option. 
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The pretend tasks wh i ch requi red the ch i 1 d to show or to exp 1 a in how 
he would ' pretend to walk' and so on, were generally responded to 
verbally. Where subjects did prefer to act out, the tester noted down 
the child's behaviour(s) briefly after each task and immediately after 
the session, wrote down additional comments. 
3 . 2.4(b) Order of presentation of tasks 
Since the effect of one ta sk on another could not be predicted, tasks 
were presented in random order for all su bjects . Initiall y, a fi xed-
random order was selected abo ve a vari ab I e- random order since the 
latter added practical complications: transcriptions of data were 
found to be very time consuming. 
From the pilot s tudy, it was f ound that randomizing all 205 tasks led 
to fatigue for all groups of subjects because it resulted in their 
di scussing pain , then perhaps belief, then anger, then pain again, and 
so on. Shifting repeatedly from one totally different idea to another 
was noted to be t iring. In addition, it was found that the tester 
missed valuable inFormation. When Lhe domain as a whole was assessed 
for each subject , the tester wa s able to draw on the child 's earlier 
answers ' in probing beyond the standard set of questions. This allowed 
her to obtain a comprehensive picture of each individual child's use 
and understanding of each word. A fixed - random order across all 205 
tasks eliminated this advantage. (Subtasks within any particular item 
were not spl it up since thi s would have required repetition of the 
instruct io ns for each sub- item) . It was a I so found that randomi zi ng 
within a pa rt icul ar domain , on ly, enabled the child to obtain clues 
from previous quest ions. 
As a compromise, tasks were randomized within sets of domains which 
then comprised the sessions, namely, 
i) word and same tasks 
ii) pain and anger tasks 
iii) dream, thought and daydream tasks 
as well as picture tasks which drew on all the words 
iv) pretend, think, believe and know tasks. 
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Prior to 'shuffling' the index cards containing the tasks for each set 
of domains, easier tasks for each set were removed. These were placed 
at the beginning of each set of tasks to ensure that the 6 year olds 
would be successful initially and therefore, at their ease in 
attempting subseq~ent questions. Simpler questions were also included 
within sessions to prevent the youngest groups from becoming 
despondent. Since there are no 'correct' answers for the majority of 
questions, each child was able to ansVier at his own level of abil ity, 
which increased motivation. 
Picture tasks were interspersed between purely verbal tasks to 
increase concentration and interest. Picture displays are ambiguous 
since they cannot fully capture the dynamic flow of real live events 
(Hirsch-Pasek, Gol inkoff and Gordon, 1984) and young children may have 
a poor understanding of convention in pictures. Where the pictures 
were of direct iinportance in the tusk itself , possible problems of 
interpretation were taken into account in analysis (relevant for QI00 
on 1 y) . 
3.2.4(c) Pre-testing 
At the beginning of the first session, 5- 10 minutes were used to relax 
the child which was found to be particularly important for the 6 year 
olds. This involved 'chatting' to the chjld about his family, pets, 
favourite games and so on. 
3.2.4(d) Number and length of sess i ons 
Each child was tested four times, each test sess ion lasting 
approximately fifteen minutes. Sessions for the 12 year olds tended 
to extend to twenty or twenty-five minutes at times as their answers 
were more detailed thereby promoting greater di scussio n and a larger 
number of questions. 
From the pilot study, it was found that the older children were able 
to concentrate for longer periods of time and did not display fatigue 
over this time period. It had been anticipated that the younger two 
groups would require a greater number of sessions to exclude the 
factor of fatigue. However , the pilot study demonstrated that because 
their answers were shorter and because t hey were not confused by 
certain questions, add"itional probe questions were reduced in number 
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and they displayed no difficulty in concentrating for about fifteen 
minutes. 
The only group within whic h some members displayed mild fatigue during 
testing were the 10 year olds . This may have been due to their 
offer i ng lengthy responses requir 'ing added probe questions as well as 
being subject to a certain amount of confusion, as were the 12 year 
olds. However, the 10 year olds may not yet have the ability to 
concentrate as well as the 12 year olds. 
The children in each age group were tested on the tasks for Sessions 
1-4 at approximately 4-5 day intervals. The influence of one task on 
another both across and with in sessions could not be controlled but 
was constant for all the subje·cts. The 6 year olds (Grade 1) were 
tested last to ensure them as much time as possible to adjust to the 
school situation prior to commenCing testing. 
3 . 2.4(e) Number of tasks per __ ~~j2.1! 
The number of tasks presented per ,ess ion was decid.ed from the pilot 
study based on two factor s : firstly , keeping particu l ar groups of 
words toget her for each session; and seco ndly, the average time taken 
to administer a particu l ar set of tasks. Furthermore, Session 1 was 
shorter than Sessions 2 and 3 since it was preceded by a pretest 
period. On this basi s, 36 task s were presented in Session 1, 50 tasks 
in Session 2, 67 tasks i n Session 3 and 50 tasks in Session 4. 
3. 2. 4(f) Practice trial s 
Where required, these were constant for all subjects. As an example, 
for the pretend tasks, subject, were asked to ' show/tell' me how you 
would pretend to sleep and pretend to drink , prior to introducing the 
experimental tasks. 
3. 2.4(g) Feedback during testing 
In the present study, feedback was mainly required to increase 
moti vation . Since the majority of tile tasks did not demand a 
'correct' answer because any answer was of qualitative interest, 
positive verbal encouragement , for example, "very good ", "a good try", 
was frequently offered during the course of testi~g. 
3. 2.4(h) 
completely 
.::L..:;,e..::.a r",n.;..i;,;.n""g<--.::d..::.u r,-'", 1,-,/1 9 t e 5 tin 9 i 5 a fa c tor w h i c h can not 
overcome but which has to be partially controlled. 
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be 
In 
doing this, the researcher used standard questions derived on the 
basis of the pilot study together with uniform probes for each 
question. Beyond this, each child wa ·:; probed further on the basis of 
his individual answers which afforded an elucidation of each child's 
unique understanding of the question: control between subjects was not 
a priority here. The difficulty ·Iay in encouraging the child to give 
of his knowledge and ensuring that this was equally encouraged for all 
subjects. 
For each task item, the child was gi ven ' back up' questions and 
encouragement such as "try", "What do you think?" or · a repetition of 
the quest i on once he had attempted a response. The probes were all 
open-ended questions and, if necess ary, the .c hild was presented with a 
"forced a lternat i ve" (Crystal, 1'1 etcher and Garman , 1976) for example, 
'Are a pai~ and an ache the same or s imilar or di fferent? '. Certain 
answers from the pilot study were included as standard probes in the 
main study. 
The responses of children of a ce)·l.arn age group' were, at times, 
suggested to other children in that age group as individual extended 
probes to check for any uniformity. Six year olds may at time s have 
been 'mi sled' by the tester, but the majority of children rejected the 
probe if they did not agree. Certa i n probes also arose duri ng the 
main study (for example, probes for Q26, same seat) after testing a 
certain age group, in this case, the 10 year olds . (The 8 year olds 
were therefore, not assessed on this probe as they had already been 
tested). It is important in ·itself that this probe arose from the 
responses of 10 year 01 ds rather than B year 01 ds. 
3.2.4(i) Transcription of data 
The children's responses for each question were transcribed verbatim 
from the tapes as soon after the record ing sessio n as possible. 
Comment s from each session were added to the transcriptions. 
Hesitati~ns by the child were noted with three dots( ... ) at the 
beginning of an explanation. Three dots were also used for a long 
pause during the course of the explanation and a dash ( -) for a 
he s itation . . Additi onal probes, beyond the set questions and standard 
probes, were transcribed verbatiln since analysis of the child's 
responses was dependent upon tile ph rasing of the question. 
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Each question was transcribed on a separate sheet to allow for 
analysis of responses for each individual child across all ta sks, as 
well as for each task both within and between age groups. 
3.2.4(j) Adult su bject s 
The adult s ubject s received all tasks exactly as for the children . 
From the pilot study .it was fo und that the entire set of tasks cou ld 
be presented in approximately one hour wHhout the interference of 
fatigue. A short break was introdu ced between each set of questions 
(that is, between Session 1 questions and Session 2 questions and so 
on) but t he adults preferred to be tested at a s ingle sitt ing . They 
were given instruction s as for the oldest groups of childre n. 
The adults were further instructed to be succinct s ince these 
questions lend themselves to endless debate, which would have made 
transcr iption and analysis i mpossi bl e. A ve rbal administration of the 
tasks (as for the ch ildren) was favoured above' written group-test 
administration to ensure that no additional variab les would be 
introduced when compari ng adult and ch i 1 d responses .. 
3.2 . 5 Rel iabil itL_measures 
Performance variation or individllal variatio n refers to the 
cons i stency in one ch i 1 d's p'erforiliance from one task to another 
equival ent task or f rom one test session to another on the same task. 
Inconsistency may arise because of poor test re-test reliability , the 
influence of maturational factors from one testing session to the next 
or because of factors in the test situation, such as fatigue on one 
occassion, the child's feeling cross Rnd noise. 
3.2.5(a) Test-retest reliability 
It was important to ascertain whether 
indicati ve of persistent viewpoin ts held 
periods or whether they are fortuitous. 
subjects' responses are 
at particular development 
In the latter case, a 
fundamenta 1 1 anguage phenomenon may be reveal ed in wh i ch performance 
variation exists apart from any individual chi ld and despite group 
consistency . This .would then indicate the l imitations of a case study 
approach which v/(lu ld result in the )'ic hness of the data being lost. 
The above conclusion necessarily assumes that inconsistency i s not 
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simply an outcome of the test situation and of the nature of the 
tasks. 
A randomly selected sample of the subjects (tl'lO from each age group) 
were retested on a random sample of questions from each domain (twenty 
five questions in all) to check for consistency of responses over time 
(see Appendices G . and H for questions and a sample of responses). 
Retesting was carried out five months after initial · testing and again 
two weeks later , to rule out any possibil ity of maturational factors 
contri but i ng to changes in performance. There appeared to be some 
deve 1 opmenta 1 change over the fi ve month peri od but two weeks was 
considered to be sufficient in lengtli to el iminate memory recall as a 
variable while minimizing the influsnce of developmental factors. 
Nesdale and Tunmer (ibid) point out that the stability of children's 
responses on the same task·and procedure over a short period has been 
largely neglected. They add that this limits comparisons between 
studies using different methods so as to determini which aspects give 
ri se to di fferent 1 evel s or types of performance. 
The term 'consistency' as used here impl ies that the two answers were 
not contradictory and were therefore , compatible. It could not be 
expected that the two answers \,ould. be exact l y the same (in wording) 
given the qualitative nature of the questions and of the responses 
required. In addition, 'consistency ' suggests that the answers were 
at the same level (for example, both drew on an example as explanation 
versus a general explanation). 
3.2 . 5(b) Measure of internal consi_s_tency 
This was built into the test design . Certain questions were repeated 
with different phrasing in order to evaluate consistency of responses. 
Since t he questions vlere devised so as to investigate each word from 
different vantage points, it vias pos s ible to establish a trend in the 
child's responses on different tasks assessing the same word or group 
of related words. During the course of testing, thi s was establi shed 
as a 'measure of internal consistency' of the child's performance on a 
variety of tasks . 
3.2.5( c) Inte r-rater re! i a i2i.l. H1' 
The experimenter served as both tester and rater and no inter-rater 
reliability measure was established. However, certain tasks were 
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analysed twi~e, that is, under the word (for example, same) and under 
the task category (for example. Definition tasks) and scoring was 
found to be consistent. Assessing each word from a variety of 
vantage points , building· a measure of internal consistency into the 
test design and establishing test-retest reliability, reduced the 
personal bias of a single rater. The tester was unaware of which 
subje~ts were which in analysis since each was numbered. 
The approach to ana I ys is adopted in the chapter wh i ch fo 11 ows was 
determined by the premisses, method, desig n and procedure outl ined in 
chapters 2 and 3. 
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CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS 
The analysis is organized around the main theme in this study, namely, 
the "grammar" and meaning of words. This theme will be discussed in 
light of the findings for the words same, pretend and pain: 
4. 1 Same: 
Findings for the words similar and different are included in 
relation to the findings for same. 
4. 2 Pretend: 
Findings for the words think, know and believe are discuss ed 
where they throw additional light on the finding s for pretend. 
4. 3 Pain: 
Findings for the words ache and sore and for the words anger, 
cross, thought, dream and daydream are included where they add 
to the findings for pain. 
4.4 Findings which reveal the "grammar" of what would appear to be 
earlier acquired words such as do, feel, see and the 
interrogative form where are analysed briefly as they re late to 
the words i n (4.2) and (4.3) above. This will enable the 
researcher to 
non-ostensive words 
words or whether 
"grammar" . 
determine whether apparently 
are 1 earned di fferently from more 
they are also subject to the 
'simpler' 
' complex' 
issue of 
Finding s from the adult subjects serve as the end-state of the 
developmental process and are presented first when discussing each 
group of words (4.1.1; 4.2.1; 4.3.1). For the children each word is 
analysed from a variety of tasks, for same (4.1); pretend (4.2) and 
paid (4.3), namely: 
Spontaneous Sentences (4 . 1.2; 4.2.2; 4.3.2). 
Definition tasks (4.1.3; 4.2.3; 4.3.3). 
Fuzzy boundary tasks (4.1.4; 4.2.4; 4.3.4) 
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Tasks assessing the word in a diversity of 1 tnguistic 
contexts, for example same with pain/dress/ball (4.1.5; 
4.2.5; 4.3.5). These tasks are formulated both outside of 
a situational context, for example: 
Q45: Can you have the same pain as me? 
and within a situational context, for example 
Q60: John is playing with some bricks and a brick falls 
on his foot. Janet says, I've got the same pain ... ' (see appendix 
C) . 
Definition and fuzzy boundary tasks considered together in 
relation to tasks assessing the word in a diversity of 
linguistic contexts. These were included so as to 
determine whether or not the meanings of two words used 
separately remain constant when these words co-occur 
(4.1.6; 4. 2.6; 4.3.6). 
Summary of findings for each· group of words (4 . 1.7; 4.2.7; 
4.3.7). 
The analysis which follows includes verbatim transcripts together with 
figures displaying percentage scores. Figures are included where they 
illustrate findings more clearly than would a description alone. It 
will be recognised that for clarity of graphical representation, 
di fferent scales are used on di fferent fi gures. Percentage scores 
afford meaningful comparisons between the children (where n~16 in each 
age group) and the adults (where n~10). Where one subject in any 
group was not asked a particular question , the percentage is computed 
accordingly. However, a response of "don't know " or 'no response' by 
the subject is included in the figure. 
In cases where the responses were dichotomous or mutually exclusive 
(for example: "yes" or "no"), only one alternative is presented in the 
figures which follow. The sum of options for any group of subjects is 
100%. Where more than two alternatives are offered by subjects within 
a group or by any individua"J subject, all the alternatives are 
represented in the figure. In these cases, the options for that 
particular group will exceed 100%. 
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Where percentages for the various criteria mentioned are so small as 
to not allow trends to be meaningfully interpreted, tables are 
preferred to figures. Space 1 imitations prevent the inclusion of the 
complete range of responses for all the subjects but these are 
available if required . 
The present set of .tasks are all presented outside of a natural 
everyday 1 anguage context. Withi n the test s ituat ion, tasks compri se 
stories which most closely approximate natural language situations and 
synthetic tasks such as : 'Can you have my pain?' and ' Does same mean 
the same thing as similar?' which would never be encountered in any 
everyday language context. 
It is argued that a word always occurs within a context. If we ask: 
'Define the word pain ' , we cannot conclude that we have arri ved at the 
mean i ng of the word outs i de of ali ngu i st i c context: the word pain 
occurred within the context of the phrase 'Define' the word ... ' even 
though we are concerned with the word as an 'object' in this case. It 
is argued that a word obtains it s mean i ng from the total sum of 
contexts in which i t occurs. To compare tas ks on the basis of whether 
they are in context or out of context does not yie ld any useful 
i nformat ion in the present framework si nce it is assumed that the 
context alters the use of the word which then prevents suitable 
comparisons from being made. 
In the analYSis and the discussion, the following abbreviations are 
used : 
S - refers to 'subject' and is applied to the children. Where a 
number is inc 1 uded (for example, S4) it refers to the number 
of the subject in order of testing (1-16 for the 8 year olds; 
17-32 for the 10 year olds; 33-48 for the 12 year olds and 
49-64 for the 6 year olds. The 6 year olds were tested last to 
allow for a period of adjustment in a new school situation). 
For ease of description, subjects are referred to as 6, 8, 10 
and 12 years of age ratller than mentioning the range 6-7, 8-9, 
10-11 and 12-13 years. 
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A - refers to 'adult subject'. Where a number is included (for 
example, A2) it refers to the number of the subject in order 
of testing (1-10). 
4.1 Same, similar and different 
Findings for the adult subjects are presented first after which the 
responses of the children are analysed. 
4.1.1 Findings for adult subjects 
The responses of the adult subjects provide the end-state of the 
developmental process. It is argued from within a developmental 
psycholinguistic perspective that language is learned in its everyday 
context which suggests that we should not remove 1 anguage from the 
communicative interaction between speakers. However, 
language learning in school removes language -from 
Children are taught to treat language as an object. 
much of the 
its context. 
Whether we can 
separate the end-state of acquisition o'f words from the dynamics of 
development is questionable. Furthermore, word meaning is regarded as 
dynamic even in adulthood so the end-state must be viewed as relative 
rather than absolute. 
4.1.1(a) Definition tasks 
Ninety percent of the adults used a genel'al explanation in defining 
same, similar and different. They focused on the issue of 
commonality, likeness or similarity, in their definitions. In this 
way, they approach .a 
regard as the 'core' 
common definition which many researchers 
of the word's meaning. This approach 
questionable for two major reasons: 
may 
is 
i) If there were a stabl e 'core', all the adults would be expected 
to use the same wording in their explanations since even synonyms have 
some different contexts of application. If synonyms overlapped 
entirely in their uses, one of them would be redundant in the 
language. It can be concluded that if there is a 'core' , it is f uzzy. 
Terms used in the adults' explanations such as "identical", "similar" , 
"something in common", "an exact replica" may all have overlapping 
uses but clearly, they all have individual uses as well. To equate 
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these explanations and thereby, to ar'gue for a common 'core' in the 
meaning of same, is to straitjacket the word, 
ii) The overlap in the uses of terms drawn on by adults to explain 
same may indicate the stable aspect of the word's meaning over 
different contexts. However, the shift in emphasis of meaning, that 
is, the way in which . the word alters its sense according to context, 
is not accounted for by a general definition. 
In their responses to the definition tasks, adults provided only a 
restricted portion of the word's meaning and failed to account for the 
"grammar" of the word. It must therefore be kept in mind when 
analysing the children's responses that definitions are not conclusive 
or all-encompassing. 
4.1.1(b) Fuzzy boundary tasks 
Individual variation was found for the fuzzy boundary tasks deal ing 
with same, simil ar and dHferent. Adults provi ded general 
explanations as for the definition tasks and displayed a lack of 
precision in the use of these words. Adults revealed sophisticated 
confusion on certain tasks which suggests that they may have a greater 
awareness of fuzzy boundaries than do the children, as will become 
clear in the sections which follow. 
Fuzzy boundaries appear to be inherent in the words themselves. With 
development, a greater awareness of fuzzy boundaries when required to 
refl ect upon 1 anguage appears to result in soph i st i cated confus i on. 
However, these findings were revealed in a particular test situation 
and caution must therefore, be exercised in general izing to everyday 
language situations where fewer doubts about word use arise. 
4.1.1(c) Same, similar and different in a diversity of linguistic 
contexts 
The adults recognized a shift in the sense of same when appl ied in 
different contexts wh i ch dev i at ed from the general exp 1 anat ions they 
offered for the definition and fuzzy boundary tasks. Same ball and 
same dress were common 1 y interpreted in the equ i va 1 ence sense. Same 
apple was most frequently interpreted in the identity sense in 
contrast to the children's interpretations. Same seat was interpreted 
in the identity sense as it was by the children. The tasks deal ing 
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with continuity over time were evaluated according to the identity 
sense and adults di sregarded overt changes in drawi ng thei r 
conclusions. For same pain, all adults focused on 'type' of pain in 
thei r exp 1 anat ions. More importantly, til is group of tasks 1 ed to 
sophisticated confusion in certain adults unlike the other same tasks. 
My anger or my pain was most frequently interpreted by adults as such 
in contrast to the i nterpretat i on of my anger as 'same anger' or my 
pain as 'same pain' by the younger children. 
Adults recognized ambiguities of sense. They concentrated on less 
obvious criteria in drawing their conclusions and they frequentl y drew 
on more than one criterion or weighed up one criterion against 
another. They tended to take a vari ety of poss i bil it i es into account 
in their answers. 
For all the tasks, strategies employed by adults in answering the 
metalinguistic questions posed, included the' use of general 
explanations in defining words; the recognition of ambiguities of 
sense for the word same; an emphasis on less overt criteria in drawing 
conclusions about similarity; a focus on more than one criterion or on 
the relationship between one criterion and another in reaching their 
conclusions; and a weighing LIP of possibil ities by evaluating 
similarities. 
With regard to word meaning, adults displayed a shift in senses 
according to the words in the 1 inguistic context with which the word 
same co-occurred. The impl icit notion of "grammar" appears to hold as 
part of the end - state in the development of word mean i ng suggest i ng. 
that alterations in sense are inherent in'the meaning of same itself. 
However, the difficulty we have in separating language use from 
metalinguistic awareness renders this conclusion tentati ve (see 
chapter 5). 
4.1 . 2 Spontaneous se ntences 
Amongst the 6 year olds, 25% wl:re un able to formulate sentences with 
same . However, they offered sentences with simi 1 ar and different and 
had no difficulty in answering questions which included the word same. 
From 8 years of age, all 
with all three words. 
the chil dren were able to Formulate se ntences 
Syntactical errors occurred, for example 
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"Those dogs are same" (6 years); "It looks similar than your dog" (6 
years); "I've got a similar watch like yours" (8 years). These 
syntactic errors occurred at 10 and 12 years of age as well. These 
errors are not of major relevance in this study but certain 
syntactical errors may reveal interesting misconceptions (see chapter 
5) . 
Errors of "grammar", important in this study, also occurred although 
infrequently (only 1 or 2 examples in each group) as in the following 
sentence: "Like, someone is different" (6 years) where the child takes 
no account of the need for a comparison when using the word different. 
Other examples are: "I've got the same teacher" (8 years); "I've got 
a similar brother to me" (8 years); "This is the same animal" (10 
years); "You have similar features" (12 years). When probed with 
"same as?" all subjects provided a comparison. One learning-disabled 
child (10 years) produced all her spontaneous sentences in the form: 
"The similar book (is on the table)" and was unable to add a 
comparison when probed. Part of the meaning of similar is that it 
implies a comparison between two things both of which have to be made 
clear to the listener. 
A different type of "grammar" error occurred once only (an 8 year 
old), namely: "I look exactly s i milar". Besides omitting a 
comparison , this subject ignored the rela t ive qual ity of simil ar as 
well as the implication of preci seness for the word exact (this does 
not bear on the issue of fuzzines s for the word exact). These two 
words cannot co-occur for t his rea son. It would be of interest to 
assess preschool children's performance on this particular task. 
In all groups of subjects, the equivalence sense predominated in the 
sentences for same (all 6 year olds, 75% of 8, 10 and 12 year olds) . 
Certain adults remarked that we can use the word (same) in different 
ways and proceeded to provide an equivalence sense and an iden t ity 
sense of same. 
4.1.3 Definition tasks 
The discussion which follows i s presented according to the order of 
presentation of the definition ta sks f or the words same, similar and 
different, namely , 
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( a) 014: When I say things are the same, what do I mean? 
(b) 018: If I say things are exactly the same, what do I 
mean? 
(c) 019: What does simil ar mean? 
(d) 024: What does the word different mean? 
A summary of the findings for all four tasks follows. 
4.1.3(a) Particular strategies were used by children of different 
age levels in providing definitions. For 014 (observed in figure I), 
more than 60% of 6 year olds (73%), 8 year olds (79%) and 10 year olds 
(60%) used the word same in the definition i tsel f and they drew on an 
example as an explanation. There appears to He an overall increase in 
the" percentage of subjects who use a general explanation across age 
level s all<.! an overall decrease in the percentage of subjects who use 
an example as an explanation across age levels. At 8 years of age, 
however, there is an increase in the example as explanation strategy 
in contrast to the 6 year olds. There is also an overall decrease in 
the percentage of subjects who "don't know". 
FIGURE 1 : STRATEGIES CHOSEN FOR 'SAME PAIN' 
~~M~ 
I// //J 
100 PERCENTAGE 
AGE LEVEL IN YEARS 
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The following verbatim transcripts illustrate 
explanation strategy: "like the same cup boards" (6 
this example as 
years); "that page 
i s the same as that page" (8 years); "the same - same meaRing, same i n 
everything" (10 years). 
From 10 years of age, 27% of the subjects offered general 
explanations, for example, "they look a1 ike" ; they're identical". 
General exp1 anations were used by 62% of the 12 year olds and by 90% 
of the adults, for example: "all things are common" (12 years); "it's 
an exact replica" (adult). 
These strateg ies were found for Q18, Q19 and Q24 as well. Examples as 
explanations are 
Q18: "exactly the same shoes" (6 years) 
Q19: "it means my thing's similar as yours" (6 years). 
Examples of general explanation s are: 
Q18: "they are identical" (12 years) -
Q19: "they are nearly al ike" 110 years) 
Q24: "when there's no similarity between them" (adult) 
Six year 01 ds tended to i IlC 1 ude the word same in an example for 
explanation strategy. An example as an explanation using the word 
being defined, i s: "l ike the same shirt s" (6 years). From 8 years of 
age, ch i 1 dren used an ex amp 1 e as an exp 1 an at i on without inc 1 ud i ng the 
word being defined, as in "the dresses are a1 ike" (8 years). General 
explanations at 6 and 8 years included the word same, for example: 
"they look the same" (6 years); "both have t he same things allan 
them"(6 years). From 10 years, general explanation witho ut including 
the word same, were used, as in, "they look alike"; "they 're 
ident ical" . From 10 years of age there was a move away from an 
emphasis on concrete, observable cha racteri stics . Furthermore, the 
use of same , if included, was applied in higher level explanations, 
for example: "They made out of the same things - so, they taste the 
same or they l ook the same" (10 years); "same characteristics" (12 
years); "they synonyms, like they mean the same thing" (12 
years) . 
From 10 years, subjects began to use words other than same and offered 
more general explanations using the word alike , as in "they look 
alike"; "they 're identical exactly alike". General explanations at 
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12 year and adult levels were of the type: "all things are common" 
no difference between them" (12 years); (12 years); "(there's) 
"they're exactly how they were before or how you thought they were ... " 
(12 years); "(they have) equal qualities"; "are identical"; "similar"; 
"exact replica"; "something in common"; "close in likeness" (adults) . 
. 4.1.3(b) For' If 1. say that two things are exactly the same, what 
do I mean?' (Q18), the younger subjects (6 and 8 year olds) used 
either a specific example which moves away from a general explanation 
or defi nit i on or they used the wordi ng from the quest i on, as for Q14 
above. Examples of these are: "it means they exactly the same" (6 
years); "exactly the same shoes" (6 years). The examples serve as the 
expianation rather than enhancing it. At 10 years, 50% of the 
subjects explained in this way whereas 50% began to explain in general 
terms, using words such as "no difference" (between them). At 12 
years of age, the variety of words used in their explanations was 
broader, namely, "no difference", "identical", "exact". When they 
included examples in their explanations, the 12 'year olds either 
offered more than one example, as in: 
"They like - another tape recorder exactly 
like this - precisely the same - there's 
not a - mark, or anyth i ng - di fferent, it's 
exact - like a test is exactly - the Std . S 
test is exactly the same as another class -
and I get the same test as the person next 
to me - it's exactly the same", 
or they drew on that example to explain further: 
"They have no things different about them 
'cos the same it could mean, 1 ike, ice 
creams are the 'same' and it could mean 
it's the same flavour, the same colour , 
everything". 
This subject mentioned that there are "no things different" and then 
added an example to explain further. The adults used general terms 
exclusively, drawing on words such as: "identical", "no difference", 
"no variations", "same in every respect". Only one adult mentioned 
both the equivalence and the identity senses of same: "it's the same 
as it was ... the equipment could be identical to that used before ... "; 
or " ... not the one and the same ... " 
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The 6 year olds focused on the concrete observable differences between 
items which constitute the examples in their exp lanation or they 
expl ai ned that "The one looks the same as the other one", the word 
looks suggesting emphasis on several characteristics. When the older 
subjects begin to offer more general exp lan ations, they may be aware 
that their justification is not fully exp lanatory. They have started 
to move away from a predominant emphasis on that which is observable. 
However, as is discussed in relation to all definitions , (chapter 5, 
section 5.1.2d), the general explanations are 1 imiti ng and fail to 
account for the chameleon quality of words. 
4 .1.3(c) 'What does similar mean?' 
equivalent to those for 014 and Q18 above. 
(Q19) gave rise to answers 
6 and 8 year olds included 
the word similar in their explanations for example, "It means my 
thing's simi lar as yours" (6 years); "It means I've got a s imilar 
whatever - we've got a s imilar thing" (8 years). General explanations 
and ' avoidance' of similar (which may be either deliberate or 
unintentional) were marked from 10 Y',ars of age, ~s in "nearly the 
same"; "more or less the same"; "not exact ly the same - in a way it's 
the same" ; "they - don't match ... they almost match"; "they nearly 
al ike". Stages we re not totally discrete similarly to find ing s for 
014 and 018, for example, one 6 year old answered that "they nearly 
the same" similar to 10 year olds' responses. 
At 12 years, diversity of general explanations increased as was found 
for 014 and 018, for example , "They are nearl y alike"; " . .. similar i s 
only when they're almost the same, but you can tell the di fferen ce" 
(gifted child); "It's not altogether tlie same .. . a little bit the 
same"; "not exactly the same . .. "; "Just about the same". Adults added 
a few additional phrases as in: " ... there's a fe\'i things in common -
not every sing le th ing ha s to be exactly the same " ; "On l y some of th e 
factors are alike "; " . .. almost the same". 
It i s of interest that similar appeared to be 'easier' to explain than 
the word same. As an example, one 6 year old gave a general 
explanation for similar (019), "they nearly the same", but was unable 
to answer 014 (same) at all. Anot her 6 year old attempted an 
explanation for 019 (similar) "it means that my t hing's - similar as 
yours" but was unable to answer Q14 (same). General explanations for 
019 were al so more common at the earl ier stages (6 and 8 years) than 
- 157 -
for 014 (same) possibly because the child could draw on the word same 
in his explanation. 
4.1.3(d) For 'What does the word different mean?' (024), the 
findings supported those for 014 (same), 018 (exactly the same) and 
019 (similar) in that the 6 and 8 year olds commonly gave examples and 
used the word differ,ent in their explanations. "Not the same" was 
included from 8 years of age (25%). Adults differed from 12 year olds 
since their general explanations were more diverse in type, for 
examp 1 e, "when there's no simi 1 arity between them"; "everyth i ng' s not 
common"; "not alike". 
4.L3(e) Summary of definition tasks 
The definition tasks for the words same, similar and different 
revealed: 
i) An overall increase from one age group to the next in the use of 
general explanations with a corresponding decrease'in using an example 
as an explanation. 
ii) The use of the word being defined was frequently included in the 
'example as explanation' strategy and most commonly avoided (whether 
deliberately or otherwise) where general explanations were used. 
iii) The 8 year olds displayed an increase rather than a decrease in 
using an example as an explanation when contrasted with the 6 year 
olds. 
i v) There was no 
subjects within any 
single definition of 
particular age level. 
4.1. 4 Fuzzy boundary tasks 
the word that was offered by 
These tasks deal with individual variation in the use of a word that 
occurs in the application of words by one speaker and between 
speakers; and the way in which tasks contrasting two words affect the 
definition of the two words in question, that is, the fuzzy boundaries 
of the word(s) when contrasted with the other word(s) . 
4.1.4(a) Individual variation was apparent in the children's 
responses. There were found to be different levels of justification 
for the same initial answer. As an example, two children answer 
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"different" for a particular task but give varied reasons for their 
answers. Q36 highlights this. In this task the child is presented 
with a series of apples varying in degrees of colour, size and 
bruising. Presented with a pair at a time, the child is asked: 'Are 
these two apples the same/similar/different?' This task is concerned 
directly with the assessment of fuzzy boundaries between the words 
same, similar and differen·t. It is a comprehension task rather than a 
metalinguistic task. 
The first two apples presented were exact replicas of each other (the 
one traced from the other). Answers for all groups of subjects were 
either "same" or "similar" for this pair, indicating that difficulties 
arose even on the set that was designed to serve as a baseline for the 
remaining items. Reasons 
seen in figure 2 below. 
provided for "similar" varied, as can be 
Sixty-nine percent of the 6 year olds 
favoured an answer of " similar" whereas the 8 year olds (81%), 10 year 
olds (56%),12 year olds (64%) and adults (60%) favoured "same". 
Variation within groups suggests rather that same and similar can be 
equally applied in this subtask. 
FIGURE 2: % OF SUBJECTS WHO ARGUE THAT THE 
TWO APPLES ARE THE SAME 
100 PERCENTAGE 
80 
80 
40 
20 
o~~~~--~~~--~~~~~~~~~~--~ 8 YEARS 8 YEARS 10 YEARS 12 YEARS ADULTS 
AGE LEVEL IN YEARS 
One 8 year old answered: "similar - 'cos red and red and the same 
shape" . When probed further vii ttl: "Vlhy are they not the same?" he 
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added "that's a tiny bit smaller". His initial response emphasized 
the sameness between the two although he used the term "similar". 
One 12 year old placed the one apple on top of the other to check that 
the sizes were the same and only then concluded "s ame " whereas another 
suggested that they were "s imilar - well, some people would say they 
'the same' but one's more round at the bottom". 
Reasons provided by the adults for "s imilar" related not to the 
appearance of the apples themselves but to their individual 
philo so phical conceptions about ' sameness'; for example: "similar -
they're the same shape and size but two apples" suggest ing that one 
can never have two apples which are the same. Thi s differ s from our 
use ' of the word same in everyday 1 anguage where we may refer to two 
things as "the same" even if they display obvious differences. In 
everyday language, we do not avoid the word same "because two objects 
could never be the same" (by the fact of their being two and not one). 
One adult remarked, "I'd say similar now - usually I'd say same" . 
From her response s to other que stions, it was cl ear that she was 
separating her idea that two items can never be the same from her use 
of the word in everyday situations . The fuzziness of words becomes 
apparent from this group of tasks. 
The subsequent sub-items on this task (Q36b,c,d) revealed even greater 
diversity of opinion both within and between groups of subjects. The 
two items displaying a brui sed app le (Q 36b ) in relation to an 
unbruised apple revealed the following findings observed in figure 3 
No trend was apparent between age groups and variation occurred within 
groups. 'Similar" was favoured by the majority of 6 year olds , 8 year 
olds, 12 year olds and adults but "different" was the predominant 
answer for the 10 year olds. It is difficult to explain why thi s 
should be the case at 10 years of age. Individual variat ion appears 
to explain this finding most clearly. 
Ninety fi ve percent of subjects in all groups gave the same answer for 
both items that i s, if they an swered "similar" for the one item, in 
whi ch the appl e had a small brui se, they answered "similar" for the 
second item in which the app le had a larger bruise. Only 5% of all 
subjects altered the category from "similar" to "different " . One 
subject explained that the one with a larger mark "could be rotten" 
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whereas the other one's "fresh". The child's understanding of the 
world comes into play in all these tasks. This was evident from one 6 
year old 's explanation that these apples are "d iffe rent ", "it's got a 
bruise - this one came from another tree". 
FIGURE 3: DEGREE OF SIMILARITY BETWEEN THE 
TWO BRUISED APPLES 
A~ ~'MI~~ DIK~~~~T 
AGE LEVEL IN YEARS 
\~ha t is important in this task i s the extent to ~I h ich different 
su bject s took account of other detailed differences beside s the bruise 
between the apples. Even on these sub-items, there was an occasiona l 
reference to size altho ugh t he bruise was the major difference, for 
example; "this one's sl i ght ly larger and the s t em's l onger and it's 
got a brui se" . It is suspected that al l experimental task will tend to 
draw ones attention to more detail than would an equivalent situation 
i n everyday circumstances. Thi s problem is inherent in the task 
itself in that any simulation of a real-life situation will tend to 
increase awareness to detai l . Only natura li stic observation can 
overcome t his and the latter is subject to other limitat ions with 
regard to the present aims (discussed in chapter 3). 
The subtasks dealing "lith differences in colour (Q36c) illustrated 
that justifications may be equ i valent although the answer of "same", 
"similar" or "different" may vary bdween subjects. As an example , 
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one child answered: "they 
concluding that they are 
suggested, "similar but 
the same 
IIsimilar ll 
one's green 
except a 
(10 years) 
and one's 
different 
whereas 
red, 
colour" 
another 
therefore 
"between 
simi 1 ar and different not quite different - the colour's the only 
thing that's different" (12 years, gifted). Adult responses were 
equally varied, for example, "similar in that they're apples, but a 
different colour" and "different in colour but similar in shape - one 
imagines a green apple to be different". 
different" (12 years) and a third ch i 1 d argued that it is 
Individual variation was apparent from the subtask concerned with 
differences in size (Q36d). The degree of variation between subjects 
was greater than the degree of commonality and responses could not be 
grouped. This occurred because subjects (in all groups) did not give 
the same responses for all three sub-items. For example, one 6 year 
old regarded the first two sets as "similar" and the final pair as 
"different " , the size difference being too 1ar'ge at this stage. 
However, others progressed from "same" to "different" after the fi rst 
pair of items. One adult regarded t hem all as "similar" and argued 
that they wou 1 d only be "d ifferent " if one was a pear and the other 
was an apple whereas an 8 year old answered "the same but one's 
smaller", progressing to "the same but one's very small". The initial 
conclusion of "same", "similar" or "tJifferent" was important. If the 
first set was regarded as "di fferent", the final set could not be 
regarded as the "same" or "similar " only as "different ". This factor 
may have influenced the subsequent respon ses although a few subjects 
did alter their initial responses according to their response for the 
fi na 1 set. 
Individual variation in our use of same, similar and different results 
in the justifications not necessar i ly conforming to the initial answer 
given by different subjects. This may be due to the inherent fuzzy 
characteristic of language itself. (It mu st be kept in mind that this 
is not a negative characteri s tic and that 1 anguage i s not in need of 
reform). There appears to be no developmental progression in this 
regard and it occurs similarly in all groups of subjects. 
4. 1.4(b) Other examples of individual variation for the word s same, 
similar and different are drawn from a group of tasks. In Q15 , 'If I 
say that I have the same pain as you , what do I mean?' , the overlap 
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between same and simil ar was apparent from answers such as "... I 
don't think you can have the same pain - you don't know what the other 
person's feeling exactly but, from everything they describe, you might 
feel that you've got similar symptoms" (adult) and "That would 
actually mean similar in that case because you don't - have the same 
one as mine - it would be - with the same characteristics". 
The ·definitions of same, similar and exactly the same (QI4, Q18 and 
Q19) throw light on fuzzy boundaries with regard to same, similar and 
different . As an example, same was descri bed in the fo 11 owi ng way: 
"Like - you not saying they're identical - you saying like, they very 
similar to each other" (12 years, Q14), and similar (Q19) was 
explained by the same subject as: "Two things like - they look alike". 
The latter explanation could be equally appropriate for same. This 
child's answer illustrates the overlap between same and similar 
although both explanations were entirely satisfactory. Similar (QI9) 
was at times defined in terms equivalent to those ·for same , as in "It 
means that things look the same" (8 years); "things are the same" (8 
years). 
An attempt to view exactly the same - same - similar and different 
along a continuum with no discrete boundaries separating them was 
suggested by an adult, namely, "I think similar i s less than the same, 
but it's also less than exactly the same". This is only one model for 
similarity and it is unlikely to be app licable to all uses of these 
words. The degree of similarity cannot be expl icitly dete rmined for 
our use of each word and there is a great deal of overl ap for one 
subject over a variety of situations as well as between subjects. 
(This relates to the "grammar" of words, to individual variation and 
to fuzziness of words). It is important that no clear definition is 
arrived at, at the adult level. One adult attempted to establish the 
number of criteria that would need to differ in order for us to draw 
the conclusion that two items are "similar". 
' sophisticated confusion' (see Chapter 5). 
This relates to 
Definition tasks for same (Q14) in contrast to exactly the same (Q18) 
are enlightening with regard to fuzzy boundaries . The separation 
between same and exactly the same is not discrete. In Q14, some 
subjects regarded same as suggesting that there are no differences at 
all which is equivalent to exactly the same. In Q18 there was greater 
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consensus in this regard although agreement was still not unanimous. 
It was also suggested for same that "maybe they could differ in one or 
two respects" (adult) but this does not provide an adequate solution 
since it overlaps with similar. Another adult argued that "I'd rather 
say 'similar' if there are some differences" and equated same with 
exactly the same. 
4.1.4(c) Fuzzy boundaries between same, similar and different were 
noted from Q20, 'Does same mean the same thing as similar?'. The 
majority of subjects in all age groups di f f erentiated same and similar 
as is clear from figure 4 below. 
FIGURE 4: DEGREE OF SAMENESS IN CONTRASTING 
'$AlAE' AND 'SIMILAR' 
tWAWE -NUliE 
PERCENTAGE 
100 
AGE LEVEL IN YEARS 
One subject, only, mentioned that same and similar may be the same "in 
some sentences" but not in others . One adult contrasted same with 
exactly the same and therefore, regarded same and similar as "the 
same l1 , 
I'd actually put same and similar more together 
and exactly the same above them - because of the 
differentiation between same and exactly the same 
and between same and sinlilar. 
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The 6 year olds were unable to offer an explanation or argued, for 
example, "No - ' cos same and simili!!:" with stress on each of the 
underlined words. Viewed together with the answers on other questions 
provided by this particular child, it was clear that he was referring 
to same and 5; mi 1 ar be; ng different words as his reason for thei r 
being different at the level of meaning. Only 13% of the 8 year olds 
were able to explain; for example, "No (lengthy pause) . .. Like same 
is like exactly the same but similar is not exactly the same, it's 
nearly the same"; "No, ' cos similar is a little bit not the same and 
same is exactly like each other" . These responses were equivalent to 
those of 12 year olds and adults for example, "same, all the factors 
are the same and similar, there's only some of the factors that are -
a1 ike" (adult). There is no apparent trend here. 
At least 75% of subjects and at most 94% irrespective of age level 
argued that same and similar are "not the same" in meaning. If they 
were exactly the same, one would be redundant. However, if a word has 
definite meaning which remains stable when it is used over a diversity 
of contexts, (revealed by a study of the corpus of language use), then 
one would expect agreement by all subjects on the above task (Q20) . 
Performance variables cannot be ruled out as an influencing factor but 
the expl anat ions accompanyi ng answers sugges t that same and simil ar 
are not discrete in their appl icati on. The abil ity t o draw a clear 
distinction between ' same and similar, does not appear to improve 
through development. The foll owi ng re spon ses demonstrate cl earl y the 
difficulties and the confu s ion that ari ses when one is required to 
draw some clear division between the se words: 
"No , similar means a bit different , same is 
they are also like, exactly like. It's the 
same thing - well , it co uld be a bit different. 
I don't know - the same-~-not neces sarily, 
like Grasshopper shoes - they the same like but 
they a bit different. The same kind of shoe but 
different co l ours , or ... " (12 years); 
"the relationship i s - you get me so confused: 
Same is when there's something which is the same 
everything is identical; similar is when there's 
a few things whi ch are - the same (laughs). 
Exactly the same has a more definite - it means 
more t he same than 'the same' " (1 aughs) (adult). 
Here the idea of the continu um model i s men t ioned again. 
- 165 -
4.1.4(d) From 022, ' Does same mean the same thing as different? Why 
not?', some additional light is throvm indirectly onto the issue of 
fuzziness. The differences between the words same and different are 
greater than the differences between same and similar. Same and 
different may be clearly differentiated in a general question such as 
Q22. However, within an environmental context as in 036 (apples 
differing in size, shape and 
may become confused at times. 
bru is i ng), the separat i on between them 
Examples of explanations from 022 are: 
" ... it doesn't mean the same. Well, same might 
mean like this tape recorder is the same as mine 
one but you cou l d say that this tape recorder is 
different to mine one· my one i s smal ler and it 
has earphones attached to it" (12 years) 
"Well, same means· well, different .. . they 
completely the different thing 'cos different 
means, just say I'm wearing a yellow shirt 
and you've got a white shirt then it means 
they different! They completely different, 
they're not the same. If we wearing the 
same colour shirt, then it's the same" (12 years). 
FIGURE 5: STRATEGIES CHOSEN FOR DEFINING 
'SAME' IN RELATlON TO 'SIMILAR' 
~~~ E~~WoN ExdATlON 
C=J f'S§3 1// /t J 
PERCENTAGE 
AGE LfVEL IN YEARS 
In the definition tasks, there· is an overall increase in general 
explanations across age levels. There is an overall decline in the 
"no explanation" category although this category remains higher than 
. 166 . 
expected at 10 years of age. A reverse trend occurs at 10 years of 
age in contrast to the reversal of trend at 8 years of age found for 
Q14 . Trend reversals may reveal apparent regression at a certain 
period in development (see chapter 5, section 5.2.1). 
Examples as explanations were of the type: 
"No - 'cos same is - like the same things and 
different are if I had a heart dress and you 
had a flower dress" (6 years) 
"No. Different is like say you got a red shirt 
and I got a blue shirt , that's different, and 
same is I got a blue shirt and you also got a 
blue shirt" (8 years) 
"No - 'cos different means, say, I've got a red 
apple and the other boy's got a green apple" 
(8 years) 
It can be 'observed in Figure 5 that in this definition task, younger 
children gave examples as an explanation whereas' the older children 
provided general explanations. Gelleral explanations were of the 
type, "same and different are upposi tes" (from 8 years of age), an 
answer which does not expl ain the meaning of each of the words in 
re 1 at i on to each other. From 12 years, an swers of the fa 11 owi ng type 
were offered 
"No - 'cos different means that one's not like 
the other and same means they both like each 
other" (12 years) 
"same means that they have - things in common but, 
they could have a few things that are not common 
and different everything - could be - not common, or 
there could be - yes - everyth ing's not commo n" 
(adult) . 
4.1.4.(e) Summary of fuzzy boundary tasks 
i) In the definition tasks, the fuzzy boundary subset of tasks 
revealed a developmental progression from providing examples as 
explanations and using the words themselves as central to the 
explanation, to more general explanations without including the words 
themselves. 
ii) The fuzzy boundary tasks illustrated an understanding that there 
are no clear demarcations between the words same and similar and 
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between the words simi 1 ar and different with regard to reference in 
the external world. 
iii) A reversal of trend occurred at 10 years of age on one task 
(Q2 2) . 
iv) There was no single definition of each word in relation to the 
other that was offered by subjects within a particular age range. 
v) The definition and fuzzy boundary tasks together revealed that 
defining a word in contrast to another word (as in the fuzzy boundary 
tasks) leads to an emphasis on certain aspects of the ·word. Degree of 
similarity was suggested in contrasting same and similar, same and 
exactl y the same, same and di fferent. HO\~ever, the exact degree of 
similarity cannot be specified and the emphasis shifts from one 
contrast to another: for same in contrast to similar subjects focused 
on increased similarity for same; whereas, for ~ame in contrast to 
exactly the same, subjects focused on decreased similarity for same. 
-
The younger subj ects, by gi v i ng an example as an exp 1 an at ion, placed 
the word in an everyday context. This reveals that they have not yet 
mastered the definition word game. In so doing, they al so emphasize 
one use of the word, and fail to account for its di verse uses. The 
general explanations offered at the later stages of development 
attempt to realize a 'prototypical' or core meaning of the word. This 
again minimizes the importance of the different uses of a word that 
occur when it is applied in different linguistic contexts. Where 
numerous examples are offered as an explanation, the diversity of 
appl ication is accounted for and the difficulty in defining a central 
meaning for the word is highlighted. 
The most comprehensive answer would combine numerous examples with a 
general explanation, thereby taking into consideration both diversity 
of application and consistency in use across situations. If there was 
no consistency in the use of the word from one situation to the next, 
word meaning should have no stability. Meaning would shift to such an 
extent that we would fail to convey what we intend in a proposition. 
However, this shift in function is only one aspect of a word's meaning 
and its diversity of appl icatian is crucial to our understanding of 
word meaning. It is argued that this consistency or stability of a 
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word is not its essence (as used colloquially). "Essence" as applied 
in the present study includes the stabil ·ity of a word's meaning as 
well as the shift in emphasis that occurs when the word is applied 
over a diversity of contexts. Furthermore, numerous examples together 
with a general explanation is not sufficient to establish word 
meaning. Specific 'training' may be required and intuition as well as 
an entire "form of life" (Wittgenstein; 1953 , pt.241) is required. 
4 . 1.5 Same, similar and different in a diversity of linguistic 
contexts 
Same, similar and different are analysed as they occur in the 
following contexts: (See Appendix C for details) 
a) same dress/shirt (Q21, Q32 a-e) different dress/shirt (QI6) 
b) same apple (QI7, Q31 d,e, Q35) 
c) 
d) 
e) 
f) 
g) 
h) 
i ) 
j) 
same chair 
same seat 
same book 
same ball 
same leaf 
same ship 
same pain 
same dream 
same anger 
(Q31 a,b) 
(Q26) 
(Q28, Q29) 
(Q33) 
(Q27a); 
(030) , 
same tadpole/frog 
all of which deal 
over time 
(Q27b); 
with continuity 
(QI5, Q45, 047, 048, 049, 060) similar pain 
(025) 
(0159) 
(041) 
A summary of findings on all these ta sks concludes this section. 
4.1.5(a) In 021 and 016, tasks for both same dress (shirt) and 
different dress (shirt) gave l'ise to a diversity of responses within 
and between groups of subjects. Many subjects in different age groups 
regarded same to mean exactly the same, for example: 
"they have to be exact same" (6 years) 
"exactly the same - it's identic al " (10 years), 
whereas others allowed for some differences, for example: 
"it might not be exactly the same " (10 years); "they both have things 
in common but they could have a fe\v differences (adult). This was 
also found for different dress/shirt (016). The plasticity of the 
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words same and different as evident from these tasks, adds to the 
findings for fuzzy boundaries discussed above. All subjects 
interpreted same (in same dress, Q21) in the sense of equivalence. 
The subtasks in Q32 (a-d) were designed to assess whether certain 
criteria are more important than others in leading subjects to draw 
the conclusion that two like articles (dresses in this case) are "the 
same". The equivalence sense of same was accepted as a baseline here. 
Q32e focused on the equivalence versus the identity sense of same. 
For Q32a at least 56% of 8 year olds (63%), 10 year olds (56%), 12 
year olds (75%) and adults (60%), disregarded size as differentiating 
the . two dresses as they did for same ball (Q33). These findings are 
revealed in Figure 6. Subjects concluded that despite a size 
difference, the two dresses are "the same". The percentage of 6 year 
olds, who claimed that the dresses were "the same" was the lowest 
(45%) in contrast to the other groups. Thi s is {;onsistent with the 
findings for same book (where 6 year olds focused on size that is, 
'concrete aspects', as a differentiating 'factor). 
FIGURE 6: DRESSES VARYING IN SIZE ARE THE 
SAME 
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60 
20 f-
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AGE LEVEL IN YEARS 
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It can be observed in Figure 7 (Q32b) that a colour difference 1 ed 
only 25% of the 6 year olds, 25% of the 8 year olds, 13% of the 10 
year olds, 27% of the 12 year olds and 10% of the adults to conclude 
that the two dresses were "the same". There was very 1 ittle 
di fference between groups and vari at i on occurred in responses across 
all subjects. 
RGURE 7 : DRESSES VARYING IN COLOUR ARE THE 
SAME 
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Where dresses varied in sleeve length (Q32c), depicted in Figure 8, at 
most 27% of the 10 year olds, 12 year ohls and adults perceived the 
dresses as "the same" with as many as 45% and 63% of the 6 and 8 year 
olds respectively, regarding the dresses to be "the same". 
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FIGURE 8 : DRESSES VARYING IN SLEEVE-LENGTH 
ARE THE SAME 
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A difference in style yielded a unanimous (100%) conclusion of 
"different" for all groups. 
It can be seen from Figure 9 (Q32e) that at least 67% of the 6 year 
aIds (88%), the 8 year aIds (94%), the 10 year aIds (81%) and the 12 
year aIds (67%) concluded that same dress suggests that there are two. 
It appears that with increasing age level, there is an overal l 
decrease in the percentage of subjects who claim the dresses are the 
same. 
With regard to dresses, style seems to be the most important criterion 
for deciding on 'sameness', fo11owed by col our and then size. A minor 
alteration in style such as sleeve length, (Q32c) did not result in 
uniformity of responses across groups. In addition, whereas all 
children answered "different" for Q32d, answers of "similar " and 
"different" occurred for Q32a, band c. This finding para11els the 
findings for same apple to be discussed below. 
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FIGURE 9 : SELECTION OF AN EQUIVALENCE SENSE 
OF 'SAME' FOR 'SAME DRESSES' 
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As with Q16 (different dress/shirt) arid Q17 (same' apple), in Q21: 
'When I ~ay that I have the same dress/shirt as you, what do I mean?' , 
6 and 8 year olds mentioned only one criterion in their explanations 
whereas older subjects ment i oned two criteri a. "Same kind of s h i rt s" 
was emphasized (for example, 12 year gifted child) to provide some 
qual ification for "same shirts". For different dress/shirt (Q16), 6 
and 8 year olds also commonly mentioned one criterion, for example: 
"You'll have a long one, ['11 have a short one" (6 years). Older 
children gave more than one criterion, for example: "It 's got a 
different colo ur; it's made from a different mater ial; it may have a 
different pattern on it" (10 years). Different necessarily impl ies 
that there must be two dresses so the equivalence sense was not an 
issue. 
4.1.5(b) Same apple (Ql7): It can be seen in Figure 10 that this 
task yielded an overall decrease from interpreting the word same in 
the sense of equivalence (88% of 6 year olds; 100% of 8 year olds; 75% 
of 10 year olds) to that of identity (57% of 12 year olds in contrast 
to 43% who argued for an equivalence sense; 77% of adults). 
Conversel y; there is an increa~;ing percentage of subjects who favou r 
the identity sense vlith age in accordance with the findings for same 
dress (Figure 9). 
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FIGURE 10 : SELECTION OF AN EQUIVALENCE OR 
AN IDENTITY SENSE OF SAME FOR 'SAME APPLES' 
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When probed as to whether th.i s task may suggest · that there is' one 
(apple) that we share', 50% of the 6 year old s accepted this as a 
possibil ity as did 75% of the 8 year olds. However, they did not 
display the conviction of the 12 year olds in this regard as is clear 
from this 12 year old's answer: "Oh yes! One has one bite and then 
the other". 
Findings for Q35 in which t he child is presented with two apple trees 
on which he must put "the same apple s ... " (see Appendix C), are 
revealed in Figure 11. It can be see n that more than 50% of children 
in the 6, 10 and 12 year old groups interpreted same in the 
equivalence sense. This vias found for 88% of the 6 year olds; 88% of 
the 10 year olds and 73% of the 12 year olds (8 year olds were not 
assessed on thi s task). In contrast, the majori ty of adul ts (80%) 
argued for the i dent ity sense on t h i s tas k: on 1 y 20% argued for the 
equivalence sense. 
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FIGURE 11 : AN EQUIVALENCE SENSE OF 'SAME' 
FOR 'SAME APPLE' IN A SITUATIONAL CONTEXT 
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The developmental progression from an emphas is on equivalence to that 
of identity adds support to the findings for same apple (Q17) and same 
dress (Q21). However, it is important that there is also variation 
between these tasks with regard to the age at which 50% of the 
su bjects favour the identity sense over the equivalence sense. It 
should be remembered, however, that the trends may not be absolutely 
stabl e because of the small sample sizes at each age leve l. 
When probed as to whether the alternative answer was a possible 
solution, differences in explanations occurred from one group to 
another. The 6 year olds offered answers such as : "funny"; or "no, 
'cos if you take them off here (the other tree) you can't put them 
back on". Extralinguistic factors were also drawn on in the 
explanations of 8 and 10 year olds, for example: "no - 'cos they were 
on thi s tree - and if you pull them off ... unless you tie them wit h 
string" (10 years). Thes e chil dren failed to recogn i ze that the 
argument would sti ll hold if one took the apples from the ground and 
placed them on the one tree. 
Only 6% of 10 year olds offered an intralinguistic explanation, for 
example: "No, 'cos you said, 'same on both'" and this was more common 
amongst the 12 year aIds , for example: "You said the ones that were on 
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the tree ... •. In this particular task, an intralinguistic an swer does 
not aid clarification. If the sentence is potentially ambiguou s, 
drawi ng on one's formul at i on of the quest i on does not serve to 
disambiguate it. It illustrates rather how the child has interpreted 
it. It i s clear that the child imposes his own interpretation on hi s 
description of the question. No adult supplied an intralingu is ti c 
answer. 
To preclude same apples from being interpreted as 'same number of 
apples', this task was presented in two parts in the pilot st udy . The 
pretest included the request: 'j l'iant yo u to put the same number of 
apple s on this tree as are on this tree' . The pretest was eliminated 
in the main study as it presented no difficulties. In the pilot study 
the main task also gave rise to a progression from equivalence to 
i den t ity. 
The tasks for different dress, same dress and same ' apple indi cate that 
the use of the word same with dress/shirt suggests that these are 'two 
of a kind' (equivalence sense) whereas same apple suggests 'two of a 
kind ' to t he younger subjects with a progressive move to concluding 
that there must be one apple wh ich is shaped. The task for same apple 
(Ql7) depe nd s more on context for c'l ari fication than does Q21 (same 
dress) , possibly because same apple occurs in both situations equally 
in everyday 1 anguage use, whereas same dress woul d be app 1 i ed more 
frequently whe n there are two dresse s . . One dress which is shared by 
two ch i 1 dren who wear it on different days is not common and wou 1 d 
most likely be outside of the exper ienc;e of middle class chi ldren . 
These tasks become 'ambig u ou~' only because the extralinguistic 
context is not specified. What is important, however" is the sense 
that is favoured by children of c1Hferent ages and the extent to which 
they are able to acknowledge that a different sense could apply in 
certain situat ions . 
4. 1.5(c) 
Q17. This 
equi valence 
apple. It 
Same chair/chairs/apple/apples (Q31) served as a probe for 
task also yielded a progressio n from the sense of 
to that of i dent ity in i nterpr::!t i ng same chair and same 
aimed to determine l'illet.her subjects wou ld favour an 
identity 
greater 
cha; rs) . 
sense rather than an equivalence sense if presented with 
restrictions (For example same chair in contrast to same 
Howe ver, the 6 year olds failed to take this into account. 
- 176 -
It is of interest that the younger children interpreted same chair and 
same apple most frequently in the equivalence sense even though these 
subtasks were presented together with those for same chairs and same 
appl es, that is, they offered equi va I ent answers for both same appl e 
and same apples. At 8 and 10 years, children tended to correct their 
answers for same chair spontaneously when presented with same chairs. 
The equivalence sense predominated for the 6, 8 and 10 year olds, but 
at 12 years, 88% of the children differentiated chair/apple as 
suggesting one (identity sense) in contrast to chairs/apples which 
suggest that there are two . Thi s is in accordance with the 
developmental trend for same apple in Q17 and Q35. 
4.1.5.(d) Same seat (Q26) was interpreted by subjects of all age 
levels in the identity sense. "I want to sit in the same seat as you" 
impl ies that there is one seat being referred to even though the 
extralinguistic context (that is, a bioscope and numerous empty 
seats), favoured an equivalence sense. Children offered explanations 
such as 
"the other person wo n't be able to see" (6 years) 
"one seat takes up a whole person (8 years) 
it would be "uncomfortable" (10 years) 
"the seat isn't big enough to seat two people" (10 years) 
The word possible was introduced by some I? year olds : 
"it's possible but I don't think they'd let people" 
(12 years) 
Adults extended beyond thG s ituat i on and suggested what they thought 
he could have meant, for example: 
"it's possible that she meant ... in the same row as him" 
The 12 year aIds and adults were probed further with: 
'When she said that, could she Ila ve meant " J want to sit next to you" 
because all the seats look the same?' 88% of the 12 year aIds and 88% 
of the adults argued against this, for example: 
"I don't see the poi nt in say i n9 that 'cos they're a 11 the 
same seat(s) " (12 years) 
" then it would be in the exact same seat" (12 years) 
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" then she would have said: 'sit next to you' or "a 
similar seat" (ad ults). 
The task same seat illustrates precisely the way in which the 
"grammar" of the word same alters in a particular context. In 
contrast to the emphasis on the identity sense in same seat, a 
sentence about same dress phrased comparab ly, namely, 'I want to wear 
the same dress as you' would be expected, on the basis of the answers 
prevalent for same dress, to result in the equivalence sense being 
favoured. It would be interpreted as "I want to wear the same kind of 
dress as you" . It is unlikely that, in this case, the listener would 
1 augh and say "you can't!" except if i ntendi ng to tease. 'I want to 
wear your dress' is more likely to suggest the identity sense of the 
word same, that is, 'I want to wear the very dress th·at you are 
weari ng' . 
Although only one dre ss was presented for 032c (same dress), the 
subjects extended beyond the picture to give real world understanding 
to the verbal statement. Contrarily, for 026 (same seat), subjects 
insisted that same seat referred to one seat not to two (even when 
probed) whereas in Q32e, tlley argued that it must refer to two 
dre sses. Thi s emphasi zes the change in sense of a word when it 
co-occurs with other words. These tasks also highlight the fuzzine ss 
of the words same, similar and different which may have been an 
influencing factor in the progression from equivalence to identity 
senses of same for tasks 32 a-d. However, uniformity of responses for 
each of these questions (for examp l e 32d) suggest that this was not 
the major reason. 
4. 1.5(e) Same book (028 and 029) did not deal with the senses of 
equivalence or identity as two books were presented wh i ch nece ssarily 
impl ied the equivalence sense. However, it can be observed in Figure 
12 that for 029 the 6 year olds (80%) and the 8 yea r olds (56%) 
focused on colour and size (observable criter ia). For the 8 year 
olds, thickness was mentioned mOl'e than in the other groups although 
for only 19% of the subjects. With the 10 year olds, overt 
characteristics were mentioned far l'= 5s frequently (19%) relative to 
content (81%). Content was emphasized similarly by the 12 year olds 
(81%) and the adults (80%). 
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FIGURE 12 : CRITERIA SELECTED FOR 'SAME' 
BOOK TASK 
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From 8 years of age, two criter'ia were me ntioned , In the case of 
adults, 30% mentioned t\yO criteria whic h is considerably more than 
those in other age levels ./ho drew on two criteria, It appears that 
there is a decreasing trend in mrntioning overt characteristics with 
i ncrea s i ng age up to 12 year 01 ds but not for adults, However, if 
adults had been asked for one criterion only, the trend may have 
continued for them as well. In future research, adults should be 
asked for one criterion only unless one is investigating strategies. 
The fi ndi ngs for Q29 support those for other tasks such as same 1 eaf 
(Q27a) and same tadpole/frog (Q27b) in I'/hich the 6 year olds focused 
on the concrete aspects of the leaf or amphibian. Th is elucidates the 
strategies employed by younger children in contrast to t.hose of older 
children in solving these types of tasks. In Q36, where the child was 
presented with t\·10 apples of different colours, sizes or degrees of 
bruising, the experimenter' 'inad'lertt,ntly placed one apple upside down 
and one 6 year old an swered that they \yere "similar - 'cos one 's 
upside down". Hhen turned the right way up, he regarded them as "the 
same" . 
From 8 years of age, children began to mention two criteria in their 
explanations, for example: "The colour's the same and the letters are 
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the same" or to identify one criterion relative to another, for 
example: '''cos his is just got thinner pages than the other one and 
it's just big and she's got fatter pages and it's small ... " (8 
years). The 10 year olds referred to content in terms such as: " ... 
they might be exactly the same reading books inside" whereas at 12 
years, children used language sllch as "same content", "same print ", "a 
smaller edition", "same information". 
The focus on overt criteria led some 6 and 8 year olds to refute the 
evidence in drawing their conclusion s. Examples for Q29 are: " ... 
because s he thinks hers is bigg'ler than his ... he's wrong ... " (6 
years); "1 don't know 'cos they both are big and red" (6 years); 
"'cos hers is a littl e bi t bigger than hi s" ("and he doesn't notice 
that it 's bigger?") "No" (6 ye ars); "Mary was wrong" (8 years). 
Similarly, for Q28, children argued that it's "bec au se their s uitcas es 
are different but their boo ks are the same" (6 y.ears); "'cos she's 
smaller than he - they've still got the same 'cos hers is small 'cos 
she's small and he's is big 'cos he's, big" 
As tington (in press) report simila rly, that 
(8 ye~rs). 01 son and 
7 year olds blame the 
speaker for a faulty message, fo r example, "You s hould have said .... " 
4 . 1.5(f) For same ball (Q33), the lIIajor ity of subjects in all 
groups fa voured the equi va 'ience sense ()f same as can be seen in Figure 
13. Specifically, this sense was emphasized by 94% of the 6 year 
olds, all the 8 year olds, 88% of the 10 year olds, 69% of the 12 year 
olds and 80% of the adults. 
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FIGURE 13 : AN EaUIVALENCE SENSE OF 'SAME' 
FOR 'SAME BALL' 
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As for same dress (Q32<)), for same ball the majority of subjects 
stated that a size difference was of no ilr~crtance in preventing one 
from concluding that they are "the sallie". From 12 years of age, the 
majority of subjects accepted, with probing, that the task was 
ambiguous and that one ball could have been selected as the answer. 
4.1.5(g) Tasks dealing ",ith continuit.y over time such as Same leaf 
(027a), same tadpoleL..f.!::.Q9. (Q27b) and~ame ~ (030) concern same in 
the sense of identity, that is, 'continuity over time' despite overt 
changes. The subject must take pragmatic factors from the situation 
into account beyond the overt appearance of the two ent it i es. For 
Q27a (same leaf) 88% of the 6 and 8 yeal' olds focused on concrete 
facets of the situation (as in other tasks such as same book 028 and 
029) and failed to take aspects of the broader context into account. 
These children answered that they are "different" (leaves), reasoning 
that they are of different colours, for example: "no, they different, 
'cos this one's brown and this olle's green". They took no account of 
. , 
the factor of continuity over time. (This may result from limited 
real world knowledge or school l earning) . From 10 years, children 
began to explain that "they're a different colour but they're the same 
leaves" . 
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Similarly, for Q27b (same tadpole/frog) in which subjects were 
required to determine whether one of the tadpoles in the pond "could 
be the same as the frog" in the picture which follows, all the 6 year 
olds argued that they al'e "di fferent" basing their answers on the 
differences in colour, size and shape, for example: "'cos these are 
black and that one's green". Tlte majority of 8 year olds (88%) argued 
that they are "the ' same", equivalent to answers given by older 
children, for example: '''cos a tadpo'le is a baby and when it gets 
older it becomes a frog". It is possible ' that this task (Q27b) is 
'easier' in that it is equivalent to human growth from baby to adult 
which is more pertinent to the chi ld's own world of experience than 
same leaves. For this reason, the 8 year olds may have responded 
equivalently to the 6 year olds on the same leaf task (Q27a) and 
equivalently to older children on the same tadpole/frog task (Q27b). 
Furthermore, continuity over time implies an emphasis on the identity 
sense, which was found to appear later in children!s explanations than 
the equivalence sense (see tasks on same apple, Q17, Q35). There may 
be an interaction between the identity s~nse and the'complexity of the 
task so that an 8 year old is able to apply the identity sense to a 
task which is 'easier' in relation to Ilis own experiences . 
From 10 years of age through the 12 year a.nd adult groups, confusion 
was apparent in that a few subjects concluded that they are "therefore 
simil ar". In these tasks. one cannot averdge same and different to 
arrive at similar. Such a conclusion is only possible when reasoning 
in the fo 11 owi ng ~Jay : 
Here are 2 boxes . They are not the same 
because one is bigger than the other. But, 
I would not say they are different because 
it is only colour that is different. So, I 
think they are similar. 
However, in relation to the same leaf tasks, a conclusion of "similar" 
distorts the description of "same leaves but different in colour " . An 
answer of "silnilar" indicates a failure on the part of the subject to 
account for continuity ovel' time. This answer would only be 
appropriate if, as was the case on a few occasions, the child 
explained that they are "similar because they l ook different but that 
they are still the same leaves". The anS~Jer "similar" was offered by 
subjects of all age groups in the same ship cask (Q30) in which a ship 
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· is reconstructed piece by piece after sinking: the subject has to 
judge whether it is "the same ship as the ~ne that went , out to sea in 
the first place". This task appeared to be more difficult than the 
same 1 eaf and same tadpol e/frog tasks perhaps because it draws on a 
less natural situation. 
4. 1.5(h) Same pain: Q15, Q45, Q47, Q48, Q49 and Q60 which deal 
with same pain, all concern the "grammar" of the word same in relation 
to the "grammar" of the word pain. 'If I say that I have the same 
pain as you, what do I mean? (QI5) r evea l ed specific characteristics 
of the word same as it relates to pain . 
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FIGURE 14 : CRITERIA SELECTED FOR 
'SAME PAIN' TASK 
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It can be see n from Figure 14 that place and type of pain were 
emphasized equally by the 6 year olds (33% and 40% respectively). the 
8 year olds (42% and 42%) and the 10 year olds (56% and 50% 
respectively). From 12 years of age, type was mentioned predominantly 
(69% of the subj ects as opposed to :~!j% who emphasized place). This 
was also found at the adult level l'lhere 100% of subjects mentioned 
type of pain as the impol-tant criterion . There is therefore, little 
discrepancy between the frequency with which type and place was 
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mentioned by the 6, 8 and 10 year old s. However, for the 12 year olds 
and adults, this is clear. For the adults, only type is mentioned. 
The argument is based on a small sample size but for the 12 year olds, 
the number of times type was mentioned relat 'ive to place was triple. 
Place would appear to be a mon~ 'concn~te' criterion than type which 
parallels the findings for same book (Q28, Q29) same leaf (27a) and 
same tadpole/frog (Q21b), 
Strategies used by children in answering this same pain question 
accorded with those for other same tasks. At 6 years of age, the word 
same was frequently included in the answer, for example, "L ike ... 
you've got the same pain in your stomach". From 8 years of age, the 
word same was not used in the explanation 01' same was applied to a 
characteristic of pain, for example, same place. These findings 
confirm those found for the definition tasks. 
From 10 years, subjects responded with more than one criterion as is 
clear from the combined percentage scores which exceed 100% for the 10 
year olds and 12 year olds. This finding contrasts fo those for the 6 
and 8 year olds who offered one criterion only in the ir explanations. 
Furthermore, from 10 years of age , clii"ldren began to offer more 
general explanations such ilS" "You'vP got the same fee ling as me"; 
"If I had a stomach ache and you ~~j 'yOU also had a stomach ache ... "; 
"we have the same reaction" (12 years). These responses contrast to 
the 'examples as explanation' strategy drawn on by the 6 and 8 year 
olds: "Like, say I had a sore tummy, and you've also got one" (6 
years); "Say I've got a sore foot and the other boy's got a sore 
foot" (8 years). 
As is clear from Figure 15, Q45 ('Can you have the same pain as me?') 
yielded consistent answel"S to 'lIS, ( ' If I say that I have the same 
pain as you, what do I mean?') for 57% of the 6 year olds, 75% of the 
10 year olds, 88% of the 12 year olds and 89% of the adults. There 
was an overall increase in cons istency of responses with age. Only at 
8 years of age were a high percentage of children (71%) inconsistent 
in their ans~lers to these two questions. (Th e issue of cons i stency 
and the reverse trend at 8 years al'e detailed in Chapter 5). 
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FIGURE 15 : SUBJECTS DISPLAYING CONSISTENCY 
ON THE TWO TASKS FOR 'SAME PAIN' 
100 PERCENTAGE 
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It had been assumed that the two questions 
different in that 015 deal s wi th language 
communication as all metal inguistic questions do . 
ADULTS 
(015 and 045) were 
or i nterpersona I 
One would I ike to 
ask the subject whether we ever say: 'I have the same pain as you' and 
if so, what we mean by saying this: On th-is basis, we would like to 
arrive at an answer which reflects his natural language use rather 
than his metalinguistic abilities, but such a task is impossible. So, 
we are compelled to ask metalinguistic questions in attempting to 
elucidate how we use language versus what a word means 'independent of 
language' . 
If we contrast 015, ' If I say I have the same pain as you, what do I 
mean?' and 045, 'Can you have the same pain as me?' Ive find some 
clarification of this i ssue. We use the expression "I 've got the same 
pain (as you)" in everyday language and we communicate quite 
effectively in this regard. QI5 attempts to tap this use. 045, on 
the other hand, may lead us to think more deeply about whether we can 
ever have the same pain as another person (essentially a philosophical 
question). If this distinction is drawn, then 015 and Q45 are not 
equivalent. HOIvever, t here may be some overlap, for example, Q15 in 
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an everyday 
throbbing?" 
context 
or, !lis 
may 
it 
lead the 
continuous, 
li stener to ask, "oh, is it 
mine was " The questions 
themselves pre-suppose a certain 'thinking' about it in other words, 
same when used with pain in evel'yday language leaves certain questions 
open (as with same apple where the dearee of similarity may vary from 
one situation to the next, but we may still use the word same. 
However, with same apple, the similarities and differences are overtly 
apparent which cannot be said for pain). It suggests that we may 
think further about it in everyday communication though not 'as 
deeply' as is suggested to be the case in 045. 
When an adult answers the follovlin9 question (060), 'Janet said: "I've 
got the same pain as you'" is that OK?' by sayi ng "No,' cos Janet 
doesn't know what pain John's got", this answer suggests confusion. 
The adult attempts to give same a restricted meaning of equivalence 
whereas, in this context of same pain which we use in everyday 
conversation, for example 'I've got the same pain as you', we don't 
have to know exactly what pain tile other. person has. Same takes on a 
different sense in this situation and the adult lias igno,ed this sense 
of the word. The adult has discolln ted that pain lias a particular 
effect on same, resulting in a pJl'ticular use of same in this 
situation. The "grammar" of the word same as it rel ates to the 
"grammar" of the word pain has been di sregarded. 
The younger children (6 and 8 year s) tend to place the word back 
within the context of everyday language use, and therefore, offer 
equivalent answers for these tvlO quest ion s (Q15 and 045). Generally, 
their answers take the form of exal~p10s. lIowever, older children and 
adults tended to foclls on tile use of same in its more common or 
frequent application in everyday language, that is, they removed same 
from its specific linguistic context of same pain. We cannot conclude 
that they are 'confused' per se in th i s case, because the phras i ng of 
the question tempts them into removing themselves from everyday 
language use. However, vlhatis impoy·tant is that this question does 
not 1 ead younger ch il dren Lo an swer in the same way as do adult s . 
What the older subjects display is sophisticated confusion: at a 
certain stage in development, certain quest ions ,lill tend to lead them 
away from natural language use (see chapter 5). 
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The younger children place the wOl"d into a natural language context 
whi ch gi ves the word as preci se a meani ng as it needs in that context 
but, they also have a restrict. ed use of each word, for example, same 
and pain, perhaps disregarding the unique senses of these words as 
revea led in th i s specific combination. The adults, on the other hand, 
answer out of context which, at times, leads to sophisticated 
confus i on. They have st ill taken account of the "grammar" of same in 
relation to the "grammar" of pain (see chapter 5). 
Q47, 'When you fall, do you always have the same pain or is it 
sometimes different?', throws additional light on the 'answers for Q15. 
At 6 years of age, place was emphasized by 56% of the subjects, both 
by giving specifiC examples as in "sometimes I fall here and sometimes 
I fall here" (indicated with pointing) and by giving more general 
explanations as in "cos sometimes you hurt yourself in different 
places". Only 38% of the 6 year aIds mentioned type and 19% mentioned 
intensity, for example: "like, if I fell harder". 
By 10 years, type, intensity and pl;,ce, were equal'ly predominant in 
explanations and more than one was, at times, mentioned by a subject. 
. 
The 12 year aIds emphasized that it "depe nd s where you fall". This 
was not probed further at the tilne, so the intention, as referring to 
the ground surface or to the speci fie part. of the body, was unclear 
although 'part of the body' was considered to be suggested in 1 ine 
with the adults. All the adults mentioned both "how hard" one falls 
and "where you hurt yourself". 
specific surface were mentioned 
Additional criteria such as height 
by one adult subject only . There 
and 
was 
a ' gradual progression in the number and specific criteria drawn on in 
explaining the answers. 
For Q48, in which one boy is being h it and the other has toothache, 
the common answer for all groups of subjects except the 8 year aIds, 
was that the pains are di ffel'ent a:; they are of a di fferent type 
(revealed in Figure 16). Explanat.ion s Wei"'!, for example, '''cos he's 
got toothache and he' s getting smackl'd" (6 years); '''cos the pain is 
in the tooth and he's got po.in ill hi s face" (10 years); "two different 
kinds of pain" (12 years). This was t he explanation given by 73% of 
the 6 year aIds, 63% of the 10 YAcl' aIds, 88% of the 12 year aIds and 
80% of the adults. Only 38% of the B year aIds argued that they were 
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of different types. The 8 year olds answered predominantly (44%) that 
the two pains were "the same". 
FIGURE 16 : CRITERIA FOR SAME/DIFFERENT PAIN 
WHERE TYPE OF PAIN DIFFERS 
DI'fFo.~T DIFt7~NT D~EoPEHT 
I I 
100 PERCENTAGE 
AGE LEVEl. IN YEARS 
In Q49, where a girl and a b6y Ilo t h IIBve toothache, it can be observed 
(Figure 17) that 81% of the 6 year olds, 81% of the 8 year olds and 
53% of the 10 year olds argued that the pains are "the same ", both 
being toothache. 
With additional probing, 50% of the 6 year olds and 63% of the 8 year 
olds argued that the pain of the boy and the girl would be different 
if it was on different sides of the mouth. The 12 year olds (50%) and 
adults (60%) predominantly concluded that the pains "may be the same" 
and proposed possibilities, for exarnp"le: "'cos they both holding the 
same side so it's probably t hree quarters the same pain ... " (12 
years); "it depends where ... " ( 12 yeat":;); "it depends on the amount of 
the toothache or where the toothache is" (adult). There was a 
definite increase in the use of the \'lord maybe vlith increasing age. 
Place was mentioned predominantly as a criterion by means of which one 
could determine whether the two pains are the same or not. 
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FIGURE 17 : DEGREES OF SIMILARITY FOR SAMEI 
DIFFERENT PAIN WHERE THE PERSON DIFFERS 
~~ Jj,9,k ~ "1A~~lm: 
100 PERCENTAGE 
80 
/ 
AGE LEVEL IN YEARS 
In contrast to Q48 where the type of pain was emphasized as important 
in determining whet her t hey were the same or not, in Q49, the 
predominant answer was that they are 
which pain is experienced is an 
co nclu s ions. In Q48, differences 
focused on whereas in Q49, the 
"t he same" but that the place in 
i mportant cr iterion in drawing 
between the two pictures were 
6 to 10 year olds focused on 
s imil arities between th e two pic tuY·es. The 12 year olds and adults 
weighed up the simi l arities against the differences and were, 
ther efore, most commonl y tentative in their answers. 
In Q60 (story ta sk for same pain) , the common response for al l groups 
of subjects (62% of 6 yea r olds and 100% of subjects in t he other 
groups) was that the story "sounds fu nny" (6 years); that Janet does 
not know what pain John has so she would not have the same pain. At 
12 year old and adult levels, 'sophisticated confus i on' was evident as 
for other same pain tasks (see chapter 5, sect ion 5.2 .1b). The se 
subjects failed to take into account that we use t he expression 'same 
pain' in everyday language even thoug h we can never be certain tha t 
our pain is the same as that of another person. This is sophisticated 
confusion because, although we use t he phrase same pain in everyday 
standard English , the word pa i n is assimilated to the words for 
physical objects to the extent that our use of same pain seems 
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impossible (see chapter 5). Yet on other tasks (for example sarne. 
ball and same dress), they were prepared to di sregard certain 
differences such as that of size and still conclude that the two 
(balls or dresses) were "the same". One 6 year old (049) also 
rej ected the use of same pa in'" cos you don't know if I've ever got 
the same pain as you!" 
What is most important is that same pain tasks led to 'sophisticated 
confusion' at t'imes whereas tasks such as same ball/dress did not. 
Thi s reveal s cl early the "grammar" of the word same and suggests that 
it may be learned differently in different 1 inguistic context s , since 
it requires very different lIses in different context s . (This issue of 
'sophisticated confusion' is detailed in chapter 5). 
'Can you have my pain?' (076) was 
'Can you have the same pain as me?' 
interpreted by many subjects as 
(045) as can be seen in Figure 
18. There is a gradual progression from interpr-eting 'my pain' as 
'the same pain'. This occurred in 53% of 6 year olds and 64% of 8 
year olds. From 10 years of age this task was most commonly 
interpreted as 'my pain' and a negative answer 'wa s gi ven. (This 
occurred for 59% of 10 year old s , 61% of 12 year olds and 78% of 
adults) . 
FIGURE 18 : INTERPRETATION OF 'MY PAIN' 
AS 'THE SAME PAIN' 
70 PERCENTAGE 
60 
50 
30 
20 
10 
o~~~~--~~~~~~~~~ __ ~~~~ 6 YEARS 8 YEARS 10 YEARS 12 YEARS ADULTS 
AGE LEVEL IN YEARS 
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Those who interpreted the quest io n as 'my pain' answered "no" and gave 
explanations such as "'cos I - I can't feel your pain" (6 years); " I 
can only have my pain" (6 ye ars ). At 10 years, children gave 
explanations such as: " ... you can't have that person 's pain" ; "no, 
you've got your pain and I 'v.!' got my pain - we can have a similar 
pain" or at adult level "no , because it's yours" (laughs). A question 
such as: 'Can you ' have my book?' could give rise to similar 
explanations such as, "no, because it's yours". However, answers such 
as "no, 'cos I can't feel your book" or "you can't have that person's 
book - take it from them", woul d not be appropri ate wi th regard to 
same book. 
Q60; the story task for same pain contrasted 'same pain' wi t h ' my/your 
pain'. Six, 8 and 10 year old s focused on 'same pain', providing 
answers such as, " ... she can't have the same pain .. she's got to be 
him" (8 years); "no, 'cos a brick hasn ' t fallen on both of their 
foots" (8 years); "I don't think they could have the same pain ... you 
couldn't tell if they had the same ~ain ... " (10 years, an example of 
sophisticated confusion, see chapter 5) ; "she doesn't know how his 
pain is II (10 years); "how could she ha ve the same pai n ... 'cos she 
can't catch a pain" (10 years). 
At 12 years of age, children contrasted 'same pain' and 'my/ your 
pa i n' . Thi s is clear in the following examples: "no, 'cos she can't 
have his pain, she could have the same pain as him "; "she doesn't know 
what kind of pain he ' s got" but she can have "sort of the same pain " ; 
"you can say 'I've got the same pa in as you', you can't say ' I've got 
your pain"' . Adults argued that "same pain" is acceptable though 
"she's probably got some physchological problem if she 's got the same 
pain and nothing actually happened". "I've got your pain" they 
regarded as incorrect. Twenty five percent of the adults argued that 
"it may be similar, it's not the same". This relates to the is sue of 
'sophisticated confusion' (see chapte r' 5) as does the argument of a 12 
year old, gifted child that '''I've got the same pain as yo u' would 
mean t hat they sharing the pain ... it's li ke, a pain is a thing, a 
noun, it's been split in half - half has been given to him and half 
has been given to her". He agreed that this would be equivalent to 
cutting an apple in half and sharing it when you have the "same 
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apple". His answers for other same pain tasks (QI5, Q45) were 
consistent with this. 
, If I say that I have a similar pain to you, what do I mean?' (Q25), 
gave rise to explanations which conform to those for same pain (for 
example, QI5). In Q15, place and type were emphasized as being "the 
same", type and place were mentioned as differing in some way, for 
example: "you've got a cough and I ' ve got a cold" (6 years, type); 
"Like, mine's got a funny feeling and yours is just very sore" (8 
years, type), with type becoming predominant from 10 years of age. In 
Q25, type and place cannot be separated, for example, "Like, you've 
got a sore tummy and I've got a headache" (6 years). Intens ity was 
also mentioned, for example, "maybe one of them just hurts a little 
more than the other" (8 years); "It's not the same, not as sore as my 
pain, but it's nearly as sore ... " (10 years). 
At 10 years, subjects explained what similar means; for example, "they 
not exactly the same" and then appl ied this explanation specifically 
to pain, for example, "your cut could have been deeper". From 12 
years of age, general explanations were favoured above examples as 
explanations, as in, "You think we have a similar pain 'cos we 
suffering similar things". 
4.1.5(i) For Q159, 'Can you have the same dreams as me?' subjects 
beyond 10 years of age generally responded "no" (69% of 12 year olds 
and 80% of adults respectively). Thi s can be seen in Figure 19. At 6 
years, 8 years and 10 years, there is 1 i ttl e difference between the 
percentage of subjects who agree and di sagree wi thi n each age group. 
However, for the 12 year olds and the adults, there are at least twice 
the number of "no" responses than "yes" responses. Marked differences 
occur for children up to 10 years in contrast to those of 12 years. 
Numerous subjects (44% of 8 year olds and 44% of 10 year olds) even at 
6 years (50%) vJere aware that same takes on a specific use when 
appl ied to dream . If they accepted that one could have the same 
dreams as another person, they suggested in their explanations that 
same could not mean 'exactly the same' when it is appl ied to dreams, 
for example: "yes ... well, not exactly the same ... similar to me" (8 
years); "No, we can dream about the same things but they can't be 
exactly the same (10 years). 
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4.1.5(j) 
FIGURE 19 : POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE RESPONSES 
FOR 'SAME DREAMS' 
D~~S sAiU~TDi!i~XMS ~~M~ 
100 PERCENTAGE 
AGE LEVEL'lN YEARS 
For 041 (Can you have ~. anger?), there is very 1 ittle 
difference between the subject,; at the different age levels. From 
Figure 20, it can be observed that 21% of the 6 year olds, 19% of the 
8 year olds, 27% of the 10 year ol ds, 33% of the 12 year olds and 10% 
of the adults, interpreted the quest i on as ' Can you have the same 
anger as me?' (060, 076). However, at the 8 year level , there are the 
least "no" responses which may be accounted for by their being the 
only group who respond "don't know " (J9%). These latter responses may 
or may not become "no" responses at the next age level. Examples of 
explanations are "'cos you cross and then I'm cross" (6 years); "yes, 
, cos you coul d both be angry wi th the same person and you ca n both be 
doing t he same things, then you'll both be the same angry" (10 years); 
"if we both got cross at the same thing ... " (10 y'ears). 
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FIGURE 20 : POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE RESPONSES 
FOR 'SAME ANGER' 
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Same anger as with same dreams (Q159) suggests an equivalence sense of 
same: no subject suggested that there could be one dream or one anger 
that is shared. The 12 year old gifted child, who reasoned in this 
way for same pain, argued that "yoll can have the same kind of anger 
but you can't have thl? same anget·". The task was formul ated as "my 
anger" to introduce this -possibility of sharing anger. All the 
subjects who interpreted the question as 'my anger', answered that it 
is not possible. This suggests that even at 6 years of age, children 
are aware that anger cannot be shal"ed, an important aspect of the 
"grammar " of the word anger. 
4 . 1.5(k) Summary of findings for same, similar and different when 
applied in a diversity of linguistic contexts 
Children of different ages have a different understanding of the word 
same when applied in particular linguistic contexts although in other 
linguistic contexts their understanding is more uniform across age 
level. It was found that same alters its sense according to the 
1 inguistic context in which it occurs, that is, it is influenced by 
the words with which it CO-OCClIY·S. Different things have different 
criteria of identity. ReCiprocally, same affects the sense of the 
word with which it co-occurs. This suggests that word meaning is not 
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hidden within or behind the word itsel f but that it takes part of its 
meaning from the other words with which it is used. 
Same ball and same dress were commonly appl ied in the equivalence 
sense for all groups of subjects. Same appl e was most frequently 
interpreted in the equivalence sense with a progression to 
interpreting it according to the identity sense at 12 years. Same 
seat was interpreted according to the identity sense by all groups of 
subjects. The tasks dealing with continuity over time were evaluated 
according to the equivalence sense with focus on overt changes 
thereafter progressing to an emphasis on the identity sense by the 
older children. For same pain, place and type were drawn on in 
explanations. My anger and my pain were i nterpreted by the youngest 
children to mean same pain 
my anger and my· pa in. 
questions as impossible. 
and same anger and by 
The older children 
the older ch ildren as 
then rejected these 
4.1.6 Definition and fuzzy boundary tasks in re ·lation to tasks for 
same, similar and different in a diversity of linguisti c 
contexts. 
There was no single definition of the word same offered by subjects 
within any particular age level. The importance of the "grammar" 
issue i s illustrated by the 'example as explanation' strategy commonly 
used by the younger ch i 1 dren. They placed the ~Iord in an everyday 
context thereby demonstrating, unintentionally , the importance of 
context in determining the me aning of the word. However, they 
emphasized · a single aspect of the word ' s meaning and failed to take 
into account its diverse uses acros.s a range of situations. The 
l atter was highlighted in the tasks assessing same in a diversity of 
linguistic contexts. The you nger children were able to use and 
understand the word same in a var iety of contexts although their 
attempt at a definition was limited. 
The older children and adults commonly attempted a genera l explanation 
when defining the word same. They were also able to alter the sense 
of the ~Iord appropriate ly in different contexts but their definitions 
failed to account for these alterations in meaning. Fuzziness within 
the word same reveal ed through the vari at i on between speakers as well 
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as for any part i cuI ar speaker, a 11 ows for the di fferent uses of the 
word which occur. 
The fuzzy boundaries between same, similar and different were 
highlighted in two subjects' application of one of these words 
accompanied by different explanations and in their us i ng different 
words followed by equivalent explanations. 
4.1. 7 Summary of findings for same, similar and different 
The tasks dealing with the words same, similar and different gave rise 
to the following finding s: 
4. L7(a) A definite progression was found in the senses of same 
from equivalence to identity only when same is used in certain 
contexts such as same apple. In other contexts, for example, same 
dress, the equivalence sense was most common and, therefore, no 
progression was apparent. The equivalence sense appears to be learned 
earlier in development and seems to apply to a broader range of 
contexts than does the iderltity sense . 
4.1.7(b) The words same, s imilar and different gave rise to 
individual variation in that different subjects used the same word 
together \~ith different exp 1 anat i ons or, they used a different word 
together with equivalent explanations. Similarly, individual subjects 
used one word (for exampl e, same) , together with different 
expl anat ions on different occas ions, or di fferent words together with 
equivalent explanations on different occasions. Th e fuzziness of 
these words may contribute to the individual variation but it is not 
undesirable and it does not detract from the communicative 
interaction. 
4.1.7(c) Related to (b) above was the finding that the boundaries 
between same, simi 1 ar and different are fuzzy. There was 1 ack of 
agreement and a great deal of ind i vidual variation in the definitions 
and uses of these words. One adult subject attempted to st ipulate the 
number of criteria fo r silme versus similar which deviates from our 
everyday use of lan<;juage. The nature of the test situation must be 
kept in mind in contrast t o natural everyday language use. 
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4.1.7(d) Younger children commonly used examples as explanations in 
defining words thereby unintentionally placing the word back into an 
everyday context. In contrast, the older children and adults favoured 
general explanations which removed the word from its everyday context. 
The subjects were all able to apply the word in a diversity of 
situations but their. understanding of the word's meaning differed 
between age levels. It was found that a progression in development 
did not imply that the child ultimately arrives at a definite 
end-state use of the word which is equivalent to that of adults. On 
the contrary, the younger children displayed greater conviction in 
their explanations in comparison to the older children and adults who 
took a greater range of possibilities into account. 
4.2 Pretend, think, know and believe 
Findings for the adult subjects are presented first and findings for 
the children follow. 
4.2.1 Findings for adult subj~cts 
These · are discussed according to definition tasks, fuzzy boundary 
tasks and tasks assessing the word :; in a diversity of 1 inguistic 
contexts. 
4.2 . 1(a) Definition tasks 
All the adults used general explanations in defining pretend. There 
appears to be a "fami ly resembl ance" in thei r answer,s rather than a 
common 'core', similarly to findings for the YIOl'd same. 
4. 2.1(b) Fuzzy boundary tasks 
Fuzzy boundari es between the YlOrds pretend and 1 i e were revealed in 
the performance of the adults as for that of the children. They did 
not all explain the contrast between these two words in equivalent 
ways but emphasized different aspects of the words' meanings. 
4. 2.1(c) Pretend, thi Ilk, know and bel i eve ina divers ity of 
linguistic context s 
Adults adjusted the meaning they assi gned to each word according to 
the context in which it OC CUlTed. This contrasts to the general 
explanations they offered in the definition tasks. For example, in 
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every context,· pretend did not involve ' taking away an essential 
aspect of the real behav i our' . Adu lts generally drew on numerous 
criteria in their explanations (for example, in pretend to sing) . 
4. 2.2 Findings for the children are presented below Spontaneous 
Sentences 
Few errors of "grammar " of the word pretend were noted in subjects of 
a 11 age groups. Furthermore, at all age 1 eve 1 s, subject s used the 
word pretend in different senses such as 'decei ving another person' 
and adopting the characteristics of another person or animal. 
Examples of sentences at 6 years of age are: "I was pretending you 
were my fri end"; "There wa s a boy and he used to pretend he was a 
cowboy" ; "I f you pretend that you're sick and you really not, then 
your mother thinks that you're sick". At 8 years, children formulated 
sentences suc h as" "My sister pretended to be happy" ; "He pretended to 
be very good at mat hs" ; "I'm pretending to be a pirate". 
Ten year olds offered sentence s such 'as: "\,hen r get a migraine 
attack, I like to think - I pretend - it's not in my head, it's my 
mother's"; "I pretend I'm George ~Iashington"; "In films you pretend 
to be something"; "J pretend that 1 read well". Examples of sentences 
at 12 years of age are : "People pretend (so as) to get out of 
things" ; "He was pretending to be cross"; "To pretend is very 
similar (to) to act or to perform ... to act you do it - it's more 
realistic than pretend". 
Pretend in a vari ety of senses may be acqui red early in language 
development because of children's known abil ity to pretend from as 
early as 2 yea r s of age . 
In contrast to the correct use of the word pretend by ch ildren as 
young as 6 years of age, errors of "grammar" were found for the 
spontaneous product i on of sentences \Vi th the words thi nk. thought. 
dream and believe. Examples of errors are 
4.2. 2(a) "I think 1 went to the play" (and did you?) "Yes" . Here 
the child uses the word think incorrectly to describe a pa st· 
behaviour about which he has full knowl edge . This con trasts to : "I 
think I put the keys away". A certain absent mindedness in ' carrying 
out automatic beha viours renders the use of think acceptable in this 
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latter case. Think was predominantly used in colloquial form at 6 
years, as in "I think it's hot today" in contrast to its use as a 
mental term, for example, "I'm thinking out this problem" (Wellman and 
Estes, 1984). 
4.2.2(b) The 6 year olds commonly used the word thought as the past 
tense of think rather than as the noun 'thought'. This task (Q87) 
preceded that of think (Q92) and could not, therefore, be a response 
to Q92. Sentences wi th "grammar" errors offered by older ch i 1 dren 
were: "I thought for 10 weeks" (8 years); "I thought very nicely" (8 
years); "I thought he was building a car" (Was hen "Yes - it was 
blue" (10 years); "I could see that the thought in that person 's head 
was " angry" (How?) "by hi s face" (10 years). 
4.2.2(c) Younger children wel-e unaware of their use of think, for 
example a child trying to think of a se ntence with think, said, "I 
can't think of one - let me think - ] think ]'11 get a BMX" (6 years), 
unaware of his use of the word think on the first two occasions. 
Older children and adults laughed when t~ey recognized these uses. 
The older children and adults gave sentences such as : "All different 
people have different thoughts" (12 years); "Sometimes my thoughts 
escape me " (adult). 
4.2.2(d) Dream was frequently used in present tense or present 
continuous tense which reveals a "grammar" error. Daydreams can take 
this form as in , "] 'm dreaming!" when one comes back to reality and 
again puts one's mind to the task at hand, but dreams are most 
commonly related in past tense. Examples of errors are: "I dream that 
there's a kitten in my bedroom" (6 years). The use of the historic 
present cannot be ruled out although this seems unlikely as a 
deliberate use on the part of 6 year olds . 
4.2.2(e) From 10 years, children used the correct ten se with dream 
or they used dream as a noun. An example of a sentence at 12 years 
is: "A dream is abstract - not necessarily realistic ... " 
4.2.2(f) Sentences with bel ieve gave rise to the past pr ogres sive 
form as in "I was believing you \,ere my friend" (6 years). From 10 
years, children produced sen tence s such as "he plays make believe 
games" thereby introducing an altered sense of bel ieve and they used 
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"believe in"; "I don't believe ... "; "You can believe in a faith" (12 
years) . 
4.2 .2 (g) Know was used correctly by all children, initially in its 
more colloquial sense, for example, "I know your name" (6 years); "I 
don't know you" (6 years, 8 years) and from 12 years, in the sense, 
" If you know something , you usually have the knowledge of it ". 
4. 2.3 Definition tasks 
The following ta sks are analyzed 
a) What does it mean to pretend? (QI64) 
b) How can you tell when someone else is pretending? 
Probe Can you always tell? (QI62) 
4.2.3(a) 'What does it mean to pretend" (QI64) revealed the same 
types of answers for different age groups as was found with the 
definition tasks for same. The 6 year olds explained by means of an 
example with the older children dralVi~g on examples to aid their 
explanations: "you pull face and then whe n they ask you, you jus t 
smil ing" (6 ye ars); " ... when you pretpnd that you a baby and 
afterwards you laugh or something" (6 years); "pretend you've got a 
tummy ache" (6 years). However, some 6 year olds gave a general 
answer such as, "when yo u chaff" or "when yo u chaffi ng someo ne". 38% 
of the 6 year olds were unable to answer, stating that "it's too 
hard" . 
At 8 ye ars , children gave general answers such as , "when you chaff "; 
"When you joke someone"; "pretend means you aren't really doing a 
thing ... "; "it's like, act ... ". Some children added examples to their 
general explanation such as " ... like when you - say you cry, you not 
really crying you pretending - that you crying". An example as an 
explanation was drawn on by one sub ject only (an 8 year old). 
At 10 years of age, general answers of the following type were 
offered: "to act like somethin~l else or someone else"; "you joking, 
like , chaffing"; "you not telling the exact truth .. . "; "it means you 
not really doing it, you not really crying ... or laughing". In the 
latter responses, examples are also inc l uded in the explanation, but 
differ in complexity from those of the 6 and 8 year olds. 
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At 12 years, children explained pretend as: "it's not real, to make it 
up"; "you joking , it's not true"; "you make up that yo u really 
whatever you not. .. "; "to chaff" . Some 12 year olds became embroiled 
in the fuzziness of language and displayed difficulty in expressing 
their views, for example, 
"(pretend means) l ots of t hings ... it means to 
pretend ... it means that somet hing 's happened 
or something ha sn't happened. Say something 
hasn't happened , and you tell a friend it 
has happened ... like say a car crashed into 
a wall ... and . .. you say it ha sn ' t happened, 
you pretending. You can call it lying 
but .. . it' s not a serious thing . I'd say 
it' s pretending and ... like if yo u want to 
pretend and he knows that you not . .. that 
you not ... that you are pretending he doesn't 
even think that you funny or wha tever, yo u ... " 
Adults provided answers such as: "to pretend is not to be yourself, to 
be someth ing else"; "to try to make someone believe that something i s 
somet hing else": "to act like someone else"; "to play at being 
something else". 
4.2.3(b) For the task 'How can you tell when someone else i s 
pretending? Probe: Can you alway s tell? (QI6 2), 88% of the 6 year 
olds gave a definite answer focllsing on overt characteristics, for 
example, "When they l augh afterY/ards"; "when they smiling"; "when they 
standing st ill and chatti ng "; "when they tell you". One 6 year old 
(549) only answered t hat "you can't, 'cos you just can't tell when 
they pretending or not l " after which he added an example: "because I 
know my sister well and she plays and she cries and 1 just say 
'Sharon, you not crying - reallY'''. It sho uld be noted that the 6 
year old s most commonl y focus on overt character ist i cs in their 
explanations. 
At 8 years of age, overt characteri st i cs were also emphas i zed, for 
example, "when they start to smi le ", although 75% of the subjects 
di splayed uncertainty , for example, "J don't know"; "I don't know if 
you ca n, no, you can't"; "sometimes you can te ll , not always"; 
"there's no Vlay - ' cos YOll have to see if he's done the thing or 
hasn't". 
- 20 I -
At 10 years, subjects offered a context to explai n and extended beyond 
the single examples used by 6 year olds in many tasks, as is clear 
from the following: "You can see the expressions on his face and you , 
most times , know how he reall y acts. He's act ing differently this 
time"; "you can see on them, they'll have like a funny l ook on their 
face or you'll say 'stop lying or pretending' and he'll smile or he ' ll 
just start laughing"; "with some people you can't tell . .. unless they 
tell you afterwards ... well some people do it better than others"; "you 
actually can ' t but someti me you can - when like they peep and they see 
I've turned around then they might open the eye". At 6 and 8 years, 
subjects gave one criterion only. At 10 years, they offered different 
explanation s depending on the co ntext. 
Twelve year olds concentrated on the difficulties one ha s in being 
certain, for example, "you can't (always tell)"; "maybe he's smiling 
or somet imes you don't know ... "; "Well, with me you can (tell) but 
some people can keep a straight face " . One gifted child offered 
numerou s explanations: "Well , often they pretend .about impo ss ible 
things so you can tell by t ha t or you kno\~ about something before 
they actually pretend about it 01' you can see by the way they're 
acting - most ... turn around and start 9i9gl ing . . . it's 51 i ghtl y 
easier if you know the person ... an unfami l iar person may be nervous 
... and you can tell". 
Adults suggested similarly, that "you can 't always " ; 
see that it's -
"you can usually 
you can see that tell , not always and you can (then) 
it 's not somet hing sincere". Adults 
those put fo r ward by the chi 1 dren 
mentioned different criter ia from 
namely , " ... depending on if the 
story i s really outrageous or not you can just see if the person's 
pretendi ng ... "; " ... if you know them, they act i na di fferen t way 
from what you know they are ... "; " ... it depends on the age 1 ike, 
little kid s you ca n see when they pretending t o play at adults ... "; " I 
think the tone of the voice betrays them sometimes ... "; "by the 
actions leading up to and after . . . (the act of pretence )" 
It i s clear from the find ing s for both Q164 and Q162 above t hat 
numerou s criteria are drawn on in exp laining pretend and co ntextual 
cues are emphasized. For "Q164, 'What does it mean to pretend', 
general explanations suc h as "chaff" were offered. However, the 
difficu lt ies we have recognizing pretence in another person are 
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illustrated by the responses for 0162, 'I-Iow can you tell when someone 
else is pretending?'. It would appear that a different set of 
criteria is required in order to pretend oneself versus recognizing 
that someone else is pretending. This is further exemplified in 0158, 
'What do you do when you pretend? ' . 
Pretend was most commonly explained by all subjects in the sense of 
'deceiving' another person rather than in the sense of taking on the 
characteristics of another person or anima l . 
4.2 . 3(c) Summary of definition tasks 
The definition tasks for the word pretend revealed: 
i) An overall increase in the use of general expl anations with a 
corresponding decrease in using an example as an explanation was found 
for different age groups. However, un 1 i ke defi nit i on s of same, wi th 
pretend even 6 year olds, at times, used a general. explanation. From 
8 years, general exp 1 an at ions vlere common or an example was included 
together with a general explanation. 
i i ) In accordance with (i) above, the word pretend was most common l y 
excluded from the definition. 
iii) The reverse trend at 8 YI!ars found in the definition tasks for 
same was not apparent for the pretend tasks. 
iv) There was no single definition of pretend offered by subjects 
within any particular age leve l although "chaff " was common for all 
groups of subjects. 
v) A host of criteria and contextual cues were drawn on in 
explaining pretend and these differed when pretend was applied to 
oneself versus to someone else. 
4.2 .4 Fuzzy boundary tasks 
4.2.4(a) 0140, 'Is to lie about something the same as to pretend 
about something or is it similar or different?' was included on the 
basis of subjects' responses on other pretend ta sks. As an example, 
one 12 year old suggested for 0158 ('What do you do when you 
pretend?') that "you not really ... pr'etend you just., .you ly i ng". When 
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required to contrast to pretend and to lie, this subject argued that 
they are different: "to 1 ie you say something that 's absolutely not 
true; to pretend you're playing around". Other children explained, 
similarly, that "um ... when you pretend you ... well . .. you don't do ... you 
just make up anything ... but you don't do it in a manner like it's 
lying, you do it like playfull y" (12 years); " (They) different - to 
lie is more serious;'! "To pretend means like, it 's only a joke" (10 
years); "it's different - to lie is ... to pretend is, you just joking 
with a person, and to lie is you telling them ... you not joking, you 
actually tell ing them a 1 ie (laughs)" (12 years); "different - 'cos if 
you 1 ie you aren't tell ing the truth and if you pretend you just 
playing" (6 years). 
The answers for this task revealed that these two words may be used 
interchangeably at times, although at other times the differences 
between them are apparent . Examples of this are, "We ll , often a 
person lies about someth i ng and they're pretendi n9 to themselves and 
to other people that ... something is not what it really is so it's 
possible (to be the same)" (12 years, gifted); "if 'yo u pretend to be 
sick and if you lie to be sick, you pretending - it' s similar - one is 
you not telling the truth and the other, you pretending to ma ke it the 
truth" (12 yea rs). 
6 year olds provided an example as an explanation, such as 
"to lie - like, jus t say ... when you were in 
the bath , you never bathed yourself and your 
mother said , 'Did you bath?' So, you said 
'Yes' and that's a lie 'cos you never really 
bathed. To pr'etend - 1 ike if you haven't 
got ... a doll, you say to your friend 'I've 
got a ... doll' and you haven't and that's - you 
pretending 'cos you haven't really got one". 
Other 6 year olds emphasized that they are two different words so they 
must be different, as in "different - 'cos to lie and to pretend" 
(each of the underlined words was stressed). 
Adults emphasized the differences between them, for example, 
"Different - 'cos a lie is usually to get you out of trouble or to 
prevent somet h i ng from happen i ng whereas pretend i s usually as a 
practical joke or it's . .. not usually ... well, it's different"; "'cos 
lying - it' s different 'cos you are deceiving a person and that person 
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has no idea that you are deceiving them;" "Pretending is ... they could 
be the same but you may pretend and the person may know you're 
pretending ... like if I pretend I 'm someone else, my mottier knows that 
I'm me and not someone else"; "No, they simi la r 'cos they both not the 
truth but lying is like telling something that's abso lutel y not true 
and pretending is - 1 ike, lying is basically bad and pretending not"; 
"I think lie is more harsh ... "; "more blatant"; " ... if you pretend 
about something you're really doing it for the fun of it. But lying I 
think is stronger, you've doing it to deceive". No subject men tioned 
that pretend can be either verbal or non-verbal whereas 1 yi ng is 
a 1 ways verbal. 
The · fuzzy boundaries between these words are illustrated in the 
difficulties the subjects experienced in offering succinct definitions 
in this task. 
4 . 2.4(b) Summary of Fuzzy boundary tasks 
i) As for the definition tasks, the fuzzy boundary tasks revealed a 
developmental progression from providing examples as explanations to 
using general explanations although genera l explanations were drawn on 
by certain 6 year 01 ds . For <Ill age groups, the word 1 i e was more 
frequently included than pretend in the explanation. 
ii) The fuzzy boundaries between to lie and to pretend were revea led . 
iii) Th e definition and fuzzy boundary tasks together suggest that 
defi ni ng a word in contrast to another word 1 eads to an emphasi s on 
certain aspects of the word. Contrasting to pretend and to lie 
resulted in an emphasis on the 'playful' nature of pretence . . 
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4.2.5 Pretend together with think, know and believe in a diversity 
of linguistic contexts 
These tasks are phrased as comprehension questions but they require 
that the ch i 1 d refl ect upon the mean i ng of the word, for example, 
pretend, in re 1 at ion to- the word that follows. Pretend is analyzed 
together with know, believe and think in the following contexts (see 
appendix 0 for details): 
a) pretend to walk 
b) pretend to sing 
c) 
d) 
e) 
f) 
g) 
h) 
i ) 
pretend 
pretend 
pretend 
pretend 
pretend 
pretend 
pretend 
to be in pain 
to dream 
to write 
to be angry 
to think 
to 1 augh 
to be yourself 
j) pretends he's sick 
knows he's sick 
thinks he's sick 
believes he's sick 
What does it mean to 
believe something? 
k) pretends he can fl y 
knows he can fl y 
thinks he can fly 
believes he can fly 
1) believes he has a 
skateboard 
m) 
n) 
thinks he has a 
bicycle 
Which one i s he more 
sure to fly - i f he 
thinks, knows , 
pretends or believes 
he can fly ? 
(0175) 
(0176) 
(0178; 080a,b; Q72; 0100) 
(0180) 
(0183) 
(0181) 
(0177) 
(0179) 
(0182) 
(0166) 
(0167) 
(0168) 
(0169) 
(0132) 
(0203) 
(0202) 
(0201) 
(0204) 
(0198) 
(0187) 
(0205) 
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'How do you pretend to ... ·, Q175 - Q183, investigate the "grammar" of 
the word pretend as it occurs in different linguistic situations. 
These tasks are formul ated as comprehens i on tasks but they requ ire 
that the subject reflect upon the meaning of each word thereby 
including a metalinguistic component. Furthermore, the probes raise 
the task to the level of metalinguistic awareness. 
4.2.5(a) The use of pretend gave rise to different findings when 
applied in different linguistic contexts. Pretend to walk (QI75) 
yielded no 
table 2. 
confusing. 
developmental progressIon. These findings.l.re presented in 
Subjects of all ages found it comparably difficult and 
Many argued (i naIl groups) that one cannot pretend to 
walk, "if you walk, you walk" (38% of 6 year aIds, 19% of 8 year olds, 
31% of 10 year olds, 44% of 12 year aIds and 40% of adults). The 
commonest answer for pretend to walk was "walk on the spot " which was 
offered by all age groups predominantly in the groups 8 years and 
above (13% of 6 year olds, 31% of 8 year aIds, 50% of 10 year aIds, 
44% of 12 year olds and 50% of auults) .. 
The explanations offered by the adults differed from those of the 
children in complexity of formulation but not in content. The 
children gave answers such as; "v/hen you walk, you walk - you could 
only walk one way" (6 years); " I can't pl-etend to walk 'cos everyone 
walks - like, the people who ha~en't got broken legs ... it's impossible 
to pretend to walk ... " (10 years) . Adults explained that pretend to 
walk suggests that one is " , .. going through the motions without 
actually doing it " ; "the action of walking is - more covering distance 
than getting from one pI ace to another and by ... movi ng your legs., .you 
give the impression of covering di stance" . 
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TAB LE 2 Criteria for pr etend to walk 
Q. 175 How do you pretend to walk? 
On this task there ~Jas no developmental progression. Certain 
subjects have answers reflected in more than one category. 
I 
Criteria fo r Age 1 eve 1 in years 
pretend to I 
wal k I 
6 ,)'ears I 8 ,)'ears 10 ,)'ears 12 years Adu l ts 
walk on the I 
spot/sitting 13% I 31% 50% 44% 50% 
I 
I 
Can't pretend I 
to walk 38% I 19% 31% 44% 40% 
I 
I 
Just stand and I 
don't move 13% I 
I 
I 
Walk in a 31% 25% I 13% 19% 
different ego "stop ego "no t I eg. "move eg. "'stumbl e"; 
way quickly"; really I around "stroll 
111 i mp" ; walking"; I "mm - do along";"walk 
"wal k livery I something in a straight 
sl owly" fast" I funny ... line or walk 
I 1 imp ... " funny" I 
I I 
I I 
Don't know 13% 19% I 13% 6% I 
I I 
I I 
Miscellaneous 13% I 13% 38% I 20% 
ego I ego "use ego "make leg.lie 
"pretending I fingers "; the so und I down 
you I "or two of walking I and 
walking I tables and I move 
out the I move arms II; I feet"; 
gate Ivhen I and hold "stand on I "have 
your I yourself an I to do 
friend's I up and escalator I it in 
not I move your and walk"; I your 
1 ooki ng I feet" "hold onto I head-
and hide I a suspended I vi sua-
somewhere" I meta 1 bar I 1 i ze 
I and move I your 
I your feet" I 1 egs 
I "s itting i n Imoving" 
I chair and I 
I say: 'Look I 
I I'm I 
I ~Jal king" I 
~ I 
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4.2.S(b) Ptetend to sing (QI76) yielded a different picture through 
development as is depicted in table 3 . 
.;.:T Ac.::B:.:L:.::E:....::.3----''--..:.C.:...r1.:...· t:..:e:.:.r..:.i.::..a for pre ten d to sin 9 
Q.176 How would you pretend to sing? 
Criteria 
for pretend 
to sing 
Move mouth 
and sound 
6 years 
19% 
ego "don't 
use the 
same voice"; 
"you sing 
very 
softly" ; 
"sing in 
another 
voice" 
Age level in years 
8 years 
25% 
I 
I 10 years 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 a" ; I eg. "1 a 
IIhum"; 
"make up 
any old 
thing· not 
a proper 
song" 
25% 
eg. 
lItune ll I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 12 years 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
25% 
eg. "mouth 
closed· 
I hum"; 
I "mumbl i ng 
I or 
I·whistling 
or 
something" 
Adults 
10% 
_ _ __ +-___ L ______ ... L-_ __ +-__ -+ __ 
I 
Move mouth 
without 
sound 
Can't 
pretend 
to sing 
Don't know 
50% 56% I 
eg.(+ radiol 
on) ; I 
"when I 
others are I 
I singing" I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I 19% 6% I 
I I 
I I 
75% 
eg. "and 
hold 
'm;c' in 
hand in 
front of 
mouth and 
dance 
I I I 
I I I 
I 31% 13% I I 
69% 
eg. "s i ng 
to 
yourself 
without 
anybody 
knowing" 
19% 
70% 
20% 
I +-----+I------~-
Mi scell aneous I I I 6% 
I I I I "tell them 
I I I I you sang" 
_ ___ .'-1 ____ ._L _. __ .. _ .. .1..I ___ LI _ _ _ -'-_ _ 
The commonest suggestion by subjects of all age groups was that one 
move ones mouth without making any sound (50% of 6 year olds, 56% of 8 
year olds; 75% of 10 year olcls; 69% of 12 year olds and 70% of 
adults). In contrast to the 6 year olds, from 8 years of age, 
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subjects explained pretend to sing by drawing on a broader context 
which was more elaborate with increasing age. As an example, at 6 
years, answers were "just make your mouth go up and down"; "you just 
open your mouth and you don't sing". At 8 years, explanations given 
were "you can pretend - on the rad io . .. "; 
"you'd 1 ike move your mouth and not really 
sing and other people would sing around you 
and then they'd think your mouth - seems like 
that the others are singing for you 'cos they 
can't tell" 
At 10 years, children explained that "you just like holding a teaspoon 
or something in front of your mouth and open your mouth or something"; 
"you could open your mouth and playa tape and then move"; "you could 
just stand and chaff you holding a mike and close your eyes and move". 
At 12 years., children suggested: "I would open my mout h and move my 
lips ... like dance or something like that"; 
"You pretending that you singing but 
you not, you just ... if somebody's at 
a far distance and they can see your 
mouth moving, they'll think you singing". 
The adults gave answers of the following type: 
"(I would) open my mout h, move my 1 ips, 
probably tilt my head upwards, hand to 
my breast as ... opera singers and try and 
imitate the actions of the other people 
without actually producing sound - unless 
I do sing and I pretend I"m singing - in 
whic h case I'd make a sound - not the actual 
sound . . . it would be totally different". 
In contrast to the children, many of the adults offered a general 
explanation such as: "It's more the action than the actual words" that 
is importan t; "You could pretend in various ways"; "Yo u make all the 
facial expressions and posture and that ... " 
The probes, namely, 'But when you sing you have to make a sound, so 
would you be pretending to sing then or to do something else?' or 'But 
then are you pretending to sing or are you really singing?' were 
answered differently by children of elifferent age levels. The 6 year 
olds either retained their original view l'iith conviction or answered 
"dunno". One 6 year old attempted to exp la in: "they wouldn't know (if 
you were talking or singing) - that's the hard th ing about it". The 
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10 year olds (63%) generally answered "don't know" when probed and 
some mentioned spontaneously with probing that you "may be pretending 
to talk". 12 year olds and adults attempted to refine their original 
answer to allow for this distinction to be made, for 
say singing a song , usually it has a ... your words fl.ow. 
they don't always flow. So you could judge it". 
example, "Just 
When you talk 
It is possible that younger children are not familiar with the 
'operatic' conventions of singing which would allow them to pretend 
convincingly. 
4.2 . S(c) 
section. 
Pretend to be in pain: Four tasks are included in thi s 
i) QI78 gave rise to the common answer in all age groups: making a 
noise and clutching the painful area of the body . On this task, 
unlike the other pretend tasks, 6 year olds mentioned more than one 
criterion in their explanations as did the older subjects. These 
findings are illustrated in table 4. 
Answers were of the type: "you'd be goi ng agh! agh! agh! (holds 
stomach) and going 'I've got a pain in my back or something" (6 
years); "if your tummy's sore, ho 1 d your tummy, and then if they ask 
what 's wrong then afterward s you laugh " (6 years); "Screaming, and 
pretend to cry, and ... " (8 years); "you keep moaning and groaning and 
say 'it's sore' ... and you make a whole big thing out of one little 
thing" (8 years); "you pretend to hol d it ... where the pain is " (10 
years); "Like it ... you've got a pain in your stomach. Yo u'd hold yo ur 
stomach. Like you could make noi ses" (10 yea rs). Fa cia l expression 
was mentioned from 10 years of age. At 12 years, besides clutching 
that part of the body and making a noi se, other actions were 
mentioned , for example , " ... 1 imp"; " ... you'd fall on the ground"; "p ut 
your hands around you or ... lie down on the floor "; "by holding your 
stomach and walking over-bent ly" ; "you would cry out in agony or 
something like that " . 
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TABLE 4 Criteria for pretend to be in pain 
Q. 178 How would you pretend to be in pain? 
Criteri a for 
erete~d to be 
ln paln 
make a noise 
clutch that 
part of the 
body 
6 years 
21% 
36% 
say "it's 29% 
sore" 
1 augh 29% 
afterwards 
1 i e in bed 14% 
pretend to 
cry 
facial 
expression 
chaff 
Age level in years 
10 years 12 years Adults 
31% 38% 50% 40% 
69% 94% 63% 70% 
25% 13% 
I 
~ '1 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I 
19% 13% 13% 10% 
6% 38% 19% 20% 
19% 
~------~------~----
The example of a sore tummy was drawn on by subjects of all ages , 
probably due to its emphasis in the picture tasks and those tasks in a 
broader situational context (eg. Q60). The majority of subjects in 
all groups mention both that one would make a noise and that one would 
clutch the 'sore' part of the body. 
Adults answered in general terms such as "by going through the action 
and making sounds as if to say you're i n pain"; using "pos tures and 
facial expressions and t rying as much as po ss ible to look like someone 
who is in pain"; "put on a I'lhole lot of vis ual cues of pain". 
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This prefend task necessarily takes the situation out of context. In 
contrast to real pain, with p)'etend pain there may be no preceding 
event which leads to pain. One adult argued that one can pretend to 
be in pa in (versus pretend to walk, pretend to si n9. and pretend to 
think) "'cos that's (the pain's) not there before ... " It is possible, 
however, that somebody could hit you but not hurt you and you could 
pretend to be in pain as revenge. In this case, the pretend behaviour 
has a potentially painful situation preceding it. Children do this in 
play or to taunt one another when fighting. 
ii) All subjects readily recognized pretend pain behaviour in the 
task 'Johnny falls ... Is he in pain or not?' (Q80b in contrast to 
80a). Pretending about being in pain involves actions which extend 
beyond the pain behaviour itself, for example, laughing. That John is 
in pain was concluded on the basis that "he fell", that "he's holding 
his stomach'" "crying'" and so 011. For all groups of subjects, the 
second picture (John laughs) indicated that he was pretending 
("chaffing") to be in pain. The 6 year olds had explained in Q162, 
'How can you tell when someone el se is pretending' and Q72 'How can 
you tell when someone else is in pain' that laughter enables one to 
discern whether the person is pretending- or not. 
'Pretend to be in pain' is recognised by the overt and frequently 
exaggerated behaviour associated with being in pain, followed by 
laughter. Pretending to be in pain oneself draws on the same set of 
criteria that one focuses on when recognising this behaviour in 
another person. In contrast, being in pain oneself draws on a 
different set of criteria from recognizing pain behaviour in another 
person. One's o~m pain is marked by physical discomfort which cannot 
be experienced when acknowledging another person's pain. Recognizing 
pain behaviour in another person is based only on overt manifestations 
such as clutching the injured part of the body, moaning, and so on. 
This is an important distinction with regard to the "grammar" of the 
word pain and the way in which it Is learned by children. 
For Q80(a) and (b), adults were probed further with 'Could he be 
pretending he's not in pain' to ~Jhic:h they agreed that he cou.ld "to 
portray an image that - he's strong ... tough ... to deny it"; "he might 
do it for social reasons, like, he wouldn't want his friend to think 
that he's a baby". This probe also suggested that another "language 
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game" may be required to learn 'pretend not ... in pain' since it draws 
on an entire situation. Laughter is suggested by the word pretend and 
appl ies to all the pretend tasks when one is attempting to deceive 
someone else. However, for tasks such as pretend to walk and pretend 
to be yourself, subjects did not mention laughter. They concentrated 
on whether pretence was possible in these contexts. 
'being oneself' were the focus of attention rather 
behaviours associated with pretending. 
'Walking' and 
than common 
iii) In Q72, 'How can you tell when someone else is in pain', the 
probe 'How do you know they're not just pretending?', · throws light on 
the "grammar" of the word pretend in relation to that of pain. Six 
year olds emphasized that "they start to smile" or "afterwards they'd 
1 augh" (75%) or that they tell you they were only pretending (25%). 
Eight year olds emphasized the difficulty one has in discerning 
pretence, giving rise to "I don' t know" answers (38%) or "you can't 
tell" (13%) . Other 8 year olds suggested a diversity of answers such 
as : 
"If you try to make them blink, then they start 
crying. If they've got a pain and you go like 
this (hands over face), ;) nd you clap, then they 
start to blink, and tllen t hey start·to cry, 
then you know t hat they pain"; 
"there might be a brui se there"; "if you can see a cut or something". 
The majority of 10 year olds argued that one cannot always tell if 
someone is pretending to be in pain or not (88%). One child suggested 
that one "take them to the doctor , the n the doctor can say if they 
pretending " . Fifty percent of the 12 year olds emphasized that one 
"cannot be sure" but they provided more varied explanations than did 
the 10 year olds, for example , 
"I'd realize it with my friend 'cos he 's not 
acting in his usual way. With a stranger, I 
don't know if [ could tell all the time, say 
you've never seen the person before and he 
could always 0alk with a l imp and it might 
not be sore"; 
" ... you can't make your face just go pale"; "[ wouldn't hop around the 
playground if I wasn't in agony"; " ... if you examine the place where 
they complaining, you can often see ... " and, " ... but vlhy, who'd want 
to pretend to be in pain?" Adults offered equivalent answers to the 
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12 years olds, emphasizing that one "can't tell" with e-xplanations 
such as, " ... it depends how good a judge of character yo u are". 
iv) 'Could this boy be in 
characteristics which could have 
pain or not?' (QI00) drew on 
indicated pain (for example, holding 
the stomach) but which, when occurring together with characteristics 
such as laughter, suggest otherwise. Figure 21 demonstrates this 
overlap. 
FIGURE 21 ; POSITIVE, NEGATIVE & INDECISIVE 
RESPONSES FOR WHETHER THE BOY'S IN PAIN 
IN PAIN NOT IN PAIN M'1J1R IN 
AGE LEVEL IN YEARS 
At least 63% of subjects in each age group concluded that he was not 
in pain (69% of the 6 year olds; 63% of the 8 year olds; 85% of the 10 
year olds; 88% of the 12 year olds and 90% of the adults) and gave as 
their reasons that "he's laughing" or "he's smi ling " . Again, overall 
there is a small increase with age in the percentage of subjects who 
mention that he is not in pain. There is once again the noticeable 
trend of a slight decrease at the 8 year level. 
Only a few other reasons were offered, namely: "he' s yawning"; II he's 
singing"; I1he's angry" . The pos si bi 1 ity that he was sore from 
laughing, "a happy pain" (10 years), Ivas suggested by 10 year olds 
(25%) , 12 year olds (25%) and adults (30%) . Other adults gave more 
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novel explanations suggesting numerous options, unlike the single-
faceted answers of the 6-12 year olds. The adults argued, for 
example, that 
"could be 
circumstances 
he "could be laughing and pretending it's not sore"; he 
or shouting or crying or laughing"; "depends on 
- he may be laughing , singing or in pain and crying". 
When probed , with 'Could he be pretending that he's not in pain? Why 
would he do that?', all the 6 year olds misunderstood this question, 
interpret i ng pretend not to be in pa i n as pretend to be in pa in they 
answered accordingly, for example, '''cos he al so wants toys ... hi s 
mother will feel sorry for him". (This probe was not i ncluded for the 
8 and 10 year olds). Many of the 12 year olds and adults accepted 
this as a possibility. Some doubted this, for example, "no - he's 
holding himself so he won't fall over" (12 years). Fifteen percent of 
all the subjects did not identify the boy as pretending to be in pain 
but argued that he was in pain. They focus ed on the hand position and 
failed to take into account his laughter as well. 
4.2.5(d) 'How do you pretend to dreain?' (0180) was explained by 6 
year olds as pretending to sleep , for example, "you just chaff that 
you sleeping"; "when YOll don't rea l"l y close you r eyes - you peep". 
From 8 years, children began to argile that "you can't" pretend to 
dream or they explained it as pretending to daydream. At 10 years of 
age, "can't" and "don't know" predominated, for example, "I don't 
thi nk you can - you can pretend to sumeone that you had a dream ... "; 
or they found an active mea ns of explaining, as in "chaff yo u 
sleepwalking"; "you cou ld l ie down and toss and turn - it could be a 
bad dream ... you could be doing a play ... ". Sugges ting a play , 
introduces a different sense of pretend . Similar answers were found 
at 12 years and at adult levels. "Can't" was mentioned for reasons 
which differed from those provided for pretend to walk (0175). They 
did not argue that "if you dream you dream" and therefore we cannot 
pretend to dream as they had proposed for pretend to walk. Rather, 
they suggested that we cannot pretend to dream because dreami ng is 
"going on inside your head and other people can't always tell when 
you're dreaming ... " (adult). 
4.2.5(e) How do you pretend to write (0183) yielded un iform answers 
in content for all age levels. Subj ects emphasized moving one's hand 
up and down over a piece of paper or over no paper at all, using a pen 
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but making no marks on the paper, using a closed pen or using no pen 
at all, with the fingers as "in a grasping position" (adult). When 
probed with regard to marks being essential to writing, 'so are you 
pretending to write or are you pretending to do something else?', they 
all remained firm that they were pretending to write. Contrarily, 
with pretend to walk (Q175) those who mentioned, as an example, 
"walking on the spot", displayed confusion when probed, 'But walking 
means we have to get from one place to another so, are you pretending 
to walk or are you pretending to do something else?'. 
4.2.5(f) For 'How do you pretend to be angry?' (QIS1), subjects of 
all age 1 evel s agreed that we can pretend to be angry. Thi rty eight 
percent of the 6 year olds answered "I dun no" but the remainder gave 
answers such as "start shouting and screaming". For all age groups, 
criteria such as facial expressions, shouting, and tell ing the other 
person, were mentioned. It was pointed out that one shouts "for no 
reason" (adult); " ... he hasn 't done anything" (10 years); "you just 
make it up" (10 years). The uniformity of responses confirms the 
findings for pretend to write (QlS3). 
4.2.5(g) For 'How do you pretend to think? ' (QI77), the largest 
percentage of subjects in each of the age groups mentioned or 
displayed gesturally the stereotyped ('classic') posture for thinking, 
namely, sitting down, staring into space or closing ones eyes, leaning 
one's head on one's hands or placing one's finger on ones chin as opposed 
to ignoring the speaker or arguing that one cannot pretend to think. 
These findings are revealed in figure 22, name ly , 44% of the 6 year 
olds, 75% of the ·S year olds, 75% of the 10 ye ar olds, SS% of the 12 
year olds, and 60% of the adults. Examples of explanations are: "just 
" sit and stare" (6 years); "you could j ust sit down 1 ike you do when 
you really think (6 years); "Vlhen you just looking and looking and 
looking" (6 years)' "sit down and YOll aren't thinking but they really 
think you are, that you're tryi ng hard" (S years). Some children 
(from 6 years) suggested that you ignore the speaker. 
At the 12 year old and adult 1 evel s, subjects used general terms and 
mentioned "concentrating ". They also offered more than one criterion 
though the content of their answers was equivalent to that of the 
younger children. Example s inc lude "sit do\·1n and not concentrate on 
anything else around me - just look straight ahead or something" (12 
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years); "by just 1 ike screwing up yo ur eyes and looking very -
concentrated , l ike when you concentrati ng" (12 yea rs); "you couldn't 
pretend to have a mental process but you could put on facial 
expressions ... " (adult); " ... you would try to portray thinking, by 
looking very deep in thought, by being thoughtful ... " (adult). 
FIGURE 22 : CRITERIA SELECTED FOR 
'PRETEND TO THINK' 
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When probed further with regard to whether 'something is going through 
your head, when you pretend to thi nk', 6 and 8 year 01 ds genera 11 y 
answered "no" and 12 year olds "not necessarily". Some older subjects 
acknowledged that we could pretend to think and be thinking at the 
same time (13% of the 10 year olds, 25% of the 12 year olds). The 
gifted 12 year old reasoned that "I'd probably stop thinking when I've 
been thinking how I could make myself look 1 ike I'm thinking". 
Similarly, an adult explained that "you most definitely will be 
thinking because you are concentl-ating on pretending". Some 12 year 
olds and adults argued that "you can ' t do them at the same time" (12 
years) and a particularly precise explanation was offered by one 
adul t, namely that "to pretend to think, you'd give the impression 
that you're deep in though t but in actual fact yo u're not thinking 
about anything" (adult). 
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It is of interest that the 'classic' posture for thinking was 
mentioned by 6 year olds in Q!31 ('\'Ihat do you do when you think?') 
whereas the older children and adults favoured a broader r ange of 
criteria on this task, QI77 (pretend to think ) 'is revealing with 
regard to the meanings of both the words pretend and think. 
4.2.5(h) ' How do you pretend to laugh?' (Q179) yielded a great 
deal of diversity both within and between groups. The commonest 
answer was that you go 'ha, ha, ha' but other aspects of the pretend 
situation were variably in cluded in the explanations. 6 year olds 
argued that "you wouldn't laugh but you would j ust go 'ha, ha , ha " ' , 
some adding "when it's not funny"; or "you can't pretend to laugh"; or 
"you'd just - chaff you laughing". Similarly, at 8 years, it was 
sugges ted that "you' d laugh but - for no reason" ; "I'd laugh in a 
funny way and it sounds 1 i ke I' ml augh i ng; it sounds different" or , 
"by telling myself a joke and then laug hing (laughs) ... 'cos you told 
yourself a joke and someone never ... " 
At 10 years of age, children me ntionE!ci t hat you "have a false laugh" , 
"you'd make a funny sound or something 1 ike that ... "; or "you could 
just 1 augh but you not rea ll .v ... ha, ha, ha ... ". Others ment i oned 
different criteria, for example. "make your facial expressions exactly 
the same as if you were really 'laughing " or mime. They all implied 
t hat i t would sound di f ferent from an ordinary laugh. Simi lar an swers 
were given by 12 year olds who me ntioned "laughing and not mak ing any 
so unds"; or that "it so und s di fferent from a real laugh". Certain 12 
year olds placed it in a broader context , for example, " .. . what 
actually made you laugh wasn't a joke t hat the person told yo u 'cos 
you were only fake laughing" ; " . .. yo u're not laughing at anything 
funny, just for the fun of it". 
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Adults ment i oned the stereotyped ' cari cature' of 1 aughter, that is, 
"by holding your stomach and your head back - you going through the 
actions with no sound being emitted". The individual variation within 
the adult group was ev i dent. Lack of spontane ity prec i p i tat i ng the 
1 aughter was ment i oned, for example, " ... because 1 aughter is 
something that comes,. it's spontaneous so you can't pretend ... no you 
can't imitate spontaneity"; "you'd laugh but there wouldn't be a 
reason for it - it wouldn't be all spontaneous"; "you'd just force out 
your laughter". The numerous ways in which laughter may be simulated 
were mentioned by one adult: "you could either go and do it in your 
head, or you could mime it, or you could actually do it but not really 
- it's not sincere". The major characteri st i cs of 1 aughter that were 
emphasized when pretending to laugh include 
i) altering or removing the sound 
ii) laughing for no apparent reason 
iii) adopting the stereotyped posture associated with laughter (only 
adults mentioned this in contrast to the stereotyped posture for 
thinking, Q177 which was mentioned by subjects of all ages). 
iv) forcing the laughter in contra st to its natural spontaneity. 
In this set of pretend tasks (a-h) , it is of interest that the older 
subjects added a broader context. This is not equivalent to the 
'example as explanation' strategy used by the younger children in 
numerous tasks. Where a broader context is drawn on, the subject 
displays no confusion. The word is placed within an everyday context. 
However , when he attempts to remove language from its everyday 
context(s) , as in general explanations , confusion may arise . 
4.2.5(i) 'How do you pretend to be yourself '" (182) gave rise to 
the following responses as can be seen from figure 23: 
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FIGURE 23 : CRITERIA SELECTED FOR 
'PRETEND TO BE YOURSELF' 
POSSIBLE po~~iT3LE ~1: 
PERCENTAGE 
AGE LEVEL IN YEARS 
There is again, a sl ight ov'~rall increase in the percentage of 
subjects who argue that you cannot pr'etend to be yoursel f (81% of 6 
year olds, 69% of 8 year olds, 88% of 10 year olds, 100% of 12 year 
olds and of adults), Afte r 10 year s of age, the other options are 
never chosen. Again, there is a sl ight decrease at the 8 year old 
level. The majority of subjects in all groups answered with or 
without probing, that you "can't pret.end to be yourself because you 
yourself already" (6 years); "yourself is yourself " (10 years). Many 
subjects of all age levels di d not reject it outright, for example, 
"1 ike you do what you did the other day" (6 years); "put wigs on" 
(laughs, 6 years); "well, you just don't do anything, you just act 
the way you really are" (10 years); "well most people try and act as 
kind and as gentle as possible" (12 years); " ... what you would do is 
you'd pretend to be the person other people believe you to be" 
(adult); "act normally" or "act normal" (12 years). Ma 0::J of these 
subjects spontaneously changed their minds and concluded that one 
cannot pretend to be oneself (final \'esponses are reflected in figure 
23 above). 
The difficulties with this qu es t ion are revealed in the following 
answers: "You impersonate YOllr :;elf, 1 ike ... No, not really. You can 
impersonate someone else but I don't know, You can't pretend to be 
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yourself. You always are yourself" (12 years); "you wouldn't really 
be able to - you - just pretending that - you just sort of - you'd 
pretend to be - casual - but that wouldn't necessarily be being 
yourself" (adult). 
It would be possible to pretend to be oneself if one felt 'out of 
sorts' and then attempted to act like 'oneself' to prevent others from 
noticing . However, this was not mentioned by any of the subjects. 
4.2.5(j) Pretends I KnO\~s I T_hinks I Believes he's sick 
If John pretends he's sick , i s he really sick? (QI66) gave rise to a 
negative response for all subjects. For Q167, If John knows he's 
sick, is he really sick?' an subjects except one adult answered 
affirmatively. The latter argued that " ... his knowledge is not 
necessarily correct". If John thinks he's sick, is he really sick? 
(QI68) gave ri se to a predominance of "No" answers at 6 years (69%) 
with possibility predominating at 8 years (56%) and increasing from 10 
years. It is noteworthy that the latter option is chosen exclusively 
by adults. These findings for thinks 'he's sick can be observed in 
figure 24. 
100 
80 
60 
20 
FIGURE 24 : POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE REPONSES 
YES 
PERCENTAGE 
FOR 'THINKS HE'S SICK' 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
NO MAYBE 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
// 
// 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
o~~~~~~~~~--~~~~~~/~~--~~/~~ 6 YEARS 8 YEARS 10 YEARS 12 YEARS ADULTS 
AGE LEVEL IN YEARS 
- 222 
Justifications for answer"ing "maybe" include: "if he feel sal ittle 
bit sore he might not be sick or he might be sick" (8 years); " ... he 
doesn't know ... " (8 years); "He might be sick and he might not. He'd 
have to find out by a doctor if he 's really sick" (10 years); " ... he's 
not sure. You have to know what happens after, like when he goes to a 
doctor" (10 years); "there 's a possibility that he might not be" 
(adult). 
In contrast, 'If John believes he's sick, is he really sick? (QI69) 
gave rise to the following responses depicted in figure 25 . 
FIGURE 25 : POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE RESPONSES 
FOR 'BEUEVES HE'S SICK 
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There is a definite decrease with age in the percentage of subjects 
who answer that he is sick (81;~ of 6 year olds, 69% of 8 year olds, 
31% of 10 year olds, 25% of 12 year olds and no adults). At 8 years, 
children began to argue that bel ieve impl ies possibil ity (25%) rather 
than a definite negative or affirmative and this reasoning was 
predominant through the 10 year olds (64%) and 12 year olds (69%) to 
adulthood (90%). 
For both Q168 (thinks he's sici<) and Q169 (bel ieves he's sick), at 8 
years children answered "maybe" and at 10 years, "maybe" or "he could 
be". These answers indicate their al'lareness of possibility, Answers 
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such as "he has to ask someone to examine him" (12 years) were common 
at 8, 10 and 12 years. 
himself sick (through the 
Certain adults suggested that "he can make 
belief that he's sick)". Adults used terms 
such as: "possible" and "probable " . 
One gifted child (12 years) suggested that 'both these questions may 
give rise to the same response namely, "psychomatic" (that is, 
psychosomatic). However, on other questions such as: ' Is to think 
something the same as to believe something?' (Q153), he differentiated 
think from believe. This illustrates the way in which the "grammar" 
of these words alters according to their place in the language: in 
certain contexts, they may be interchangeable whereas in other 
contexts they may be markedly different in sense. 
'What does it mean to bel ieve something?' (Q132) adds support to the 
findings for the 6 year olds on Q169 (believes he's sick). At 6 
years, children generally regarded bel ieve as suggesting the truth, 
for example, "someone tells you something and you . . . know that they 
telling the truth" and "believe is when you know that they telling the 
truth" . 
Some 6 year aIds demonstrated acknOl,ledgernent that bel ieve suggests 
something which is not definitive, for example, "To believe 
something means that. .. you ... don't think that I've really got it ... and 
then I say: ' You better bel i eve me' and they won't - they mi ght 
believe or they might not" (6 years). 
Although the 6 year aIds answered "no" predorninantly for both pretend 
and think and "yes" for know and bel ieve (Q166, 0167, 0168, 0169), 
their answers revealed that they .Jere aware of differences behJeen 
these words on other tas ks . As an example , one 8 year old an swered 
0132, 'What does it mean to believe something?': "like ... I said to my 
friend I got a dog and - he said ' I believe you' - that means, like he 
knows - I've got a dog - he knows I'm not lying" (laughs). In this 
case, know and believe are both used to suggest certainty. However, 
for 0205, which required that they rate know, believe, think and 
pretend in relation to each other, this subject rated know as implying 
greater certainty than believe. 
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The "g rammar" of the word believe 
for Q132, (What does it mean to 
is further elucidated in the answers 
believe 
those answers for other bel ieve ta sks. 
believe from believe in (some thing ) 
something ?") in relation to 
Q132 did not different i ate 
and t he fuzzy bound a ri es 
separating .these senses of believe is high lighted , for example, one 10 
year old argued that: "um ... you believe something's true ... you be lieve 
in something ... If you, belie ve in it, it is true" but for Q169 (believe 
he's sick) he argued that "maybe John's sick , we can't tell". 
Similarly, one adult defined to bel ieve as "to have a conviction" 
(Q132) but argued that if Joh n believes he's sick (Q I69 ) "he could 
be " . 
One' 8 year old argued t hat bel ieve is " .. . to bel ieve somet hing and 
it's not reall y true. Just say, like, the chair's moving and i t's no t 
true" (QI32) whereas for Q169 (be'lieves he's sick), th i s su bject 
answered that "maybe it's not true (and he just believes it)." 
4 . 2.5(k) Pretends / KnO\vs L.l~i nk~j Bel ieves he can fly 
A definition provides only a pilrtia'i exp l an ation of the meani ng of a 
word in co ntrast to it s nuances displayed in 
when applied in a var i ety of contexts . 
contrast to the tasks above elucidates this. 
th e "grammar" of the word 
Th e following tasks in 
Q20 1-Q204 are formula ted 
as follows : 'Jo hn i s standing on the edge of a high mountain and he 
thinks (Q201) / knows (Q202) / pretends (Q203 )/ believes (Q204)he can fly. 
Will he try and jump off the mountain or not?' 
For Q201 (thinks he can fly ) variat ion occurred I'lith i n and between 
groups of subjec·ts as depicted in figure 26, unlike Q168 (thinks , he's 
sick) where a clear progression from "no" to "maybe" occurred. There 
i s a small decrease in the subjects Ivho say "no" with age (50% of 6 
year olds, 44% of 8 year ol ds, 44% of 10 year aIds and 39% of 12 year 
aId s ) and there is a s l ight increase with adults (60%). The decrease 
in the "yes" response i s consistent across all age groups. "Maybe" 
has decreased s l ight l y from 12 years (31%) to adults (15%) and "no" 
has i ncreased. Think i n relation to fly is more definite in se nse: 
one would only enter into danger if certa in of one's ab i lity to fly. 
Reason s varied for example, "no ' cos it's too high" (6 years); "if 
he 's stupid, he will, but if he's not , he won't" (laughs) (10 years); 
" ... he'll die ( l augh s). He can't fly unless he's got an engi ne or -
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an aeroplane" (8 years); "He'd be mad to, he'd fall" (8 years); 
" ... if he really thinks he's going to be able to fly, he could fly, 
yes" (10 · years); "not unless he really actually believes he can 
fly ... " (12 years). One adult suggested that it would be determined 
"depending on the way he's been brought up to act on his thoughts ... " 
FIGURE 26 : POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE RESPONSES 
FOR 'THINKS HE CAN FLY' 
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For Q204 (John bel ieves he can fly), approximately 25% to 33% of 
subjects in the 6-12 year old categories responded "no" whereas none 
of the adult subjects responded "no". These findings are depicted in 
figure 27 below. We can see that already at 6 and 8 years subjects 
choose the "maybe" option (albeit one subject in each group) and this 
is selected with increasing frequency in the older age ranges becoming 
the predominant option (60%) for adults. There is a slight difference 
in the percentage of children who respond "yes". This is not found in 
adults and may be accounted for by the "maybe" option which is most 
frequently selected by them. 
"Maybe " response s occurred from 10 years (19%) and minimally (6%) at 6 
and 8 years unlike 8 year s olds' responses on Q169. In addition, the 
progression is not as definite in Q204 as vias the case for Q169. 
Unlike Q169, "yes" rather than "maybe " predominates for the 10 and 12 
year olds. At 8 years, answers such as "he can't fly" and personal 
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views such as "I wou ldn't take a chance" occurred. Adults offered 
answers such as "he might". 
FIGURE 27 : POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE RESPONSES 
FOR 'BEUEVES HE CAN FLY' 
YES NO MAYBE 
70 PERCENTAGE 
60 / 
50 % 
/ 
~ 
AGE LEVEL IN YEARS 
In Q202 (know), "yes" predominated throughout the groups (75% by 6 
year olds, 88% of 8 year olds, 88% of 10 year olds, 81% of 12 year 
olds) with small variabil ity between subjects and a unanimous "yes" 
response at adult level . These findings are depicted in figure 28. 
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FIGURE 28 : POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE RESPONSES 
FOR 'KNOWS HE CAN FlY' 
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Q203 (pretend) gave rise to "no" an swers predominantly for all age 
groups (81% of 6 year olds , 8 n of 8 year olds , 88% of 10 year olds , 
88% of 12 year olds. 80% of adults), as can be observed in fig ure 29 . 
FIGURE 29 : POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE RESPONSES 
FOR 'PRETENDSHE CAN FLY' 
YES NO MAYBE 
100 PERCENTAGE 
AGE LEVEL IN YEARS 
There was small va riabi lity between subjects whic h reached 88% at the 
highest leve l. The f indin gs ~;uppor t those for Q166 (pretends he's 
sick) although "no" occurred unanimously across all subjects for Q166. 
4 .2 . 5(1) Answers for Q169 and Q204 reveal differences in the 
"grammar" of the word bel i eve in these two contexts. In Q204, 'If 
John bel ieves he can fly', bel i eve was evaluated by most children and 
by a few adults as s ugg est in~1 t hat he will fly. There are more 
contextual clues provided in Q204 and circums tanti al evide nce i s drawn 
on by subjec t s to exp l ain their judgements. Q198 'Jo hn believes that 
Mary has a skateboard. Does she have one or not?' sup ported t he 
findings for Q204. "Yes" predominated at 6 years (50%) with a 
progression to "maybe" from 8 years (50% of 8 year old s, 31% of 10 
year olds, 88% of 12 year olds and 80% of adults) as can be seen in 
. fi gure 30. 
FIGURE 30 : POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE RESPONSES 
FOR 'BEUEVES HE HAS A SKATEBOARD' 
YES NO MAYBE ~~~\l 
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4 . 2.5(m) 'John thinks that Mary has a bicycle. Does she have on or 
not?' (QI87) adds support to th~ ar'lliment regarding the "grammar" of 
the word think. As can be seen from fi gure 31 below, there is a 
marked progression from "yes" at 6 yea rs to "maybe" at 8 yea r s and 
beyond. 
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One 6 year old suggested that "you \"lOuldn't know", but without using 
the word "maybe". 
Q168 (thinks he's sick) and Q201 (thinks he can fly) throw 1 ight on 
the "grammar" of the word think when think occurs in different 
contexts . For Q168, there was a marked increase ina response of 
"maybe" by older subjects, as was revealed in figure 24 (section 
4.2.5j). In Q201 (thinks he can fly), on the other hand, "yes" was 
frequent 1 y offered and no c 1 ea r progres s i on was apparent (fi gure 26 
Section 4.2.5k). Age, mentality, height and whether he wil l get 
killed, were all taken into account in drawing conc lu s i ons for this 
1 atter task. 
Q168 (thinks he's sick) revealed a definite trend of "no" at 6 and 8 
years. It appears that the context alters the se nse of think and that 
certain tasks in which the word think i s incorporated, are earl ier 
acquired than others. This ha s important implications for t he testing 
of word meani ng and suggests that a very c1 ear gradi ng of tasks must 
be establ ished . It. adds support to ~he argument that vocabu lary 
studies to date are limited (see Chapter 5). 
FIGURE 31 : POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE RESPONSES 
FOR 'THINKS HE HAS A BICYCLE' 
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4.2.5(n) For 0205 , 75% of the 6 year olds and the majori t y of t he 
ol der su bjects rated certainty as occurring along a co ntinuum 
progressing from to know (something) - to believe (somet hing) - to 
think (something) and to pretend (something). This fi nding ties in 
with the answers for other tasks (for example, 0201-02 04 ) assessing 
these verbs. The 6 year olds initially regarded believe as indicating 
a positi ve response and think as indi cat ing a negative r esponse, which 
conforms to the hierarchy 
4.2. 5(0) 
knO\~ 
believe 
think 
pretend 
Summary of fi nd i ngs for pretend in a divers ity of 
lingui stic contexts 
i) It was foun d that pretend alters its sens.e accordi ng to the 
linguistic context in which it occurs, that is, there is a reciprocal 
relationship between pretend and th~ word t hat follows. The se 
f i nding s suggest that once the ch rJ d has learned the word pretend in 
one context, we cannot assume that he is able to generalize its use to 
all possible contexts. He underextends hi s use as occurs in 
substanti ve word meaning development. It, is suggested t hat he may 
need to learn the word in a variety of "language games" . 
ii) There were uniform responses for subjects of all ages when 
pretend was used in certain contexts (for example, pretend to write) 
and a deve lopmental progression . when pretend was used in other 
co nte xts (for example , pretend to dream). Pretend to be in pain 
yie l ded a divel'sity of responses across all subjects possibly related 
to the di versity of respon ies for other pain tasks (see section 4.3). 
Thi s suggests that pretend may be learned at different rates in 
relation to different words. 
iii) Pretend does not imply simply 'taking away' the essential from 
the behaviour (see Chapter 2.4.1e and chapter 5). Think provides a 
cl ear counter example since one can think and pretend to thi nk at t he 
same time. Furthermore, different aspects of the behaviou r are 
'removed' in different cases, as for pretend to be in pain (the cause 
is removed) versus pretend to think, 
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iv) On certain tasks, for example, pretend to sing and pretend to be 
' i n pain, there was a deve 1 opmenta 1 progress i on from drawi ng on one 
criterion to drawing on many criteria in the explanation. This was 
not found for all the pretend tasks. 
4.2.6 Definition and fuzzy boundary tasks in relation to tasks for 
pretend, kno~, think and believe in a diversity of linguistic 
contexts. 
There was no single definition of the word pretend provided by 
subjects within any particular age level. However, "chaff" was 
common ly used across the entire sample. Comparable to findings for 
the, word same, subjects' definitions failed to account for the 
diversity of uses of the word pretend when applied in different 
1 i ngu i st i c contexts. Since the word pretend was found to alter its 
sense according to the word with which it co-occurs, it follows that a 
grasp of the meaning of two words when considered· separately does not 
imply a grasp of their meanings when considered together in a 
particular context. 
When subjects argued that if you pl'etend to be in pain you "chaff 
you've got pain", they applied their limited definition of pretend 
(namely, 'chaff') to pain which reveals little about how these words 
function when they co-occur. Definitions of pretend and definitions 
of pain did not remain constant when appl ied to tasks asses s ing these 
words together, namely pretend to be in pain. Furthermore, meanings 
of the words pain and pretend in 'What do you do when you have a 
pain?' (Q51) and ' What do you do when you pretend?' (Q158) did not 
simply combine in the tasks dealing with pretend to be in pain (see 
Chapter 5 section 5.1.2e for further elaboration on this point). 
4.2.7 Summary of findings for pretend, think, know and believe 
The fo l lowing findings were revea led from this group of tasks: 
i) There was no single defin it ion of pretend offered by subjects of 
any age 1 evel although "chaff" I,as common for all groups of subjects. 
i i ) There was a progres s ion from offeri ng an example as an 
explanation to providing general explanations although general 
explanations were offered by children as young as 6 years of age. The 
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word pretend was common ly included in the explanations of the younger 
children. 
iii) Contrasting two words such as to pretend and to lie led to 
specific facets of each word being emphasized. 
iv) The senses of pretend , think, know and believe altered according 
to the 1 inguistic context in which they occurred. For certain tasks, 
findings were similar for all age groups (for example, pretend to 
walk); for others, a developmental trend was found (for example, 
pretend to dream). 
v) Know, believe, think and pretend were rated along a continuum 
for degree of certainty. 
4.3 Pain, ache and sore 
Findings for the word pain together with its associated words ache and 
sore are summarized first for the adult subjects (4.3.1) after which 
findings for the children are presented. 
4.3.1 Findings for adult. s ubje ct~ 
4.3.1(a) No single definit ion of pain was offered by all adults 
although general explanations were most commonly drawn on by adults. 
4.3.1(b) Contrasting pain in the fuzzy boundary tasks led to an 
emphasis on different characteristics of the word. 
4.3.1(c) The co-occurrence of pain ./ith other words yielded 
differences in adults' explanation s for the words in combi nation 
versus in isolation. 
Finding s for the children are presented below 
4.3.2 Spontaneous Sentence s 
"Grammar" errors occurred infrequentl y with the words pain, ache and 
sore. Errors are underlined in the fo llowing examples: 
4.3.2(a) Amongst the 6 year olds : 
"You get them when you 1 i ke si ck" suggests that we may have many 
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pains. This may be rather, a syntactical errOl'. 
"Someone told them that they had a tummy ache" 
This violates the use of the word ache in that one person cannot 
identify an ache in another person. 
"He had a face ache". The word face is not commonly used with ache. 
This is not entirely unacceptable but deviates from our everyday 
language use. 
"I had the pain in my stomach". 
suggests an error of "g rammar ". 
Th is is an error of syntax wh i ch 
Pain does not take a definite 
article: unless it ha s already been referred to in the discourse , for 
example, "The pain I told you about yesterday" 
4 .J.2(b) 
example: 
Errors of "grammar" amongst the 8 ye ar olds were, for 
"he had a broken leg and it Vias a gr_E!~ain" and by the same child, 
"When my fi nger got in the door, I was there - it was a great pa in" 
"You have a big pain" 
"I feel that I've got a pain ill my ann" (in this case, one would use 
know or omit feel altogether) . 
"My father ' s got a pain on his face" . 
4.3.2(c) At 10 years, tile only errors that occurred were: 
"Jane's toe is ~ching her" 
"I had a sore toe ache " 
,-- --
"I have a pain in my stomach ache (lallghs)" 
4. 3.2(d) At 12 years, the one error noted was: "Few people have 
got aches and pains". Thi s chil d applied t he phrase 'aches and pains ' 
in a general context which goes against our everyday language use. 
4.3.2(e) Only two spontaneou :; en"ors occurred for the entire range 
of 205 questions for all subjects. For Q72 ('How can yo u tell when 
someone else i s in pain?'), one 8 year old argued that " ... If they' ve 
got a pain and you go like t ha t ... and they start to cry, then you know 
that they pain". Another 8 year old stated, "I'm often 1 ike them, I 
have teeth ache " (incorrect use of plural form with ache) . 
4.3. 2(f) Same pain or similar pain were used correctly in 
spontaneous sentences such as : 
"Me and my friend have the saE1~R.ai!:l" (8 years); "Is the pain that 
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I've got the same as yours?" (8 years); "Me and my friend broke our 
legs and we had a similar pain" (8 years); "My pain is similar to 
yours" (10 years). 
4.3 . 3 Definition Tasks 
The questions 'What is a pain?' (Q39), '\4hat is an ache?' (Q40) and 
'What is a sore?' (Q43) form the basis of the present discussion. 
4.3.3(a) For Q39, 'what is a pain?' more than 50% of subjects in 
all age groups exp l ained in general terms (57% of 6 year olds; 88% of 
8 year olds; 88% of 10 year olds; 94% of 12 year olds and 100% of 
adults). From 12 years of age, more than one criterion was mentioned. 
General explanations were of the type: "when you sore in your body" (6 
years); "when something's sore in you body" (8 years); "when you hurt 
yourself" (8 years); "when your nerves are di sturbed and it hurts" (10 
year's); "you've got something throbbing and you sore in a place" (12 
years); "it means that something ' s hurting you" (12 years) . In 
contrast, an example as an explanation w,as of the type: "like I've got 
a pain in my tummy" (6 years); "just 5ay Illy hand's sore and it hurts, 
then it's pain" (8 years); "soll1ettl'ing that's in lilY stomach li ke 
cramps" (10 years). 
The terms used to explain pain were essentially equivalent for the 
6-12 year olds. The children explained something as "sore" or that 
"it hurts". The adults, on the other hand, used the general terms 
"unpleasant " , "discomfort ", "a feeling " for example, pain is "A 
feeling or emotion experienced when you hurt yourself"; "An unpleasant 
feel ing (which) arises from a physical or emotional experience " ; "A 
sensation that something isn't right - causing an unpleasant feeling"; 
something which causes discomfort and can be relieved " ; "either 
physical discomfort or someone who irr itates you". The only 12 year 
old who suggested that pain is something "unpleasant" was the gifted 
child and he used the word "horrible" to convey this in contrast to 
the adult explanati ons: "say you've been struck in that part ... and you 
feel sore ... it feels horriul e". 
4.3.3(b) 'What is an ache?' (Q40) gave ri se to the following 
qual itative responses across groups of subjects. Exampl es are 
included in table 5. 
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TABLE 5 Criteria for defining an ache 
Age 1 eve 1 in years 
I I 
Criteria 6 years 8 yeaJ's I 10 years I 12 years Adults 
I I 
I I 
Explain in ego "the I ego "similarl eg. "s i mil a r- eg. Il more 
relation to same" I to a pain I they don't sort of 
a pain I but not I have to be continuous 
I exactly the I the same pain .. pain 
I same thing I thing - not can be 
I ... can't I the same short, 
I have a pain I pain ... one .. stabbing. 
I I in your I hurts less" I think 
I I tooth I I I ache is 
I I don't think" l Imore long-
. I I I Iterm .. l ike 
I I " it . s 1 ike I I - a pro-
I I after I I longed 
I I a pain , I I pain"; 
I I it aches for i I "an ache 
I I a long time " I I is less 
I I I I strong 
I I I I than 
I I I I a pain 
I I I I the 
I I I I precursor 
I I I Ito pain .. " 
~. I I I 
I I I I 
Use word leg. "I've I eg . "i t ' s I I ego "my pain 
ache in la aching Ian ache I I is aching" 
explanation I headache" 11 i ke .. I I I 
I I got a I I 
I Istomach I I 
I I ache" I I 
I I I I 
I I I I 
Use word leg. "when leg. "some · I ego lIit's I ego II it's eg. "pro-
sore in I some- thing sorc, I something I 1 i ke a sore longed ... 
explanation I thing's in your I that's sure I you get in and it' s 
I very arm or I in a part of l your body sorell 
I sorel! 1 eg " I your body" I and it aches" 
I I I I 
I I I I 
Use word I eg. "also I ego II when I ego II i t I ego !Ian 
hurt in I like when l something's I starts to I emot i on ... 
explanation I you hurt I hurting you" I hurt and I exper-
I yourself" I Ithen it goes I ienced 
I I I away and I when you 
I I I comes back" I hurt 
I I I I yourself" 
I I I I 
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The 10 and 12 year olds introduced what an ache is not, for example: 
"something - if it's not a cut or anything - it's just in your body, 
you can't see it or . .. you can only feel it" (10 years); and 
"Like, you haven't got a broken bone and like it 
doesn't hurt continually, every now and then, 
like - it gets sore like - you pulled a muscle, 
you get ' a stitch while you swimming, and it starts 
to hurt and then it goes away and comes back ... 
(12 years). 
This contrasts to 6 year old responses such as "Ache is like - when a 
chair creaks and like, something's bY'oken or old"; "I've got a aching 
headache" . 
Certain subjects viewed an ache as more specific (in relation to their 
answers for a pa in) and therefore, cited places in the body to wh i ch 
the word ache could be applied. 
For example : 
"an ache is when you' re all tired and, every 
time you move yourse l f you're feeling restless 
and like it 's sore. You've also got pains" 
(12 years) 
"an ache is probably the same kind of thing (as 
a pain) except it' s norma lly ... you really can't use 
it in this illstance ' cos most of the time you've 
got a sore or a pain., ,an ache is something which 
you can only have in certain places - in yo ur tooth , 
stomach, back, neck ... You can use neck for ache but 
not in t he same part s of the body as the others" 
(12 years, gifted). 
From 10 years of age, an explanation in relation to a pain was common. 
As is clear from figure 32, only 6% of 6 year olds and 13% of 8 year 
olds related an ache to a pain compared to 88% of 10 year olds, 80% of 
12 year olds and 50% of adults. 
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FIGURE 32 : ACHE RELATED TO PAIN ON THE 
DEFINITION TASK FOR 'ACHE' 
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Thi s question was pI"eceded by What is 'a pain? (Q39) and a response 
which related the hlo was, therefore, expected. It was of interest 
that so few 6 and 8 year olds drew on this. 
As for Q39 ('What is a pain?') there was a progression from providing 
an example as an explanatioh to offering an example in the explanation 
to providing a general explanation at the adult level. These findings 
are displayed in table 6. 
The use of examples places the task in an everyday context whereas a 
general explanation removes it from everyday contexts. 
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I 
Age level I 
in years I 
I 
I 
6 years: I 
8 ~ears: 
10 ~ears : 
12 years: 
Adults: 
I 
I 
I 
I 
~T~A~BL~E~6~~~St~r~a~t~e~gi~ ? used in explaining an ache 
I 
Example as I 
exp lanation I 
"your head's 
sorell ; 
"ache is a · 
tummy ache" 
"when you've 
a headache"; 
"something" 
sore in yo ur 
arm or leg" 
I 
I 
Strategies 
I 
I 
Example in explanation I General exp lanation 
"can't have 
your tooth. 
th ink . . . " ; 
a pain in 
I don't 
" ... if it's not a cut 
or anything . . . it's in 
your body"; 
I 
I 
I "when something's 
I very sore"; 
I" it's something sore" 
I 
I 
I 
I"not a cut or any-
I thing - just in your 
I body, you can't see 
I H .. only feel it"; 
I 
I "it's something 
Ithat's sore in a part 
I of your body" 
I "so~et hing that's in yourl 
stomach like cramps " I 
I 
I 
"Like, you hd ven't 
broken bone ... like 
get a stitch while 
swimmi ng " ; 
got a I "it doesn't hurt 
you Iconti nually, every now 
you I and then, 1 i ke ... it 
"when you' re all tired 
and every time you move 
yourself you're feeling 
restless and like 
it' s sore"; 
"something you can only 
have in certain places 
(vs. pain)-tooth, 
stomach, back, neck,." 
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Istart s to hurt and 
It hen it goes away and 
I comes back" 
I 
I 
I 
I 
"it's the same kind 
of thing as a p~ 
except ... an ache is 
I something yo u can 
lon l y have in certa i n 
Iplaces - in your 
Itooth, stomach, back, 
Ineck - can use neck 
I for ache but not in 
I the same parts of the 
I body as the others 
I (gifted child) 
I 
I 
I "physical discomfort"; 
I"an emotion exper-
I ienced when you hurt 
I yourself" 
4.3.3(c) An anal ysis 
combi ned revealed common 
sore. These findings are 
of responses for all groups of subjects 
features vlhich separated pain from ache and 
summarized in table 7. 
TABLE 7 
subjects 
Concept 
Qua 1 ity 
Physical 
Emotiona l 
Description 
Specific 
to place 
Specific to 
incident 
Able to see 
4.3.3(d) 
performance 
Criteria separati!!lLy-aj n from ache and sore for all 
Pa 'j n 
physical or 
emot i ona 1 
- it's sore -
- hurts/when 
something 
hurts you 
- unpleasant 
feeling 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I Inside your 
I body - can't 
I see it, can 
I only feel it 
I 
When subjects Ivere 
from one testing 
I Ache 
I 
I 
I physical only 
I 
I 
I 
I it's sorel 
I very sore 
I 
I 
I - discomfort 
I 
I 
I I (eg .) a tummy 
lache/ toothache 
~---I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
L 
I 
I In s ide your 
I body - can't 
I see it - can 
I only feel it 
I 
retested to check 
Sore/A sore 
- healing after a 
cut 
- a mark/scab on 
yo ur body 
(eg.) fall ing/ 
scraping yourself/ 
bleeding and then 
healing 
Can see it 
for cons isten cy of 
session to the next, four additional 
questions were interspersed, namely : 
When do you use the word pain? 
When do you use the word ache? 
When do you use the word cross? 
When do you use the word angry '! 
These questions were included to determine whether there was any 
difference between the answers to these questions about the use of the 
word (for example, pain) and the quest ions such as '\~hat i s pain?' 
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(Q39) whi ch do not emphas i ze the use of the word. Answers conformed 
to those for Q39, Q40 and Q43 (4.3.3(a) (b) (c) above) 
'When do you use the word pain ?' 9ave rise to answers such as: "like, 
if you've got something sore and you say: 'It's pain '" (6 years); 
"when somebody hurts you, you say: 'You're a pain - 'cos you hurt me'" 
(6 years); " ... well , I don't actually ever use pain - I don't say 
'I ~ve got a pain in my arm' - I said: 'There's something hurting 
here'" (8 years); "When yo u in agony, when you've hurt yourself" (10 
years); "when you sore" (12 years) . 
, When do you use the I-/ord ache?' 1 ed to answers of the type: " . .. we 11 , 
I ' m not that sort of guy who pl ays soccer and says: ' I ache here', I 
say: 'It's sore here' " (8 years); "when it's inside - it's not like-
a cut" (10 years); "well , it's 1 ike a inside pain, a headache" (12 
years). 
4.3.3(e) Summary of defin ition tasks 
i) Findings revealed fairly uniform 
exp 1 anat ions offered by ch i1 dren from 
complexity in adulth ood (Q39). 
general responses in the 
6-12 yea rs with increased 
ii) Only one criterion was 
contrast to the older children 
drawn on by the younge r ch il dren in 
and examples as explanations decreased 
with age together with an increase in general explanations. 
iii) Commonalties se parating pain from ache and sore were found in 
the respon ses of all subjects combined. 
i v) Ache was commonly exp 1 a i ned with reference to pain by 10 year 
olds and older subjects although the reverse did not occur. 
4.3.4 Fuzzy Boundary Tasks 
The following tasks are incl uded in this discussion: 
a) Q42 Are a pain and an ache the same/simi l ar/diffe rent? 
b) Q44 Is a sore the same as a pain? 
c) Q52 Are sor e and pain the same/ sim i la r/ differe nt? 
d) Q53 Can a pa 'j n become an ache? When would that happen? and 
Q63 Can an ache become a pain? ~~hen would that happen? 
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4 .3. 4(a) Are a pain and an ache the same/simil ar/d ifferent (Q4 2) 
gave ri se t o the f oll owing respo nses within age group s (depicted i n 
figure 33). 
80 
eo 
FIGURE 33 : DEGREE OF SIMILARITY IN 
CONTRASTING 'A PAIN' AND 'AN ACHE' 
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Similar was sel ected by a least 47% of subj ects in each gro up, t he 
per centage increasing at t he 12 year (75%) and adult (70%) l evels. 
Thi s may be due to their ability to take into account numerous facets 
with regard to a pain and an a che . As an example, adult~ mentio ned 
that th ey are "the same" i n certain res pects but "s imi l ar " or 
"di fferen t " in othe r respects : "Well, an ac he and a physica l pain -
are t he same and, an ache and psychological pai n ar e different". Th is 
contrasts to t he response of an 8 year' old, namely, 
"A bi t simi l ar ... and .. . hit the same . . . 'cos a 
pai n is something sore and - ache is al so 
something SO I'e, so it' s the same .. . " 
(Why not eXBI:tly the same? ) "They are exactly 
the same". 
"Simi 1 ar " may predomi nate because the bound ari es between these words 
are not dist inct and an answl~r of "s ame" or "different" suggests 
greate r speci f ic i ty. However, as is deta il ed in the sect i on on 
- 242 -
individual variations, the meaning assigned to each of these words 
(for example similar) differed from child to child and for anyone 
child as applied in different contexts. Similar may be regarded as 
meaning 'the same' or as meaning 'different' within this particular 
context. A response of same/similar/different in isolation from the 
accompanying explanation yielded no useful information with regard to 
the child's understanding of the question though it served to 
highlight the fuzzy borders between these words. 
A qualitative analysis of the types of responses provided at each age 
level is more revealing, as is clear from table 8. 
The.re is a great deal of variation within groups. The 6 and 8 year 
olds mentioned one aspect of word meaning only (that is, only one 
qual itative category) whereas the 10 and 12 year olds and the adults 
frequently mentioned numerous aspects, that is, covering more than one 
category. 
4.3.4(b) Q44 and Q52 revealed commonalties for all groups combined. 
For Q44 'Is a sore the same a, a pain?' three main differences were 
raised: 
i) A sore suggests act i on on the part of the person, for example, 
when you fall you may get a sore, whereas a pain suggests something 
that happens to you and therefore implies less activity on the part of 
the person . 
ii) A sore is external whereas a pain is internal. 
iii) Pain may be the result of a sore. 
4.3.4(c) For Q52, 'Are sore and pain the same/s imilar/ different?' 
the following commonal ties were apparent: 
i) 6 and 8 year olds 
explained sore as a sore 
consistently confused a sore with sore. 
but USillg sore for both. 
They 
ii) Where differentiated, pain was regarded as "more sore than sore" 
(example from a 6 year old). 
iii) Sore suggested something external. 
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TABLE 8 Criteria selected in contrasting a pain and an ache 
Age level in years 
I I I I 
Criteria I 6 years 8 years I 10 years I 12 years I Adults 
I I I I 
I I I I 
One more lache more pain more l either achel pain more I 
sore Isore sore I or pain I serious I 
I I I I 
I I I I 
Continuous/I I ache longerl ache I ache 
Inter- I I I longer Icontinuous 
mittent I I I I 
Different 
typ.e of 
thing 
I f I I 
I"a pain "pain is I"ache insidel"pain is when l "pain in 
lis ~Ihen 1 i ke a I (and pa in) I you're very I knee and 
Isomething sore - I inside or Isore, and an Ihead aches-
I is sore ache is I outside"; lache is like I both 
land ache a I I when you're I physical 
I is when differentl"not like a Isort of lazy I discomfort 
Isomething kind of I pain, like .. you could I .. but the 
I else is sore" I a sting or be ~tiff or I figurative 
I sore" I something " something .. " 'He is a 
I I pain', you 
I"ache has I I "ache is couldn't 
Igot like al I something say 'he is 
I sore and I I which you an ache'" 
la pain hasl I can only have 
I got a I I in certain 
I pain" I I places"; 
I I I 
I "they both I I 
Idifferent I I 
I things I I 
Ihappening" I I 
"don't have 
to be the 
same kind 
of thing"; I I I I 
I I I I 
I I I "cut/a sore I 
I I I l is pa in. . I 
I I I I tummy I 
I I I I grumb 1 i ng I 
I I I lis ache" I 
I I I I I 
I I I I ,,- pa in I 
I I I I (longer/ I 
I I I I ~lOrse) " I 
I I ~I:------~I--------TI------
I I I I 
Different I "a 'ache I "but they I I "the words I 
words I and eain" I mean the I I are used I 
I each I same" I I differently" I 
I Ivord I I I I 
lemphasizedl I I I 
I I I I I 
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"Different" was most commonly se 1 ected (53% of the time for Q52) in 
contrast to "similar" for Q42 ('Are a pain and an ache the 
same/similar/different?'). There appears to be greater fuzziness of 
boundari es between pain and ache ve\'sus pain and sore. Examples of 
explanations for sore and pain are: "'cos if you've got a sore and 
you've got a pain, on the sore you put a plaster, on the .pain you 
can't" (6 years); "it depends what you mean ... an itchy bit sore ... or a 
vampire bat sore ... " (8 years); "No, 'cos a pain you can't see and a 
sore you can see ... " (8 years). In contrast, an adult argued that 
"when you're small, they the same but' then you grow out of some 
words". (So it's just our usage of words but they're 
interchangeable?). "yes". 
4.3.4(d) 'Can a pain become an ache? When would that happen?' 
(Q53) and conversely 'Can an ache become a pain? When would that 
happen?' (Q63) are analysed together Ylhen they relate to each other 
very closely. These questions required the subject to use an example 
in his explanation so the aspect of example as explanation versus 
general explanation is not analyzed. 
In most instances, where the subject s answered that a pain could not 
become an ache, they explained that they are "the same thing". This 
was not the only possible explanation, for example, one may not be 
able to 'become' the other because they occur in different parts of 
the body. However, these reasons were never offered even though they 
were mentioned by some subjects when asked whether a pain and an ache 
are the same/similar/different? (Q42). The answers for Q53 are 
contained in figure 34: 
FIGURE 34 : PERCENTAGE OF SUBJECTS WHO ARGUE 
THAT 'A PAIN' CAN BECOME 'AN ACHE' 
100 PERCENTAGE 
80 
~ 
40 
20 
o II YEARS II YEARS 10 YEARS 12 YEARS , ADULTS 
AGE LEVEL IN YEARS 
There is an increase'across age level s from 47% to 80% who argued that 
a pain can become an ache, However , from the lack of consensus within 
each group, the fuzzy boundaries between these words is apparent, 
Examples of reasons given to ac(ompany a "yes" response were: " ... when 
the pain's finished" (6 years): " ... like, just say I've got a pain 
here, then after a while it goes avlay and I get an ache ... a different 
thing" (8 years); " .. . when you have a pain in your head and you can 
get a headache -, when it becomes very sore" (10 years); " ... 1 ike if 
you don't look after it, a headache can become into a migraine attack" 
(10 years); " .. . I'/hen you don ' t treat: it" (12 years); " ... it becomes 
worse" (10 years, 12 years). 
The answers show that relative intensity is considered to be a 
variable. Other anSl'/ers on the type of pain, for examp l e, "no ... 'cos 
if you've got a pain ... 'cos if you've got a sore tummy, that means you 
hungry" (6 years); 
" ... like .. ,say you ' ve got a pain in your stomach 
and then ... you eat something you shouldn't and 
you have, like , a stomae ll ache after that" (12 years) 
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"Yes, well after it's passed, it could be a bit 
stiff and every time YOll move your arm or 
something like that, YOll could be aching (12 years). 
The factor of duration is clear from the following: 
"Yes, a pain can become an ache and now 
there's a difference between pain and ache. If 
pain is one instance, ache is continual pain that 
goes on . and on - it's really throbbing (adult); 
" ... yes, I suppose so ... if you bit on something 
and you have a sharp pain in your tooth , later you 
find that maybe a filling has fallen out and then 
it's an ache 'cos it's going to be there till 
you have it filled" (adult); 
"Yes, well, in the beginning a pain is sharp then it dies away into an 
ache" (adult). 
These responses contrast to : 
"Yes, say I've been hit by a tennis b~ll, 
I've got a brui se and ... the pai n is constant 
and as the bruise deve1ops,and gets better 
it will turn into an acll e and not be like 
a constant pain" (12 years), where pain is 
considered to be "constant". 
It is important to note that, at times, subjects reverse the same 
criteria. One subject may argue that a pain goes on for longer than 
an ache and another, that an ache is of longer duration than a pain. 
There was also no uniformity in responses both within groups and 
between groups of subjects. Overall, adults emphasized that an ache 
is prolonged vlhereas the 12 year olds emphasized degree of intensity 
as the main differentiating factor. 
'Can an ache become a pain?' (Q63) yielded similar results to Q53 
above. Six, 8 and 10 year olds offe red uniform responses with an 
increase at 12 year old and adult level s in those who argued that an 
ache can become a pain (69% of 12 year olds and 70% of adults). There 
was no commonal ity in responses both within and across groups of 
subjects, as is evident from figure 35. 
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80 PERCENTAGE 
80 
AGE LEVEL IN YEARS 
No overall trend is apparent. The COlllillon answer at 6 years (44%), 12 
years (69%) and adult levels (70%) \'laS "yes " whereas "no" occurred 
predominantly at 8 years (63%) and at 10 years (56%), 19% of the 6 
year olds answered "don't know" which was not found from 8 years. The 
argument for a "no" response at all age l evels was that "they're the 
same". The explanations accompanying a "yes" response revealed a 
great deal of diversity as was apparent for Q53 ~ Six year olds were 
unable to offer .justifications for their responses. One 6 year old 
when asked "When would that happen" repl i ed "anytime " . In the group 
of 6 year olds, this is of interest in that they provide examples as 
explanations though not understanding what the word "example" means 
(see section on Example as Explanation). 
Representative explanations are" ... yo u have an ache and it starts 
healing" (10 years); " . . . if it's getting better" (10 years) both of 
which regard an ache as more severe than a pain. "Ache, ja! You can 
have a pill and it will go do,m to pain. It won't be as bad" (12 
years); if it "callie down to a pain" (12 years). In contrast, others 
adopted the reverse position: " . .. after a time ... if you don't treat it 
or something ... it could become Vlorse ilild it could swell up - something 
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1 ike that" (12 years). Adults al so refl ected these di fferi ng 
positions, for example, "I don't really know - I suppose it could -
maybe if you've got a toothache and an abscess forms, it becomes a 
very ... intense pain"; "ja ... it could become more severe"; " ... pain is 
more defined". 
For Q53, type was emphasized as differentiating an ache from a pain. 
There may be difficulties inherent in the question itself, as revealed 
in a few responses, namely: when probed with regard to whether an ache 
or a pain goes on for longer, one 12 year old answered. " ... an ache 
can be just a day, it can be for any time, as long as forever ... ". 
one adult suggested that ": .. an emotional ache would become a physical 
pain" but added that "I don't know if it really occurs or if we just 
use terminology like that"; and one 10 year old considered the 
difference between them to be 'in the mind': 
"If you falloff your bike and you fr-acture your 
arm but you don't know if it's broken, it's a 
pain ... uh ... a ache ... and then ... if you go to a 
doctor and tlley tell YOll ahd you think it's more 
serious, it feels ... (~/orse)". 
For any particular child, responses on both questions Q53 and Q63 were 
compatible in the 8, 10 and 12 yeal' old and adult groups. If the 
subject considered pain to be more severe ( in Q53) thi s was refl ected 
in his reversing the situation in Q63. One adult answered "yes" for 
Q53 and "no" for Q63 explaining that she could not think of an example 
where that situation would pertain, namely, where an ache would become 
a pain. Her responses were st ill compatible. Similarly, one 8 year 
old argued that a pain can become an ache "if your pain like, is like 
sore, so ita 1 so aches . .. " but an ache cannot become a pain. When 
probed with: ('Can you have a pain that isn't sore?' he said " I don't 
know"). One 10 year old also argued that "usually it starts as a pain 
- it's not so sore" and then a pain could become an ache but not the 
reverse. 
The 6 year olds (excludi ng one su bj ect ) \,ere not consistent across 
these two tasks. They were unilble to offer explanations so that the 
influence of 'guessing' could not be discounted. It is al so possible 
that the task included a mell10ry factor: the 6 year olds tended to deal 
with each question separately ~/hereas the older children may have 
recalled answering "yes" to 053 and therefore, respond "yes" to 063, 
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in other words, they process them as one. The exp lanat ions did 
ensure, however, that they reflect upon each question in its own 
right. 
4.3 .4(e) Summary of fuzzy boundary tasks 
i) A respom;e of "s imilar" wa s common in all groups of subjects, 
increasing at 12 years and adult levels. This may be due to older 
subjects' abi 1 i ty to take numerous facets of a word into account; it 
may be due to the fuzzy boundaries between the words assessed for 
example , pain and ache; or due to both these factors. 
ii) The 6 year olds focused on one criterion only in co ntrast to the 
other subjects, and they tended to focus on each word individually 
rather than contrasting them with each other. 
iii) A respo nse of "different" wa s common for the task contrasting 
pain and sore. 
iv) Hhether a pain and an ache can develop into each other (Q53, 
Q63) yielded no commonality of responses and no developmental trend. 
Responses to these two questions were generall y compatible for the 8, 
10, 12 year olds and adults but not for the 6 year olds. 
4.3 . 5 Pain, ache and sore in a ~;v~rsity of lingui stic contexts 
These words are analyzed in the .foll owing contexts (see Appendix E for 
details): 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
e) 
same pain 
similar pain 
pretend to be in pain 
give pain 
feel pain 
"grammar" errors 
(Q15, Q45, 047, 048, 049, Q60, Q76) 
(025) 
(017B, 080a, b 0100, 072) 
(Q77, 085 , 065) 
(Q129) 
(0129, 0127, 061, Q125) 
4 . 3.5(a) Findings for ~amu~J.!1. (QI 5, 045, 048, Q49, Q60 and Q76) 
are recalled from section 4.1.5. It was found that place and type of 
pain were emphasized equally by 6. 8 and 10 year olds with type being 
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mentioned predominantly at'12 year old and adult levels (Q45, Q47, 
Q25). In 048 and 049, type predom inated in the responses of all 
groups of subjects. For 049, all groups of subjects regarded place as 
an important criterion in determining whether the pains were the same 
or not. In 060 and 076, 'my pain' was interpreted as 'same pain' by 
the youngest subjects and as 'my pain' by the older subjects. 
'Sophisticated confusion' was noted in certain same pain tasks, 
particularly in the gifted 12 year old and the adults. Strategies 
used altered from an inclusion of same together with a focus on one 
critel'i on to more than one cr i teri on bei ng mentioned with the word 
same not included in the answer. 
4.3.5(b) Findings for pretend to be in pain (0178 ; 080a,b; 0100; 
072) are recalled from section 4.2.5(c). It was found that subjects 
of all ages readily recognised pretend pain behaviour (080a,b) . All 
subjects cl utched the painful area of the body and emitted noi ses to 
display pretend pain behaviour. Recognizing this'behaviour in others 
was similarly described and laughter was mentioned as following the 
behavi oural sequence. 
these tasks. However, 
person progressed from 
laughter (at 6 years) 
There was no apparent developmental trend on 
explanations for detecting pain in another 
a focus on overt cllaracteristics such as 
to mentioning tile difficulties one would 
experience in being certain. 
It is suggested from these f'indings that recogn izing pretend pain 
behaviour in another person draws on certain different criteria from 
those which we use to pretend t o be in pain our selves . This suggests 
that pain may be learned in two different "language games". The 
majority of subjects in all groups were able to separate out 
'clutching the body part' from the pain bellaviour itself and concluded 
that a boy displaying this behaviour while laughing was "no t in pain " . 
4.3.5(c) Give pain 
i) 'Jo hn gave me 
on the "grammar" of 
a pa in and now he wants it back aga in' (077) draws 
the word give in the context of give a pain. This 
use of give is not compatible with give in the sense of "transfer 
possession of ... " (Concise Oxfol'd Dictional'y 1976, p.450) as would be 
the case if give was applied to an object. The child has most likely 
never heard these words used toge\.ller as tlley ne ver co-occur in 
everyday language. An adult would never say, for example, "Give the 
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pain back". When presented with this task, the child has to interpret 
these words when they co-occur. (It is not being suggested that this 
interpretation by the child is conscious). 
Give pain was assessed in three tasks 
Q77 John gave me a pain and now he want s it back again 
Q85 'The stone gave me a pain 
Q65 He gives me a pain 
The way in which the child answers reflects his understanding of these 
words. It was found that the children ~/ere able to use certain ~/ords 
(for example, have a pa in) in different contexts but that deta i I ed 
questioning about the meanings of the words indicated that their 
understandi ng of some of these words di ffers from that of adults. As 
an example, the phrase ' gi ve a pain ' suggested to some 6 year a Ids 
that one is able to give the pain back by hitting the person back, 
(that is, retaliate , although some agreed that H would not be the 
same pain as the original one). The child failed to take into account 
the "grammar" of the word give as i t re'·ates specifically to pain . The 
older children on the other hand, answered that it is "nonsense", that 
is, they did not even attempt an interpretation. 
Older children might hear 'give me a pain' as a unit rather than as 
give (or, the "grammar" of give) in relation to pain (or, the 
"g rammar" of pain). Younger children may not have heard this 
expres s ion as a unit so they dea l with eac h word separately. On the 
other hand, the word gi ve takes on a part i cuI ar use when app lied wi th 
, 
the word pa in. Younger ch i 1 dren may have understood the word gi ve in 
relation to the word pain in the same way, with the same use, as when 
they hear give in relation to words such as book; whereas older 
children are able to recognize these differe nt use s . 
Consider the phrases 'give pleilsure' and ' gi ve full marks'. Neither 
of these phrases suggests that something was handed over: this 
criterion would be applicable if give were applied to physical objects 
only. He 'gave me a ki ss', also i lll plies that one ' imparts something 
to someone else' but kiss is not a physical object. 
The sentence 'I gave him a pa in back ' i s syntactical ly well-formed but 
it is not acceptable in terms of our real world and is, therefore, 
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unusable. (Contrast this with ' 1 gave him his money back' which is 
acceptable) . . Give and pain never co··occur where give means 'transfer 
possession of'. It is part of the "grammar" of the word pain that it 
cannot be transferred from one person to another. 
A detailed study of word meaning requires that we analyze the sense of 
the word as grasped by the ch ild. The present fin dings revealed that 
the 6 year olds have a na rrow sense of a word which becomes 
progressively di verse with development. This narrow perspective also 
reduces, for the child, the fuzziness between ~Iords that he has to 
deal with in word-meaning. Furthermore, the 6 yea r olds displayed 
greater conviction in answering which may be accounted for by both the 
narrow perspect i ve and the 1 esser degree of fuzz i ness as well as an 
interaction between these two factors. 
Give a pain is related to the phrase have a pain or to the "grammar" 
of the twq words have and pain. Have in have · a pain bears some 
similarities to have in have a book , and have a drink but there are 
also differences in function. \,hen applied to a materi al object, have 
implies 'able to transfer'. It would appear that the chi ld must have 
learned t he word have as part of the phrase (have a pain versus have a 
book). Have a pain implies that t.he pain is in a certain place or 
location whereas have a book does not imply that the book is in a 
certain place. Have, as appl iE'd to lIIaterial objects seems to form a 
"grammatical" group or "language game" in which the word may be 
learned. The older child displays his ability to use the different 
senses of have in these different contexts. 
ii) For 'The stone gave me a pain!' (Q85) all subjects argued that 
John's statement was incorrect. When asked what the mother would 
reply to this, the majority of subjects indicated that the stone could 
not have 'given' him a pain. However, it is possible to co nclude that 
the stone 'gave him a pain' because he tripped over it (nonl iteral 
sense of give) rather than because it was active in doing so (1 iteral 
sense of give). Thi s was evident from answers at 12 years and at 
adult levels , for example: "That might be true ... I mean, the stone's 
the cause of his pain " (adult) . HOIvever , more frequently, subjects 
emphasized that he tripped over it: (Mother ~Iill say): "Don't talk 
junk!" (6 years); "The stone can't give you pain ... 'cos you only trip 
over it" (6 years) (laughs);"The stone never gave him a pain - he 
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wasn't looking where he was going" (8 years). One 10 year old used 
intralinguistic rea soning , namely, " ... she ' ll say 'he's stupid' 'cos 
he says 'the stone gave me a pain' in ste ad of ' I fell over the stone' 
and all that". Similar explanatiolls were offered by adults, for 
example , "Perhaps he sh ould rather say 'The stone caused my pain'. A 
stone ' s inanimate, it can't give a pain away". 
Other 10 and 12 year olds and adults mentioned that it " ... doesn't 
make sense ... 'cos the stone didn't actually give him the pain ... " (10 
years); "you tripped over it by mistake, it didn't give you one" (12 
years); "How can a stone gi ve you a pain?" (12 years); "it wasn't the 
stone that gave you a pa in, , cos it wasn't the stone's faul t but you 
gave yourself a pain ... " (adult). 
One of the constraints on the word pain is that it is a consequence of 
an activity or state. Impl icit in this is that pain can only be 
applied to a purposive agent capable of making decisions (for example, 
a person) and that it cannot be applied to inanimate objects such as a 
stone. The constraints for a particular .lO rd affect the words with 
which it can co-occur. Children of ,I ll ages were al'/are that give a 
pain presupposes that whatever 9ives a poilJ is capable of an acti vity 
or state. 
iii) What does it mean if w'~ say: ' He gives me a pain?' (Q65) 
revealed a progressi ve move from a litera l to a figurative explanation 
from 8 years of age. This is due in part to the understanding of the 
"grammar" of the word give in re lat ion to that of the word pain. Hhen 
the child reaches the stage at which he is' aware that one does not use 
give in the sense of ' impart something to someone else' when talking 
about pain, then he suggests an alternative explanati on f or this task. 
However, in l ine with Hugh es and Grieve's study (1980), it is possible 
that the child assumed that there must be an explanation for this 
question if it was being asked at all and , not knowing or not having 
heard the figurative use, attempts to explain it literally. A literal 
explanation was offered by only 13% of 12 year olds and then it was 
inc luded with an alternative explanation, for example" maybe 
someone drops something on your toe or he could give you a mental 
pain ... and hurt your feel ings " . 
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Literal explanations were for exampl e, "It means he punched you in the 
stomach or hit you" (6 years); "when someone hurts ' you; someone drops 
something on you" (6 years); "they friends and one's got pain and the 
other one hasn't and then he goes to his home and he gets the pain" (6 
years); " . .. when someone's got il pain, you can catch it ... " (6 years); 
"you can't give no one a pain - if you try and give someone a pain, 
you'll have to cut yourself. You must cut yourself and then - you put 
one hal f on them and one hal f on you" (Can you do that?) "No" (6 
years); " ... you could have kicked him and he got a pain" (8 years); 
"He can't give you a pain 'cos it's inside your body - it doesn't come 
out of your body" (6 years). 
Similar explanations were offered by some 10 year olds, for example, 
"he gives me a headache or he gives me ... he doesn't stop screaming": 
"when he's screaming or something and he gives me ... no, that's a ache, 
a headache ... I don't know". This latter subject attempted a literal 
explanation and then during the course of her explanation, she seemed 
to decide that ' this was not fully explanatory. She may be in a 
transition from 1 iteral to figurative. Oiher 10 year olds gave such 
answers as "He irritates you"; "he's getUng on your nerves"; "he's 
bugging you". 
12 year olds explained that "she annoys me all the time, constantly"; 
"he's always \vorrying you ... "; "he keeps on nagging and ... you can't 
stand it. .. " "he irritates you" (adults). One 12 year old (gifted) 
differentiated the two meanings clearly: "it really me ans that. .. he 
gives you a pain by hitting you or something. But when people say 
that, they mean that the person irl'itates them". Conclusions cannot 
be drawn on the basis of one subject's performance. However, this 
gifted 12 year old answered in a way that provides a link between the 
literal and figurative uses of the word give in this task. 
This task itself does not comprise a true metaphor since it has an 
internal grammar and allol'ls foY' the insert.io n of additional words as 
in, ' He gave me a Ql9. pain' . Contrast this with 'true' metaphor ic 
extension as in 'He kicked the bucket'. Insertion of words as in 'He 
kicked the old bucket' are not acceptable in this case. However, the 
older children's resporses suggest a metaphoric explanation of the 
sentence. 
- 255 -
Figurative language involves breaking rules and, an awareness that one 
is doing so. The child must learn the rule first (Chomsky, 1965) and, 
knowing the rules, he is then able to understand and assign meaning to 
deviation from a rule. Vosniadou, Ol'tony, Reynold s and Wilson (1984) 
reported that children interpret metaphors 1 iterally when the correct 
meaning eludes them. Similarly, \viig and Semel (1976) found that 
learning-disabled children typically interpret idioms such as 'she 
just fell apart', 'she hit the roof' ,in terms of the literal meanings 
of the words. 
4.3.5(d) Feel - pain 
Q129, 'Does this sentence sound OK/not? I have a pain in my head but 
I can't feel it', yielded a predominant anSYIer of "unacceptable" for 
all age groups. 
Virtually all subjects in all groups responded "no" (95% of 6 year 
olds, 90% of 8 year olds, 95% of 10 year olds, 100% of 12 year olds 
and adults). The subjects who ans\vered affirmatively were not asked 
to justify their answers and it is difhcult to rule out guessing as a 
factor. (An example of when this could occur would have provided 
clarification). Those who answered "no", all gave explanations which 
emphasized that "if you've got a pain you ha ve to feel it" (6 years; 
adult); otherwise " ... you ca n 't tell that you've got a pain" (12 
years) '''cos then it's not a pain" (10 years); " ... you saying: I've 
got it but I can't feel it. .. 1 know I've got it but 1 don't know I've 
got it . . . Now that's really idiotic" (8 years); "Pain's a feeling as 
well, so of course you can can feel it" (12 years). 
It would be of interest to examine preschool children's understanding 
of feel as it co-occurs .Iith pain to establ i s h the age at l'ihich they 
are not aYIare of the alteration of sense of feel in their particular 
context. 
4.3.5(e) "Grammar" errors 
i) The sentence '1 have a pain in my head but I can't feel it' 
(QI29) includes a contradiction: an essentia l characteristic of pain 
is that you feel it. This sentence reflects a deep violation of 
"grammar". It does not occur in fairy tales; it does not make sense 
and we seem 'unable to get hold of it'. Certain subjects in the 8 , 10 
and 12 year old groups correcteci the sentence in the following way: " I 
- 256 -
have a pain in my head and can feel it" which includes redundant 
information because pain impl ies that you must feel it. One 10 year 
old did add, " ... I can feel it , it' ,; there" which is acceptable as 
emphasis to counter an opposing view. 
ii) 'If I say "Look I Ilave a 
sound OK or not?' (0127) yielded 
observed in Figure 36. 
pa in on my _ arm", does that sentence 
the following responses which can be 
FIGURE 36 : THE APPROPRIACY OF 
'PAIN ON MY ARM' 
APPROPRIATE APPRIS\>RIATE 
K§S'l 
PERCENTAGE 
AGE LEVEL IN YEARS 
As for Q129 ('I have a pain in my head but I can't feel it'), "No" 
predominates from 8 years of age (81:. of 8 year olds, 100% of 10 and 
12 year olds and of adult s ). However, at 6 years of age, 56% of the 
subjects found this sentence acceptable. 
Where a subject answered "yes" IJut gave an explanation which indicated 
that it would only be applicable in certain cases , this was scored as 
"no" because the explanation qualified it. An example of this is "yes 
- only if it ' s outside there -like if it's a cut" (8 years). "Yes" 
answers may have been due t u a lack of di fferentiation between 
focus i ng on syntax and semant i cs in t he sentence or an error of 
"grammar". As an example, onE, 6 year old answered "yes" but when 
probed: "Can you see the pa -in? " he an s\vered "No " . Probed further "But 
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the sentence sounds OK?" he said "Yes ". In this case, guessing is 
difficult to rule out. 
iii) Explanations for all groups of subjects emphasized that you 
" ... can't see the pain" or pains are " inside"; it's "internal injury" 
(10 years). An intralinguistic answer was one such as, "Like, it can 
be a sore" but pain takes 'in your arm'. This task illustrates the 
"grammar" of the word pain and relates it to the issue of ostensive 
definition. 
Another task dealing with ostensive definition and pain is Q61, 'Is a 
pain a thing inside you?' As soon a, we talk about 'a thing' we tend 
to . fall into our own preconceptions or expectations regarding 'a 
thing ' as something that can be pointed to and this is where pain 
cannot be explained by means of ostensive definition. For this task, 
"Yes" was favoured for an groups of subjects (100% of the 6 year 
olds; 63% of the 8 year olds; l5% of the 10 year ·olds; 75% of the 12 
year olds and 70% of the adults) . . Those who favoured a "no" response 
pointed out that pain could be external due to an external cause (8 
years, 10 years, 12 years, adults). However, even if due to a car 
accident (10 years) a twi st of the arm (12 years) or a cut on the body 
(adult), the pain will still be intern;ll so that there is some 
confusion in this regard. \jhen asked \oJhether one can point to pain, 
the majority of 6 year 01 ds (75%) answerted "yes" whereas answers 
varied from 10 years as i n "You ca n point to where the pain is" (10 
years); and "(You) can point to the area" (adult). "No" responses 
were explained as "you can just fee l it, 1 ike" (75% of the 10 year 
olds, 50% of the 12 year olds and 20% of the adul ts) . 
iv) 'Does this sentence sound OK/ not?' 'I love a pain' (QI25) gave 
rise to the following responses revealed in figure 37. 
It is of interest to note that Inore adults were willing to accept this 
sentence than were the children. Hovlever, at least 60% of all the 
subjects responded negat i vely. Expl anat ions offered by adults were 
"You could say that if you \vere referring to a person as a pain"; 
" ... it's grammatically correct"; " ... somet i mes it so unds unusual but 
it could be true , like, a toothache is sometimes - pleasant". They 
have drawn on examples beyond the immediately obvio us and suggest 
possible situations where the sentence Illay be acceptable . 
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FIGURE 37 : THE APPROPRIACY OF 'LOVE A PAIN' 
PERCENTAGE 
APPROPRIATE APPR~RIATE 
&\\\'3 
AGE LEVEL IN YEARS 
Explanations for those Wh l answered iri the negative were equivalent 
in content for all age gro! .. ps, for example, "no - 'cos you can't love 
a pain -'cos if a pain's ma(ing you sore, you can't love it, 'cos it's 
maki ng you sore" (6 years) . " ... ' cos you can't love it - yo u ... not 
happy that you've got pain" (6 years); "no, 'cos a pain hurt s" (6 
years); "you hate a pain" (6 years). The use of "can't" was apparent 
in the answers of 8 year olds as well. At 10 years, subjects prefer 
the word don't which suggests that it is possible to love pain though 
it is not common, for exampl e, "Yo u can say that but no one 1 i kes 
pains and things like that" (8 years, 10 years); " ... you can ' t - well, 
you could like having pain s but I don't think anyone would like having 
pains" (8 years). 
The use of "could" was draw:1 on by 12 years olds, for example, " ... the 
pain is sore - you (laughs) couldn't love it"; "You could have a pain 
but you couldn't love it w~' en you've got pain"; "You could tal k about 
a person who everybody hatn ... ". At the 12 year 1 evel, the subjects 
are 1 ikely to use the mar! tentative form of the modal, indicating 
perhaps, a weakening of :he possibil ity (Macdonald 1985). These 
answers reflect an aspect of the "grammar" of the \-lOrd pain , namely, 
that it is somethi ng unpl easant. It waul d then fall ow t hat "most 
sensible people don't like to be in pain" (12 years) and that, 
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therefore, one "couldn't" be in pain. Tilis interpretation could be 
equall y applied to the 6 and 8 year olds tllOUgll it is of interest t hat 
none of the 10 year olds used t he word can't. Th i s sugg ests t hat the 
reasons for us i ng th is word may d Hfer for the younge st ch i 1 dren in 
contrast to the 12 year olds . The exp lanation s given by the adults 
were equi va lent to those of th(! 12 year olds although they used more 
general terms, such a·s : " .. . pain i s usua lly an unpleasant experience "; 
" . .. painful is discomfort " . 
4.3 .5(f) Summary of f i n~~~l!.!:.-.l'a in i n a diversity of 1 ingui stic 
contexts 
i) Pretend pain was readily r,!cognized in others and displayed by 
subjects of all age ranges. 
ii) Same pain sugge sted that t here must be two pains but resulted in 
'sophisticated confusion' at adult leve ls. 
iii) Give pain reveal ed a progression from focusing on give in the 
sense of 'transfer possessioll to someone else' (Concise Oxford 
Di ctionary, 1976) to a figurative explana tion in t he older subjects. 
i v) Feel pain was answet'erJ cClrl'ectly by sub jects of all ages, with 
older children differenti,lting Lhe Si llses of feel (t hat i s, 'touch' 
versus ' experi ence' it). 
v) Ta sks which included "grammal'" errors yielded no apparent 
trends. 
4.3.6 Definition and fuzzy bOllndalJ~ tasks in relation to tasks for 
pain, ache and sorl! i n ~_..2.!ye t' s ity of linguistic contexts 
4 .3.6(a) There was no sing le definition of the words pain, ache and 
sore provided by subjects wi thin a particular age group alt hough 
definitions Vlere more uniform across groups than for same. 
4.3.6(b) Together with the I-lOrds same and pretend wh i ch gave rise 
to no s i ngle definition, the co ·· ocur·rence of same and pain , or pretend 
and pain , yielded changes in expl allati ons for these words when they 
co-occurred. Definit ions pl'o vide only a part ia l explanation of the 
words meaning in contrast to it s nUil.nces I'Jhen applied in different 
contexts. 
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4.3.6(c) Tasks for pretend and pain in contrast td the task pretend 
pain revealed interesting findings with regard to the "grammar" of 
words. For' What do you do when you pretend' the common answer was 
"chaff". Even though the younger chi ldren give an example as an 
explanation (for example, "pretend to sleep") they are later able to 
apply pretend in another context (for example, "pretend to be in 
pain"). For 'What do you do when you're in pain?' the common answer 
was either "cry" (a physiological consequence) or "go to the doctor" 
(a practical consequence). 'How would you pretend to be in pain?' 
yielded "hold the painful area and moan" or "pretend to cry". If one 
combined the answers from the pl"etend task and the pain task, it gives 
ri se to "pretend to cry" or "pretend to go to the doctor" wh i ch is 
only a partial explanation: "pl"etend to cry" could be misinterpreted 
as something other than that one is pretending to be in pain. Holding 
an area of the body and crying is 'less 1 ikely to be mistaken for 
something other than what is intended. To 'pretend to go to the 
doctor' may suggest in a role play that one is in pain but this 
situation would not commonly be drJvlll,OI1 in 'pretending to be in 
pain'. A combination of the defini tion t~sks: 'vJhat does it mean to 
pretend?' 'Ihich gave rise to "daft" and 'Hhat is a pain?' which gave 
rise to "something sore", would yield: "chaff to be sore". 
No subject argued that we cannot pretend to be in pain as was common 
for pretend to walk and ment i oned occas i olla 11 y for pretend to sing. 
Considered together, these tasks indicate that the "grammar" of 
pretend alters according to the linguistic context. In certa in 
contexts, pretending is 110t possible; in other contexts it is. In 
certain contexts (for example, pretend to be in pain) something 
essential to the situation is I'ellloved, for example, the cause of the 
pain and one simulates the behaviours one would carry out if one were 
in pain. For pretend to sil1g, however, sound may be removed, again, a 
characteristic essential to singing itself. HOI'Iever, it is possible 
to pretend to sing by actually singing but altering onds voice. 
4.3.7(a) Strategies varied fl'om examples as explanations and only 
one criterion being dra\'/n on to general explanations and more than a 
single criterion being drawn 011 in certain tasks . 
- 261 , 
4.3.7(b) Uniformity or vlriability of responses occurred across all 
subjects for the fuzzy boundary tasks. 
4.3.7(c) There was no single definition of the words pain, ache and 
sore and differences were found in performance at different age levels 
depending on the linguistic context in which the word pain occurred. 
4.4 Feel, see, do and interrogative form where 
These words were analysed in a diversity of linguistic contexts, that 
is, in relation to the words in the three previous sections. 
4.4.1 
a) 
to feel 
Feel was examined ill the following tasks: 
It wi 11 be recall ed that all subjects were aware that one has 
pain in order to ha'e pain at all (QI29, section 4.3.5(d)). 
b) Can you feel your dre~~s? (Q195). 
c) I feel an anger. 'Does this sentence sound OK or not?' (Q118). 
4.4.1(b) Responses for Q195 ('Can you feel your dreams?') are 
revealed in figure 38. 
All the 6 year olds interpreted feel in the sense of 'touch' and 
argued, for example: "no, because ' it's a dream - it just comes out of 
your head". From 8 years, feel was interpreted by some children 
(though a minority in all groups) as 'experiencing an emotion'. 
From 10 years of age, subjects who responded positively regarded feel 
in this context to mean som3thing other than 'touch', for example "you 
feel like you on a boat, you sitting on a boat and a shark's chasing 
you" (10 years); "like, if it's a sad dream, like you could get like 
your heart could be all son" (10 years); "well if it's a scary dream 
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FIGURE 38 : ACCEPTANCE THAT YOU CAN 
'FEEL YOUR DREAMS' 
YES NO 
:==J &\\S"l 
PERCENTAGE 
AGE LEVEL IN YEARS 
you could shake" (10 year~); "yes 1 suppose - if you have a dream 
about something scary, you can feel scared" (12 years, gifted); "Yes, 
I'd say - if you've got a pain in your arm - say if you've got a sore 
arm wh i I e you dream and then you dream about somebody hit t i ng you on 
the same place then you think that you felt the dream" (12 years); you 
feel the movement in the dream "like if a chair falls and you jump up" 
(12 years). Subjects at 10 and 12 years mentioned having a nightmare 
and 'feeli.ng' it , for example , "well - no - like if you having a 
nightmare ... like say someone is about to stab you, well then you could 
suddenly wake up and go ... ,;tart screaming or something like that but 
you can't usually feel ... " [12 years). 
Examples from piloting a , 11all sampl e of preschool children confirm 
these findings. When aske(: 'Can you feel your brother's pain?' and 
'Can your brother feel your pa i n?', one 4 year old argued" " I can't 
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feel my brother's pain (but) he can fe el mine - (I think)". This may 
be due to hi s egocentric frame of reference. Another 4 year old 
argued that he can feel hi s brother' s pain: "If I put my hand there 
(on the injured knee), then I can feel the pain running ... " 
4.4.1(c) Further confirmation of t hese findings comes from another 
task: ' Does this sentence sound OK/not? I feel an anger?' (0118). 
Reasons varied from an emphasis on an anger to an emphasis on the word 
feel . Only the latter are of relevance to the present discussion. 
Examples of such explanat i ons are: 
"yes . .. you feel an anger - no. - ' cos you 
can't feel anger you can fear it but you 
feel it. I fear anger - I'm scared of it" 
(12 years) 
"no - 'cos you can't feel anger - it's 
something inside yuu - you can't feel 
it - but it just comes out - you· feel 
angry but you can't feel it with your 
hands - you can fee ·1 i.t inside you but 
you can't touch it " (12 years) 
These two subjects then gave a:; il cen-reet ed sentence: "I feel angry" 
without acknowledging that the \'Iol'd 1'ue l had been included once again 
and that, therefore, their explanation failed to hold. The ad ult 
subjects seemed to be arguing about the objective status of an anger. 
4.4.2 Where 
The "grammar" of the question form "here is assessed in relation to 
the "grammar" of think (Q160), feel an ache (075) , feel anger (062), 
feel a pain (054), and dream (0147). 
4.4.2(a) 'Where do you feel a pain? ' (Q54) and 'Where do you feel 
anger?' (062) deal with the chnd's grJSp of the "grammar" of where in 
rela t ion to the "g ramma r" of ~ain or anger. To t he questi on 'Wh ere do 
you f~el pain? ', the child does not answer in the kitchen. He has an 
understanding that where in the context of an ache takes an answer in 
the body/head and so on. Similarly, \~ith the ques t ion: 'Where do you 
feel anger?'. If these qu\!stions vJere phrased in a sl ightly different 
way, for example, 'Where did you first feel anger/pain?', the answer 
could quite real istically have been "(Hhen 1 was) in the kitchen". 
Yet, for the question s as phl'ased in this study, "in the 
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kitchen/lounge" was never pffered as an answer. This type of answer 
may appear ridiculous but this is only because we so take for granted 
that the child would neve -' answer in this way. Yet, we have no 
reason to assume that the child would not answer in this way. Where 
in 'Where do you feel anger?' could have been a different word (that 
is, formed by different letters) from where in a question such as: 
'Where did you first feel this anger/pain?' 
4 . 4.2(b) Responses for 'Where do you feel pain?' (Q54) can be 
observed in figure 39 below. 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
FIGURE 39 : CRITERIA SELECTED FOR WHERE YOU 
FEEL PAIN 
EXAMPLES ANYWHERE 
&\\\1 
PERCENTAGE 
O~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ __ ~~~..J 8 YEARS 8 YEARS 10 YEARS 12 YEARS ADULTS 
AGE LEVEL IN YEARS 
This question was answered with varied examples such as, "in my side, 
my tummy, my leg" (6 years); mentioned by anyone child or "anywhere". 
Examples were given by the najority of 6 years olds (87%), and 8 year 
olds (75%). Fifty percent of the 10 year olds gave examples and this 
decreased in the 12 year olds (13%) . "Anywhere" was the answer 
offered by the remaining children in each group and by the majority of 
12 year olds (87%) and adults (100%). 
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4.4.2(c) 'Where do you feel dn ache?' (q75) gave rise to equivalent 
answers to 054 above but specific parts of the body were emphasized, 
for example, head(ache), tooth(ache) and back(ache). There was again 
a progression to answering "anywhere" although 12 year olds and adults 
also commented that an ache is usually associated with particular 
parts of the body. 
Pain can be used as a count or a mass noun. Nouns such as pain are 
able to shift from mass to count whi c h involves a shift in sense 
according to the linguistic context in which it is used, for example , 
'she was in s ome pain' or, 'pain ·i s unpleasant' includes pain as a 
mass noun. In, ' I have a pain in my head', pain is used as a count 
noun, as in 'some pains are intense '. This contrasts to the word 
anger which can only be used as a mas s noun and part of its "grammar" 
is that it is not localized to a specific part of the body. 
4.4 . 2(d) 062, , Where do you feel 
localization. This question is. as 
anger? ' deals with the quest i on of 
a r esult, deliberately misleading. 
Answers varied within and be tween groups of subjects as can be seen in 
table 9. 
There is no deve lopmental pr oql"es,.i on as for pain (054). 062 was 
asked twi ce (073) as a consi s t ency ch ec k for a small group of subjects 
in all ages. Only three ou t of the 19 s ubject s tested (15%) were 
inconsistent (see Appendix H) . 
Pain is always specific for the s peake r but not for the listener. For 
this reason, one can say '! have a pain' but not 'I have the pain' . 
The can only be used if the referent is specific for both the speaker 
and the lis tener (Brown, 1973 ) . Ho chil d lIIade an error of this type. 
This also relat es to t he co unt / m'l"S dis tinction. Pain takes the 
indefinite arti cl e or no article at dll bu t it is specific to a part 
of the body. 
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TABLE 9 Responses fOI" where you feel anger 
Adults offer more than one location 01" possibility. 
Age I eve lin years 
1 I 1 
Location 6 years I 8 years I 10 years 1 12 years Adults 
========F======*I====~I======*I======F===== I -----r- I 
head 
whole body/ 
everywhere 
Mind 
Brain 
Heart 
Tummy 
Speech 
Can't 
tell 
Don't know 
25% 
25% 
13% 
38% 
I 50% I 25% I 38% 38% 
1 1 1 
I I I 
I 13% I 25% I 13% 25% 
I I I 
1 1 1 
I I I I I 13% I 25% 13% 
I -1 I I I I 25% 
1 I 1 
I I I 
I I I 25% 
1 _J ___ ----+I----t----I I I I I I 1 __________ J ____ _ --+1 ___ --+--'-__ _ 
I I I I I 13% I I ----- +-----f---f-----
I I I 
I I I 13% I -----+ --+I---f-----
I 38% I 25% I 
1 __ --.l _--,---I ___ ---'----__ _ 
4.4.2(e) 'Where do you think?' (CiJ60) gave rise to "in my head" 
with "brain" or "mind" being sliggest"J from 12 years of age. "Mind" 
is metaphysical in comparison with "head " \,hich is physical. Five to 
six year olds are confused if asked whether their minds and brains are 
in the same place. One child said that his mind was in his 
heart(MacDonald , 1985). It is of interest that a preschooler (4,1I 
years) argued in response to Lhi ~, ques t ion that he th in ks "on the 
right side of my head". The follo~ling exchange between the child (K) 
and the experimenter (E) refl ects an error of "grammar": 
- ~6i 
~ I: 
" 
I: , 
" 
E: "vlhat does it mean to think?" 
K: I'm thinking in here (points to head) - uh -
I think in that side of my head (points to 
right side of head) 
E: 
K: 
E: 
"You don't think in that side?" (points to 
left side) 
No, only whell I'm thinking of something on 
that side (left side). When I'm thinking 
of something on this side (right) then I 
think fro m this side (right) of my head 
"If you're thinking of that yellow box 
(positioned on his right), which side to 
you think on?" 
K: - uh - that side (points to right side of 
head) 
E: "And if you're thinking of .mommy?" 
K: - that side - behind me (points to the back 
of his head) 
E: 
K: 
E: 
"vlhy's mommy at the bac k there?" 
(100 ks behind him towards the entrance of 
the school). No, my mOnJfI1Y didn't bring me 
to school, my father br(Jl lght me to school 
"And if you're thinking about daddy, wllere 
do you think?" 
K: also there (points to the back of his head). 
It is part of the "grammar" of the l'iord think, that you do not think 
on different sides of your head. It is not canonical to say that we 
think in the right s ide of the head. This child has not understood 
the type of answer that one is able to give to the question 'Where do 
YOll think? ' 
The answers of the older chihlren conf irm that it is part of our 
Western tradition to say that vie think in ollr head(s). The phrasing 
of this question may be mislead ing and may not, itself be canonical. 
The question forces t he subj "c t. to ansl/er 'in ... ' which may be 
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confus i ng in itself. However, it i s important that all the pri mary 
school s.ubjects answered this question, (even if it seemed 
misleading), in equivalent ways. 
4.4.2(f) 'Where do you drea,!!? (0147) gave rise to the following 
answers: At 8 years 75% of the children interpreted the question 
where in terms of ' place outs i de of the body', for examp 1 e, 
"anywhere" . when you sleep, when you at mov i es" . "; "well, they can 
'happen ina shoppi ng cent re or in your bed". The 6 year 01 ds were 
given the probe (' Where in your body does it happen?') together wi th 
the initial question so that this tendency is not evident in the 6 
year olds. It is of interest that from 10 years, where in relation to 
dream is considered to refer to 'place in the body' (without 
additional probes) for example, "in your head" (44%) with further 
differentiat 'ion and specificity into "your brain" (50%) occurring at 
12 years of age. Adu1 ts predominantly an swered "in your head" (70%). 
It is possible that if the question was formulated as 'Where does 
thinking take. place?' or 'HoVi do you think?', they may have answered 
"in the mind". These ansvlers are int(!re sting 
studies Vlhich asked children this ques ti on. 
findings in relating to "Sjranlillar" i s IJ r esented 
4.4.3 See was assessed in two task s : 
a) 0134: 'Can you see your thought s? ' and 
b) 0156:' Can you see your dreams?' 
in relation to Piaget's 
Reinterpretation of his 
in Chapter 5. 
4.4.3(a) For 0134, 'Can you see your thoughts?', "No" predominated 
for all the children (81% of 6 year olds, 56% of 8 year olds, 67% of 
10 year olds, 56% of 12 year olds) vrith "yes" and "no" being equally 
suggested by adults. These Fi ndi ngs can be observed in fi gure 40. 
This task deals \~ith the "grammar" of the word see as it relates to 
thoughts, that is, see takes on a particular sense in this context. 
The younger subjects failed to make clear the alterations in sense, 
for example, "Yes (you can see them) in your head" (6 years); 
"um ... on1y .Ihen you close your (~y es " (8 years and 10 years); "Yes , but 
not right in front of you 1 ike a TV sCl'een " (10 years). 
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FIGURE 40 : ACCEPTANCE THAT YOU CAN 
• SEE YOUR THOUGHTS' • 
YES NO 
&SSS'l 
100 PERCENTAGE 
AGE LEVEL IN YEARS 
From 8 years of age, subjects began to qual i fy thei r answers 
emphas ising that one cannot see them in the 'usual sense' of see. 
These answer s 
affirmatively. 
were scored as "yes" since the question 
Their explanations qualified this. 
Examples of explanations ar8: 
was answered 
" ... i n your head ... l i ke.. (it's) blurred, you can 't really (see 
it)"(lO years); "no ... 'cos you can't see inside your head . .. on l y if 
you've got supertonic eyes" (10 years); "In your head you can but not 
from your eyes" (8 years ); "No, but you can see it in your head (8 
years); "you can picture th .!m in your head but you can't see them " (12 
years); " ... when I ' m workiwi out a sum or something, I sort of see the 
numbers but they ' re not rea ' ly there ... " (12 years, gifted). 
It is clear that a 6 year old may answer "yes - in my head" where an 
older child would answer "no - it's in your head but you don 't 
actually see it". Their understanding of the "grammar" of t he word 
see in this context , affects the conclusion drawn. 
Adults used words or phrases such as: "visualize", "have a vision", 
"imagine them in your mind" . They explained that " . .. often you can 
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get a thought bu t you can 't describe i t. If you can see i t , you would 
be ab l e to descr i be it". One adu lt exp la i ned: 
4 . 4.3( b) 
"Yes, sort of, i n a I"lay (you can see them) . 
You cou ld f orm a me ntal im age but if it's a 
concept ... you don't .. . I suppose you do write 
it out i n your head but you don ' t actually 
visualize the words .. . It's a subconscious 
thing, some thing you ' re not aware of - you 
don't see a lo t of words across a page " . 
'Can you see your dreams? ' (QI56) gave rise to a 
predominance of "No " responses at 6 years of age (63%) with "yes" 
predom inating at 8 ye al-s ( 75%), 10 years (63%), 12 years (75%) and at 
the adult level (80%). These find i ngs are depicted in figure 41. 
FIGURE 41 : ACCEPTANCE THAT YOU CAN 
'SEE YOUR DREAMS' • 
YES NO 
100 PERCENTAGE 
80 
AGE U:VEL IN YEARS 
As for Q134 above, from 8 years of age those subjects who answered 
affirmat i ve l y altered the sense 
dream with wh i ch it co -occu r s . 
my ming um ... but I can 't see 
of see in accordance wi th t he word 
Examples of explanations are: " ... in 
them ... " (8 years); "Yes ... if you 
visualize them but yo u can 't see them .. . you think about them. , you see 
them in your head ... " (10 years); "you can visualize them in your 
brain but you don't actua ll y see them with your eyes" '( 12 years, 
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gifted); " ... 1 ike you can't see them over there" (points ahead). "You 
can picture them in your mind " (12 years); "not really, well, you can 
sort of see them in your mi nd ... not really in front of you" (12 
years). Similarly, at adult level: " .. . in the subconscious, when 
you're asleep"; "you can see pictures but that's while you're asleep 
so they're not like you see everything else"; "yes, definitely ... you 
seem them - not through your eyes - in your mind's eye you see them"; 
"not in the full sense of the word - metaphysically you can - images 
are passing before you, but it's not clear". 
These answers reflect that see takes on a different sense in relation 
to dream in contrast to, for exalilple, see a chair. From 8 years of 
age~ a greater number of subjects in each group answered that one can 
see one's dreams and exp 1 a i ned th is altered sense of see. It woul d 
appear that see in relation til dream requires a different learning 
process from see in relation to wOl'ds denoting concrete objects: a 
different sense of see is involved. There may - also be an innate 
ability in children to generalize the use of see (and of all words) to 
numerous contexts. To date, this generalizing ability has been taken 
for granted by researchers. 
4.4.4 Do 
The "grammar" of the word do is revealed in relation to the "grammar" 
of be in pain, pretend, think and be angry (Q51, Q158 and Q161 and 
Q46). 
Children in all age groups displayed the ability to understand the 
word do differently when it co-uccurs with be in pain, think, pretend 
and be angry. However, the word thillk 'dema nd s' a greater 'shift' in 
sense when compared to the other verbs. The 6 year 01 ds fail ed to 
make this shift. They applied do in the sense of 'action' across all 
these linguistic contexts. 
4.4.4(a) For Q51 'fJhat do you do Vlhen you have a pain? ' , certain 
children amongst the 6 year olcls , 8 year olds and 10 year olds 
mentioned "cry", that is, an in tern al physiological response, the 
effect of the pain itself. However, tile s ituational or broader 
consequences such as "go to the eloctor ", "take medi ci ne ", and so on, 
predominated for all groups of subj(!cts. At all ages, alternatives 
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were offered depending upon the natul'e . of the pain, for example: "I 
te 11 my mother - she gives me med i cine or - if it's sore on my 1 eg, 
that 1 hurt myself and it's a pain, t hen my mother closes it up" (6 
years), although 6 and 8 year olds commonly offered a single solution 
only. 
From 10 years of age, . do was interpreted as: "I might not show it or 1 
might show it" (10 years); " I try not to show it. .. 'cos 1 don't think 
it's any use ... " (12 years); "I usually wait for it to pass" (12 
years). Adults suggested that one "try to relieve it"; " ... relieve 
the pressure or put pressure on"; "try to get rid of it"; "if 
physical ... do something medical, if emotional, speak about it ... " 
(adults). Many adults separatE!d out physical and emotional pain in 
this regard. 
The "grammar" of do in relation to be in pain is very different from 
the "grammar" of do in relation to think and pretend as illustrated by 
the answers to these tasks below. 
4 . 4.4(b) 'What do you do \-,hen you tllink' (Q161) was a difficult 
question for subjects of all aCJe gt'OUps. Tile 6 year olds focused on 
overt characteristics and displayed convict ion in their answers, for 
example, "you sta nd still and - you just think"; "1 ike you just stand 
still and think"; "you sit do.m"; "close your eyes". 
Some of the 8 year olds, although less definite in their answers than 
the 6 year olds, focused on visible characteristics, for example, "I 
don't know um ... like when you just ... l ike when you, like, like - I 
don't move anywhere I just stay in one place like I'm just like 
this"(sits and looks into space); "you dOII't talk"; "you can go like 
this (head on hands), you look at one thing for a long time and then 
you look at something else". The stereotyped posture of ' head on 
hands' was mentioned by a few subjects. Others moved a.,ay from that 
which is observable, for example, "when yo u doing maths then you 
think"; "you be clever". One B year old gave an answer that 
paralleled closely (in content) that of older children, namely , "you 
try to remembet' something and then you thinking of that, what you've 
done or what". However, the language used to express this contrasted 
with that of the 12 year olds,' for example, "you pay careful attention 
to what you want to do, if you gonna elo it or not". 
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The 10 and 12 year olds displayed confusion in answering this 
question, for example, "you thillkin9 about something, 1 ike ... in a test 
- 1 can't explain - like, if you don't know the answers like you sit 
and think - you want to try and find out something" (10 years); 
"you ... you think about someth -ing, if it's 
its .. . you think about something" (12 years). 
right or wrong, or if 
The 10 year olds still 
mentioned overt characteristics, as in, "I sit down, 1 just don't 
talk, 1 just keep quiet and sit there or 1 just walk around"; "you 
don't talk to like anybody, you just like, sit or stand" . 
12 year olds mentioned 'sitting stnl' or 'standing still' as did the 
younger subjects. The 12 year 01 ds progressed from an emphasi s on 
overt action to covert behaviour. 
Adults provided more sophisticated answers in comparison to the 12 
year olds, for example, "you putting your thoughts together and you 
come out with an answer to a problem"; "it's a mental process that you 
carry out"; "you arrange ideas and things that you're going to do"; 
"you co nc entrate on something you don't kno\-/ the answer to and you try 
and work it out ... " The "grammal'" (If the 1'I0rd do is highlighted in 
the follol'ling answers: " ... well, YO Il always think - so you can be 
doing anything" (adult); " ... [ uan't think you do anything 
specifically when you think ... " (adults). Ano the r adult asked "(you 
mean) physical actions or ... ?" then laughed and anslvered that "there's 
no way of doing it ... thoughts cOllie to your mind". These three 
subjects interpreted do in an active sense but, Ivhen applying it to 
think , they offered a different answer from that of younger children, 
namely, that you do not do anythini specific when you think. 
4.4.4(c) 'How do you know when someone is thinking? " (0131) yie lded 
a great deal of diversity both Ivithin and between groups of subjects. 
The 6 and 8 year olds concentrated on facial expression (overt) in 
their explanations, either "when they just staring" or showi ng by 
means of a gesture, that the ~erson Ivi 11 stare into space (50% of 6 
year olds; 50% of 8 year olds). Orw subject (6 years) qua lified this, 
explain-ing that sometimes "you don't" (know). A broader context was 
included by 38% of these younger subjects: "' cos they say ... and they'd 
be angry ... 'cos they can't think properly when sOllleone's talking" (6 
years); "you talk to them and they don't ansl'fer" (8 years); "they 
won't listen to you ... they'l l just keep on thinking" (8 years). 
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At 10 years, facial expression was mentioned but 75% of the subjects 
drew on a broader context in thei r ex pI an at ions: t he person's effect 
on others was mentioned rather than "s taring into space". Examples of 
such responses were: "you can see they concentrating - 1 ike if you 
say, 'Come here' they won 't corne, t hey too busy thinking "; " ' cos you 
can see he's not talking or anything like that"; "when they not like 
co-operating with you. They thinking of something and like you 
say, 'Do you want to come and play vlith me' and they just say, 'No' 
they thinking". 'Staring into space' is a stereotyped idea about 
thinking since one can think without assuming a particular posture at 
all. As the gifted child (12 yea r s) mentioned: 
"If they're al ive , they're thinking. A 
person is always ttlinking subconscious l y 
about anything but - you don't really know ... 
you can see when a person's really deep in 
thought by ... the expres s i on on his face ... 
he would probably sit down, wouldn't run 
around Dr he'd probably be frown~ng". 
Thirty eight percent of 12 year olds ment ioned facial expression as 
being one criterion of many, for (,;<arnple, "by their looks on their 
face - (they look) puzzl ed and if YOLI talking to them and they don't 
respond properly, you know they're th inking about something el se"; 
"Somet ime s they just stan! up into ~; pace and like if you ask them a 
quest i on or somethi ng. , . they won't hear you and they won't do i t on 
purpose, it's just that they thinkinsi and they i n anot her world and 
you can tell". 
All adults mentioned more than one criterion and they emphasized the 
difficulty one has in determining \vhether someone else i s thinking or 
not : "you don't know ... maybe by actions and.,.r think you can't really 
tell if somebody's thinking ... you don't really know"; "(you) can't 
rea 11 y tell but you mi ght be able to te lli f the person wasn ' t payi ng 
attention to things ar ound them or by facial 
usually quiet and they loo k thoughtful (smiles) 
expression"; "they 
they look dreamy, 
sometimes perplexed , they trying to puzzl e something out " . 
The younger subjects appear to Ilave a narrow, more stereotyped vi ew of 
another person thinking. The divers ity of behaviours encompassed by 
this one word is revealed in the responses of the adults. In contrast 
to Q161, 'What do YOll do when you tltin!<.'!' subjects draw on a different 
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set of behaviours in reaching their conclusions. This has important 
implications for language learning (see Chapter 6). 
4.4.4(d) 'What do you do when yo u pretend?' (0158) revealed a 
greater diversity of responses with in each age group than 0161 ('What 
do you do when you think?'). Examples of answers at the 6 year level 
are, "like you pretend you sleeping, so, you go like this (closes 
eyes, 1 eans back, head back)". Thi s subject gave an exampl e as an 
explanation, as did some older children as in "um ... you not really, 
you not really - like say you crying and you pretend that you're 
crying, you're not really cry ing " (8 years); "urn ... when you pretend 
say yo u crying and you want to chaff somebody that yo u crying" (8 
years). However, general explanations such as , "you laugh 
afterwards"; "like chaff"; "you do something and you not really 
properly doing it" were also found from 6 years of age in accordance 
with the definitions of pretend (Q162 and 0164). Eight year olds 
gave similar answers, for example, "I start j~king"; "it's like 
miming". 
At 10 and 12 years, more general explanations were offered, for 
example, "you just acting l ike someth ing else"; "you act like 
something or you can dress up"; "you cIlaff them"; " ... you act 
something"; "you make -believe ... " (10 years); "you make it up"; "you 
chaff ... you pretend you do i ng somettd ng, but you not do i ng it" (12 
years). Otlier 12 year olds drew on examples as did the younger 
children, bu t in. a broader context: "yo u just ... you pretend you hurt -
you make people think that you hurt, look 1 ike you hurt"; "1 ike say 
someone ... kicks you and miss es but li e doesn't know ... then you could 
fall on the ground and hold your calf 'aah, it's sore' and he could 
think you for reals , but you know that you pretending". Adults 
sugg ested tllat "yo u go into a fantasy world"; "yo u take on the 
characteristics of somebody else"; "you imagine something"; "you act 
the part of something ·else". One adult emphasized that pretending can 
be done in different ways , that is, "you either make-believe that 
you're somet hing th at you're not or you say something which isn't, or 
you do an act, a charade". The interpretation of do depends upon 
"what I'm, pretending about" (adult). 
It emerges from the findings for feel, where, see and do that the 
"grammar" of one word affects the "grammar" of other \'iords with which 
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it is used and that this occurs in very specific 
illustrates that the younger chi'ldren answered 
differently from the older children. 
ways. 
these 
The data 
questions 
4.4.4(e) 'What do you do when you're angry?' (Q46) gave rise to 
very different answers from Q51 (have a pain), Q158 (pretend) and 
Q161 (think). 6 year 01 ds answered "I scream and shout"; "I go and 
sit on my bed and read a book"; "you get cross"; "I just go to lie on 
my bed". Similarly, 8 year olds suggested "I scream"; "you start 
shouting"; "you scream and shout and you like, cross with the person 
you angry with"; "you get so cross that you want to get mad at 
everyone " ; "I start hitting the bed"; "I get like mad (laughs) .. . " 
From 10 years, subjects offered alternatives depending on the 
situation, for example, "well, I scream at my friends, and if I'm 
cross, I start hitting them"; "It depends what I'm, angry at ... If I'm 
angry with somebody 1 just ignore thelll or sometimes I feel very angry 
and 1 go and read or something"; "you can s hout, you can just like go 
into a room and stay there". 
Twelve year olds responded siolilarly to 10 year olds but suggested a 
greater dive rsity of criteri a, as ill "yo u feel very cross and you, 
like, breaking things ... "; "I don't really want to talk to anybody"; 
" ... when they get in the way, you Jlush them out of . the way, and 
that ... "; "maybe you hit the person or shout at him"; "when I feel 
angry, I take it out but when I'm cross I can keep it in"; "I always 
slam the door behind me so that they know I'm cross, then I take it 
out on my cushion or something"; " ... I try to be alone". 
Adults suggested that "I try alld lE·t my f) ' ustrations out - I usually 
shout or get agitated ... when I'm allgry it 's much more outspoken than 
if I'm cross. I'll just mutt(~r or sometliing"; "I usually walk away 
from the things that are making me angry, then I may give vent to my 
annoyance and I might shout at the person"; "it \,ould depend on the 
situation .... I could tell about it, I co uld bottle it up, I could ... "; 
"cry or - take it out on someone - or shout"; "p robably shout and go 
red in the face . .. cross is irritated - angry is physical, like you 
slap something or you scream or \,hate'ler". They differentiated cross 
from angry as d id a few 12 year olds . 
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These tasks illustrate that angry, like pain and pretend, does not 
require a shift from the focus on overt action to more mental 
operations as does think. In the angry , pain and pretend tasks, the 
progression is mainly in the types of explanations offered and in the 
strategies employed in answering the questions. Strategies used 
progress from an example as an explanation to a general explanation 
and to a greater diversity of possibil ities being emphasized. Think 
would appear to be a later developing word in that it requires a 
greater shift in function in relation to the word do. 
4.4.5 Summary of finding s for feel, !·,here, see, do 
i) Feel in relation to dream gave rise to a progression from 
interpret i ng feel in the sense of 'touch' at 6 years, to that of 
'experiencing an emotion' from 8 years and beyond. 
ii) Where yielded a progression f rom an external reference source 
for 'where do you dream' to an internal reference whereas where in 
relation to pain, ache and think gav,! rise to responses 'in the body' 
for all age groups. 
iii) See in relation to thoughts ilild dreams yie lded . qualified 
re sponse s with regard to the sense of ~oee fl'OIll 8 years of age. 
iv) Do was lIsed differently by children of all ages when appl i ed to 
be in pain, pretend and be angry. However, For think , the 6 year olds 
applied do in the sense of 'action' and failed to take into account 
its specific relation to the "grammar" of think. 
In the chapter which follows, findings for all the words are explained 
in relation to the theoretical is sues and the aims presented in 
chapters 1 and 2. 
, ns 
CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION 
See how high the seas of language run here 
(Wittgenstein, 1953, pt.194). 
This chapter opens with a summary of the main experimental findings 
discussed in light of the two major aims. Each sub-aim is dealt with 
specifically. Additional findings arising from the experimental data 
are then presented followed by a discussion of the findings in 1 ight 
of their theoretical implications. A model of word meaning 
development during the primary schoo l period concludes this chapter. 
The model is presented schemat i ca lly together with expl anatory notes. 
It is suggested that the nature of word meaning renders formalization 
di ffi cult. 
5.1 Findings in relation to the aims 
Findings are presented as answers to th·e questions posed as sub-aims 
in the Introduct ion to this study. 
5.1.1 Metalinguistic questions and judgements as a met hod of 
examining the meanings of non-ostensive words 
Findings for the ninety-five tasks for the three words (same, pretend 
and pain) together with their semantically-linked words, revealed that 
the method devised for investigating primary school children's 
understanding of non-ostensive \"lords is a useful one. Similarities 
and differences both within and between chi ldren of different age 
groups were elucidated. Metalinguistically-phrased questions 
requiring justifications together with extended probe questions delved 
into the child's understanding. Subjects were questioned about a 
particular word from different vantage points which highlighted each 
child's individual viewpoint thereby reducing the possibility of the 
results being simply spurious. 
This method highl ighted the qual itative differences in understanding 
of word meaning b~tween children of different age groups, the 
differences in a .,ord's meaning when applied in different contexts 
(for anyone age group) and the individual differences in subjects' 
performance. Qualitative differences were noted in the chi ldren's 
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responses as well as in the strategies employed by children of 
different ages. The method was suitable for the age range in question 
(namely, that of primary school children) and it revealed variations 
in performance which are hidden in comprehension and production tasks 
for children beyond the preschool period. The present findings differ 
from those reported in comprehension , expression and metal inguistic 
studies to date. 
It was found that there were re 1 at i ve 1 y few spontaneous errors of 
"grammar" beyond the preschool period. Metalinguistically-phrased 
questions enabled the researcher to penetrate beyond the surface of 
the child's knowledge to his deeper understanding of these words. 
Children offered different qualitative explanations when reflecting on 
word meaning even though they were able to apply the word correctly in 
their spontaneous conversation. 
The analysis did not attempt to delve to the core of a word's meaning 
since it was argued that, in this sense, there is no core meaning. 
Rather, the meaning of a word can be established according to a broad 
description of the uses of the word over a variety of tasks. The 
researcher was not attempting to isol at e causes nor to offer logical 
explanations, but rather, to describe the meanings of words on the 
basis of their "grammatical" use in the language. The method of 
as sessment e 1 uc i dated the approach to .Iord mean i ng propo sed by the 
present researcher, namely that a large part of the word's meaning 
stems from the alterations in senses according to the words with which 
it co-occurs. 
Regarding metalinguistic awareness and the method adopted in this 
study, four questions require consideration , namely: 
a) Are the present finding s artifi cial s ince they arise from an 
experimental setting? 
b) What is the relationship between metalinguistic awareness and 
language use? 
c) Does metalinguistic awareness exp lain the continuity in language 
development from childhood to adul t hood? 
d) What is the ontological status of l inguistic concepts? 
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5.l.1(a) Artificiality of findings arising from an experimental 
setting 
A distinction needs to be drawn between the use and understanding of 
words in a natural communicative setting and word meaning independent 
of its context. He have to ascertain whether we have arri ved at 
findings which are authentic with regard to language and its 
deve l opment or whether we have simply extracted findings which have no 
bearing on the natural development of language but which arise from 
the nature of the experiment itself. 
All experiments include some artificiality. This can be reduced to a 
certain degree but can only be el iminated completely if observation 
within a natura l setting is used. The present findings may appear to 
be artificial because they are arrived at by direct questioni ng. As 
was pointed out, however, it is only by means of direct questioning 
that we can delve beyond the ch i ld's correct spontaneous productions. 
This approach complies with that of all language comprehension studies 
but it extends beyond them by ases s i n9 each word (for example, same ) 
in numerous linguistic contexts (for example, same pain, same ball, 
same dress). 
Linguistic approaches which have concerned themselves with the "ideal 
speaker-hearer" (for examp)e, Chomsky, 1965) minimize context and 
performance factors in thei r theori es. . The present approach I'lh i ch 
emphasizes the "grammar" of words questions the validity of describing 
word meaning out of its everyday context and use. However, our basic 
assumptions about language necessa.rily come into play. If we accept 
the idea of "language as an abstract object" (Katz, 1981) then the 
present approach, an analysis of language in context, would appear to 
be invalid. \ve I'lould then attempt to explain a word's meaning in the 
abstract rather than within the process of communication. 
The present approach assumes that language theories should be built 
around child development studies with communication in context as 
their primary focus. Investigating \~ord meaning \~ithout accounting 
for the reciprocal effect of one I"lord on other words, provides a 
simplified and distorted pi cture. 
5.1.5.(b) The relationsliip bet\'leel~ metalinguistic al'lareness and 
1 anguage use 
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Beyond the age of about 5 years, natural observat i on as a method of 
data collection becomes increasingly difficult. Experimental tasks 
allow us to manipulate the variables we are interested in but such 
methods inevitably introduce some degree of artificial ity into the 
situation . 
Many of the tasks presented in this study use words in ways not found 
in everyday language, for example, 
see your dreams 
see your thoughts 
John gave me a pain and now he wants it back again. 
Even if the child attempts to att ach some meaning to what appear to 
him to be bizarre questions (as in Hughes and Grieve's study, ibid), 
what is important is the way in which he uses the words and the types 
of explanations he offers. Commonalities be-tween children in 
different age groups are of particular importance. 
We have to ascertain whether we have arrived at findings which are 
authent i c with regard to 1 anguage and its developme nt or whether we 
have simply extract ed findings which . have no bearing on the natural 
development of language but ari se from the nature of the experiment 
itself. 
Metalingui stic awareness is a type of linguistic sk i ll but its st atus 
is controversial. We have to determine what place meta linguistic 
awareness holds within the linguistic system. I s it a superimposition 
on the linguistic system, that is, an object of awareness apart from 
the linguistic system; or does metalinguistic awareness spring from 
lingui stic under stand ing? If metalinguistic awareness has no bearing 
on 1 anguage use, then the present findings reveal something about t he 
child 's ab ilities other than his primary language abilities at 
different periods during the school years. 
On the basis of the present findings, it would seem that 
metalinguistic awareness stems from a lingu i stic und erstanding bu t 
also draws on more general abilit ies (such as cognition) which are 
then superimposed on the linguistic system . Th is conclusion i s 
reached on the basis of th e following: 
i) The strategies employed by children of different ages in 
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answering the questions posed differ on the basis of the different 
levels of language use which then affects the type of answer given for 
the metalinguistic tasks (see section 5.1.2c). The extent to which 
these strategies are linguistic versus non-linguistic requires further 
investigation. 
ii) Language facility may account partially for the reverse trend 
found at about 8 years of age on numerous tasks (see section 5.2.1a). 
Cognitive abilities, reading skills or a combination of these factors 
may further explain this trend. (From the present tasks, a 
distinction between the influence of cognition and that of reading 
cannot be made). It is of interest that at about 8 years, the reading 
tasks to which the child is exposed progress from an emphasis on 
visual perception to an emphasis on auditory perception. It has been 
noted that ch i 1 dren are frequently referred for 1 earn i ng d i ffi cult i es 
around the 8 year age level (Shapiro, 1985; Wiig, 1~85). 
It is also possible that increased ability at the level of 
metalinguistic awareness leads to increased understanding of word 
mean i ng, for examp 1 e, our abi 1 ity to refl ect upon the mean i ngs of 
words such as pain may add to, or eVGn be necessary for, our fuller 
understanding of the word's meaning. The present findings lead to 
speculation that metalinguistic skills are an extension of language 
skills. The present metalinguistic tasks penetrated more deeply into 
the child's knowledge and understanding of the \'/Ords and, thereby, 
revealed that the child's knowledge is only partial, progressing with 
development. If, on the other hand, metal inguistic awareness is a 
skill superimposed on that of language abil ity, then the findings 
would reveal different skills which bear little relation to the 
child's everyday language use. 
The present researcher argues that the child's 
understanding is qualitatively different from that 
, deeper' 1 eve 1 of 
of adults'. There 
is no single point at which one kllows the meaning of a word and words 
are not finite with regard to their uses. The development of word 
meaning is regarded as dynamic , continuing through adulthood (Mulford, 
1977). It is the present contention that I'/e are only able to 'tap' 
the child's level of comprehension by questioning him about particular 
\'lords. 
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In contradistinction to this, traditional comprehension tasks lead to 
an all-or-none quantitative measure: a child either comprehends a word 
or he does not. A related argument has been that we are only 
justified in questioning the ' child about words that we hear him use 
and therefore, that we 'know' he all'eady has within his repertoire. 
However, what constitutes 'having something within one's repertoire?' 
The majority of appl ied researchers, for example, those in speech and 
language pathology ha ve built upon this premiss in formulating 
vocabul ary and other 1 anguage tests (for exampl e the Reynell Test of 
Language Development, 1980; the Peabody Pi cture Vocabul ary Test, Dunn 
1965). 
Concluding that the child 'has the word in hi s repertoire' suggests 
that he has acquired its complete and extensive range of uses. The 
tradit i ona 1 approach rests on a false foundat i on, stemmi ng from the 
ostensive definition approach. 
The children's spontaneou s production of the non-ostensive words 
assessed was found to be in advance of their abil ity to reflec t upon 
these words. (No distinction is drawn between metalinguistic 
performance and metalinguistic competence). Previous research has 
indicated a developmen t al lag betlveen comprehension and production on 
the one hand and metalingui st ic sk ill s on the other, t he latter being 
11/ 2 to 2 years behind in development (Ka rmiloff- Smith , 1979b). A 
child may understand a particular word differently from an adult eve n 
though he appl i es it spontaneously in the same context. In 
spontaneous commun i cat i on, we waul d fa i1 to not i ce differences unless 
we questioned the child (or adult) about his intended meaning. 
Bowerman (1981) asks when we can be certain that the child has 
acquired 
after it 
a particular proces s or meaning. Errors have been noted 
has been assumed that the child has acquired a particular 
structure . She suggests that these "l ate errors ... involve changes 
in the kinds of connections the ch ild has initially established 
between meanings and linguistic forms" ( ibid, p.3). The present 
re se archer suggests that these "late errors" may be clearly explained 
with i n the framework of "grammar". \je cannot i dent ify errors in the 
child's use of the word over a variety of contexts. However, he ha s a 
restricted understanding of the l,oY'd and uses it in thi s restricted 
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sense only. He therefore, learns to use the word correctly in 
production before he has a full grasp of its meaning. 
It may be argued that asking the child questions about a word which he 
does not 'have within his repertoire' would lead to bizarre answers. 
Bever (1982, p.430) states that " ... we may find instances in which 
children systematical l y generate false kinds of hypotheses about their 
native language" and that this may certainly be the case when they are 
required to reflect upon their language. However, commonalities in 
the responses of children of different age levels indicate genuine 
levels of ability. 
If the child has a different understanding of the word same as it 
applies to ball. pain and dress, it would suggest that the word is not 
learned as an all-or-none phenomenon and that vocabulary studies must 
take this into account. 'Within the child's repertoire' may require 
qualification: a 6 year old may be said to have a word 'in his 
repertoire' if he understands the word comparably to others in his age 
group but a 10 year old who uses the word comparably to a 6 year old, 
does not have the word ' in his t'epertoire'. There is no definite 
moment in time during which the child can be said to have a word in 
his repertoire. Rather, we need to revise our use of the word 
vocabulary so as to take into account diFferent expectations for 
children of different age levels and so as to include meta li nguistic 
awareness withi n our vocabul ary assessment. 
5.1.1(c) Metalinguistic awareness: Continuity in language 
development from childhood to adulthood 
Al l metalinguistic questions, which require that one reflect upon 
language itself, remove language from its everyday use. However, as 
was mentioned earlier, beyond the preschool period we are compelled to 
draw on metalinguistic questions in order to penetrate beyond the 
child's expressive language (which reveals few errors) to his deeper 
understanding. 
It would seem that metalinguistic a~/areness is a skill developing 
during the primary school period since differences occur in the 
performance of primary school children on these questions. It is 
suggested that the notion of "language games" may explain continuity 
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in the learning of words from tile preschool period through the primary 
school years and into adulthood. 
The findings have important implications for an evaluation of language 
learning and development in the use of words. They suggest that the 
child does not learn a word in one context, build up an image of it 
and then apply it in that form in different contexts. Rather, the 
child learns to use words with altered nuances over a variety of 
contexts. If he is able to do this after having learned t he word in 
one or a few contexts only, it suggests something important about his 
innate ability to ge neralize in this regard. If not, it suggests that 
learn ing must include a variety of "language games" for each word . 
Numerous examples can be cited from the analysis to illustrate the 
notion of "language games". One particularly enlightening example is 
the use or learning of pain as it appl ies in the first person i n 
contrast to its use in the third person. In the ffrst person, pain is 
a sensation which one experiences. When deciding that someone else is 
in pain, the children drew on a different set of criteria, for 
example, one person may observe another clutching his stomach, 
groaning, say i ng "I'm in such pain!" , screwing up his face in agonY, 
and so on. The child does not, in the same way, recognize his own 
pain from his own clutching bc!haviour, and so on. Rather, in the 
first person, the clutch i ng and groaning will fo ll ow the experience of 
pain. In the third person, these behaviours precede his recognition 
of pain behaviour (in the other person). The one use of the word pain 
does not necessarily imply the other and suggests that they may need 
to be learned in different "language games". 
Similary , using the \'iord pain in 'I am in pain' versus pretending to 
be in pain demands that we take into account different aspects of the 
situation. We cannot learn this by means of ostensive definition even 
were we able to po in t to the pain itself (which we cannot). We ha ve 
to learn to shift the emphasis and selection of criteria when using 
the word pain in different contex ts. It is also possible t hat part of 
our awareness of our own humanness is that we naturally infer that 
in the way that we do others experience sensations 
ourselves (Macdonald, 1985). 
such as pain 
These findings gi ve ri se to two possib l e explanations: 
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i) The word is learned in different "language games", for example, 
pain for self; pain for others; pretend to be in pain (which may be 
equivalent for self and other), and so on; same in relation to ball; 
same in relation to pain where different criteria hold. 
ii) The child has an innate ability to extend a word from one 
"language game" to a diversity of others which, in many ways, differ 
markedly from the first. Innateness can only be inferred rather than 
concluded directly. Hypothetically, pain may be learned first in 
relation to oneself and only later w-ill - the ch ild be able to use the 
word when he recognizes pain in others. 
It is important to determine how "language games" are represented in 
the language system, for example, are they part of the word's meaning 
or of the concept or are they part of the rul es of the system? 
Further research may enlighten us in this regard. 
5.1.1(d) The ontological status of everyday concepts. 
Thi s concerns the extent to whi ch everyday concepts are i nherent in 
the word ve rsus in the child's mind versus part of t he child's 
strategy in answering the questions posed. The present findings may 
be useful for test-and theory-uuilding in child langu age development 
but may not reveal concepts\~hich are in chi ldren 's minds. However , 
the changes that occur in children's answers with development 
elucidate certain underl ying abilities possessed by chi ldren of 
different ages . The meaning may be part of the chi ld 's st rategy in 
answering the particular questions posed (that is, his performance 
which stems from his compet~nce as a native speaker) rather than being 
part of the language system which underlies his language behaviour. 
The 6 year olds appear to regard an example as being able to fully 
explain the question. Eigllt year olds tend to say" . .. l ike, if you've 
got. .. " indicating, by using "I ike ", tha t they are aware that the 
example is only one aspect of the entire question but that it adds 
clarification . A general explanation seems to be regarded by the 
speaker as sufficiently explanatory to warrant no additional examples. 
Numerous examples as an explanation were also provided by the gifted 
child, particularly, and by ot h',r 12 year olds. These answers reveal 
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a lack of sophisticated confusion and an unintentional focus on the 
"grammar" of words. 
When 6 year olds attempted to anSlVer a question of the form (i) 'What 
is a -', they gave what we would consider to be 'an example'. The 
quest i on ' What is a -' may be understood by them to be: ' Gi ve an 
example of' - or 'give a synonym for'. However, what is most 
interesting is that when presented with the question form: (ii) 'Give 
me an example of' -, most of the 6 year olds were unable to answer the 
question, saying they did not know what an example is. These 
questions were reworded for the 6 year olds, in the form: 'Give me one 
(word) you know'. Can we then say that the child has the concept 
'EXAMPLE'? 
We are tempted to say "yes" when we see that he 
gives what we would call an example (i above). 
gives an example or 
In others words, in 
this situation, his behaviour approaches what we would call 'knowing 
the concept EXAMPLE'. But the second question (ii above) indicates 
that he does not yet have the concept in the same way as our adul t 
concept. He may be regarded as having a part of that concept. This 
finding ties in with the view of "grammar": the children were able to 
apply a word appropriately or in this case, to use a strategy, without 
having a complete understanding of its meaning. They were also aware 
of what they did not know. 
The general exp 1 anat ions offered by the older ch i 1 dren and by the 
adults also fail ed to encompass the "grammar" of the word, that is, 
the way in which it varies from one 1 inguistic context to another. 
Their explanations suggest that the word (for example , same) carries 
wi th it, to all context s, the mean i ng of ' commonality' or ' li keness 
between two entities'. When applied in the identity sense, this 
suggests that the likeness persists for the one entity. What has been 
termed a 'general explanation' is no more likely to convey completely 
the meaning of a word, than is an example as an explanation. The use 
of general explanations might be a symptom of sophisticated confusion 
(see Section 5.2.1b). It must be kept in mind that sophisticated 
confusion is part of our induc t ion into adult life which it is 
desirable for the child to attain. 
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The findings illustrate two types of developmental progression. 
First, development occurred in the strategies employed by children in 
answering the metalinguistically-phrased questions. Here the focus is 
on the child from which conclusions about word meaning may be 
tentatively drawn. Second, development was apparent in the children's 
understanding of the "grammar" of the words assessed. In thi s case, 
the focus is on the 'word although this cannot be separated entirely 
from the child's response. Adopting a "grammar" approach to word 
meaning, we achieve little by separating that part of the word's 
meaning which is inherent to the word itself from that part of its 
meaning which stems from the word with which it co-occurs since both 
aspects are essential to the word's meaning. 
Studies to date have not taken the "grammar" of words into account and 
would most likely argue that only that which remains stable from one 
context to another can be regarded as the l'iord's ~eaning. Dictionary 
definitions of words would appear to reflect this constancy. Theories 
of word meaning which have investigate.d words out of a 1 inguistic 
context (for example, feature theori es) do not adequate 1 y account for 
the way a word alters its sense when it combines with ot her words and 
they favour stability of meaning. However, the present researcher has 
illustrated t hat these approaches do not encompass the complexity of a 
word's meaning and that definitions of words as well as theories of 
word meaning to date, are therefore, limited. 
Whether the mean i ng is inherent in the word itself or not may be 
considered from two vantage points 
i) The meaning stems both from the word itsel f and from ' the other 
word(s) with which the word co-occurs in a particul ar context. As an 
example of the latter, in the sentence ' I feel pain ' , feel is 
essential to the word pain since you have to feel pain in order to 
experience it at all, whereas pain adds to the meaning of feel in this 
linguistic context since here, feel must mean 'experience' rather than 
'touch'. A crucial part of the word ' s meaning comes from its uses in 
a diversity of contexts. 
ii) Children's inferences about a 
differentiated from the word's mean i ng 
l'iord's 
itself . 
meaning 
This 
must 
re l ates 
be 
to 
whether words can be regarded as ever having a meaning outside of a 
1 inguistic context. In the present study , it is argued that even 
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definitions occur within a 1 inguistic context. If so, the issue is 
nullified s ince we can then only arrive at an adequate explanation of 
language by investigating peoples ' uses thereof. 
The progress i on from provi ding an example as an exp 1 an at i on and from 
including the word being explained within the explanation, to drawing 
on an example as part of the explanation, to a general explanation, 
was found over numerous tasks dealing with different words. This may 
not tell us directly about the meaning of the words but the strategies 
employed at different periods of development reflect different 
understanding ("grammar" ) of the syntactical forms in which the 
questions were formulated, such as: 
"When I say ... what do I mean?" 
"What does ... mean?" 
and "What is a ... ?" 
The present findings suggest that the child's ·grasp of a word's 
meaning may be restricted by the strategies at his disposal for 
answering the questions posed. Conversely, the child 's level of 
understanding may lead to his employing certain strategies in 
explaining the words within this padicular type of ta sk. The child 
may possess a deeper understanding of the word's mea ning t han he is 
able to express verbally or the explanation he offers may be a direct 
reflection of his level of understanding. This distinction becomes 
superfluous when we consider the commonalities that occur between 
children of a particular age group in the types of strategies 
employed. What is of importance is that strategies used differ from 
one age 1 evel to the next. The need to separate what is part of the 
word's meaning from what is inference on the part of the child, falls 
away within the framework of "grammar" and an inve stigation of 
language in context. 
5.1 . 2 "Grammar" and the meaning of non-ostensive words 
It was found that word s as applied in particular linguistic contexts 
were understood differently by children of different ages. There was 
no clear demarcat"ion in the responses from one age le vel to the next 
but a gradual developmental progression was noted on certain ta sks . 
When a particular word was applied in different linguistic contexts, 
uniformity or variabil ity of respon ses was noted across children of 
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a 11 ages. The 1 atter suggests that a word does not have a s i ngl e use 
which remains constant on every occasion. It would appear that 
certain uses are learned earl ier than others. These findings are 
discussed below in -relation to each sub-aim. 
5.1.2(a) Qua 1 itat i ve differences with i n and between age groups in 
using and · understanding non-ostensive words in particular 
linguistic contexts 
Findings for the words same, pretend, pain, do, feel, see and where 
revealed changes in the uses of these words in a variety of contexts 
on a group of tasks. This was found both within particular age groups 
as well as between age groups. Certain tasks yielded a developmental 
trend with increasing age and others gave rise to either homogeneous 
responses or heterogeneous responses from subject to subject 
independent of age level. Findings differed for each word and for 
each task. 
A developmental trend was found in the uses of the words same, pretend 
and pain on certain tasks but not on others. This suggests that the 
context in wh i ch the word i s app 1 i ed is a factor i nfl uenc i ng the 
meaning that the child assigns to the word. The se findings support a 
"grammar" approach to word 
with its rel ated words 
explanations. 
meani ng. Findings for each word together 
are presented below fo 11 owed by bri ef 
i) For the word same, there was found to be an overall decrease in 
the equivalence sense of same with an increase in the identity sense 
on a va riety of tasks (Q17 same apple; Q32e same dress; Q33 same ball) 
except for a slight reverse trend at 8 years. For Q32e (same dress) 
and Q35 (same apple) , the rudiments of the identity se nse appear at 6 
years (see table 10). These findings highl ight the importance of 
taking the linguistic context into acc ount wh en analyzing word meaning 
which previous researchers have failed to do. Karmiloff-Smith (1979a) 
ment i oned that t ype of task is important in eva 1 uat i ng results with 
regard to same but she did not elaborate. 
Development from an emphasis on the equivalence to the identity sense 
of the word same reveal s a move away from the co ncrete object (see 
section 5.3.2). The equivalence sel1:;e generally focusses on overt 
similarities between concrete objects (for example, ball, leaf , 
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dress). Where a non-ostensive word was used (for example, pain), the 
youngest children focussed on overt characteristics in relation to the 
pain, for example, place, in contrast to the older children who 
emphasized type. The identity sense ilighlights 'covert' similarities 
for concrete objects viewed over t ime, for example, older children 
emphasized that the tadpole developed into the frog and that, despite 
overt changes, it was the same (th i ng) . The i dent ity sense 
(continunity over time) does not allow one to point to an external 
reference. 
TABLE 10 Summary of findings for same, similar and different 
Task I Developmental I Un i formity Variation 
I Trend I for all between 
I I subjects groups 
I I of subjects 
I I 
I I 
Definition I In strategies employed: I No single 
tasks I example as explanation I definition 
I and use of word being I offered by 
I defined to general subjects 
I explanation from 10 with i n a 
I years single age 
I 1 evel 
I 
I 
Fuzzy I In strategies employed: Variation 
boundary I example as explanation 
tasks I plus use of word being 
I defined to general 
I explanation 
I 
I 
Different I One criterion to more Variation 
dress/ I than one criterion 
shirt (QI6) I mentioned 
I 
Same dress I Q32a (size) I Variation Q32b (colour) I Variation Q32c (sleeve- Reverse trend 
1 ength) I at 8 years I Variation Q32d (style) I I Style suggests 
I I difference Q32e ( 1 dress)1 I equivalence 
I I sense pre-
I I dominant for 
I I all groups 
Same dress/ I One criterion to more I 
shirt (Q21) I than one criterion I 
I mentioned I 
I I 
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Tab l e 10 cont i nued . . .. 
Task , Developmental Uniformi ty , Variation 
, Trend for all , between 
, subjects , gro up s 
, , of subjects 
, , 
, , 
Same Appl e , Sense ·of equivalence , 
(017) , until 10 years to that , 
, of identity from 12 , 
, years. Reverse trend , 
, at 8 years , 
I I 
, , 
Appl e t rees , Equivalence sense to , 
(Q3 5) , 12 years; i dent ity , 
, sense at adult level , 
I I 
, , 
Same chai r( s) , Equivalence sense pre- , 
(031) , domin ant at 6 years , 
, with identity se nse , 
, emphasized from 8 years' , 
I I I 
, , , 
Same seat , , Identity sense , 
(026) , , 1'01' all su bjects , 
I .--~-t--. I , , 
Same book , - Focus on overt. , , 
(Q29) , characteri stic with , , 
, progress ion to , , 
, emphasis on content , , 
, from 10 years , , 
, , , 
, 
- One criterion at 6 , , 
, yea r s; , , 
, two criteria at 8 , , 
, years , , 
I I I , , , 
Same ball , , Equivale nce , 
(Q33) , , sense favoured , 
, 
, by all subjects , 
, ~ , , , 
Same leaf , Concrete aspects , , 
(027a) , emphas ized at 6 and 8 , , 
, years , , 
I I I 
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Table 10 continued ... 
Task 
Same tadpole/ 
frog (Q27b) 
Same ship 
(Q30) 
Same pain 
(QI5) 
Q15 and Q45 
Q47 
Q48 
Q49 
Q60 
Developmental 
Trend 
Concrete aspects 
focused on by 6 year 
olds only 
Confusion apparent 
from 10 years of age 
for both Q27a and Q27b 
Place and/or type 
mentioned at 6, 8 and 
10 years; type only 
predominating from 12 
years 
Increase in consistency 
of responses with age 
with reverse trend at 
8 years 
Place predominant at 
6 years; 10 years -
type, intensity and 
place equally 
predominant 
Two criteria mentioned 
from 10 years 
Increase in use of 
"maybe" from 12 years 
Sophisticated 
confusion evident from 
12 years 
- 29,1 . 
Uni formity 
for all 
subjects 
"Similar" 
predominant 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Uniformity with I 
reverse trend I 
at 8 years I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Uniformity I 
I 
I 
I 
Variation 
between 
groups 
of subjects 
Table 10 continued ... 
Task 
Q76 
Q25 (similar 
. pain) 
Same dreams 
(Q159) 
Same anger 
(Q41) 
Developmental 
Trend 
Interpretation of 'my 
pain ' as 'the same 
pain' decreases with 
age. Reverse trend at 
8 years 
Example as explanation 
to general explanation 
from 10 years 
Progression with age: 
change from 12 years 
Uni formity 
for all 
subjects 
Un iformity with 
reverse trend 
at 8 years 
Variation 
between 
groups 
of subjects 
ii) Pain and pretend yielded variab ility from one task to another 
and developmental trends on certain tasks but no progression in senses 
of these words was found with age (see tables 11 and 12). It is 
possible that an investigation in preschool children will reveal a 
progression of this type or that the different senses are learned 
simultaneously but that their application to different contexts 
alters. Findings for the word ' pretend , revealed greater uniformi~y of 
responses for all age groups than for the other words which suggest 
that certain words are learned earlier than others. 
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TABLE 11 
Task 
Definition 
tasks 
(Q164) 
(Q162) 
Fuzzy 
boundary 
tasks 
(Q140) 
Pretend to 
walk 
TQ17S) 
Pretend to 
, 
~ (Q176) 
Pretend to be 
, 
ain 1n 
Q178) 
Summary of findings for pretend, know, think and believe 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Developmental Trend 
Progression from 
example as explanation 
to general explanations 
from 8 years 
Overt criteria 
emphasized at 6 and 8 
years; entire context 
drawn on from 10 years 
Example as explanation 
to general explanation 
from 8 years 
From 8 years, subjects 
draw on a broader 
context in explaining 
which becomes more 
el abo rate with 
increasing age 
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I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Uni formity 
for all 
subjects 
"chaff" common 
ina 11 groups 
1 ie more 
frequently 
included than 
pretend in the 
explanation 
"Can't pretend 
to walk" 
making a noise 
and clutching 
the painful area 
of the body; 2 
criteria 
ment ioned by 6 
year olds as 
well as older 
children 
Variation 
between 
groups 
of subjects 
no single 
definition 
offered 
Table 11 cont i nued . .. 
Task Developmental Trend Uni formity I Variation 
for a 11 I between 
su bjects I groups 
I of subjects 
I 
I (Q80a, b) Ipretend behaviourl 
I recognized I 
Someone else Progression from I 
in pain emphasis on overt I (Q72) criteria t o an entire I 
context from 8 years I 
I 
I 
Is the boy in I Variation 
pain/ not? I (QIOO) I 
I 
I 
Pretend to Trend I 
dream I QIBO) I 
-
I 
I 
Pretend to I Uniformity 
write I Q183) I 
I 
I 
Pretend to I Uni form i ty 
be angry I (Q181) I 
I 
I 
Pretend to Progression from I In content 
think overt criteria to I (Q177) others such as I 
"concentrating" I 
I 
I 
Pretend to I Variation 
1 augh I (Q179) I 
I 
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Table 11 cont i nued ... 
Task I Developmental Trend Uniformity Variation 
I for all between 
I su bjects groups 
I of subjects 
I 
I 
Pretend to be I Reverse trend at 8 Uniformity 
yourself I years. (Q182) I 
I 
I 
Pretends he's I Uni formity 
sick (Q166) I 
I 
Knows he's I Un iformi ty 
sick (Q167) I 
I 
Thinks he's I Progression to 
sick (Q168) I "maybe " from 8 years 
I 
Believes he's I Progression to 
sick (Q169) I "maybe" from 8 yeat'S 
I 
I Q205 I Uniformity 
I I 
I I 
Thinks he can I I Variation 
fly (Q201) I I 
I I 
Knows he can I I Uniformity 
fly (Q202) I I 
I I 
I I 
Pretends he I I Uniformity 
can fly (Q203) I I 
I I 
Believes he I 6-12 years respond I 
can fl y (Q204)1 uniformly, adu lt s I 
I differ due to "maybe" I 
I option I 
I I 
I I 
Believes she I Progression to I 
has a skate- I "maybe" at 8 years I 
board (Q198) I I 
I I 
Thi nks he has I Progression to I 
a bicycle I "maybe" at 8 years I (Q187) I I 
I I 
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TABLE 12 : Summary of findings for pain, ache and sore 
Task I Developmental Trend I Uniformity Variation 
I I for a 11 between 
I I subjects groups 
I I of subjects 
I I 
I l 
Defi nition I More than one General 
tasks I criterion mentioned exp l anation (Q39) I from 12 years 
I (Q40) I Ache expla i ned with 
I reference to ~Q 
I common from 10 years 
I 
I 
Fuzzy I Variation 
boundaries I (Q42 ) I "Simi l ar" increasingly I 
I selected from 12 years. 
I More than one 
I qual i tative category 
I mentioned from 10 years 
I (Q52 ) I Sore and a sore 
I confused by 6 and 8 
I year olds (Q42) and I Greater (Q52) I fuzziness of 
I boundaries 
I between pain and 
I ache versus I 
I illIl and sore I 
I I (Q53) and I I (Q63) I I Variation 
I I I I I Same pain I I I (see same I I 
tasks I I 
table 10) I I 
I I 
I I 
Pretend t o be I I 
i n pai n (see I I pretend tasks I I 
table 11 ) I I 
.J I 
I I 
Give pain 6 year olds suggest I I (Q77) that pain can be I I 
t ransferred from one I I 
person to another I I 
I I 
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Table 12 continued ... 
Task 
(Q85) 
(Q65) 
Feel pain 
"Grammar" 
errors 
Feel pain 
(QI29) 
Pain on my 
arm 
\QT27) 
pain ins i de 
point to 
pain 
(Q61) 
love a pain 
(QI25) 
I Developmental Trend 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I I Progression from 
I literal to figurative 
I explanation from 
I 10 years 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I I Unacceptable from 
I 8 years 
I 
I 
I I Yes at 6 years, 
I var iation from 
I 10 year s 
I I Unacceptable to the 
I maj ority of subjects. 
I More adults and 8 
I year olds found it 
I acceptable for 
I different reasons. 
I 
Uniformity 
for all 
subjects 
Uniformity 
Un i formity 
.Unacceptabl e 
yes 
Variation 
between 
groups 
of subjects 
iii) Developmental trends were fo und in children's understanding of 
do in certain linguistic contexts (name ly, 'What do you do when you 
think?') with greater uniformity in other contexts (for example, 'What 
do you do I'lhen you pretend?'). Do was interpreted in the sense of 
'act' which older children recognized as not being applicable to the 
word think (summarized in table 13 ). 
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TABLE 13 Summary of finding s for feel, where, see and do 
Task I Developmental Trend I Un i formity Variation 
I I for all between 
I I su bjects groups 
I I of subjects 
I I 
I I 
Feel your I Sense of 'touch ' at I 
dreams I 6 years; 'experience ' I (QI95) I from 8 years I 
I I 
Feel eain I I Experience (QI29) I I 
I t 
I I 
Where - eain I Examples to "anywhere" I (Q54) I from 10-12 years I 
I I 
Where - an I Examples to "anywhere" I Particular part s 
ache I from 12 years I of body (Q75) I I mentioned, -for 
I I example, head , 
I I .stomach 
Where - anger I I Variation (Q62) I I 
I I 
Where - think I "head" to "bra in " or I (QI60) I "mind" from 12 years I 
I I 
Where - dream I Place outside the I I (QI47) I body to place in the I I 
I body from 10 years I I 
t t t 
I I I 
See - thoughts I "No" for all the I I (QI34) I chi ldren ; 11yes H and I I 
I "no " for adu lts; I I See - dreams I "No " at 6 years; lIyes!1 I I 
TQI56) I from 8 years and beyond I I 
t t t I I I 
Do - eain I "Cry" me nti oned by 6, I Situationa l I (Q51) I 8 and 10 year olds_ I consequences I 
I From 10 years, do I I 
I i nterpreted as not I I 
I equivalent to 'action' I I 
t t t I I I 
Do - think I Overt characteristics I I (0161) I at 6 years, decreasing I I 
I from 8 years to I I 
I confusion and an I I 
I emphasis on covert I I 
I behavi our from 10 yearsl I 
t _____ L __ t 
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Table 13 continued ... 
Task 
Know - think (someon-e--
else) (0131) 
Do - pretend 
(0158) 
Do - angry 
TQ46) 
Developmental Trend 
Faciai expression to 
broader context from 
10 years 
Examples to general 
explanations or to 
numerous examples 
from 10 years 
Examples at 6 and 8 
I 
I 
I 
years; situation- I 
dependent from 10 years l 
I 
Uniformity 
for all 
subjects 
Variation 
between 
groups 
of subjects 
Variation 
in content 
iv) There was a progressive move with age from understanding feel in 
the sense of 'touch' to understallding feel in the sense of 
'experience'. In certain contexts, Ilamely, feel pain, the younger 
children also interpreted feel in the sense of 'experience'. 
v) See was interpreted by younger children in the sense of "have or 
exercise the power of discerning objects with the eyes" (Concise 
Oxford Dictionary, 1976). Older children were able to apply another 
sense of see, namely, "call up picture of, imagine" when see was 
applied to dreams, as an example. 
Indi.vidual variation between subjects was found an the fuzzy boundary 
tasks for all words (see sections 4.1.4; 4.2.4; 4.3.4). Uniformity 
in responses of subjects of different age groups was noted on certain 
tasks part i cul arly pretend tasks such as pretend to wal k and pretend 
to write. This may be becau se pretend is learned earl ier and is, 
therefore, applied similarly in numerous contexts by children of all 
age 1 eve 1 s . However, a deve 1 opmenta 'l progress i on occurred for other 
pretend tasks. These finding s, considered together, support the view 
of "grammar" of words. 
From the present set of tasks, one 6 year old male (S49) frequently 
offered explanations equivalent to those of older children. However, 
it is of interes t that on his schoo l reading assessment, his score was 
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average relative to his peers. The overlap of trends within any 
particular age level parallel s decal age in a Piagetian approach 
although specific stages are not being suggested in the present study. 
The child's initial answer tends to favour the one explanation (for 
example, the equivalence sense) above the other (the identity sense) 
and this follows a clear trend with development. Howev.er this issue 
is more complex than just a steady trend. 549· (6 years) favoured the 
identity notion and was consistent in this preference on a diversity 
of same tasks (QI7; Q27a; Q30) in which either sense was acceptable. 
He rejected the equivalence sense of same as an option when probed on 
these tasks. It appears in light of this, that although the 
equ iva 1 ence sense is more common 1 y preferred and seems to be 1 earned 
first by the majority of the younger subjects, this is not always the 
case. What is most important is that whichever sense is favoured, the 
younger chil dren fi nd it more d i ffi cult to accept ambi gu ity and to 
shift from their preferred notion with probing. From about 10 years 
of age , children generally favoured one approach but, with probing, 
readily acknowledged that the other answer was acceptable. At times, 
they were ab1 e to take into account numerous facets of the 'prob1 em' 
to the extent that they appeared confused. 
Within a Piagetian framework, children are only considered to be truly 
at a particular stage (such as concrete operational) if they maintain 
their position with probing. The present findings differ from 
Piaget's approach in that discrete stages do not seem to present 
themselves and maintaining one's original view with probing is not 
indicative of attainment of a particular developmental stage . 
It is possible that there may be a greater number of situations in 
everyday communication in which the equivalence se nse is required, and 
that this may be the reason why children generally learn this sense 
first. Whether 549 should be considered as more ad vanced than his 
peers is questionable. If this were the case, the equivalence sense 
would be regarded as preceding that of identity in development and 549 
would be particularly advanced for hi s age. We would assume that he 
also acquired the equivalence sense before the identity sense but at 
an earlier age than hi s peers. On the other hand, it is possible that 
either sense is acquired first but that the young child finds the 
shift from one sense to another on the same task difficult . However, 
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in particular contexts which demand the identity sense only , he can 
make the adjustment: again, he is holding only a single sense in his 
mind at anyone time. Each child's ind iv idual preference is important 
to take into account when analyzing his responses for same in a 
-diversity of contexts. 
5 .1.2(b) The effect of lingui st ic context on the use and 
understanding of the words same, [lretend and [lain b,Z: 
children of different ages 
From the findings in 5.1.2(a) above, it can be concluded that 
linguistic context alters the sense of the word. More specifically 
i) Each word Qas a variety of uses over a diversity of contexts and 
these uses together constitute its meaning. The "grammar" of words is 
revealed by the alterations in sense of a word from one context to 
another and by the way a word allows for combination s with some words 
but not with others in t he language. 
ii) Definition s vary widely and they 'are incomplete in elucidating 
the meaning of the word (see section 5.1.2d). 
iii) Fuzziness of words allows thelll flexibility in altering their 
senses in different l i ngui st ic context s. 
The "grammar" of the words same, pretend and pain together with their 
semantically - linked words will be considered separately in the 
discussion which follows. 
Pain ache and sore 
The "grammar" of these words includes attributes as diverse as the 
following: 
i) you have to feel pain in order to experience pain at all and in 
this case, feel does not take on the sense of 'touch' 
ii) there is usually a cause for the pain followed by physiological 
consequences and, most frequently, practical consequences as well 
ii i) pain can only be applied to anilnate objects except in fantasy or 
in metaphorical language 
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iv) pain can be applied to any part of the body 
v) pain can be of varying intensities and of differing qualities, 
for example, dull, throbbing, stabbing 
vi) pain cannot be shared by two people or transferred from one 
person to another 
vii) experiences of pain are private but are communicated verbally, 
by actions, or by nonlinguistic behaviours such as groaning 
viii) recognlzlng pain behaviour in another person draws on a 
different set of criteria from recognizing pain in oneself 
ix) we can point to the pain behaviour but not to the pain itself 
x) emotional pain differs from physical pain 
These attributes differ from those of Rosch and her co-workers (1973a, 
1973b, 1975, 1976) in prototype theory. Rosch's attributes were 
perceptual and applied to substantive words or to superordinate 
categories. As an example, for the concept 'CHAIR', attributes include 
'have a back', 'a seat', 'four legs', and so on (Neisser, 1984). When 
applied to non-ostensive words, an entire s ituation needs to be taken 
into consideration as has been done in describing the word ~ain above. 
These attributes are not as easily identifiable as those for 
substant i ve words. These attri butes are not protoypi ca I of the word 
pain but rather, are essential to the word. Without these attributes, 
the word waul d expres s someth i n9 other than pain . However, it is not 
being suggested that these attributes constitute the central 'core' 
meaning of the word. The meaning of the word stems not only from the 
word's attributes but also from the alteration of its senses in a 
variety of co-occurrence relations. If we disregarded the sense 
alterations of the words in attempting to arrive at its meaning, we 
would ignore crucial facets of the word's use, as a definition does. 
We also have to take into account the limited set of words with which 
a particular word can occur. 
Ache has certain attributes which ove\'lap with pain, for example, (i), 
(ii), (iii), (vi) and (viii) above but certain attributes, such as 
(iv) and (v) above differ. The word ache can be appl ied to any part 
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of the body but it i s usually used in relation to specific areas of 
the body , namely, teeth, back, stomach. When app 1 i ed to other body 
parts, it suggests a dull, throbbing type of pain and prolonged pain 
but the boundaries are fuzzy. The ability to explain how a pain and 
an ache differ develops with increasing age. Children from 6 yea rs 
were aware of certain differences but not all. As an example, one 
child offered a spont~neous sentence with " face ache". 
"Family resemblances" is not suitable for describing the relationship 
between at t ributes and the di stribut ion of attributes for any 
particular word. From the attributes stipulated above, it is clear 
that a "family re semb lance " does not exist between 'cannot point to 
the pain itself' and 'there is a cause for the pain'. Rather, there 
is a "family resemblance" between . different uses of pain in different 
1 i ngui st i c contexts, t hat is , between the senses of the word rather 
than between its attributes . 
From the tasks, attributes would seem to be learned earlier than 
senses as in tasks such as Q129 ('I have a pai n in my head but I can't 
feel it'. Does that sentence sound Ol( or not?) and Q61 ('Can you 
point to pain? '). Children of all ages recognized the absurdity in 
these quest io ns and explained in compara ble te rms. On the other hand, 
senses of a word seem to follow a developmental progression as was 
found for same where children progressed from an emphasis on the 
equivalence sense to that of identity. 
Same, similar and different 
The "grammar" of the word same i ncl udes the fo ll owi ng attri bute s 
i) hiO items are being compared or one item is compared to itself 
over time 
i i) one item can be an exact repl ica of another or there can be 
differences 
iii) the equivalence sense of same applies when two items are 
compared and the identity sense applies when one item is compared to 
itself over a period of time 
For the word similar, attr i butes include: 
- 306 -
i) two items are necessarily compared 
ii) items can never be exact: similar implies a relative quality 
It was noted th at · same alters its sense according to the 1 inguistic 
context in which it occurs. The word ball occurring with the word 
same, as an example, can take either an identity or an equivalence 
sense. Chil dren progressed from favouri ng an equi va 1 ence sense to 
favouring an identity sense . Younger children compared the two balls 
in terms of overt criteria such as size and colour. 
With same pain , on the other hand, only the identity sense is 
applicable. It is part of the "grammar" of the word pain that pain 
cannot be shared between two people. For this reason, the sense of 
same is not variable in this case. Children of all ages were aware of 
thi s aspect of the mean i ng of pain and no progress i on from the sense 
of equivalence to that of identity occurred. 
For the tasks same leaf and same tadpo.le/frog, both of which dealt 
with sameness in terms of 'continuity over time', the extral inguistic 
context favoured the identity sense but a progression from the 
equivalence to the identity sense was again noted with increasing age. 
Unli ke the same pain tasks in \vhich the identity sense is obligatory 
because of the "grammar" of the word pain , for the same 1 ea f and same 
tadpole/frog tasks either sense could apply with regard to the 
"grammar" of the words invol ved but the extra lingui stic context 
restricts the meaning. The way in which the extral inguistic context 
does limit our assignment of mean ing to words is also part of their 
"grammarlt . 
The "grammar" of the word pretend, includes the following attributes: 
i) a real behaviour is s imulated in an attempt to del iberately 
deceive or to 'chaff' someone else 
ii) the pretender is concealing something 
iii) consequences include smiling or laughing to reveal that it is 
only a joke 
iv) there is a limit which must not be overstepped 
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v) in certain instances, an impasse arises (for example, pretend to 
walk) 
vi) pretence must be distinctively like the genuine article 
simulated. 
The senses of pretend 'include: 
i) a real behaviour is simulated as part of a joke 
ii) a real behaviour is simulated so as to deliberately deceive 
When contrasted with to lie, to pretend implies something more playful 
and to lie implies deception. 
Nouns such as pain appear to be more easily described in terms of 
attributes whereas other words (verbs, adjectives, pronouns) such as 
pretend and same seem to depend more heavil y on senses. "Grammar " is 
important for all words but the emphasis alters for different words. 
Verbs are more flexible than nouns in that they can be used with a 
greater variety of other words in t.he language. This ties in with 
their collocational ra nge. 
There appears to be greater constancy in the use of the word pain in 
different contexts, that is, attributes are more important than senses 
versus an emphaSis on senses for the word same rather than on 
attri butes. Furthermore, same and pretend can combi ne with numerous 
other words in the 1 anguage, for example, pretend to be in pa in , 
pretend to be angry, pretend to laugh, pretend to drink, pretend to 
walk, and so on. Pain, on the otller hand, is more constrained in its 
uses. 
Sense has no externa 1 refer(~nce but it is determi ned by the 
intralinguistic context in which the word occurs. It is difficult to 
clearly separate senses from attributes for any particular word. 
S.1. 2(c) Problem-solVing strateqies employed by children of 
different ages in answering the metalinguistic questions 
Children of different ages were found to employ different strategies 
in answering the questions posed. 
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i) Children progressed from drawing on an example as an explanation 
to using a general explanation, particularly in the definition and 
fuzzy boundary tasks. The age of onset of general explanations varied 
according to the task, for example , for definitions of pretend , 
general explanations were mare common from 8 years of age whereas for 
same, general explanations were no ted only in 10 and 12 year olds. 
These fi ndi ngs support those of previ ous researchers (for exampl e, 
Macdonald, 1983) . 
The younger subjects, by giving 
the word in an everyday context. 
an example as an explanation, placed 
This reveals that they have not yet 
mastered the definition word game. In so doing, they also emphasize 
one use of the word, and fa i 1 to account for its di verse uses. The 
general explanations offered at the later stages of development 
attempt to realize a 'p rototypical' or core meaning of the word. This 
again minimizes the importance of the different uses of a word that 
occur when it is applied in different l ing ui st ic contexts. Where 
numerous examples are offered as all explanation, the diversity of 
appl ication is accounted for and the difficulty in de fining a central 
meaning for the word is highlighted. 
The most comprehen sive answer would combine numerous examples with a 
general explanation, thereby taking into considerat io n both diversity 
of application and consistency in use across ' situations. If there 
were no consistency in the use of the word fr om one situati on to the 
next, word meaning would have no stabil ity. Meaning would sh i ft to 
such an extent tha t we would fa il to convey what we intend in a 
proposition. However, this sh ift in senses is only one aspect of a 
word's meaning and its diversity of application i s crucial to our 
understanding of word meaning. It is argued that thi s consi stency or 
stability of a word i s not i t s essence (as used colloquially). 
"Essence" as applied in the present study includes the stability of a 
word's mean i ng as well as the sh i ft in emphas is t hat occurs when the 
word is applied over a diversity of contexts. Furt hermo re, numerous 
examples together with a genera 'i explanation may not be sufficient to 
est ablish word meaning. Specif ic 'training' together with intuition 
and an entire "form of 1 ife" (Wittgenstein; 1953, pt.241) may be 
requi red. 
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i i) The youngest children tended to include the word being defined 
in their explanation whereas the older children avoided using the word 
being defined (whether intentionally or unintentionally). 
iii) There was a progression with age from mentioni ng one criterion 
to mentioning two criteria on a diversity of tasks. Aga in, the age at 
which two criteria were mentioned, differed from one task to another. 
For example, in Q42 which involved contrasting a pain and an ache , 
only adults mentioned two criteria. Contrarily, for pretend to be in 
pain, two criteria were mentioned from 6 years of age and increasingly 
so through development. For Q29 (same book), two criteria were 
mentioned from 8 years of age and for same pain (QI5), two criteria 
were drawn on by children of 10 years and older. 
I n the fuzzy boundary tasks, the younger ch i 1 dren were frequent I y 
unable to hold the two words in mind simul taneously in order to 
contrast them. Contrari 1 y, the older ch i I dren drew on more tha n one 
criterion and were able to contrast one word with another. 
The above findings confirm those of Karmiloff -Smi th (1979a), Berthoud-
Papandropoulou (1982, cited by Macdonald 1984), and Macdonald (1983, 
1984) . They found that children progress from extralinguistic to 
intralinguistic and then to metalinguistic justifications. Only at 12 
years, did children respo nd to the question: 
"If I say that things are the same, 
what do I mean?", 
With answers such as 
"there's a connection between them". 
This approximates a truly metalinguistic answer in which the child 
attempts to formulate a rule. It may appear only at 12 years because 
of "the directness of the question about word meaning, or el se perhaps 
the abstractness of the concept in question" (Macdonald, 1984, p.14). 
The differences in age for each type of justification found in 
previous studies, were also confirmed since they varied from task to 
task for any particular word. 
iv) Focu s on the concrete aspects of the task was found to decrease 
with age, for example, for same book (Q29), colour or size (overt 
characteristics) were mentioned predominantly at 6 years with a 
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decrease and corresponding increase in mentioning content at 12 years. 
Adults most commonly suggested both criteria. Similarly , for same 
pa in (015), place and type were me llt i oned by ch i 1 dren at 6 and 8 
years, with both criteria drawn on from 10 years of age and type only, 
being mentioned by adults. Place is more overt than type. 
On those tasks for same tasks which assessed continuity over time, the 
6 and 8 year olds focused on overt changes for same leaf, disregarding 
the identity sense of same. For same tadpole/frog, the 6 year olds 
emphasized the identity sense as did the older children. 
It would appear that certain ta sks are more difficult than others, for 
example, same in same pain appears to be more difficult than same in 
same book. Furthermore, certain ~Iords may be learned earl ier and 
therefore, be able to be applied to a variety of contexts earlier than 
other words, for example, even 6 year olds described pretend in 
general terms and drew on two criteria in explainihg pretend to be in 
pain. 
v) It was found that the child is increasingly able to weigh up 
possibil ities as was revealed in hi s lise of "maybe". Once again, the 
age at which "maybe" was used varied f rom task to task. For same pain 
(049), "maybe" was included from 8 years and increased with age as for 
0168 (think he's sick) and Q169 (bel ieve he's sick). For 0201 (thinks 
he can fly) and Q202 (knows he can fly), only one subject of 8 years 
responded "maybe" as did two 6 year olds for each of 0168 (think Mary 
has a bicycle) and Q198 (bel ieve Mary has a skateboard). For 0203 
(pretend he can fly), "maybe" was mentioned only from 10 years of age. 
Olson and Astington (1984) reported similar findings , that is, young 
children did not use "maybe" and the inclusion of "maybe" developed 
with age. ("Maybe" is the correct respon se on tasks where the main 
ve rb i s non-factive). 
Development was found to progress from an example as an explanation to 
a general explanation. An example as an explanation constrains the 
word to use within a single context (a s ingle sense) only. These 
examples all drew on concret e objects . . A general explanation, on the 
ot her hand, attempts to find a single sense that will apply for all 
uses of the word, thereby fail ing to account for the word's diversity 
of senses which i s so important to its meaning. A general explanation 
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allows for greater flexibility in that it takes 
context of its uses. At the same time, 
the word out of the 
it imposes tighter 
constraints because when the word i s replaced in everyday contexts, 
the sense of the word has to be altered. 
The above findings (i-v) indicate the importance of taking the 
linguistic context into account in evaluating these tasks. 
All these findings support the view of word meaning which emphasizes 
the "grammar" of words as advocated in the present study. The 
strategies used by children of 6 through 10 years may not be adequate 
to enable the child to attain a use of the word which encompasses its 
diversity, ambiguity and so on . It is possible that these strategies 
are unrelated to language use per se since they derive from answers to 
metalinguistic tasks. However, it is equally possible that a child 
must pass through these stages on hoi s way to becomi ng a competent 
adult language user. The changes in strategy employed by children of 
different ages may be due ent ire 1 y or in part, to the i r different 
cognitive abilities. 
5. 1.2(d) The extent to which definitions encompass the meanings of 
non-ostensive- words 
It was found that adults di sp layed varied use and understanding of a 
word when appl ied in numerous contexts. No single definition was 
provided by all the adults for a particular word and their responses 
revealed only a part, rather than the whole, of the word's meaning. 
There was found to be no single definition of a word offered within or 
between age levels. The defini t ion did not encompass the diversity of 
uses of the word and was, therefore, 1 imited in reveal ing the meaning 
of the word. They focused on only one aspect of t he word's meaning. 
As an example, the definition s offered by subjects of all ages for the 
words same and pain are presented below followed by their use in 
combination: 
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same 
- two things are identical 
- two things are similar 
- two things which have 
something in common 
- an exact replica 
- they look alike 
~ same pain 
when you're sore in your body 
- when you hurt yourself 
- something unpleasant 
physical discomfort 
- a feeling experienced when 
you hurt yourself 
~ 
The place of the pain is important 
in deciding whether the two pains 
are the same or not 
(younger chi ldren) 
Type of pain is important in deciding 
whether the two pains are the same 
or not 
(12 year olds and adults) 
From the definitions suggested for the word same, "something in 
common" and "similar" would apply to the use of Same in combination 
with pain. "An exact repl ica ", "they look a1 ike " and "they're 
identical" fail to hold in the context of same pain . The definitions 
for pain are suitable for exp1ainaing same pain but younger children 
focus on the location of the pain and t he older children and adults 
concentrate on the type of pain in drawing their conclusions. 
A second example is provided by the definitions for pretend and pain 
followed by explanations of their use in combination. 
Pretend 
chaff 
- joke someone 
- you aren't really doing 
a thing 
- not telling the exact tru th 
- play at being something el se 
- make someone believe 
that something is 
something else 
- act 
Pretend pain 
- c1 utch the paliifu1 area 
body and emit noi ses 
followed by laughter 
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Pain 
when you sore in yo ur body 
when yo u hurt yourself 
something unpleasant 
physical discomfort 
a feeling experienced when 
you hurt yo urself 
/ 
of the 
The explanations for pretend disregard 
behaviours encompassed by pretend pain . 
the specific sequence of 
The word pretend is a 
particularl y clear example illustrating the way in which a word shifts 
its emphas is in its co -occurrence re 1 at ions with other words. The 
child's developing language skills include his ability to make these 
adjustments in the senses of words. Part of the meaning of the word 
is its numerous alterations in sense in different linguistic contexts. 
It is concluded that the mean i ng of a word is revealed through its 
di verse uses. 
5 .1. 2(e) Retention of meanings when words are combined in 
comparison to the meanings which subjects have as s igned to 
them in isolation 
The definitions or uses of two words in isolation did not hold when 
these two words co-ocurred (as was nlustrated above for same pa i n) 
and for pretend pain thereby elucidating the changi in use that a word 
undergoes in difFerent linguistic contexts. The younger children were 
noted to make less of a shift in use of each of the words than were 
the older children. The tasks for do as applied to pretend and think 
highlight this issue clearly. 
The younger children applied t heir limited understanding of do in a 
variety of contexts. However, they did not take account of the 
"gra~nar" of the word(s) with which it co-ocurred, for example, think. 
Do alters it s use when appl i ed with think and requi res a di fferent 
sense from that of 'action' as indicated by the adults ' explanations. 
However, it must be emphasized that the 6 year olds did display some 
abil i ty to shi ft the mean i ng of do accord i ng to the context . They 
used do differently in relation to pretend from their use in relation 
to think but both the se uses were action-based. Pretend appears to be 
learned (understood) earlier than think (as concluded from the 
definition tasks for pretend , Q164; Q166) and 'What do yo u do when yo u 
pretend?' assumes an action as the answer. The 6 year olds appl ied 
thi s restricted use of do to think as well, thereby suggesting t hat 
they had not full y grasped the meaning of think , part of which would 
demand a~ al te red use of do. 
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The only evidence that we have regarding ~/hat the child knows about 
the word think, is that which comes from his answer to questions such 
as this one. The following findings are of importance: 
i) 6 year olds understood the question 'What do you do when you 
think?' at a different level from the 10 and 12> year olds and from the 
adults. It may be argued that they understand it equivalently to 
adults but are unable to express it because they do not have the 
language required for such explanations. However, even if i t is 
accepted that 6 year olds understand the word think as do adults, they 
do not understand the phrase 'what do you do' or the word do in this 
phrase, in the same way as do adu lts. The 6 year 01 ds provi ded a 
different answer from that offered by the adults. If a critic argues 
th is po i nt as app 1 i ed to the phrase what do you do as well as to the 
word think, the argument would continue wi thout reso lution. However, 
no critic can deny that the answers provided by the children differ 
from those of the adults suggesting that the 6 year olds have a 
different understanding of these words. 
If the view holds that the child acquired the concept first to which 
he attaches the word as a label, then this view assumes that t he child 
acquired the concept 'THINK' in its totality. If this is the case, 
then there should be no differences between the answers provided by 6 
year olds to the above questions and those offered by adu lt s. Critics 
cou1 d st ill argue that the on 1 y difference is in the 1 anguage used by 
the 6 year old, not in the concept which he holds. If so , then one 
might just as we ll say that they have a di fferent grasp of the word 
think. A clear separation between the word and the concept is 
difficult and, in this case, the critic's statement contradicts 
itse If. 
ii) It was noted that adults gave explanations such as , "when you 
think, you concentrate on something" whereas 6 year olds described a 
context as in "you stand still"; "you frown". The adults' answers 
fail to take into account that a whole setting is important for a 
certain activity and that this setting comes to form part of our 
understanding of that word's meaning. 
The 6 year olds focused on what appear to be adjuncts of the activity 
of thinking , that is, standing still and frowning are not critica l for 
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thinking and they are neither necessary nor sufficient criteria for 
the word t hinking. However, even though we may not display these 
different behaviours when we think, these behaviours comprise part of 
our concept ' THINK'. When asked 'What do you do when you think?' 
(QI61), the 6 year olds may focu s on these adjunct behaviours because 
they do not have a complete grasp of do in this context, that is, as 
it relates to the word t hi nk; because their knowledge of the word 
think is limited compared with older children and adults' knowledge of 
this word. This is equivalent to overextension as discussed in 
relation to substantive word-mean ing (Section 2.2.1a). 
The present researcher suggests that "grammar" errors may occur 
beca use ch i 1 dren underextend or overextend the senses of a word to 
other words i n the language. An example of underextension is the 
comment by Ursul a cited in introducing chapter 2 when she asks about 
pai n . "Where will it go?" She uses the word go in such a way as to 
take no accou nt of its specific sense in relation to the word pai n. 
Go away can be appl ied to animate objects but not to words denoting 
non-ostensive entities. An example of overextension I'/Ould be "I 'll 
strangle your hand" which was me nti oned in chapter 2. Here, st rangle 
is applied to a word with which it is not usually used. The child has 
ignored the constraints which the word strangl e imposes on it's use i n 
the language . 
It woul d be of interest to ask the 6 year olds whether we can think 
without frowning . Do they regard the frowning as an essential 
component of thinking or not? Questions such as 'Can you walk and 
th ink at the same time?' which were presented but which are not 
analyzed in depth in this study, have some bearing on this issue. 
Briefl y, 6 year olds argued predominantly that thinking is an activity 
which ha s to occur 'all on its own'. However, thinking is not an 
act i vity separate from another ongoi ng act i vity but it occurs as part 
of the other activity. We are ab le to think about an unrelated issue 
while engaged in an acti vity, for example, doodl ing while thinking 
about something else. In this case, thinking can be sepa rated from 
the activity itself. Howe ve r, if I'le draw and th ink about it, we are 
"drawing thoughtfully". Here, the two activities have become one and 
the acti vity of thinking is not separate from the act of drawing. The 
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younger children regarded thinking as an activity separate from other 
activities. 
The use of same altered its emphasis in each of the contexts with 
different criteria being important in concluding whether they were the 
same or not: same ball (emphasis on size and colour), same dress 
(emphasis on style) and same pain (emphasis on place or type). 
5.1.2(f) Development of an awareness of fuzzy boundaries of 
semantically-linked words 
The definition and fuzzy boundary tasks assess conceptual meaning 
direct 1 y . Quest ions were not as ked about the not i on of fuzzi nes s 
itself: conclusions about the notion of fuzzines s are, therefore 
inferred. Co-occurrence relations were not dealt with in these tasks. 
With development, it was found that the child direct s his attention to 
the tangible, observable aspects of the word's meaning, progressing to 
a focus on the less tangible aspects. 
For the fuzzy boundary tasks, val-i abi 1 ity was noted for subjects of 
all ages and no developmental progression was apparent. Thi s was 
found for tasks such as Q36a·e (subject is presented with apples 
varying in degrees of size, colo ur alld bruis 'ing); Q20 (the contrast 
between same and s imil ar); Q140 (the cont I'ast between to 1 i e and to 
pretend) ; Q42 (the contrast between an ache and a pain). This 
individual variation within subj ect s in the use of a word and for any 
one subject on different occas ions of use was anticipated for these 
fuzzy boundary tasks because we cannot stipulate the limits of each 
word and because senses of words overlap in certa in contexts. 
However, despite this variation, people are able to communicate 
effectively with one another. 
Soph i st i cated confus i on was no ted in the performance of the older 
children and particularly, in the adults' responses . This 
sophisticated confusi on may be due to a greater awa reness of fuzziness 
(discussed in section which follows, 5.2.1b) . 
The definition and fuzzy boundary tasks illustrated the difficulties 
we have arriving at a specific definition of a word. Fuzziness and 
t he "grammar" of words prevent this. The tasks assessing each word in 
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different linguistic contexts reveal the diversity of uses and of 
explanations offered. 
The fuzzy boundaries between words complicate ' the distinction between 
"grammar" of words and overextension. Fuzziness may be essential in 
the language to complement the notion of "grammar". Questions about 
fuzziness of linguistic concepts still remain, for example: Are we 
pre-programmed , to have fuzzy concepts or are fuzzy concepts an 
end-poi nt of 1 earni ng or development ? Are concepts inherently fuzzy 
from the beginning or are they the result of learning or induction 
into our society? 
Andersen's study (1975) revealed a progression in the development of 
fuzzy boundari es inch i 1 dren. Part of the development of 1 anguage 
seems to involve an abilHy to take fuzzine ss into account in our 
everyday use of 1 anguage even wi thout refl ect i ng upon the not i on of 
fuzziness itself. 
5. 2 Additional findings 
5.2.1 The phenomenon of re.!]ress i on as 'a promi nent feature of the 
developmental process where subjects are regui red to refl ect 
upon word meaning 
Two types of apparent regression were noted, firstly, a reve·rse trend 
in the developmental process usually at 8 years and secondly, what has 
been termed 'sophisticated confus ion' by the present researcher. 
These will be detailed below. 
5.2.1(a) Reverse trend at 8 years 
Metalinguistic studies to date (for example, Tunmer and Herriman, 
1984) have found an apparent decl ine in performance on met al inguistic 
tasks at 12 years of age when compared to the performance of 10 year 
olds . Th ese studies were concerned mainly with syntactic f orms as in 
complex sentences rather than with word meaning. Reversals in 
performance have al so been men t i oned by psycho 1 ogi sts (for ex amp 1 e, 
Feldman, 1980). 
In the present study, a reverse trend was found most commonly at 8 
years of age and occas ionall y at 10 years of age on a va riety of 
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tasks. These findings are based on a small sample size and must be 
viewed with caution. However, the 8 year olds were t he only group of 
subjects who did not foll ow the overall pattern and s i nce thi s was 
noted in numerous tasks, it requires interpretation . · The subjects 
were sampled randomly and an attempt had been made to control for 
external factors so that this finding was unexpected. In tasks where 
only one subject differed, this was not considered as indicating a 
trend (for example , Q14 definition of same , Q32a same dress, Q33 same 
ball , Q129 '1 have a pain in my head but I can't feel it'). 
For the 10 year olds, there was never a discrepancy of more than one 
subject in comparison with the 8 year olds for that task. However, 
for the 8 year olds, a reverse trend occurred on the follow ing tasks: 
(a) For Q32c, same dress, when presented with dresses differing in 
sleeve length, more 8 year olds than 6 year o·lds concluded that the 
dresses were "the same". They fai 1 ed to take acc'ount of di fferences 
or of numerous possibilities. 
(b) For Q48 (picture task for same pa i n in which one boy is hit by a 
man and another has toothache), more 8 year olds answered that their 
pains were "the same", again failing to take account of differences to 
the extent considered by the 6 year olds. 
(c) For Q76 
olds than 6 
However, an 
(' Can you have my pain?'), a greater number of 8 year 
year 01d5 interpreted 'my pain' as 'the same pain'. 
overall developmental progre ss ion was found with 
increasing age. Younger chi l dren interpreted 'my pain' as 'the same 
pain'. Other children generally interpreted it as 'my pain'. 
(d) For QI7 (same apples). a greater number of 8 year olds favoured 
an equivalence sense of same over an identity sense in explaining this 
task. Again, there was found to be an overall developmental 
progression from the equivalence sense to the identity sense with 
increasing age. 
(e) For Q15 and Q45, a rephrasing of the question for same pain to 
check for consi stency, yi el ded greater i ncons i stency amongst 8 year 
olds than amongst 6 year old s and an overall increa se in consistency 
from 10 years of age. 
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(f) For Q41 (same anger), 20% of tile 8 year olds responded "don't 
know" which was not found in any of the other groups. 
(g) Q125 ('I love a pain') was regarded as acceptable by more 8 year 
olds than 6 year olds despite all overall developmental trend from 'not 
acceptab 1 e' to ' acceptab 1 e' . 
(h) Q182 (' How do you pretend to be yoursel f?') was regarded as 
possible by more 8 year olds than 6 year olds. 
It is of importance tilat no reverse trend was found at 8 years on a 
host of other tasks, for example, pretend to think, pretend to walk, 
pretend to write, pretend to be in pain and pretend to be angry. 
These tasks generally yielded homogeneous responses or individual 
variation over the entire group of subjects. It is difficult to group 
the tasks homogeneously because, in 1 ine with the present approach, 
each task alters the sense of the word in question . . 
It is of interest that changes in interpretation of the sense of'do, 
see and feel occurred from 8 years of age. Six year olds generally 
interpreted these words according to their more common uses. From 8 
years, children began to altel' their illterpretations and from 10 
years, confusion was apparent in the subjects' responses. This may 
have some beari ng on the reverse trend at 8 years for other tasks 
(mentioned above). Eight years may be the period during which changes 
occur in the child's understanding of words, shifting from one sense 
to another. This may give rise to an apparent decline in their 
performance because they are attempting to cope with novel insights. 
Macdonald (1984) found that the youngest children in her study (5 
years), although exposed to reading and writing instruction for about 
8 months, did not offer intralinguistic or metali nguistic 
justifications tile latter becoming apparent only two years later. She 
suggests that at this later stage, the child receives exercises which 
require that he "make expl icit what he knows about 1 anguage" and he 
begins to reflect on the form rather than on the content of language. 
From the present findings, it would seem that a crucia l change occurs 
in the child's approach to langua')e tasks at about 8 years of age. 
Whether due to an increase in general cognitive control, to reading or 
to a combination, cannot be specif i ed from the present findings. 
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However, we are confronted by a chi ld who is inducted, progressively, 
into our adult way of life. 
It has also been reported that learning problems are frequently 
recognized clinically in children of about 8-9 years of age who 
presented with no apparent difficulties in the preschool and early 
school years (for example, Le vine and Satz, 1984; Levine, Oberklaid 
and Meltzer, 1981). Around this period, the child is moving into the 
concrete operational stage and, in addition, schoo l work shifts from a 
vi sua 1 to an auditory-verbal emphas is, both of wh i ch may be 
contributing factors. These children have been found to score high on 
tests such as the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (Dunn, 1965) but not 
on higher level comprehension tasks such as those of Wiig and Semel 
(1980) or on metalinguistic .tasks (Shapiro, 1985). 
Levine, Oberklaid and Meltzer (1981) carried out a study i n which 
ch i 1 dren who had presented with no 1 earn i ng probl ems in the earl y 
years, manifested with "developmental output failure " or "working 
disabilities " rather than "learning disabilities" in the early school 
years. They di splayed inefficient productivity and encoding even 
though they presented with near-normal learning and decoding. 
Problems were found in areas such as fine motor control, visual 
retrieval, sequential memory, expressive language and se lecti ve 
attention. Expressive language problems included difficulties 
organizing a story, rapid word recall and syntax. These researchers 
expl ained that the changes were noted near the fourth grade when 
children progress from passive learning with it ~ emphasis on decoding 
(for example, reading) to a more ac t i ve form of education which 
emphasizes encod ing on the part of the child (for example, . writing 
essays, forming projects). Similarly, the present finding s suggest 
that the period 8-10 years may be a particularly vulnerable one for 
the child in that he is in a transition phase which require s that he 
cope with a great deal of new information . Education programmes need 
to account for this as part of the normal developmental progression. 
5.2 . 1(b) :3 S6p hi sticated Confusion 
The term 'sophisticated confusion' was adopted by the researcher to 
suggest confusion that occurs naturally as part of the develo pmental 
3 Thanks to D. FRANKLIN for suggest ing th i s term 
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progression. It is a 'real' confusion but it occurs at a high level 
in the development of word-meaning and it is, therefore, an advanced 
stage of development. The term 'confusion' usually brings to mind a 
negative connotation and seems to imply regressive rather than 
progressive behaviour. However, in 
the term 'sophisticated', it is 
perhaps, necessary) aspect of 
constitutes advance into the stage 
word-meaning. 
its present context, together with 
used to suggest a natural (and 
the developmental process. It 
which follows in the development of 
The word sophisticated must not mislead the reader into thinking that 
only 'sophisticated' adults (as used in an everyday co lloq uial sense) 
display this behaviour. It is argued that most adults demonstrate 
some confusion on certain tasks relative to children. If this is so, 
then it may comprise a definite stage in development thereby enabling 
us to make certa in predi ct ions about the development of word mean i ng 
at the higher levels. Future research would be required to determine 
whether this 'is discrete as a stage, complying with those 
characteristics outl ined by Piaget (ibid) and others (see chapter 2). 
For the same pain tasks, adult ; as well as the gifted 12 year old, 
displayed confusion arguing that if one ta'lks of "same pain", one 
suggests that there is "one pain which is shared". 
Sophisticated confusion was displayed by one 6 year old (S49) only 
amongst all the subjects of 6, 8 and 10 years. S49 answered for Q1S 
('If I say I've got the same pain as you, what do I mean'), "wrong -
'cos you don't know if I' ve ever got the same pa in as you". He 
demonstrated conviction in this answer for different tasks. (It 
shou ld be noted that this is the same chi'ld who favoured an identity 
rather than an equivalence sense of same in contrast to his peers). 
This conviction may be due to the 6 year old's 'narrow perspective', 
an outcome of hi s relatively limited experience both with regard to 
language use itself and with regard to hi s knowledge of the external 
world. In contrast, sophisticated confusion in adults appeared to 
relate to an increasing awareness of the di versity of uses of words. 
This diversity i s due to the fuzziness and "grammar " of words, 
characteristics of word meaning of which adults are not consciously 
aware. These errors do not violate our understanding in terms of our 
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knowledge of the world. Rather, they reveal our confusion about 
language which re sults when we reflect too deeply on it. Adults found 
it difficult to be precise i n their answers and any attempt at 
precision led to their qual ifying answers, contradicting facets of 
other answers, and so on. The adult's extensive experience both with 
1 anguage and in terms of knowl edge of the worl d may result in thei r 
cons i deri ng one use of a word in re 1 at i on to another . I f the uses of 
a word are 1 inked by means of a "family resemblance", any attempt at 
precise definition of the word yields a lack of clarity or a 
distortion of the word's meaning. Sophisticated confusion seems, 
therefore, to be a natural part of the end-state of the de ve lopmental 
proces s. 
Similar confusion occurred for the same apple task for which it was 
argued that two apples can never be exactly alike and that same apple 
necessarily refers to one apple which is shared. It is of interest 
that this argument was not propounded in relation to the other same 
tasks (for example, same ball, same dress, etc). 
A clear example of sophistica ted confusion is the sentence offered by 
a Masters student in Philoso phy for QJ3, 'Make up a sentence with the 
word same '. He answered, "This cup of coffee is the same as this cup 
of coffee" (indicating the one cup of coffee tw "ice). In everyday 
language , we would not use same in th i s way as it fails to add to our 
communicati ve intent. 
The distinction between sophisticated confusion and an error of 
"grammar " i s clearly demonstrated by responses to the same tasks 
dealing with continuity over time (same leaf, same tadpole/frog, same 
ship). It was argued, f or example, that the leaves are not "s imilar" 
becau se they have changed over time. This violated the uses and 
meaning of t he word similar. In contrast, arguing that one cannot 
talk of same pain because tha t would suggest that there is one pain 
that is shared, illustrates confusion. In everyday language use, we 
do say "same pain" in order to suggest that there is a similarity 
between our experi ences of pa i n even though we cannot veri fy the 
extent to which they are the same. Verification plays no part in our 
use of the word same in many everyday con texts. 
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Confusion seems to bear a complex relationship to comprehension, 
varying at different periods of development. It is suggested that, at 
fi rst, the ch il d does not comprehend t.he probe and is, therefore, not 
confused by it. Inconsistencies displayed by the 6 year olds on 
certain tasks also fall into thi s level. Subsequently, the child may 
comprehend the probe but answer' with conviction, providing either an 
appropriate non-linguistic answer, or a linguistic justification. If 
the ch i 1 d answers wi th convi ct ion, it imp 1 i es that although he has 
understood the probe, his understanding is limited in that he has 
failed to take into account it s subt leties. 
From the responses of the gifted 12 year old, it would appear that 
once we are able to grasp the probe 'fully', we tend to become 
confused. If this child had displayed no confusion, it would have 
suggested that confusion is a level attained independently of one's 
comprehension of the question. 
Sophi st i cated confus i on seems to ari se predomi nantly from an attempt 
to remove the word from its everyday context and to philosophize about 
it. An example of confusion within a task is clear from one 12 year 
old's answer for Q75 ( 'Where do YOIl feel an ache?') : 
"you feel it - well, 1 i ke - in your head" (a s 
for pain/ not?) "yes and no. Most of the parts 
of the body you can have a pain, yo u can al so 
have an ache the re. But certai n parts, 1 ike ... 
say you've got a headache, then your head is 
sore and it. .. can't have a headache, i t' s not 
like a pain, it doesn't go - like one thing it 
goes on and off - a head pain - you can but -
not usually... -
Sophisti cated confusion relates not to perf orma nce variability at the 
level of language use but rather, to performance variabil ity at the 
level of metal inguistic awareness. Additional studies may indicate 
whether confusion occurs in different forms at different periods .. of 
development. 
Confusion was found on definition tasks, for example, certain adults 
and 12 year olds argued co ns isten tl y that same refers to one thing 
(identity notion) whereas similar refers to two things (equivalence 
notion) and that same can never, therefore, be used to apply to two 
things. They gave explanations such as: "".so people say 'same' but 
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they're actually wrong!" This demonstrates confusion in that this use 
of same in everyday language would not be ' wrong'. Rather, our 
everyday language use det"rmines the meaning of same. 
The following quotes from another , two adult subjects also reveal 
confusion : 
Same I think is stronger than similar. 
Similar, I would tend to think would 
have more extraneous features than same. 
(Classify how many?) urn . .. well, urn ... same 
I would tend to th ink one or two; similar 
I would tend to think ... three, four, possibly 
five . Beyond that it's getting to be, kind 
of - different . .. 
Same is one (object) and similar would be 
two different things. 
On other tasks, the 12 year o'ids and adults provided more succinct 
examples and explanations t han did the younger children. 
Sophisticated confusion is evident from 't he following response s One 
adult argued for same apples (Q35) 
"They the same - wait, let me t hink - I'd 
say they similar , ja, ' cos two things can't 
be the same - wait! they can ! they won't be 
the same - if you think about apples, you 
know, molecules etcetra .. . but they s imilar". 
Another adult argued on this task that they are 
"simil ar - t hey're the same shape and size 
but .two apples - you can never have two 
apples which are the same " . 
One adult suggested for Q33 (s ame ball) that 
"In my personal experience, one sort of 
says same r ather glibly without th inki ng 
of t he implications" that even though the 
sizes are differen t, one could still say 
"same " or maybe "similar" . 
In Q49 (same pain) , the 12 year old, gifted child argued in accordance 
with his view of same in all the othel- tasks, that "it's the same kind 
of pain, not the same pain ... if you say: 'They've got the same pain', 
it would be saying they share it". This reveals a level of confusion. 
In everyday conversation, we do say 'j've got the same pain as you' to 
mean 'I've got the same ki nd of pain ... '. This subject had emphasized 
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that two things can never be the same . However, this is not how we 
use the word same in our everyday language. 
The issue of sophisticated confusion is related to that of 
meta1 'ingui stic awareness and language use. Meta1inguistic questions 
about word meaning were found to lead to sophisticated confusion at 
the higher developmental peri ods. When we bring language back to its 
natural uses, sophisticated confusion is not apparent. The younger 
chi 1 dren constantly returned to examples from thei r own experi ences 
(see section 5.2 . 1) 
Although superfi cia 11 y equ i va 1 ent in content, certa in answers may be 
stimulated by very different underlying reasons, at different age 
levels . For example, at 6 years, a narrow perspective and inability 
to take into, account all the relevant facets of the si tuation( s) may 
lead to a certain conclusion which is arri ved at too, by adults who 
are confronted by so broad a range of issues that it 1 eads them to 
sophisticated confusion. Thi s is necessarily hypot hetical but the 
data shows very clear evidence of vacillat ion. Another pos sible 
conclusion would be that sophisticated confusion can occur at any age 
1 eve1 and it may then be po stll1 ated that thi s is due to the fuzzy 
boundaries between words and to the subtle alterations of sense due to 
the "grammar" of words in differe nt co ntexts. 
It would appear that sop hi sticated confusion occurs at an advanced 
level of language development. Six year olds 
because they do not understand the question. 
may not become confused 
Eight and ten year olds 
may not have reached t he 1 eve 1 where they are able to be creat i ve 1 y 
imaginative with language or Ivhere t hey are able to philosophize. 
Twelve year olds become confus "d: they understand the question and, 
1 ike adu1 ts, they move away from our everyd ay use of 1 anguage. 
Unlike syntax which is more clearly explained by a lingui st than by a 
lay person, word 
higher levels. 
clarification as 
We would imagine 
meaning lead s to sophi st icated confus ion at the 
To have sophisticated confusion rather than 
our end-state wou ld appe ar to be counter-intuit ive . 
that philosophers could arrive at clarification by 
drawing on theorie s which explain language. However, it is arg ued 
that the very nature of language, i ts chameleon var i ability in 
di ffer ent envi ronments and the "fami 1y resemb1 ance" 1 ink between the 
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uses of any 
formulated. 
particular word, prevents a precise theory from being 
As Rhees (1936, cited by Ken ny, 1982, p.40) states: 
A philosopher ha s temptations which an 
ordinary person does not have. We could 
say he knows better what the word means ... 
But actually philo sopher s generally k~ow less. 
Because ordinary people have no temptations to 
misunder s tand language. 
5.2.2 Variation in the child's performance over time when required 
to reflect upon word meaning 
Out of a total of 192 tasks (for all subjects) used to check 
test -retest re 1 i abi 1 ity, there were on 1 y eleven answers wh i ch were 
incompatible over the two testing sess ions. There was only 6% 
variance which was unaccounted for with 94% consistency, suggesting 
that the findings are not spurious (see Appendix H). These findings 
suggest that the criteria drawn on to explain the words tested may be 
viewed across all subjects in the entire sample rather than for each 
individual child. 
The majority of subject s in th e present study were cons i stent across 
these sets of tasks (the measure of internal consistency ) which 
suggests that our 'ideas about word meaning (those words assessed) are 
sufficientl y stable to lend themselves to spec ific investigation. 
Thi s finding also suggests that ,,,e Cdn aim to 'get to' the child's 
thinking , that is, to his 'deep ' understanding of these words. 
If the child answers incollsistently on the two tasks, it cou ld be that 
the tasks are not equivalent or that. the child is inconsistent. If 
the child answers consistently across the two tasks, it implies that 
the tasks are equivalent and that the child is consistent. Across the 
group of subjects as a ,,,hole, if most subjects are consistent, it 
suggests that the tasks al'e equivalent and that the few inconsistent 
subjects are genuinely in consis tent . If most subjects are 
inconsistent but few are consistent, the n the tasks would most likel y 
be equi valent or be able to be viewed as equivalent. However, 
cons i stency for re 1 at i ve 1 y few s ubj ects may be simply fortu itous . If 
all subjects are inconsistent, then the tasks are not equivalent. If 
they provide additional or different criteria when explaining the two 
questions, it adds an i mportant element to our understanding of the 
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complexity and diversity of the task and of the particular word being 
assessed. 
The interval between the two tasks is important to take into account. 
The child may assume that the tester requires the same answer or may 
equally assume that the tester would not ask the same question twice. 
In the latter case, he may deliberately offer a different answer, that 
is, he may attempt to view the question in a different way. 
Answers provided from one task to the next are most often not worded 
inexactly the same way so that it is 1 eft to the tester to judge 
whether these two answers are equivalent or not. Contradictions can 
clearly be recognized. However, it must be kept in mind that, if the 
two tasks are answered differently, this could possibly be due not to 
inconsistency on the part of the child but rather, to the fact that 
the task can be understood in different ways. This is impossible to 
rule out as a factor. If the child change s his mind, on these issues, 
then the inconsistency lies within the child. 
It is argued that the child's level of language and explanation is his 
1 evel of understanding of the task(s): to say that 6 year olds may 
have a certain concept but that they do not as yet, have the necessary 
language to express this knowl edge,i s questioned. We cannot argue 
that the probe question is not a valid one to ask 6 year olds because 
it is too difficult for them. Rather, it is their very inability to 
recognize the subtleties of the probe question which enlightens us as 
to their level of understanding of the probe and which illustrates 
their level of ability relative to that of t he older children. 
For this reason, the child's le ve "1 of answer to any particular 
question must be taken into account. Consulting his previous answers 
in order to check the child's ability may actually gloss over some of 
the subtle qualitati ve differences between questions. This approach 
woul d enhance the simi 1 arit i es between quest ions and undermi ne the 
differences, and may credit the chi l d beyond hi s level of performance. 
The present findings do not allow for clari ficatio n of the following 
i) whether "incons istency refl ects transition phase in 
development; 
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ii) whether inconsistency is related to the issue of conviction 
generally and , if so, in what way; 
iii) whether certain children and adults Jre simply more definite in 
their ideas than others; and 
iv) related to (iii) above, whether there are ' types ' rather than 
stages of development in word meaning, that is, qualitative types that 
can occur at any period of development rather than developmental 
stages in word meaning. 
Conviction in 6 yea r olds ma'y be due to their not grasping the 
subtleties of the probe question(s). There is al so a degree of 
instabil ity in the 6 year olds' answers, that i s, at times, they are 
readily swayed by the probes. 
5.3 Impl ications of the present Jil!.cfj!!9..~ 
Included in this section is a disclission 'o f the fonowing: 
5 . 3.1 Trends in the development of word me aning during the primary 
school period. 
5 .3 . 2 The role of ostensive defini tion and the concrete object in 
the learning of non-ostensive words. 
5.3.3 "Grammar" and the use of the term 'vocabu lary'. 
5.3 . 4 Generalizing ability within constraints. 
5 .3. 5 Implications for previous lingui stic and psycholinguistic 
approaches to word meaning. 
5.3.6 The "grammar" of words and Piaget' s st udie s. 
5.3 .1 Trends in the development of \vord meaning during t he primary 
schoo 1 peri od 
Fodor 's criticism of the stage approach (1980) on purely logical 
grounds (Section 2.2) i ncreases the need for cautio n when integrating 
the present findings. He argues that any progression in children's 
development occurs through biologically-determined l eve l s. The 
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present findings may be interpreted in line with Fodor's argument and 
may be explained as biologically-determined levels of development. On 
the other hand, these findings may reflect the increased mastery of 
older children of the scholastic definition game in comparison with 
younger children. Older children may be more indoctrinated with the 
pi cture of 1 anguage as a 'defi n it i ona 1 cal cul us'. ne use of ' general 
explanations' might be a symptom of sophisticated confusion . 
To date, researchers have not been abl e to propose stages for the 
development of word meaning: it would seem to be nearly impossible 
(Macdonald, 1985). Rather, trends or tendencies are descriptive of 
research findings. It is important to note that different words are 
subject to different "grammar" errors and that the linguistic context 
affects the use of a word at any particular period. This relates to 
the finding reported by Macdonald (1984) that the different aspects of 
metalinguistic awareness have been found to emerge at different 
periods of development. 
A summary overview of developmental trends Found in the present study 
is presented below (see table 14). This table necessarily provides 
on 1 y a broad out 1 i ne of deve 1 opmenta 1 trends. Un iformity and 
variability of responses across all subjects are the limiting 
conditions with regard to these trends. As was discussed in chapter 2 
(section 2.2.3c), it must be kept in mind that the subjects were drawn 
from a particular subgroup of the population. The findings may 
reflect universal trends, possibly developing at different rates in 
different population groups; or they may reveal culture-specific 
trends. Normative studies would be a useful follow-up in confirming 
these possibilities. 
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Table 14 
Summary overview of trends at different~ods of development 
Age Level 
2 - 4/ 5 years 
(Based on pilot 
study only) 
6 - 7 years 
8 - 9 years 
10 - 11 years 
12 - 13 years 
Adults 
1 "Grammar" 
1 
1 1- "grammar" errors in 
production 
- restricted use and 
understand ing of 
words across contexts 
- "grammar" errors 
minimal in production 
errors at level of 
comprehension on 
certain tasks 
- "grammar" errors 
mi n i ma 1 product i on 
- few "grammar" errors 
in comprehension 
- apparent regression on 
certain tasks 
"grammar" errors 
mi ni mal in production 
- few "grammar" errors 
in compre hen sion 
- awareness of 
metaphoric language 
Strategies 
Metalinguistic 
tasks difficult 
- example as 
explanation 
use word itself in 
explanation 
- example as explanation-> 
example in explanation 
example in explanation- > 
general explanation 
- no "grammar" errors 
in production or 
comprehension 
1 - sophisticated 
co nfus ion begins on 
metal inguisti c tasks 
- awarenes s of ambiguity 
begins on the present 
tasks 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
- awareness of metaphoric 1 
language at high 'I~vel 1 
1 
As for 12 - 13 years but l 
increase in complexity 1 
1 
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5.3.2 The role of ostensive definition and the 'concrete' object in 
the learning of non-ostens_ive ~/ords 
The present findings suggest that ostensive definition does not fully 
account for word learning. If we could learn the word's entire 
meaning by pointing it out, then a word would reta-in a single use or 
sense when appl ied in different contexts and definitions would be 
fully expl anatory. Furthermore, formi ng a mental image cannot be of 
importance in understand i ng and us i ng the word. I f a word a Hers its 
sense according to the context, then it is impossible to ascertain 
what mental image of the word would be built up. Would it be the same 
from one occasion of use to the next? If an image is built up in the 
mind, it must be i ncidental to the learning of word meaning and to the 
use of the word. Defi nit ions fail to encompass the mean i ng of a word 
but they include a part of its meaning thereby comprising one 
"language game" in which the word is used. 
When the findings for the question 'Hhat do you do when you think?' 
are viewed in relation to the issue of ostensive definition, they 
indicate that ostensive definition plays a role in the learning of the 
word think or of the concept 'THINK' but they also highlight the 
1 imitations of ostensive definition J S fully explaining the learning 
of the word think . We are able to point to a frown or to someone 
standing still but we cannot point to a thought. The child has 
1 earned the word in that context and the frown or the act i on of 
standing still is logically bound to the word: these are not 
inessentials. Since . we use specific criteria to determine that 
someone ·is thinking, it suggests that these behavioural criteria are 
important parts of the concept 'THINK'. 
It is evident, too, that ostensi ve definition plays a l imited role in 
the learning of non-ostensive as well as substantive words. As an 
example, apple is as 'concrete' a wot'd as possible, but, same apple 
imposes a particular sense on the "grammar" of apple in relation to 
that of same and determines whether one or two apples is/a re being 
referred to here, 
The language that the child has in his repertoire will limit his 
answer about the word think. However, his language ability forms part 
of his grasp of think at any particular period of development. In 
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analysi s, the content of answers versus 1 anguage use has been taken 
into account. As an ex amp 1 e, wi th pretend wh i ch seems to be acqu ired 
earl ier than think, the 6 year old USGS the word 'chaff' to convey 
what an older chil d mi ght convey in' p 1 ay- act' but the content or the 
idea expressed is equivalent . (In contrast, 'frown' was used by 6 
year olds and 'concentrate' by older children, in 'explaining think). 
It is tempt i ng to regard the word chaff as ' "ch i 1 drenese" and to as k 
what words the child could use to expl ain think in the same way that 
he can use 'chaff' to explain pretend? Adults too, found think 
difficult to explain. Even if we find no words in the child's 
expressive repertoire which are suitable, it does not alter the 
ongoing argument: the child does not have these 'adult' concepts in 
his repertoire and his focus on overt behaviours is his understanding 
of think at that period. A biologist may, similarly, give a 
biological explanation for 'What is an elephant? 'which a child cannot 
do as he lacks the biological terminology. The question is : Does the 
child want to answer in this way but lack the necessary language to do 
so? It seems rather, that the child's idea of think differs from that 
of the adult, thereby giving rise to the different explanations. 
Adults may be influenced by the type of answer they think they should 
be providing (for example , an an swer equivalent to a paradigm for a 
mathematical definition). Children ma'y an swer more freely, be closer 
to a ' good' anSI'/er, because they are not i nfl uenced by th is factor, 
that is, by what kind of answer they sho uld be giving. Our experience 
may constrain us as adults, leading us to provide an analytic answer. 
When asked: 
'What do you do when ... ?' 
Adults tend to answer in the form of a definition, as in 
'to think is to ... (for example, concentrate)'. 
Children on the other hand, answer in the form: 
'when you think you ... (for example, frown)'. 
The child is not yet constrain"d by the false sophistication of the 
adult. 
The increased language level of the older children and adults as well 
as their increased educational level and cognitive abilities must not 
be regarded as variables unaccounted for in this study. The school 
situation may lead the child to answer these questions in certain ways 
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but this is all part of the child's induction into language, society 
and culture. The se are not var ·iables but factors inherent in the 
developmental process. All children pass through these "stages" and 
their development of language must, of necessity, include these other 
developing skills and experiences. 
It is suggested that ·non-ostensive and substantive words are bound by 
similar constraints in the learning process, for example, pain is 
learned in the same way as chair but in different "language games" 
(see section 5.3.2) . Ostensive definition comes into play more with 
su bstantive words but again, it is not fully explanatory. Ostensive 
definition does not tell us how the child learns to use the word (for 
example, chair) in a variety of different contexts, for example, 'I'm 
sitting on the chair'; 'I'm pret.ending to be a chair'; 'Rover's hiding 
under the chair' . As Wittgenstein (1953, pt.97) states: 
Th ought is surrounded by a halo ... 
Whereas, of course, if the words 
"language", "experience", ".world" 
have a use , it must be as humble a 
one as that of the words "table", 
Itlampll, IIdoor n , 
An ostensive definition account of t.he learning of word meaning fails 
to explain the process which underlies the child's development of 
words. Rather, from the findings, it. appea rs that children progress 
from the senses of words as they cluster around physical objects to 
their senses as applied to non-phys ical entities. This would suggest 
that words are not all equally 'humble ' either heuristically or 
conceptually . These uses may underl ie the extended appl ications of 
words that develop in the later stages. We do know that certain words 
are learned earlier than others and the se are generally described as 
'concrete' or 'substantive' words. 
I n the use of pa in, it .Ias found that same pa i n changed from an 
emphasis on place to that of type in these tasks. Thi s suggests that 
for younger children, the word pain may possibly have greater kinship 
with words denoting physi cal objects than for older children. It is 
not being argued that words are either 'concrete' or 'abstract' but 
that the child will first understand the .lOrd in a physical object 
sense (for example, same ball ) and only later in other contexts (for 
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example, same pain). His early understanding of same pain may not 
include the sense of same as applied to non-ostensive words. 
The tasks assessing the word in a diversity of linguistic environments 
investigate conceptual meaning by analyzing the way in which one word 
influences the ~ense which is attached to the meaning of the word with 
which it co-occurs. Words such as same and ball, same and pain, 
pretend and walk can occur together and do not, therefore, viol ate 
collocational, selectional or stylistic constraints. However , it was 
found that the child develops from being able to interpret these words 
when they occur with words which have external reference, focusing on 
that aspect of the word's meaning which pertains to something 
obs~rvable to interpreting these phrases in more 'abstract' terms. As 
an example, same ball appears to be learned earlier than same pain 
with the latter leading to sophisticated confusion at the 12 year old 
and particularly, the adult levels. Same leaf, in a task assessing 
sameness or continuity over a period of time, led the youngest 
children to focus on observable aspects . of the situation such as the 
colour of the leaves whereas the older children ignored these changes 
in drawing their conclusions. 
5.3.3 "Grammar" and the us~ of J:.!~~rlll 'vocabulary' 
Piaget drew our attention to stages of development in children 's 
thinking and to how children's thinking differs from that of adults: 
it led to importan t consequences in our understanding and assessment 
of children. Similarly, children do not use words in the same way as 
do adults. To date, vocabu lary studies have imposed an adult 
perspective on the child. 
It was found that children of 6 years of age have only a partial 
understanding of certain se lected words when te sted on numerous tasks, 
even though they are able to use the se words appropriately in their 
spontaneous 1 anguage. Thei r understandi ng was found to develop with 
increasing age. Vocabulary studies to date would regard a child as 
'having a \~ord in his repertoire ' if he is able to use it 
appropriately. This view assumes that a word is acquired once and for 
a 11 with no further deve 1 opmen t occurr'i ng. However, from the present 
findings , it is fallacious to conclude that the chi ld 'h as ' a word in 
his vocabulary. Questioning the child about word meaning reveals his 
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partial understanding and we are required to modify our use of the 
term 'vocabulary': our use vades depending on the age level with 
which we are concerned. A child may be said to have a word in his 
repertoire if , at a particular age level, he has the use and 
understanding of that word within the variety of contexts appropriate 
to children of his particular age group. With age, the uses of words 
already in his repertoire become extended and the number of words in 
his repertoire also increases . 
Psychology studies on word frequency (Section 2.3.3b) commonly record 
words as they hear them expressed by children of different age levels. 
However, this approach 
of these words and, 
takes no account of the child's understanding 
particularly, of his understanding over a 
diversity of contexts. It takes no account of the development in word 
mean i ng that occurs beyond the pre schoo 1 peri od. A ch i 1 d of 6 years 
may use a word in the same number of contexts as. a 12 year old but 
their understanding and explanations of use will differ. It is this 
aspect for which vocabulary studies fail to account. 
Vocabulary tests regard the child' s li se of a word as indi cat ive that 
he has the word in his repertoire and score for an all-or-none 
response. Rather , the tester shou ld delve beyond this surface level 
to the child 's grasp of what he understand s when he uses the word in 
different 1 i ngui st i c contexts. They draw on 1 i mited defi nit ions of 
words and do not take into account how senses of words alter according 
to context nor how a child's gra sp of a word's meaning alters 
qualitatively with development. 
In the present study, the majority of children displayed no difficulty 
in using the word correctly, as ~/as noted in the tasks asseSSing 
initial sentence formulation. Yet, with further questioning, they 
revealed differences in performance with age and from one task to 
another using the same word. 
The relationship between comprehension and production requires 
reconsideration in light of the "grammar" of the word vocabulary, and 
is discussed in the section which follows. 
5.3.4 Generalizing ability within constraints 
Leech (1974, pp.30-31) explains that the categories of language are 
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part i ally arbitrary: "conceptual boundari es of teo vary from language 
to language in a way that defies principled explanation"; and 
" ... languages have a tendency to 'impose structure upon the real 
world' by treating some distinctions as cruc ial, and ignoring others". 
Leech (ibid) discusses the two processes of generalization and 
differentiation as being involved in concept learning . Generalization 
is the process whereby the child extends a name from certain referents 
to all objects which share attributes of those referents. 
Differentiation, the complementary process, restricts the reference of 
the word thereby excluding certain objects from it s range of 
reference . Since both processes can not be learned s imultaneousl y, the 
child either overgeneralizes or undergeneralizes (Leech, ibid). 
Children have an innate capacity for generalizing, that is, they have 
the ability to combine words in no vel ways. Children have the 
flexibil ity to be able to shift the senses of a word in different 
contexts. The "grammar" of each word i n the language differs from the 
"grammar" of any other word in the language. It is unimaginable that 
the child hears the word used in every s ingl e context i n which he i s 
subsequently able to apply it. To gcneralize a ~Iord's meaning to a 
variety of "language games", the uses of which bear a "family 
resembl ance" to each other ratlier than be ing exact repl icas of each 
other , woul d appear to be a n,markab 1 e abi I ity. We know t hat each 
word could not possibly be taught (whether directly or indirectly) nor 
could a child be exposed to every poss ible use of a word in every 
possible I inguistic context. Each Vlord has an infinite var iety of 
uses and this would be a task so formidable as to prevent the child's 
learning language at all. It appear s, therefore, that there must be a 
process underlying the child's ability to l earn the "grammar" of words 
and that this l11ust have some innate capacity, for example, his innate 
ability to make general ization s from one context of use to another. 
The chi I d may not even detect that he i s us i ng the same word, for 
example, feel in feel the dog and feel the pain.Thi s genera lizing 
abil ity may parallel our abil ity to group items in the environment 
selectively in terms of their similarities within a particular context 
(which may be grouped differently in another context). As Leech 
(ibid, p.39) states: 
It is both the great virtue and the great 
vice of linguistic categories that they 
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simplify things for us, by disregarding 
many of the boundaries and gradations that 
could theoretically be distinguished. 
Furthermore, the child is able to exercize selective constraints in 
his uses of a word, for example, pain can only occur with certain 
other words in the language (we could not say: 'I taste pain'). It is 
not being suggested that the words, themselves, are innate but rather, 
that certain organlzlng principles are innate. The ability to 
generalize could not be learned and is essential for using language. 
The "grammar" of words highlights the importance of this generalizing 
ability in our language use . 
The ' "grammar" of words for any language is specific to that language. 
This aspect of the language would seem, therefore, to have no innate 
factors as a basis. It is tied up with the cultural and social 1 ife ' 
of the child (Bruner, 1966, 1977, 1978). Language is part of a larger 
process whereby the child is inducted into the form of life of his 
particular cultural group. However, all children in all cultures 
learn language. The process underlying hi s learning of the "grammar" 
of words would seem to be universal. 
The younger children may display greater flexibility because they do 
not yet take account of the constraints of language. Hence, their use 
of 1 anguage frequently para 11 e 1 s the fi gurat i ve 1 anguage of older 
children and adults. However , their restricted knowledge of the world 
imposes other limits on their use of language which may lead to their 
displaying conviction when probed. Their limited real-world knowledge 
restricts the possibilities that they would otherwise take into 
account. 
5.3.5 :...F.:.:i nc.:d::.;ic:.n:.;,g",s_--,ic.:n_--,r.::ec:..l, at,:.::' o",nc.......--"t 0 pre v i 0 II S linguistic and 
psycholinguistic approaches to word meaning 
5.3.5(a) The meaning of a liord alters according to the context in 
which it occurs. This suggests that the distinction between 
'linguistic concepts' and 'Piagetian concepts' i s a useful one since 
these concepts are not subject to the same influences. 
5.3.5(b) The 
of the feature 
present research questions the psychological real ity 
theory approaches. "Grammar" was found to descri be 
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deve 1 opment beyond the preschool peri od. It was argued that a core 
theory of meaning is 1 imited in explaining word meaning during this 
period and context was regarded as important when explaining 
non-ostensive word meaning. 
5 .3.S(c) The examples presented in sections 5.1.2(d) and 5.1.2(e) 
for same pain and pretend pain , highl ight the difference between the 
present interest in co-occurrence relations and that of other 
researchers such as Katz (1972) and Leech (ibid) . Stylistic, 
collocational and selectional constraints are of interest in the 
present study only insofar as they contribute to our ~nderstanding of 
certain uses of the words investigated, For example, give pain may be 
partially explained by means of selectional restrictions. Pretend in 
relation to walk versus be in pain versus sing illustrates the present 
focus on conceptual mean ing. Pretend can occur in all of these 
linguistic contexts but, in each case, 
"1 anguage game", the 1 atter stemmi ng from 
walk, pain and sing. 
it enc?mpasses 
the mean i ng of 
an entire 
the words 
5.3.5(d) The relationship between "grammar" and syntax is a complex 
one. Children of different age levels answer the questions 
differently (examples as explanation~ versus general explanations) 
hence revealing their varied interpretations of the phrases ('What is 
a . . . ' at the l evel of "grammar"). It is also suggested that the 
meaning of a word, its "grammal'", determines the way in which it is 
used syntactically rather than the reverse. 
The present fi nd i ngs challenge a core theory of mean i ng, for example, 
that of the feature theory approach. The 1 atter do not adequately 
account for the way in which a word alters its sense according to the 
linguistic context in which it occurs. 
It was found that younger children apply words in restricted senses 
only. A particular linguistic context fails to elucidate for them any 
specific sense of the word: they tend to ignore these particular 
senses i n favour of thei r usual under standing of the word and they 
display conviction in their answers when probed. 
5.3.5(e) Overext ension and the "grammar" of words 
The child's overextension of a wo rd , for exampl e , dog to include all 
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animals, is a process similar to that of the "grammar" of words and 
may actually be explained by means of "grammar". Similarly, the child 
may understand the word do at a comprehension level (on metalinguistic 
tasks) to suggest an activity' and may overextend this sense of the 
word to think when asked the question: 'What do you do when you 
think?' 
It may be useful to investigate children's overextension of non-
ostens i ve words as has been done with substant i ve words, for example, 
does he use pain to mean ache. The child's spontaneous use may not be 
revealing in this regard. However, when he applies the word, we need 
to question him in simple terms about his use so as to investigate any 
further extension of the word. 
5.3. 5(f) Cl ark's contrast approach to word 1 earn i ng (1983) may 
apply equally to words as they co-occur in specif i c lingui st i c 
contexts. As an example, the child may understand feel to mean 
'touch' which he then applies in the context of feel pain . It is 
only when he gains a better understanding of the "grammar" of the word 
pain that he will better understand feel pain as meaning 'experiencing 
pain' or perhaps , his increasing understanding of the word feel will 
add to his understanding of th., word pain. This suggests that the 
child unintentionally contrasts the se nses of a particular word with 
the senses of another word , prior to hi s bei ng abl e to correctly 
understand the two words in combinatiun. It is important to emp ha s ize 
once again that the chi l d's spontaneous use will not reflect the depth 
of his understanding as metalinguistic questions are able to do. 
5.3.5(g) The present findings in relation to the claim that word 
labels are mapped onto preformed concepts 
The young child displays meta linguistic differences from the adult. 
This difference suggests that th e view which considers the word to be 
a label attached to a pre viously-formed concept, i s erroneous. This 
view would only hold if -the concept, once learned, undergoes no 
further changes through the course of development. If thi s were the 
case then it would suggest that the idea of think is something in the 
mind, perhaps an image in the mind. This poses two clearly 
recognizable problems . First, there are arguments against the idea of 
the concept as an image (for example, Wittgenstein , 1969, pp.10-11). 
If this were the case, the child ~/O uld have no means of answering 
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quest ions such as 'What do yo u do when you th ink?' He woul d either 
answer as an adult does (implying that he has the concept) or he would 
not answer at all indicating that he does not have the concept. This 
was not the case in the present ta sk. 
The findings revealed differences between the children's and the 
adults' answers. Behaviours such as frowning are an integral part of 
the concept of thinking , even for adults. The child focuses on the se 
aspects because he is closer to having learned this word. 
Furthermore, these 'adjuncts' for any particular word are not 
arbitrary : a few characteristics are identified with a particular word 
(see picture task Q100) which both children and adults would commonly 
associate with that particular concept. These facets are, therefore, 
not peri phera 1 to the idea of th i nk i ng but are an important part of 
its meaning. 
The 'name as label' theorist would argue that t he·child does not yet 
have the concept 'THINK' . However , the presen t findings reveal that 
he is able to use the word think . If the concept precedes the word in 
the acquisition process, t hen his using the word necessarily suggests 
that he has the concept. Contrarily, the present approach views the 
development of the word as occurring along a continuum. 
It i s not the case from tile present findings that the child 
understands the word as does the adul t nor that he uses the word and 
therefore, must necessarily understand it as does the adult. If it is 
argued that the child may rather interpret the question 'Wh at do you 
do .. ' differently from the adult, it impl ies that he has a different 
understanding of this question from that of the adult: again, a 
progression in the development of word-meaning is suggested. 
5.3.5(h) Prototype approaches ~ld_ a core meaning 
The approach adopted in the present study, namely, that of "grammar" 
of words, "language games" and "fami l y resemblances", is not su bject 
to the criticisms levelled against the feature theories: it favours a 
holistic approach in language learning as does the prototype approach; 
it includes "family resemblances" as did Rosch (1973a, 1973b, 1975 ) in 
her highly accl aimed work; it does not deny that a word has some 
stabil ity of meaning but it denies that t here is a 'core' meaning 
which encompasses the entire mean ing of the word. It must be 
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emphasized that Rosch was not concerned with assessing words according 
to the linguistic contexts in which they occur, as is the focus of the 
present study. 
The present fi nd i ngs do not contrad i ct the idea of "fami 1 y 
resembl ances". "Chaff" was a common definition offered for the word 
pretend as was the suggestion that pretend impl ies "doing something 
that isn't real" . However, this does not suggest that there is a core 
concept for all uses of the word pretend as this is only a part of the 
meaning of pretend. 
It is argued that words do not have a central core meaning but that 
their meaning is their use in a variety of linguistic contexts. 
However, it is not being denied tilat there is some stabil ity of 
meaning. If there were no stabil ity of meaning, we would be able to 
use words as Humpty Dumpty did: 
"I don't know what you mean by 'g lory''', Alice said. 
"I meant there's a ni ce kno.ck -down argument for you! ,,, 
"But 'glory' doesn't mean 'a nice knock-down 
argument ,'" Alice objected. 
"When I use a \<o y·d", Humpty Du mpty said, in rather a 
scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to 
mean - neither more nor less'. 
"The quest ion is", sa id Alice, 'whether you 
can make words mean so many different things". 
As an example, words such as pain and ache overlap in their senses 
(their boundaries are fuzzy). Howeve r, the areas in which no overlap 
in senses occurs is not what constitutes a core of meaning for each 
-word. The meaning for each of these words comes from thi s one sense 
together with all the other senses in which the word is used. 
i) Common answers were found for all the children on the definit io n 
questions because there is only a small voca bulary in English with 
which to explain pretend, that is, a small group of words which all ow 
for paraphrase. All subjects tend to draw on this same set of words. 
However, when they use the words 'chaff" or 'doing something that 
isn't real', they do not necessarily build up a me ntal image in their 
minds. Views which suggest that tilere is a 'core' meaning imply that 
an image of the meaning may be bui lt up in the mind. It must be 
remembered that Rosch (ibid) suggested this for category membership 
which may hold but which does not app l y to word meani ng as assessed in 
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the present study. Even with paraphY'use , if we favour a core meaning 
approach, we would have to account for the core meaning of each of 
the words in the paraphrase which would go on indefinitely . All we 
would be able to conclude then would be that: 'pretend is pretend'. 
We do not learn a word ' s meaning through its definition since, if we 
did, we would have to go on defining the definition ad infinitum. 
ii) Pretend does not always mean "doing something that isn't real". 
As an example, acting on stage involves acting in every way 1 ike the 
person one is trying to be. The broader situation is not real but 
there is al so a shift in emphasis with regard to what is not real 
within the si tua t ion. 
Similarly, for the word same: it may be def i ned as 'two things alike ', 
'having things in common', but , this does not mean that we have to, or 
that we can, build up a picture of "common '" in our minds whenever we 
use the word same . The present researcher argues · that words do have 
definite, stable meanings. However, this meaning is revealed by a 
study of the corpus of lang uage use, rather than by establ ishing the 
core meaning witllin the word . 
5.3.6 The "grammar" of words and Piaget's studies 
Piaget's epistemology is essentially built on the 
growing chi ld's logico-mathematica l interaction 
with an ever-extending physical environment. It 
can be argued that Piaget has underestimated the 
importance of chi ldren' s constructive interaction 
with other environment s, such as the linguistic one 
(Karmiloff-Smith , 1977, p.393). 
Although it must be kept in mi nd that Pi aget ' s model was not des i gned 
to explain language acquisition and that it resists such application 
(Sinclair 1976a , 1976b), the child's conception of the word will 
affect his use of language. As an example, the child may use pain 
with car , pins and needles \vith come out, and sun with follows (you) . 
These errors of "grammar" appear to be li nked to the child's view of 
the world at particul ar stages of development. 
Similarly, children anthropomorphize ~/ith rega rd to their world. To 
the extent that a car may be fantasized as being 'like a human', it 
can be said to be angry. In this case, no "grammar" issue is 
revealed. However , if reg"arded as an inanimate object, then this task 
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reflects an error of "grammar". Part of the meaning of the word is 
the way in which it can be used in the language. In order to use the 
word pain, the child must come to know that we can say: 
'1 have a pain in my toe' 
But not: *'1 have a pain in London ' 
that is, that pain 'goes Ivith' in but only when in is used in specific 
ways; 
that we can say: 
and: 
'I am in pain' but not *'1 am in ache' 
'I am aching' but not *'1 am paining' 
Piaget's study of naming with older children, in which he asks 
questions such as: 'Why is the sun called "the sun"?' aimed to 
determi ne how the chi 1 d 1 earns to call the sun, , the sun'. However , 
what he is also asking is: HolY does the child learn to answer the 
question: 
What is x called? 
--.• 
or Why is that called t hat? 
In other words, there is a 1 anguage factor that enters into these 
questions and the results can be interpreted acco rding· to the 
"grammar" of the words in the question. Piaget draws on a particular 
"language game" in asking these questions and there may be a 
developmental progression in the chil d 's answering questions related 
to 'calling' something by name. Piaget did not take the language into 
account in his interpretation of children's answer s. If reinterpreted 
from the perspective of "g rammar", Piaget's findings can be understood 
in a different ~Iay. This does not deny his cognitive basis but 
suggests that the child's grasp of the language at a particular stage 
(hi s grasp of the language is related to a cogn iti ve stage) determines 
his answers. As with the tasks in the present study, the young child 
may initially understand where as referring to something external to 
himself and only later, as suggesting something internal. 
It would also be of interest to assess chndren's knowledge of words 
such as same, more and less from the perspective of "grammar" and then 
to assess these children on concrete operational tasks. It is 
possible that their level of understanding of th e "grammar" of t he se 
Ivords wi 11 e 1 uc i date why certa inch i 1 dren perform better than others 
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on these tasks and why a particular child may not perform equa ll y on a • 
number of concrete operational tasks. 
5.4 Model of the development of the meani ng of non -ostens i ve words 
in primary school chi ldren 
The present findings ' for the ~Iords same, pa in and pretend together 
with their semantica ll y- linked words highlight the theoretica l notion 
of the "grammar" of words that the senses of a word alter according to 
the words with which, and the expression and disco ur se types in which, 
they occur. This was concluded from the explanations provided by 
primary school children regarding their understanding of these words 
when applied in different contexts. For any particular group of 
children and for the group of adults, the meaning of a word altered 
(in emphasis) according to the context in which it occurred. In 
addition, subjects' definitions of a word encompassed only a part 
rather than the whole of its meaning. Subjects were unable to 
demarcate clear boundaries for wOI-ds and semantically-l inked words 
were found to overlap in certain of their uses . 
It appears on the basis of the above co nclusion s that word meaning i s 
by its very nature, difficult to forlllalize in an el egant theory. We 
have no rules to govern our use si nce the rules of use vary from word 
to word and for any particular word, from linguistic context to 
linguistic co ntext. 
Perhaps 
meanings 
itself . 
we need to formalize strategies for explaining how the 
of words are learned rather than formalizing word meaning 
Thi s relates to the problem of how much information is 
contained in the word or language itself 
the part of the child (section 5.1.1d). 
and how much is inference on 
When a child appl ies a word 
incorrect 1 y, a di st i nct i on may be made between these two factors. 
However, from the viewpoint of "grammar", t he meaning stems from the 
use of the word in the language. Therefore , separating the meaning of 
the word from its use in the language, leads us only to a restricted 
use of the word. 
We cannot encapsulate within a theory the way in Ivhich a chi ld learns 
every word in the 1 anguage. Perhaps we need rather to accept that 
language does not lend itself to such specif icatio n and that, at best, 
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we can offer a method for ana 1 ys is , the t ypes of quest ions to be 
asked, what to look for and how 
(word meaning) to speak for itself . 
to proceed, all owi ng 1 anguage 
A~ Wittgenstein states: 
... my thoughts were soon cri pp 1 ed if I tri ed 
to force them on in any s ingle direction against 
'their natural inclination . 
And this was, of course, connected with 
the very nature of the investigation. For 
this compels us to travel over a wide field 
of thought cI'iss-cross in every direction . . . 
(ibid, Preface , p.vi). 
use 
A schematic model summarizing the present approach to word meaning 
including its development, possible innateness factors and a method 
of assessment, follows. This concludes the prese nt chapter . 
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5.4 Model of the development of ' non-ostensive word meaning in 
primary school children : This model summarizes the principles 
or major tenets of the present approach and outlines the method 
of assessment and developmental variati on. 
"Grammar" and non-ostensive word meaning 
in primary school children 
Method of Assessment 
Meaning is the primary focus 
Sense alters according to context 
Definition s reveal only a part of the word's 
meaning 
Non-ostensive words have fuzzy boundaries 
'Vocabulary' must account for changes in 
development of word meaning with age 
Word meaning, by its very nature, makes 
formaliza tio n difficult 
Constraints on word use: a word can co-occur 
with certain selec t words in the language only. 
Development 
Metalinguistic questions Ability to generalize in 
specific ways for different 
words/word combinations 
continues through de ve lopment. 
Standard probe questions 
Judgements 
Words must be analysed in 
the context of their use(s) 
Analysis of each word in a 
variety of tasks and in 
different linguistic contexts 
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Strategies differ with age 
Trends in content occur at 
different age levels 
Changes in word meaning with 
age 
Regression on certain tasks 
at +- 8 years 
Word applied according to its 
physical object sense or in 
relati on to a phYSical object 
- > non- physical entities 
Ostensive definition limited in 
explaining non-ostensive word 
mean ing 
"Language games" explain 
development from child to adult 
Sophisticated co nfusion part of 
the end -state 
CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, a summary of the major findings 
Thereafter, educational and clinical implications 
discussed followed by suggestions for future research. 
6.1 Summary of major findings 
is presented. 
are briefly 
The present findings have major theoretical and cl inical impl ications 
for adopting an alternate approach.to the study of word meaning. 
This study elucidate the value of metalinguistically-phrased questions 
and judgements in the study of word meaning in 6-12 years olds. This 
method highl ighted di fferences which spontaneous product ion and 
eXisting methods of el iciting comprehension have failed to capture at 
this developmental period. This method also afforded a means of 
assessing non-ostensive words which a.re difficult to investigate 
formally because they cannot be suitably represented in a visual 
display. The present findings revealed the limitations in previous 
vocabulary studies and suggested a reconsideration of our use of the 
term 'vocabulary'. 
A developmental progression was found in the strategies employed by 
the subjects to answer the metalinguistically-phrased questions. 
Furthermore, children of different ages (both within and between 
groups) assigned different meanings to the words as these words 
occurred in diverse contexts. The ansl'lers also varied depending on 
the word: certain words revealed developmental trends in specific 
contexts (same in same pain); others gave rise to uniformity across 
age groups (pretend as assessed in a variety of 1 inguistic contexts) ; 
whereas others resulted in variability across subjects (the fuzzy 
boundary tasks for all the words). 
Trends rather than definite stages were noted in the development of 
word meaning dUl'ing this period. It is of importance that a reverse 
trend was found, predominantly at 8 years of age, on a variety of 
tasks for all the words. Further investigations may provide a 
suitable explanation. However, it is clear that a lack of smooth 
development must be taken into account in our description of child 
- 348 -
language. Similarly, the 'sophisticated confusion ' noted in the 
adults' performance alters our perspective on what constitutes an 
end-goal in the development of word meaning. Apparent confusion 
occurs naturally as part of the developmental process . 
. 
The present theoretical framework questioned a number of approaches to 
word meaning: those which favour a core theory of meaning; referential 
and ideational philosophical approaches to word meaning; approaches 
which advocate ostensive definition as primary in language learning; 
and those psycholinguistic approaches which regard words as labels for 
previ ously- acqui red concepts. The present ori entat i on was 
on the basis of a critical analysis of these approaches. 
formulated 
This study 
did not aim to deal with these issues directly but the findings add 
support to these criticisms. 
The role of ostensive definition was questioned as a primary factor in 
the learning of non-ostensive words . This suggests either that its 
role has been overplayed in the learning of substantive words or that 
substantive and non-ostensive words are subject to different learning 
processes. The former opt i on was favoured by the present research 
drawi ng on "1 anguage games", the different discourse types in wh i ch a 
word may be used, to explain the learning of all words. It was found, 
however, that the senses of the words assessed were initially those 
relating to the more ' concrete' application of the word. This may 
suggest that certain processes operate in the learning of substantive 
words as well as of certain senses of non-ostensive words. Ostensive 
definition appears to contribute to the learning of all words as does 
the linguistic context in which the word is used . 
The present findings high l ighted the usefulness of the term "grammar". 
This term led to an investigation of aspects of word meaning which had 
not been taken into account in other approaches concerned with 
co-occurrences constraints. The "grammar of words involves 
co-occurrence preferences over and above those encompassed by terms 
such as . 'selectional restrictions' and 'collocational constraints'. 
It takes account not only of idiomatic expressions or of co-occurrence 
tendencies, but also of the manner in which the meaning of the word is 
altered according to its I inguistic context. Developmentally, the 
notion of "grammar" led to an evaluation of the extent to which 
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children of different ages are able to account for linguistic context 
in making judgements about a word's meaning. 
Theoretically, it was posited that a word derives its meaning from its 
use in a variety of contexts. It was concluded from the f i ndings that 
the term "grammar" is a necessary one in our expl ication of the 
deve 1 opment of word mean i ng. L i ngu i st i c context affects our use and 
understanding of a word, thereby contributing to the meaning of the 
word. Definitions were incomplete in elucidating the meanings of the 
non-ostensive words assessed and it was argued that definitions 
discount the importance of linguistic context in word 
Fuzziness of words seems to afford a certain flexibil ity so 
meaning. 
that the 
word can alter its sense depending upon its linguistic environment. 
Developmental differences were foundi n eh i 1 dren' s abi 1 ity to account 
for the alterations in sense that a word undergoes in different 
linguistic contexts. This suggests that the child has to learn the 
numerous senses of every word in the language in a diversity of 
1 inguistic contexts. In addition , he must learn the specific set of 
words with which each word can co-occur and the shifts in sense which 
the word undergoes in each linguistic environment. 
It was suggested that the child has an innate abil ity to general ize 
while learning language. However, as was emphasized, an elegant 
theory of word meaning may be implausible due to the very nature of 
word meaning and the "grammar" of ~Iords. Furthermore , it was not the 
aim of this study to formulate a theory of word meaning. Rather, a 
model of development during the 6-12 year period was proposed and a 
method of analyzing children's language abilities was offered. The 
application of this model to applied fields is discussed in the 
sections which follow. 
6.2 Clinical and educational implications 
As the present study was inspired, in part, by cl inical observations 
of children with language difficulties, it seems only fitting to offer 
suggestions to assist workers in applied fields. These will be 
presented briefly. 
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6.2.1 A method of assessment is suggested rather than a formal 
test.Metalinguistically-phroszej questions requiring justifications for 
answers and examining a ch ild 's understanding of a word in a variety 
of different contexts is advocated. We need to transcribe language 
samples for preschool children and for aphasic adults. From such 
samples, we will be able to examine the specific types of "grammar" 
errors that occur in different ling uis t ic contexts. As an example, do 
aphasic adults make certain mistakes when using same with pain but not 
with ball and what aspects of th e "grammar" of each word are violated? 
6.2.2 Language testing 
6. 2.2(a) We need to clarify our use of the term 'vocabulary' and to 
alter our methods of testing children for word meaning. The present 
findings suggest that we need to grade the child's understanding of a 
particular word in a variety of tasks which use the word in diverse 
1 inguistic contexts. A quantitative measu re will tell us 1 ittle about 
t he ch ild's vocabulary abilities relative to others in his age group. 
The type of answer he provides and his l evel of understanding of t he 
word is an important diagnostic factor. Answers will reflect whether 
the child is responding comparably to a younger chi ld , an older child, 
or to his peers. His responses on a variety of tasks are important to 
take into account as is his individual use of certa in words. 
Vocabul ary tests to date either assume a correct versus incorrect 
response, or at best, allow for a partially correct response. 
However, further anal ysis is required within these responses: children 
from 6-12 years may be presented 11ith the same (equ i valent) set of 
questions but the types of responses they offer will reveal whether 
they are functioning within their age level or not. 
6.2.2(b) Language tests may also be extended by including 
metalinguistically-phrased questions. There is a particular dearth of 
tests for children beyond the preschool period and 
metalinguistically-phrased questions may offer an avenue for 
augmenting our testing skills. Tests to date generally evaluate 
language comprehension and production. 
6.2.2(c) Metalinguistic tasks are presented predominantly verbally. 
However, language tests have attempted to minimize language use both 
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in admi ni strat i on of test items and in the response 
(particularly when working with children who present with 
required 
language 
difficulties). The present research suggests that, in this way, we 
tend to lose useful information about the child's performance and 
ability, for example, the extent to which he comprehends 
metalinguistic questions and the level of explanation he offers to 
substantiate his answers. At a preschool level, metal inguistic tasks 
woul d be i nappropri ate but for the pri mary school ch i 1 d, they may be 
particularly enlightening. 
6.2.2(d) In testing preschool children, we need to take into 
account not only semantic factors (that is, the use of the word as 
agent, object, etc.) and pragmatic factors (that is, the use of the 
word to gain attention, make a request, and so on) as has been 
emphas i zed by speech/l anguage therapi sts (for example, Prutt i ng, 
1979) but also, the "grammar" of the words that the child uses (that 
is, the child's use of the word in a diversity of linguistic 
contexts) . The pragmat i c approaches are. concerned wi th how the chi 1 d 
uses language to communicate. The present approach emphasizes the use 
of a word in particular linguistic contexts within communicative 
situations. 
6. 2.2(e) In hi s study of children's comprehension of more and less 
Palermo (1973) points out that findings of studies may have differed 
due to the differences between the tasks used in assessment. The 
present researcher argues that these tasks al so demand a di fferent 
"grammar" of the words being assessed and that it is the alterations 
in word mean i ng accord i ng to the context, wh i ch may be the cruc i a 1 
intervening variable. 
6.2 . 2(f) The present metalinguistically-phrased questions may be 
too difficult for preschool children. We need to ascertain at what 
age level they are unable to answer these questions at all. What may 
be more appropriate is questioning the child indirectly on the basis 
of his spontaneous errors of "grammar". 
6. 2. 2(g) We need to determine whether language-impaired chi ldren 
present wi th a greater number of errors of "grammar" than do normal 
preschool children and whether their errors are of the same type or 
not. 
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It is of interest that some children who present with what is regarded 
as 'cluttering' behaviour, that is, very rapid speech, atonal in 
qua 1 ity, have been noted by the present researcher to d i sp 1 ay errors 
of "grammar" both in the preschool years and 1 ater at school 1 evel . 
These errors are also transferred from verba l to written language. 
Thi s requi res detai 1 ed study but may throw 1 ight on what frequently 
appears to be a difficulty with general izing. The child has to be 
taught the different or numerous uses of a word in contrast to a 
normal child who is able to apply the word appropriately in different 
contexts. Children with language impairments are frequently unable to 
select out similar features and to ignore differences in applying 
words. Wiig and Semel (1980) have reported on learning disabled 
children who fail to recognize ambiguity and who focus on one meaning 
of a wo rd only. This requires further assessment from the viewpoint 
of "grammar" namely, in what contexts do these children fail? 
6.2.2(h) When taking a language sample , it is not sufficient to 
note the extralinguistic context in which the child produces an 
utterance. We need to note down, as well, the linguistic context in 
which the word is produced. As an example, in what linguistic 
contexts does the child use the word same (for example ball/dress); in 
what "language games " does he use the Hord, that is, is he able to use 
and understand the word pain in a "language game " about his own pain; 
about others' pa in; about pretend i ng versus really be i ng in pa in; and 
what is his intention in each particular context? Are there any 
spontaneous "grammatical" errors in his uses of the word? And, if so, 
in what linguistic contexts do these errors occur? 
6.2.3 Teaching vocabulary 
When teaching vocabulary to children with language and learning 
problems, it is not sufficient to simply have a theme around which our 
therapy is structured. We have to design the presentation of each 
word, that is, decide on the linguistic contexts in whic h each word 
should be presented. Investigation is required to determine whether a 
language-impaired child will ultimately be able to generalize from a 
number of direct uses of the word in different linguisti c contexts. 
This may app l y equally to the word finding difficulties of aphasic 
adults and to the difficulties they experience when generalizing 
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spontaneously from one context to another. Again, further research is 
required in this regard. Metalinguistically-phrased questions may 
extend our understanding of the language abilities of adults who 
present with different types of aphasia. 
Principles that can guide the teaching of verbal language 
children will hold · equally1C hearing-impaired children 
language. It is speculated that hearing-impaired children 
to normal 
use sign 
taught by 
oral-aural methods may be 'rigid' in their language use because they 
are not exposed to sufficient "1 anguage games". They are, therefore, 
unable to take account of the "grammar" of words in different 
linguistic contexts. 
6.2.4 Language and reading 
The present findings have impl ications for the teaching of reading 
using a language-experience approach. The present findings suggest 
that it would be important to improve the child's knowledge and use of 
words in a variety of linguistic contexts. Reading materials for the 
early grades are designed to incl-ease vocabulary and to establ ish a 
comprehensive grasp of the meanings and uses of words. These reading 
materials may be enhanced by · a "grammar " emphasis with language 
abilities stimulated through the use of words in different "language 
games" . 
6.2.5 Implications for Second Language Learners 
Wittgenstein (cited by Zabeeh, 1971) points out: 
Whether a word of the language of our tribe 
is rightly translated into a word of the 
English language depends upon the role this 
word plays in the whole life of the tribe , the 
occasions on which it is used, the expressions 
of emotion by which it is generally accompanied, 
the idea which it generally awakens or which 
promote its saying, etc .. ,It follows that if 
a tribe is quite unlike the behaviour of a 
tribe of the translator, he could not understand 
their language. 
Findings from the present study would favour teaching a second 
language within simulated 
involving language although 
communication situations using tasks 
not di rectly 1 anguage-based. Everyday 
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words, for example, do, feel, see and \;here (to draw on words from the 
present study), need to be included in different "language games" and 
linguistic contexts. It has to be gauged whether and in what way the 
use of each word in the first language differs from that of the second 
1 anguage. As an ex amp 1 e , one 1 anguage may use the word pain for 
'emotional pain' whereas another language may have a specific word for 
, emot i on a 1 pa in' . 
The principles of learning a second language are equi valent for adults 
and children. However, it must be kept in mind that adults are more 
advanced cognitively and that linguistically they are aware of 
ambiguity , are more subject to sophisticated confusion, and so on. 
In all the language programmes mentioned above, syntax is necessarily 
included indirectly, as are semantics and pragmatics. Children who 
transfer their reading skills from one language to another (for 
example, transition from vernacular to English) may require detailed 
intervention at the level of "grammar " of words in the second 
1 anguage. 
The present findings offer a mode l which may be suit able for use by 
both linguists and psycholingui sts. However, within this framework, 
additional research is required from both a theoretical and a clinical 
perspective. In the final section, suggestions for future research 
are proposed in concluding this study. 
6.3 . Suggest ions for future research 
The model proposed to assess and descri be the development of word 
meaning in 6-12 year olds, offers a no vel framework for future 
research from both theoretical and clinical perspectives. 
suggestions for future research are presented below. 
A few 
This research requires verif ication on large samples of children and 
adults . Longitudinal data would be valuable so as to control the 
factor of individual variation across subjects. 
The relationship between the "grammar" of words and cognitive 
abilities may yield useful information. As was me ntioned earlier 
(section 5.3.6) performance on conservat ion tasks and the child's 
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understanding of words such as more, less, same (for example, 
Sinclair , 1975, 1976a, 1976b) may be further highlighted by 
investigating the child's understanding of these words in different 
linguistic contexts. The latter may reveal why some children perform 
better than their peers on certain conservation tasks and why 
particular conservation tasks are learned earlier than others. The 
child's early use of the word may occur in a linguistic context which 
has specific bearing on the particular conservation task in question. 
These findings may al so add to tho se which have attempted to rel ate 
metalinguistic awareness and cognitive abilities (for example, Hakes , 
Evans and Tunmer, 1980). 
The relationship between the "grammar" of words and intelligence level 
may also be enlightening. Vocabulary has been regarded as one of the 
best predictors of overall IQ score (for example, Matarazzo, 1972; 
Sternberg, 1984). It measures, indirectly , children's ability to 
acqui re i nformat i on in co ntext . Sternberg and Powell (1983) found 
that the quality of children's definitions of unknown words embedded 
in paragraphs , correlated highly with overall verbal intelligence, 
readi ng comprehens i on and vocabul al'y test scores. 
As was mentioned (chapter 3), researchers (for example, Gardner, 1984; 
Sternberg, ibid) have questioned the value of IQ tests as a measure of 
intelligence. Furthermore , verbal IQ scores pertain to a broad 
measure of language (for example, by me ans of associations) which 
differs from an investigation of language according to the "grammar" 
of words. 
As was discussed (chapter 3) , intell igence level was randomized in the 
present study. Language level could not be correlated with 
intelligence level for any particular child because no single measure 
of intelligence was available for all groups of subjects. However, 
the present study may offer a useful means of evaluating intelligence 
indirectly via the understand ing and use of word meaning. It was 
noted that the 12 year old gifted child, unlike most of his peers, 
displayed sophisticated confusion comparable to adults. 
I t would be of interest to assess preschool children's ability to take 
account of the "grammar" of words. This would enable us to determine 
whether there is a 1 ink between the acquisition of word meaning and 
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its development (beyond the acquisition period). It is suggested that 
we ask metal inguistic questions of preschool children from 6 years 
downwards. At a certain period of development,such questions will not 
be answered at all or will give rise to bizarre answers. However, the 
commonal ities in responses will reveal interesting errors of 
"grammar" . 
On the basis of the present findings and from the pilot study 
conducted with a small group of preschool ch i 1 dren, it is hypothes i zed 
that 4-5 year olds will be able to answer certain metalinguistic 
questions but that they will display "grammar" errors in their 
understanding of the words being assessed. Words such as do, feel 
and see, used frequently by preschool ch il dren, coul d be as sessed. 
The important quest ion is what ch i 1 dren understand by these words, 
that is, the way in which their understanding differs from that of 
older children and adults. 
It would be of interest to investigate the "grammar" of words in 
relation to other language components such as syntax. It would also 
be valuable to study in greater depth , processes such as that of 
general izing, . which underl ie our use of words, sounds and syntactical 
forms in different linguis t ic contexts . ~~e need to determine whether 
these processes differ for each component of language and, from 
another vantage point, we need to establish how t he child . is able to 
account selectively for simi larities and differences in his 
environment and in his use of langauge. Work with language-impaired 
children and with aphasic adults may enlighten us in this regard. 
In line ~/ith Carey's 'chromium study' (1983), it would be enlightening 
to teach a 'nonsense' word (for example, zing ) which has no referent 
in the external worl d 
non-ostensive words. 
in order to ma p out the acquisition 
One ch i 1 d coul d be presented 
process for 
with the 
non-ostensive word in di fferent 1 ingui stic contexts and "language 
games" in contrast to another child who receives no direct teaching of 
the word and a third child who receives an ostensive definition 
emphas is. It woul d be of interest to determi ne the vari ety and number 
of linguistic contexts in which the child requires specific teaching 
prior to his being able to extend the word spontaneously to novel 
contexts. 
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· An investigation of metaphoric 1 anguage from the viewpoint of the 
"grammar" of words may determine whether "grammar" provides a 1 ink 
between literal and figurative language. The difficulties we have in 
de 1 i mit i ng the senses of a word suggest that metaphori c uses may be 
additional senses of a wOI'd extending along a continuum from 1 itera1 
to figurative uses. In his figurative use of a word, the speaker has 
to disregard literal sense and recognize that the word must be applied 
as part of a unit with no internal grammar as ,Iell as acknowledging 
that he is breaking rules. If this is the case, then it remains to be 
determined whether metaphoric use as an additional sense of the word 
(its "grammar") is a property of the 1 anguage or i s rather a one'off 
occasion. As G. Matthews (1980, p.93) states: 
. .. "strong" has an incredibly complex array of 
meanings and applicat ions. Among the many things 
that may correctly be said to be strong are oxen, 
wei ght 1 i fters , colors, tea, argument s, customs, 
convictions, markets in certain commodities, 
irregular verbs, and ocean tides ... 
.. . Saying just which uses are literal and which are 
figurati ve is (also) difficult. Showing in any 
helpful way how the allegedly figurati ve uses are 
related to the allegedly literal ones may not even 
be possible. 
The 1itera1'figurative distinction, of which 
perhaps nobody can give an entirely clear and 
coherent account, is one we learn to acce pt at an 
early age. Once we do accept it, we lose much of 
our natural curiosity about the wonderfully 
intricate ways in which the meanings of a 
word are related to each other. 
Preschool children display errors of "grammar" in their spontaneous 
1 anguage product i on. A study of chi 1 dren ' s understandi ng of jokes 
from the point of view of the "grammar" of wo rds may be of interest in 
1 ight of previous studies (for example, Horgan 1981). As Wittgenstein 
(1953 , pt. Ill) remarks : 
The problems anslng through a misinterpretation 
of our forms of language have the character of 
depth. They are deep disq uie tudes; their roots 
are as deep in us as the forms of ou r language 
and their significance i s as great as th e 
importance of our language. Let us ask ourselves: 
why do we feel a grammat ical joke to be deep? .. 
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In her review of word meaning in the 'State of the Art' (1982), Carey 
criticizes the semantic feature theory and concludes that 
We are left with no theory of lexical 
development to replace the semantic 
feature hypothesis (p.374). 
It is felt that the present study offers a found at i on for bu il di ng a 
theory of word meaning. This study addressed certain of Carey's five 
potential research questions, namely: 
a) What use does the child make of a linguistic context in which he 
hears a new word, on learning a word's meaning? "Grammar" deals 
directly with the issue of lingui st ic context and its effect on other 
words in the language . The learning process was not explained because 
the present study dealt with word meaning beyond the acquisition 
period. 
b) Carey (ibid) mentions that it is difficult t.o find evidence for 
incorrect lexical entries but that these are important to take into 
account. The 1 imitations of lexical theories of word meaning were 
discussed. However, "grammar" errors were noted on metalinguistic 
tasks and it was emphasized that we need to penetrate beyond the 
child's correct spontaneolls productions in order to obtain a clearer 
picture of his language abilities. Errors were noted in this regard. 
c) Carey questions whether lexical acquisition is the same for all 
kinds of words. A lexical approach was not applied in thi s study but 
"1 anguage games" and "fami 1 y resemblances" seem to hold for all words 
although differences necessarily occur within "language games". The 
non-ostensive words studied were appl ied initially in more concrete 
senses, for example, . same pain was used to suggest that the pains were 
in the same place (versus of the same type); same book wa s applied to 
mean two books of the same colour and size rather than having 
equivalent content. 
d) Carey questions whether there are constraints on all human 
concepts which reduce the classes of meanings that the child may map 
onto a new word. Th is quest 'j on was not answered direct ly in the 
present study but it was touched upon in discussing flexibility within 
constraints in the development of word meaning. Further re sea rch i s 
required to determine whether generalizing ability such as the ability 
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to focus on similarities and to ignore differences se lectively in 
different environments pertains to both language and to other 
behaviours or whether it i s discrete in eacll case. 
e) Finally , 
development is 
Carey 
able 
quest ions whether a theory of semant i c 
to be constrained by systematic differences 
between chil d and adult concepts. From the present fi nd i ngs , it is 
postulated that there is continuity in development from child to adult 
language with metalinguistic awareness providing the link. However, 
systematic differences were found in strategies employed, differences 
which have some bearing on the subject's understanding and use of the 
word at any particular developmental stage . 
Additional research is required to confirm these findings. However, 
it is hoped that thi s study provides an incentive for further 
investigations into the area of word meaning from the perspective of 
"grammar". 
The words of Wittgenstein provide a suitable conclusion. He states 
that : 
Language is a labyrinth of paths. 
You approach from one side and know 
your way about; youapproach the 
same place from another side and no 
longer know your way about 
(Wittgenstein, ibid, pt.203). 
The same or al most the same pOints 
were always being approached afresh 
from different directions ... 
(Wittgenstein , ibid , preface p.vi) 
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APPENDIX A 
INSTRUCTIONS 
6 and 8 year olds 
You're going to help me with my work but it's got nothing to do with 
your school work. I want to find out some things about children' s 
language so, we're going to play some games in which I'm going to ask 
you to do a whole lot of things. I'm not trying to find out how 
clever you are. There's no right or wrong answer. You must tell me 
if you don't know the answer or if you don't understand what I want 
you to do. It doesn't help me if you guess. I ' m asking older. 
children these questions as well , so some of them will be hard. 
10 and 12 year olds 
I'm trying to find out some things about childr~n's language and I 
want you to help me. This has got nothing to do with school work and 
I'm not testing you. I'm going to ask you to do a whole lot of 
different things. There's no right or wrong answer. It doesn't help 
me if you guess. Some of these questions may seem easy but I'm asking 
younger children as well . 
Adults 
I ' m doing a study on children's language. I'm going to ask you a 
series of questions - exactl y those questions which I' ve asked 6-12 
year olds so some you will find very simple. Please try and be as 
concise as yo u can in your answers. 
APPENDIX B 
In Appendices B - H, Q(Question) refers to the number of the task and 
was selected because the majority of the tasks are in question form. 
The number of the task is based on the order of presentation of tasks 
over the four testing sessions. For the analysi s , the tasks are 
grouped differently according to type but the original number is 
reta i ned. 
List of pretest tasks in order of presentation 
Ql 
Qla 
Qlb 
Q2 
Q3 
Q4 
Q5 
Q6 
Q7 
Q8 
Q9 
QIO 
QIl 
Q12 
What i s a word? 
Probe: What are words for? 
What is a sentence? 
What is a language? 
What is a name? 
Probe: What are names for? 
Can a word be clever? 
Probe: Give me an example of a clever word 
or Give me a clever word you know (6 years) 
I s dog a word? 
Can you give me I word you know? (6 years only) 
Is a book made of paper? 
Is pain a word? 
Is dog a name? 
Is John a name? 
Is the word book made of paper? 
Can a word be furry? 
Has the name John got 2 legs? 
or: For the 6 year olds, chi ld's own name fills the 
space. 
In Appendices C, D and E which follow, all drawings are by Charlene 
Mendelson. The original drawings were all in colour. 
APPENDIX C 
Tasks for the words same, similar and different 
Spontaneous Sentences 
Q13 I want you to make up 3 sentences with the word same . 
Now make up 3 sentences with the word simil ar 
Now make up 3 sentences with the word different 
or: I want you to make up a little story with same etc. 
(6 years) 
Definition tasks 
Q14 When I say things are the same, what do I mean? 
Q18 If I say that 2 things are exactly the same, what do I mean? 
Q19 What does similar mean? 
Q24 What does 
or: for 
the word different mean? 
6 year 01 ds, the word word is replaced by one/more 
l'iords according to the child's explanation of word in 
the pre-test. 
Fuzzy boundary tasks 
Q20 Does same mean the same thing as similar? Hhy/ Why not? 
Q22 Does same mean the same thing as different? Why/Why not? 
Q36 A series of. apples varying in degrees of colour, size and 
bruising: Present 2 apples at a time (numbers 1+2). Are 
these 2 apples the same or are they si milar or different? 
Why? Present 1+3. And these 2? (1+4) and these 2? And so 
on . 
Tasks in a diversity of linguistic contexts 
Tasks "'hich occur in a broader situational context are marked with a 
cross +. 
Same dress/shirt 
Q21 When I say that I have the same dress/ shirt as you, what do I 
mean? 
Probe: Give example or (for 6 years), what will the 
dress/ dresses look l ike? 
Q32a-e (5 pictures presented) 
Present pictures (a) to (e) one at a time: 
Can I say about thi s pi cture "Jane " has the same dress as 
Mary?" 
Probe:" Does it matter that the sizes/ colours/ sleeves are 
different? 
For (e) Probe: Could there be 2 dresses? 

different dress/shirt 
Q16 When I say that I have a different dress/s hirt from you, what 
do I mean? 
Probe: Give an example or (for 6 years) "What will the 
dress/dresses look like? 
same apple 
Q17 If I say that we're eating the same apple, what do I mean? 
Q35 Present pi ctures of 2 apple trees with 6 small apples: Here 
are 2 appl e trees. Thi s tree ha s some appl es on it (2) and 
there are some apples 1 yi ng on the ground (4). I want you to 
put the same apples on this tree as are on this tree. 
Probe: When I said that, could I have taken 2 apples from 
the tree because these are the very apples or couldn't I have 
done that? Why/Why not? 
If subject takes app les from the tree, probe the reverse 
same chair 
Q31 
same 
4 pictures of cha irs and apples of different colour or size 
(apples) and of di fferent type (ch airs) are presented. If 
John says to Mary: 
a) tlWe're sitting on 
that? 
b) IIWe're sitting on 
that? 
d) IIWe' re eating the 
e) "We're eating the 
seat 
the same chair", which pi cture shows 
the same cha irs", which picture shows 
same apples", which picture shows that? 
same apple", which picture shows that? 
Q26+ Here's a picture of a bioscope with empty seats. 
Here 's John and here's Mary. John and Mary are going to 
bioscope. They can sit anywhere they like. 
John says: "I want to sit in t he front row" 
Mary says: "Yes, and I want to sit in the same seat.as you" . 
If John sits here (shows on picture), where will Mary sit? 
RemellIber, she tell s John: "I want to sit in the same 
seat as you". 
Probe: Why did you put them both there?/Why did you put them 
there? 
(For 8, 10, 12 years and Adults): When she said "r want to 
sit in the same seat as you", could she have meant that she 
wants to sit in the seat next to him (shows on picture) 
because both the seats look the same? · 
Or wouldn't she have meant that? Why not? 
. '';' 
same ball 
Q33 (Present the 2 pictures) 
This is Jane and this is Mary. Which picture shows: 
Jane has the same ball as Mary or are none of them OK? 
Why/ Why not? 
For the 10 and 12 year olds only: 
Probe: 
same book 
But you said there was 1 seat (Q26), how come there 
are 2 balls (or vice versa). Do there -have to be 2 
balls when I say that? 
. .' , 
~ . . . 
'. : .. ' 
. -' I · .\ 
'- , '.' -.' I I 
~i 
- . 
ftf ~);, 
- .- . 
John and Mary are walking to school . Each of them is 
carrying a book. John's book is big and Mary ' s book 
is small er. 
John says : "We have the same books" 
Mary says: "Do we? Mine is so small and yours is so big" 
Why did John say that their books are t he same? 
'. 
Q29+ John and mary are walking to school. Each of them is carrying 
a big book. 
John says: "Your book is the same as mine" 
Mary says: "Oh no. it's not!" 
Why does Mary say that thei r books are not .the same? 
(Pi cture as for Q28 but John ' and Mary are carryi ng books of 
the same size and overt appearance). 
same leaf + 
Q27a There was a boy named Johnny who had a big tree outside hi s 
bedroom window. The tree had a few leaves on it . He used to 
love to watch the birds on the tree. Then it started to get 
co 1 d and the 1 eaves became a redd ish colour and then brown . 
The bi rd' s d i dn' t corne anymore. They had gone away for the 
wi nter. One day the boy woke up and found only two 1 eaves 
left on his tree. He ran outside and saw some leaves lying on 
the ground. One of them had a hole in it. 
Are these 1 eaves on the ground the same as the ones the boy 
loved to look at on his tree, or are they similar or 
different? Why/ Why not? 
Depending on the subject's answer: if answered "same" 
Probe: But , they don 't look the same, these are green and 
these are brown, and this one's got a hole in it (shows on 
picture) or if answered "not the same" 
Probe: But , where did these leaves corne from? (From this tree 
or another tree?) 


same tadpole/frog 
Q27b+ Mary goes dovm to the pond wi th her mother and she sees some 
tadpoles in the pond. When she goes back a month later , she 
sees a frog on the edge of the pond . Caul d one of these 
tadpoles be the same as this frog or not? Why/ Hhy not? If 
answered "same" 
Probe: 
Probe: 
But , they don't look the same, these are brown and 
long and these are green (shows on picture). If 
an3wered "not the same" 
But, surely they must be the same if the tadpole 
grows into a f rog? · 
(6 years) - Pretest: "What is a tadpole? " 
------"':' .---
same ship+ 
Q30 There was a ship that went out to sea and it crashed against 
the rocks and it sank . The people hauled (took) it out and 
started to rebuild (remake) it piece by piece (bit by bit). 
Some of the pieces were badly damaged so they used some of the 
old pieces and they used some new pieces (6 and 8 years -
bracketed portions). Once they had rebuilt it, was this Hie 
same ship as the one that went out to sea in the first place, 
or was it similar or different? Why? 
If chi ld answers "s ame" 
Probe: Even if they used some new pieces? 
And if it looked different afterwards? 
If child answers "not the same" 
Probe: Even if it's the very one that went out to sea? 
And if it looked the same afterwards? 
This task is based on G. Matthews (1984). ·However, the probes 
are oriented linguistically not philosophically. 
same pain 
015 If I say that I have the same pain as you, what do I mean? 
Probe: Gi ve an examp 1 e 2..r:: (for 6 years) What wi 11 the 
pain/pains be like? 
Do they have to be in the same pl ace (or not) to be 
the same? 
Do they have to be caused by the same thing? 
or (6 years) Do they have to be because of the same 
thing? 
045 Can you have the same pain as me? When would that happen? 
Probe: Do they have to be in the same place to be the same? 
If I've got a pain up here in my arm (shows) and 
you've got a pain down here in your arm (shows), will 
those be the same paints) or not? Why/Why not? 
047 When you fall, do you always have the same pain , or is it 
sometimes different? What makes it different? 
Q48 In this picture, a boy is hit by a man and in this picture, a 
boy has toothache . Is the pain of this boy the same as the 
pain of this boy or is it similar or different? Why? 
'l>£N1'",S-r 
Q49 In this pi cture , a boy has toothache and in this picture, a 
girl has toothache. Is the pain of the girl the same as the 
pain of the boy, or i s it similar or different? Why? If say 
"same ll 
Probe: And, if his is in a big tooth and hers is in a little 
tooth, is it still the same? 
1:>£N1'",S-r 
Q60+ John is playing with some bricks and a brick falls on his 
foot. 
John says: "Ouch! my foot! my 'foot!" 
Janet says: "Ouch, ouch! I've got the same pa in" 
John says: "You mean a brick's fallen on your foot too? " 
Janet says" "No, no! I've got your pain". 
Does that story sound OK or not? Why/ Why not? 
When Janet says "I've got the same pain" is that OK? What 
does she mean? And when she ' says "I've .got your pain"? Must a 
brick have fallen on her foot too, for her to say that? 
-
, 
.. 
076 -Can you have my pain? Why not? 
Similar pain 
025 If I say that I have a similar pain 
Probe: 
Same anger 
Give example or (for 
pain/ pains be like? 
041 Can you have my anger? 
Same dream 
to you , what do I mean? 
6 years), what wi" the 
0159 Can your dreams be the same as my dreams? Why/ Why not? 
APPENDIX D 
Tasks for the words pretend , know, believe and think. 
Spontaneous Sentences 
Q88 I want you to make up 3 sentences with the word pretend 
Q89 Now make up 3 'sentences with the word know 
Q91 Now make up 3 sentences with the word believe 
Q92 Make up 3 sentences with the word think 
Definition tasks 
Q164 \~hat does it mean to pretend? 
Q132 What does it mean to believe? 
Q149 What is a thought? 
Fuzz,):' boundar,):' tasks 
Q140 Is to lie about something the same as to pretend about 
something or is it similar or different? 
Q136 Is to know something the same as to think something? 
Q153 Is to believe something the same as to think something or are 
they similar or different? 
Tasks in a diversit,):' of 1 in.guist"ic contexts 
Tasks which occur in a broader situational context are marked 
with a cross+. 
Q175 I want you to tell (or show) me how you would pretend to walk. 
If subject says: "Stand on one spot and move your feet up and 
down" 
Probe: But part of walking is getting from one place to 
another, so are you pretending to wal k, or are you 
pretending to do something else? 
If subject says eg o "You walk funnily ... " 
Probe: But, are you pretend i n9 to walk or are you rea 11 y 
walking? Then how would you pretend to walk? 
0176 How would you pretend to sing? 
0183 
0179 
0177 
If subject says: ' "You open your mouth and make no sound", 
Probe: But , when you sing you have to make a sound, so would 
you be pretend i ng to sing then or to do someth i ng 
else? And how would we know if you were pretending 
to sing or pretending to talk? 
If subject 
Probe: 
says eg: "You sing but not the same way as usual" 
But', then are you pretending to sing or are you 
really singing? 
How would you pretend to write? 
Probes as for 0175 and 0176 modified for pretend to write 
How would you pretend to laugh? 
Probes as for 0175 and 0176 modified for pretend to 1 augh 
How would you pretend to think? 
Probes as for 0175 and 0176 modified for pretend to think 
0180 How waul d you pretend to dream? . 
Probes as for 0175 and 0176 modified for pretend to dream 
0181 How would you pretend to be angry? . 
Probes as for Q175 and Q176 modifi ed for pretend to be angry 
Q178 How would you pretend to be in pain? 
Probes as for 0175 and 0176 modified for pretend to be in pain 
080a , b Present picture 1: 
• 
a) Johnny falls down and he's sitting on the ground 1 ike 
this. Bobby (hi's friend) comes up to him. Is Johnny in pain 
here or not? How do you know? What does Bobby do? 
b) Now look what happens (present picture 2) . 
Is Johnny in pain here or not? How do you know? 
What does Bobby do? 
J ) 
Q100 The child is presented with the following picture and asked: 
Could he be in pain/ not? How do you know? 
Probe: (8, la , 12 years) - Could he be pretending he's not 
in pain? Why wou ld he do that? 
Q182 How would you pretend to be yourself? 
Probe: Can yo u pretend to be yourse l f? 
Q166 If John pretends he's sick, is he really sick/ not? 
Q167 I f John knows he' s sick, is he really sick/not? 
Q168 If John thinks he's sick , is he really sick/not? 
Q169 If John believes he's sick, is he really sick/not? 
Pretend to fly 
Q201 John is standing on the edge of a high mountain and he thinks 
he can fly . Will he try and fly (jump) over the mountain or 
not? Why/ Why not? 
Probe for Q201-Q204: Will he kill himself or not? 
Q202 John knows he can fl y. Wi 11 he try and fl y (jump) over the 
mountain then? Why/Why not? 
Q203 If John pretends he can fly, will he try and fl y (jump) over 
the mountain? Why/Why not? 
Q204 If John bel ieves he can fly , will he try and fly (jump) over 
the mountain? Why/ Why not? 
Q205 Out of all of these (Q201-Q204) ' which one is he more sure to 
jump - if he thinks - knows - pretends - or bel ieves he can 
fly? And then, which one comes next? (eg. think , pretend or 
believe) etc. 
Do - pretend (on self) 
Q158 What do you do when you pretend? 
Probe: Do you usually smile afterwards/ not? 
Do you usually tell the other pe r son you were just 
pretending/ not? 
Tell-pretend (on someo ne else ) 
Q162 How can you tell when someone else is pretending? 
Can you always tell? 
Q72 How can you tell when someone else is in pain? 
Probe: How do yo u know they're not just pretending? 
Are there times whell you're not sure? 
APPENDI X E 
Tasks for the words pain, ache and sore. Tasks for other words are 
included where they add to the pain tasks. 
Spontaneous Sentences 
Q37 I want you to make up 3 sentences (6 years: 
with the word pain 
Now make up 3 sentences with the word ache 
Now make up 3 sentences with the word sore 
Q38 Make up 3 sentences with the word angry 
Now make up 3 sentences with the word cross 
Q87 Make up 3 sentences with the word thought 
Q90 Make up 3 sentences with the word dream 
Definition Tasks 
Q39 What is a pain? 
Q40 What is an ache? 
Q43 What is a sore? 
Fuzzy boundary tasks 
a 1 ittl e story) 
Q42 Are a pain and an ache the same or are they similar or 
different? 
Q44 Is a sore the same as a pain? 
Q52 Are sore and pain the same or similar or different? 
Q53 Can a pain become an ache? Can you start with a pain and then 
it becomes an ache? 
Where child mentions length of time as a factor 
Probe: When it goes on for longer, does it change its name? 
Q63 Can an ache become a pain? 
Give an example/when would that happen? 
Tasks in a diversity of linguistic contexts 
Tasks which occur in a broader situat ional context are marked with a 
cross + 
Same pain: 
Q15 , Q45, Q48, Q49 , Q60, Q76 as for same tasks, Appendix C 
Pretend to be in pain: 
Q178, Q80 a & b, Q100, as for pretend tasks, Appendix D 
Tell pain: 
Q72 as for pretend tasks, Appendix D 
Do pain: 
Q51 What do you do when you have a pain? 
Where pain / ·ache: 
Q75 Where do you feel an ache? 
Q54 Where can you have a pain? 
Give pain 
Q77 · (Picture presented):-
John hits Bobby, and then Bobby runs to his mother and says: 
"John gave me a pain and now he wants it back again". 
"What will his mother say?" 
Q65 What does it mean if we say: 'He gives me a pain?' 
How do you make the pain go away? Can you gi ve it back to 
him? 
Q85 Bobby is playing outside with his ball. He .falls over a stone 
and starts to cry. He runs to hi s mother and says: "The 
stone gave me a pain!" What will his mother say? 
Tasks with "grammar" errors 
0125 If I say: "I love a pain" 
Probes: Is that OK/ not? Can you make it better/ improve 
upon it ? 
0127 If I say: "Look! I have a pain on my arm" 
Probes: Is that OK/ not? Can you make it better/ improve 
upon it? 
0129 If I say: "I've got a pain i 11 my head but I can't feel itll 
Probes: Is that OK/not? Can you make it better/ improve 
upon it? 
061 Is a pain a thing inside you? Can you point to it? 
APPENDIX F 
Tasks for the words do, feel, see and where 
Do 
Q51 
Q158 
What do you 
What do you 
do when you have a pain? 
do when you pretend? 
Probe: Do you usually smile afterwards/not? 
Do you usually tell the other person 
pretending/not? 
Q161 What do you do when you think? 
you were just 
Probe: Do you think about everything you're going to do 
before you do it? 
What things would you think about before you do them? 
Q31 How do you know when someone else is thinking? 
Q46 What do you do when you feel angry? 
Feel 
Q195 Can you feel your dreams? 
Q1l8 Does thi s sentence sound OK/not? ' I feel an anger' 
See 
Q134 Can you see your thoughts? 
Q156 Can you see your dreams? 
Where 
Q62 Where do you feel anger? Always? 
Q75 Where can you feel an ache? 
Q54 Where can you have a pa in? 
Q160 Where do you think? 
Q147 Where do you dream? Where in your body does it happen ? 
Always? 
APPENDIX G 
Set of tasks randomly selected for re-testing 
(These are listed according to their order of presentation) 
Same 
Q3 Can a word be ,clever? 
Q14 When I say things are the same, what do I mean? 
Q17 If I say that we're eating the same apple, what do I mean? 
Q19 What does similar mean? 
Q30 Ship story. 
Extra Tasks Added: 
a. When do people use the word pain? 
b. When do people use the word ache? 
Pain I Anger 
Q42 Are 'a pain' and 'an ache' the same or are they similar or 
different? 
Q45 Can you have the same pain as me? When would the happen? 
Q56 Can a car be angry? And a dog? And an ant? 
Q72 
Thought 
QI37 
0139 
0143 
0150 
How can you tell when someone else is in pain? 
I Dream I Daydream 
Can you have more than I thought at a time or only one? 
If you're thinking, can that become a dream? 
Is daydreaming the same as thinking? 
What is a dream?-
Believe I Think I Pretend I Know 
0153 Is to believe something the same as to think something or are 
they similar or different? 
0164 What does it mean to pretend? 
0175 I want you to tell (or show) me how you would pretend to walk 
0181 How would you pretend to be angry? 
Extra Tasks Added: 
c. When do people use the word angry? 
d. When do people use the word cross? 
Believe / Think /. Pretend / Know (contd.) 
Q202 John is standing on the edge of a high mountain and he knows 
he can fly. Will he try/and jump over the mountain or not? 
Q204 John is standing on the edge of a high mountain and he 
believes he can fly. Will he try/and jump over the mountain 
or not? 
APPENDIX H 
Examples of incompatible answers for the two test sessions 
RETEST 1 RETEST 2 
Q45 Can you have the same pain as me? 
12 year old 
"urn - (sigh) - um ... (laughs) 
oy! sort of, j a - when I've 
got a headache in the same 
place as you've got a 
headache (have to be in the 
same place?) yes (same cause?) 
no - oy! uh - no! (How do you 
know we've got the same pain?) 
Well, say I say to you: 
'I've got a headache over 
here' then you'll say ' ja, 
I've also got one over here' 
(so, we have to tell each 
other?) Yes". 
"um - could have the same kind 
-- --
of pain but couldn't have the 
same ~ (you say: I've got 
the same pain?) 
sure - most people do" 
Q204 If John bel ieves he can fly, will he try and jump over the 
mountain? 
12 year old 
"jail 
Pr.obe: "and wi 11 he get 
kill ed?" 
II ja II 
"he shouldn't" 
Probe: "would he get killed?" 
Q202 If John knows he can fly, wi 11 he try and jump over the 
mountain? 
6 year old 
"yes!! 
Probe: "and wi 11 he get 
killed?" 
Probe: "even if he knovls?" 
"yes - because if he knows he 
can fl y, then he'll fl y off 
the mountain " (And will he get 
killed?) "he won't - 'cos he 
knows he can fly" 
Q42 Are "a pain " and 'an ac;)1e' the same or similar or different? 
8 year old 
IIsimilar" "different" 
Five answers revealed a change in level of explanation over the 
two sessions. Examples are: 
Q14 If I say that two things are the same, what do I mean? 
Gifted 12 year old 
"well, they s imilar and they 
may - appear to be the same 
and they may - act the same 
and ... someth i ng 1 ike that. .. 
they could be (the same), 
like identical twins; like 
leaves on trees - if they 
come from the same tree 
then they could be - some 
of the leaves might be 
exactly the same size and 
everything" 
Q175 How do you pretend to walk? 
6 year old 
.. urn . .. dunno 11 
"uh - that they are - the same 
in appearance - they look - uh, 
you know, you wouldn't be able 
to tel l them apart" 
"you can't - 'cos you can only 
wal k" 
Different compatible criteria were offered to explain a 
particular question, for example: 
Q181 How woul d you pretend to be angry? 
8 year old 
"you could start screaming, 
you could hit - the wall 
or you could stamp your 
feet. . . 
"urn - well you start shouting 
and you look at the person 
wi th hard eyes and the person 
would know : now she's not 
really doing it in the same way 
as when she's really angry with 
me - you can't actually do it 
exact 1 y the same ' cos always a 
laugh would come out" 
